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PRINCIPLES
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
AN
ENQUIRY
CONCERNING
THE
MORAL WORLD.

THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

AN

ENQUIRY

Into the WISE and GOOD

GOVERNMENT

OF THE

MORAL WORLD.

IN WHICH

The Continuance of GOOD ADMINISTRATION, and of DUE CARE about VIRTUE, for ever, is inferred from preſent Order in all Things, in that Part chiefly where VIRTUE is concerned.

By GEORGE TURNBULL, *LL.D.*

And if NATURAL PHILOSOPHY, *in all its Parts, by purſuing this Method, ſhall at length be perfected, the Bounds of* MORAL PHILOSOPHY *will alſo be enlarged.*
NEWTON'S Opt. B. III.

Account for Moral, as for Nat'ral Things.
Eſſay on Man, Ep. I.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN NOON, at the *White Hart*, near *Mercers Chapel*, in *Cheapſide*. MDCCXL.

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TO T

RIGHT HONO

PHILIP,

Earl of *STANHOPE*, &c.

This TREATISE is moſt humbly Dedicated

By His LORDSHIP's

Moſt devoted

Humble Servant,

GEORGE TURNBULL.

THE

EPISTLE DEDICATORY.

MY LORD,

I AM very ſure, that to one of Your truly liberal and virtuous caſt of mind, the ſcope of this Treatiſe will be very agreeable: Which, to give the ſhorteſt view of it I can, is, by endeavouring to account for MORAL, as the great *Newton* has taught us to explain NATURAL Appearances, (that is, by reducing them to good general laws) to ſhew, that from what we ſee of perfectly wiſe and good adminiſtration at preſent with regard to man, as well as all other things conſtituting the ſame ſyſtem, there is ſufficient reaſon to conclude, that the ſame admirable order ſhall prevail for ever, and conſequently that due care will be taken of virtue, in all its different ſtages, to all eternity.

No

No man, by having the higheſt opinion of virtue, and of the happineſs accruing from rational exerciſes, and virtuous conſciouſneſs, was ever the leſs inclined to believe a future exiſtence. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as they who are entirely immerſed in groſs voluptuouſneſs, and quite ſtrangers to the pure joys virtue alone can give, are the leaſt willing to think of a ſucceeding life; ſo they who having a ſtrong ſenſe of the ſupreme excellence of virtue, highly prefer to what is vulgarly called *pleaſure*, the ſolid, unchanging bliſs, with which they feel a well-regulated mind and conformable conduct, ſo unſpeakably to exhilirate the ſoul even in ſevere outward diſtreſs, are the readieſt to embrace and indulge that comfortable opinion and hope, which renders the cauſe of virtue completely triumphant. The ineffable ſatisfaction redounding from the exerciſes of virtuous affections, and the conſcience of merit, is a truly divine reward: it comes from our Maker: it is of his appointment: and he who hath ſo conſtituted things, muſt love virtue; and that which he delights in, he will certainly promote to perfect happineſs by the propereſt ſteps and methods.

We are well authoriſed to ſay, that a *virtuous man is the Image of God*; that *he partakes of the divine nature*. And the ſubſtantial, unfading

fading happineſs, which virtue creates, and that augments as it advances and improves, is to us a faint ſhadow of the divine all-perfect felicity reſulting from no other ſource, but his abſolute moral perfection, being of a kind with it: and it is a ſure prognoſtick of that fulneſs of bliſs, which muſt ariſe from virtue, when being by due culture brought to great perfection, it ſhall be placed in circumſtances for exerting all its power and excellence ſuited to ſuch an improved ſtate of it.

Now, MY LORD, being convinced of the acceptableneſs of this Deſign to Your Lordſhip, when I offer the work to You, with a heart full of eſteem, love and gratitude, as the beſt pledge of my ſincere attachment I can preſent You with, ſuffer me but to ſay one truth: which is, that I never had the pleaſure of converſing with Your Lordſhip, without not only being inſtructed, but, which is better, without feeling an acceſſion of freſh vigor to that love of truth, liberty, mankind, virtue and religion; Your opinion of my ſincere regard to which, procured and preſerves me that place in Your friendſhip, which all who know You, proclaim merit: a friendſhip which is one of the greateſt joys, as well as honours of my life, and to which I am deeply indebted on many

many accounts, which I am not at liberty to declare.

THO' no good man can deſpiſe merited praiſe, yet You ſhun it even from thoſe whom You know to be incapable of flattering, through a jealouſy and watchfulneſs almoſt peculiar to Yourſelf; leſt Your mind, whoſe ſupreme delight is in doing good, ſhould ever ſtand in need, in the ſmalleſt degree, of any other motive to act the beſt, the worthieſt, the moſt generous part, beſides a thorough-feeling of the excellence of ſo doing.

I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt obedient

Humble Servant,

DECEMBER,
19. 1739.

GEORGE TURNBULL.

PREFACE.

THO' *not a few who are really lovers of, and great proficients in* Natural Philoſophy, *be not aſhamed of the deepeſt ignorance of the parts and proportions of the human mind, and their mutual relation, connexion and dependency; but reject all ſuch enquiries with an opprobrious ſneer as* metaphyſick, *meaning by that term of contempt, ſomething quite remote from true philoſophy, and all uſeful or polite learning, to be abandoned by men of genius and taſte to* Pedants *and* Sophiſts.——*Yet it is certain, that the order and ſymmetry of this inward part is in itſelf no leſs real and exact than that of the body. And that this moral anatomy is not only a part, but the moſt uſeful part of* Natural Philoſophy, *rightly underſtood, is too evident to need any proof to thoſe who will but take the trouble to conſider what* Natural Philoſophy, *in its full extent, muſt mean.*

FOR, in the firſt place, it is an enquiry into a real part of nature, which muſt be carried on in the ſame way with our reſearches into our own bodily contexture, or into any other, whether vegetable or animal fabrick. Secondly, 'Tis only by an acurate inſpection of this whole, and its conſtituent parts, that we can come at the knowledge of the means and cauſes, by which our inward conſtitution may be rendered or preſerved ſound and entire; or contrariwiſe, maimed, diſtorted, impaired and injured. And yet, in the third place, That it is upon our inward ſtate or temper, our well-being

well-being and happineſs, or our uneaſineſs and miſery chiefly depend, muſt be immediately acknowledged by all who can think; or are in the leaſt acquainted with themſelves. To deny it is indeed to aſſert, that our perceiving or conſcious part is not principal in us. Moral Philoſophy, *or an enquiry into the frame and connexion of thoſe various powers, appetites and affections, which, by their coaleſcence and joint-operation, conſtitute the ſoul, and its temper, or diſpoſition, may indeed degenerate into a very idle, ſophiſtical, quibling, contentious logomachy: It hath too often had that miſerable fate, thro' the fault of thoſe to whom unhappily people of a more liberal and polite, as well as more uſeful and ſolid turn, have principally left it to handle theſe ſubjects. But hath not* Phiſiology *likewiſe ſuffered no leſs cruelly in the ſame manner? And what other remedy is there in either caſe, but to treat them both as they ought to be:* i. e. *as queſtions of fact or natural hiſtory, in which hypotheſes aſſumed at random, and by caprice, or not ſufficiently confirmed by experience, are never to be built upon; and in which no words ought to be admitted, till they have had a clear and determinate meaning affixed to them; and withal, in that free, elegant and pleaſing way, which we may know from ſome few examples among the moderns, and from very many among the ancients, not to be incompatible with the profoundeſt ſubjects in* Philoſophy: *inſtead of handling them in that inſipid, tedious ungainful manner, which having of late more generally prevailed in the ſchools, far from doing ſervice to* Philoſophy, *hath indeed brought it into contempt, and as it were quite baniſhed it from amongſt the polite and faſhionable part of the world, whoſe ſtudies are by that means become very trifling, ſuperficial and unmanly*—Mere virtuoſoſhip.

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THE great Maſter, to whoſe truly marvellous (I had almoſt ſaid more than human) ſagacity and acuracy, we are indebted for all the greater improvements that have been made in Natural Philoſophy, *after pointing out in the cleareſt manner, the only way by which we can acquire real knowledge of any part of nature, corporeal or moral, plainly declares, that he looked upon the enlargement* Moral Philoſophy *muſt needs receive, ſo ſoon as* Natural Philoſophy, *in its full extent, being purſued in that only proper method of advancing it, ſhould be brought to any conſiderable degree of perfection, to be the principal advantage mankind and human ſociety would then reap from ſuch ſcience.*

IT was by this important, comprehenſive hint, I was led long ago to apply myſelf to the ſtudy of the human mind in the ſame way as to that of the human body, or any other part of Natural Philoſophy *: that is, to try whether due enquiry into moral nature would not ſoon enable us to account for* moral, *as the beſt of* Philoſophers *teaches us to explain* natural *phenomena.*

NOW, no ſooner had I conceived this idea of moral reſearches, than I began to look carefully into the better ancients, (into Plato's *works in particular) to know their opinion of human nature, and of the order of the world. And by this reſearch I quickly found, that they had a very firm perſuaſion of an infinitely wiſe and good adminiſtration, actually prevailing at preſent throughout the whole of nature, and therefore very likely to prevail for ever, founded, partly, upon what they were able to comprehend in general of order in the government of the ſenſible world ; but chiefly (for they had made no very great advances in what is now commonly called* Natural Philoſophy*) upon the great in-*

ſight

ſight they had acquired into the moral conſtitution of man, by applying themſelves to moral enquiries. They were able to diſcern clearly from thence, that man is very well fitted and qualified for attaining to a very high degree of moral perfection even here; and being ſatisfied, that ſuch care is taken of virtue, and ſuch proviſion made for her in this life, as is moſt proper and beſt ſuited to her firſt ſtate of formation and diſcipline, they could not entertain any doubts of the kind concern of Heaven about her to be carried on, as may beſt ſerve the purpoſe of general good, by proper ſteps, for ever.

AND accordingly what I now publiſh, is an attempt (in conſequence of ſuch obſervations as I have been able to make, or have been led to by others) to vindicate human nature, and the ways of GOD to man, *by reducing the more remarkable appearances in the human ſyſtem to excellent general laws:* i. e. *to powers and laws of powers, admirably adapted to produce a very noble ſpecies of being in the riſing ſcale of life and perfection.*

AND what I think I have proved, by thus endeavouring to account for moral as for natural things, *amounts briefly to this, "That order is kept in man, as well as in the other parts of nature within our obſervation, conſtituting the ſame ſyſtem: And that from what we clearly ſee of perfectly wiſe and good government in all preſent things, in that part chiefly where virtue is concerned, there is ſufficient reaſon to infer the univerſal, never-ceaſing ſuperintendency of a divine providence, and a future ſtate of complete happineſs to the virtuous; or the continuance of perfectly wiſe and good order in all things,*

things, and, which is chief, of due concern about virtue, in all its different ſtages, for ever and ever."

IN order to conclude a providence, (in the belief of which the chief happineſs of thinking perſons is abſolutely bound up) it is plain, we muſt firſt have acurately conſidered the condition of virtue and vice with reſpect to this life merely, ſo as to be able to determine, when, and how far, or in what degrees, and how circumſtantiated the one or the other is our preſent greater good or ill. Now it is only by ſtrictly examining the ſtructure and fabrick of the mind, the frame and connexion of all its powers and affections, and the manner of their operation, that we can aſcertain the end and purpoſe of our being; find out how our moral part either improves or ſuffers; know what its force is when naturally preſerved and maintained in its ſound ſtate, and what happens to it in proportion as it is neglected or proſtituted, abuſed or corrupted. Thus, alone, can we with any degree of certainty and aſſurance ſay, what is the natural force and tendency of virtue, on the one hand, or the natural influence and reſult of vice, on the other; or in what manner either of theſe may work toward our happineſs or miſery.

BUT if we ſet about ſuch an enquiry in the fair impartial way of experiment, and of reaſoning from experiment alone, we ſhall plainly perceive, that as many as the hardſhips and difficulties are, which virtue has to encounter, ſtruggle with, and ſurmount in this ſtate; far however, from being quite abandon'd, ſhe is not left without great ſupport and comfort: Nay, that in reality, ſhe is only expoſed ſo far as various trial neceſſary to her culture and improvement requires; and has a real happineſs belonging to her exerciſes, ſufficient to render

render her the beſt and wiſeſt choice even at preſent, in the opinion of all who make a fair and complete eſtimate of human life: juſt ſo much as leaves room for further hopes in her behalf, by clearly ſhewing providence to be already moſt ſeriouſly concerned about her, and thoroughly intereſted on her ſide in her firſt probationary ſtate. And therefore the argument for a future life in this treatiſe, runs in this channel, "There is ſuch proviſion made for virtue, there is ſuch happineſs, ſuch advantages belonging to her, even here in her firſt ſtate, or at her firſt ſetting out in life, as render it highly probable, nay, abſolutely certain, that a perfectly kind providential care of her intereſts begun here, is to be extended to a ſucceeding life, and perfected hereafter." There is ſuch a foundation laid, nay, ſuch an advancement made here, as plainly points out the nature and ſcope of that moral building intended to be carried on to its completion in another ſtate. For that work or ſcheme muſt be advanced gradually, becauſe virtue muſt be gradually formed to ripeneſs and vigour, by means of proper exerciſes and trials: And virtue cannot poſſibly in the nature of things have the happineſs reſulting from its exerciſes, but in proportion as it advances and improves. Education muſt precede perfection in the moral, as ſpring muſt go before harveſt in the natural world. And moral perfection muſt be arrived to full maturity by proper cultivation, before the excellent fruits it can then, and then only produce, can be reaped and enjoyed. Virtue muſt be fit to be placed in the circumſtances which alone can render it fully happy, by affording it proper means and occaſions of exerting its complete force and excellence, before it can be placed in ſuch circumſtances; or being ſo placed, could reap to

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the full, all the advantages of such a situation: but being well provided for, and duly attended to and supported in its first state of education and discipline, what reasonable ground of doubt or fear can there be with regard to its future condition, or its succeeding circumstances in another state, after it is brought by due culture, step by step, to considerable strength, beauty and perfection, as virtue must: Gradual improvement to perfection by proper diligence to cultivate it, being involved in the very notion of virtue and merit.

I think I need say no more of the design in a Preface. *The variety of materials contained in this* Essay, *and the order in which it proceeds, may be soon seen by casting one's eye on the* Contents, *as they are digested into a regular summary of the whole. And therefore all that remains to be said here is, in the first place, that the margine is filled with quotations from ancient authors, not to make a shew of reading; but because, in reality, the best observations in this enquiry are taken from some ancient moralist; and it seem'd to me so much the more necessary to do justice to them on this occasion by such references, that it hath been so lately asserted, the wisest ancients had not just notions of God, or of a future state; or, at least, were not able to produce any conclusive arguments on these important subjects. But of this opinion I have said enough in my* Conclusion. *And therefore I shall just say a word of the modern authors from whom I have received the greatest assistances in this work. I think all of them from whom I have borrowed any thing are referred to in the notes. But the pleasure and advantage I have reaped from them, render it but justice in me to make more particular mention of them in this place.*

SOME

SOME few very good and uſeful remarks are taken from Dr. John Clark's excellent Sermons at Boyle's lecture.

I have quoted ſome very beautiful paſſages relating to the neceſſity of general laws, and to the wiſe order of nature appearing in the eſtabliſhed connexions between our ſenſible ideas of different ſenſes, from the philoſophical writings of Dr. Berkley (*Biſhop of* Cloyd) *a writer highly eſteemed by all perſons of good taſte.*

I have uſed ſome of Dr. Butler's (*Biſhop of* Briſtol) *phraſes in his diſcourſe* on the analogy, &c. *becauſe I thought them very proper, and well choſen for the purpoſe to which they are employed: and this I take to be a liberty that does not ſo much as border on plagiariſm. Beſide that, I am obliged to the ſame treatiſe for ſeveral very uſeful and truly philoſophical obſervations on human nature. But every intelligent reader, who is acquainted with his excellent ſermons, will quickly perceive, that throughout the whole I am yet more indebted to them. And, indeed, that true method of enquiring into human nature, which is delineated with ſuch force and perſpicuity of argument in the admirable preface to theſe divine diſcourſes, being ſtrictly kept to in them, they make a full vindication of human nature, and of the ways of God to man. There the natural dignity of human nature, the real excellence of virtue, the ſolid happineſs it creates, and it alone can give, and the indefeaſible, unalienable right of moral conſcience to maintain the ſuperiority, and govern in the human breaſt, are ſet forth in the moſt forcible convincive manner, with evidence truly irreſiſtible.*

I cannot expreſs the vaſt ſatisfaction, and equal benefit, with which I have often read the Earl of Shaftſbury's Charac-

Characteriſticks: *a work that muſt live for ever in the eſteem of all who delight in moral enquiries. There is in his* Eſſay on virtue and merit, and his moral Rapſody, *a complete ſyſtem of* Moral Philoſophy *demonſtrated in the ſtricteſt manner, which fully ſecures that firſt ſtep to revelation, the belief of a Deity and providence. And I cannot poſſibly account to myſelf, how it could come about, that a perſon of great candor and integrity, well acquainted with theſe writings, and who hath on other occaſions ſhewn ſuch a laudable readineſs to do juſtice to miſtaken or wilfully miſrepreſented authors, ſhould ſay, This writer aimed at giving a ſcheme of virtue without religion, ſince he hath on purpoſe at great length demonſtrated the relation which virtue has to piety; and hath there fully proved,* the firſt not to be complete but in the later; *becauſe* where the later is wanting, there can neither be the ſame benignity, firmneſs or conſtancy; the ſame good compoſure of the affections or uniformity of mind. And thus the perfection and height of virtue muſt be owing to the Belief of a God. *Theſe are that incomparable author's own words. 'Tis true, indeed, he hath let fall ſome things concerning revelation, which have rendered his ſatisfaction with regard to the evidences of it very doubtful to many. But even with regard to ſuch ſurmiſes in his writings, may I not refer it to any candid perſon, who acts the better part? He, who for the ſake of them, thro' the warmth of his zeal, (tho' it be for the beſt cauſes) condemns the whole work in the lump; or he who hath been at pains to find out ſome alleviations and excuſes for them? Such a perſon I know whoſe ſincere belief of chriſtianity would not be called into queſtion, were I at liberty to name him: And ſure if*

there be any virtue peculiarly recommended by the chriſtian religion, it is, The charity which is not eaſily provoked to think evil, but beareth all things, and hopeth all things, *i. e. is diſpoſed to put the moſt favourable conſtruction upon every thing.*

THE writer from whom I have borrowed moſt, is Mr. Hutcheſon, *profeſſor of* Moral Philoſophy *in the* Univerſity of Glaſgow, *a teacher and writer who hath done eminent ſervice to virtue and religion in both ways, and ſtill continues indefatigably ſo to do. But that none of my faults may be imputed to him, it is fit I ſhould appriſe my Readers, that in quoting from him I have ſometimes taken the liberty, not only to change ſome of his phraſes, but to join places together which lye at ſome diſtance in the original; and which is yet a greater freedom, to intermix ſome things of my own with his reaſonings. This his native candor and ingenuity will not only very readily forgive, but immediately attribute to its true cauſe, which was not any affectation of amending or correcting one whom I think not inferior to any modern writer on morals in accuracy and perſpicuity, but rather ſuperior to almoſt all; but purely, becauſe ſuch changes and additions appeared to me not unneceſſary to ſerve the purpoſe of my argument.*

THE only other author I have to name is Mr. Pope, in his Eſſay on Man, *which hath been lately defended againſt the objections of Mr.* Crouſaz, *with ſo much judgment, and ſuch good taſte of poetry as well as philoſophy, by the very learned, ingenious and worthy author of the divine legation of* Moſes. *Never did any poetical work afford me ſuch delight, becauſe none ever gave me ſuch deep and uſeful inſtruction. As much as I have had occaſion by a long courſe of ſtudy in that way to be*

acquainted

acquainted with the ſubject, yet that truly philoſophical poem is always new to me: the oftner I read it, the more I am charmed with it, and benefited by it.

THIS author hath ſhewn us, that the ſeemingly moſt abſtruſe matters in philoſophy, may be rendered, inſtead of dry and tedious, exceeding pleaſing and agreeable. He hath given to this very profound ſubject, all the charms of poetry, without ſacrificing perſpicuity to ornament, without wandering from the preciſion, or breaking the chain of reaſon. *And tho' I am far from thinking writing in proſe upon ſuch philoſophical matters, not to be abſolutely neceſſary on many accounts, (otherwiſe I had not attempted what I have now done) yet I could not chuſe but conclude my abſtract reaſonings with a quotation from him, as far as he goes; which is indeed to the bottom of his ſubject: becauſe I have often felt,* that principles, precepts or maxims, written in ſuch *harmonious* verſe, both ſtrike the reaſon more ſtrongly at firſt, and are more eaſily retained by it afterwards. *And it is impoſſible for any one to expreſs ſuch profound abſtract truths in proſe, ſo ſhortly as he has done in verſe:* Yet nothing is more certain, than that much of the force, as well as grace of arguments or inſtructions, depends on their conciſeneſs. *What a bleſſing to ſociety is ſuch a genius! who hath*

—— turn'd the tuneful art,
From ſounds to things, from fancy to the heart;
For Wit's falſe mirror, held up nature's light;
Shew'd erring pride, *whatever is, is right.*
That reaſon, paſſion, anſwer one great aim;
That true ſelf-love, and ſocial are the ſame;
That virtue only makes our bliſs below;
And all our knowledge is, ourſelves to know.

Such a poet, indeed, deſerves the ancient venerable name ſo juſtly appropriated to poets who employed their muſe to truly divine purpoſes, (divinus, ſanctus) * *and all the honours due to that ſacred, highly beneficial character. But as is the heart, ſo will one's works always be.*

BUT now that I am ſpeaking of poetry, and its genuine noble ends, I cannot forbear expreſſing my moſt ardent wiſhes, that ſome genius fit for the glorious taſk, would give us a Counter-lucretius ; *and ſing thoſe wonderful harmonies and beauties of nature which have been lately diſcovered by ſearching into her order and adminiſtration; and the praiſes of that* Divine man *to whom we are principally beholden for all theſe momentous diſcoveries; who may indeed be ſaid, by unraveling the deepeſt myſteries of nature, and ſetting her excellent laws in their true light, to have effectually diſcomfited Atheiſm and Superſtition, and all the gloomy horrors which naturally ſprout from the frightful notion of a fatherleſs world and blind chance, or, which is yet more terrible, the opinion of a malignant adminiſtration.*

A certain poet, who is univerſally confeſſed to have ſhewn a moſt extraordinary genius for deſcriptive poetry in ſome of his works, and in all of them a heart deeply impregnated with the warmeſt love of virtue and mankind, if he chances to caſt his eye on this Preface, *as his friendſhip to me will naturally induce him to do upon*

* Poetam natura ipſa valere, & mentis viribus excitari, & quaſi divino quodam ſpiritu inflari. Quare ſuo jure noſter ille Ennius *ſanctos* appellat *poetas*, quod quaſi Deorum aliquo dono atque munere commendati nobis eſſe videantur. Sit igitur ſanctum hoc poetæ nomen quod nulla unquam barbaria violavit.

Cicero pro Archia poeta.

whatever

whatever bears my name, I desire he would consider this, as a call upon him from one who highly esteems and sincerely loves him, to set about a work so greatly wanting, and which must gain him immortal honour, by doing vast service to the cause he has most sincerely at heart.

AND what is susceptible of poetical charms, if the beautiful order, and the immense magnificence of nature in all her works be not? There is a person of very uncommon abilities, and equal virtue, from whom, in frequent conversations upon this subject, I have had many very useful hints, but I am not at liberty to name him: Let me, however, assure him of my warm sense and high value of a friendship so useful to me on many occasions. Let me just add, that tho' this enquiry hath not been very long by me in the shape it now appears, yet it is (a few things taken from late writers excepted) the substance of several pneumatological *discourses, (as they are called in the school language) read above a dozen years ago to students of* Moral Philosophy, *by way of preparative to a course of lectures,* on the rights and duties of mankind ; *at which time were published two* Theses, *in the* University *way, indicating the importance of this philosophy; one upon the connexion be-natural and moral philosophy; and the other, upon the manifest evidences and signs of wisdom and good order appearing in the moral as well as the natural world.*

The Corolaries *subjoined to the last part (in which I hope the* Reader *will excuse some repetitions hardly avoidable, since it will appear, that upon the whole I have taken no small pains to diversify things I was often of necessity obliged to repeat) well deserve the attention of all who are seriously concerned about the improvement of true philosophy,*

philoſophy, and right education. To ſome part of the work carved out in them, ſhall my ſtudies ever be devoted, in proportion as providence gives me health, leiſure and opportunity for carrying them on to advantage, Many who have great abilties for ſuch employments. 'tis to be regreted, are not in the eaſy circumſtances neceſſary to the purſuit of ſuch ſerious, profound enquiries. But are there not ſeverals, who have both abilities and excellent opportunities, and whoſe profeſſion loudly calls upon them indefatigably to dedicate themſelves to the ſervice of virtue and religion; who wholly neglect theſe noble ends? Let me therefore addreſs ſuch, together with thoſe, who ſuitably to their character, very earneſtly employ their time, their talents, and all the advantages providence affords them, in recommending and promoting truth, piety, or uſeful learning, in the words of Cicero, *who was ever engaged, either in uſeful action, or in teaching virtue and true philoſophy.* 'Quod enim munus reip. afferre, majus, meliuſve poſſumus, quam ſi docemus atque erudimus juventutem? His præſertim moribus atque temporibus: quibus ita prolapſa eſt, ut omnium opibus refrenanda, ac coercenda ſit.

THE

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

HUMAN NATURE and the ways of GOD to man vindicated, by delineating the general laws to which the principal phenomena in the human ſyſtem are reducible, and ſhewing them to be wiſe and good.

—Nam ſic habetote nullo in genere diſputandi magis honeſte patefieri, quid ſit homini tributum natura, quantam vim rerum optimarum mens humana contineat; cujus muneris colendi, efficiendique cauſa nati, & in lucem editi ſimus, quæ ſit conjunctio hominum, quæ naturalis ſocietas inter ipſos. His enim explicatis fons legum & juris inveniri poteſt. *M. T. Cicero de leg. l.* 1.

Remember man, the univerſal cauſe,
Acts not by partial but by gen'ral laws;
And makes what happineſs we juſtly call,
Subſiſt, not in the good of one, but all.
There's not a bleſſing individuals find,
But ſome way leans and hearken to the kind.

Eſſay on man, Ep. 4.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

INTROD. Natural philosophy distinguish'd from moral.

EVERY one who knows what natural philosophy is, or how it proceeds in its enquiries will easily conceive what moral philosophy must mean; and how it likewise ought to be pursued: for all enquiries into fact, reality, or any part of nature must be set about, and carried on in the same way; and an enquiry into human nature is as much an enquiry into fact, as any question about the frame and texture (for instance) of any plant, or of the human body.

INTROD.

But both are enquiries into fact or nature.

The objects of science are justly divided into corporeal, or sensible ones; and those which not being perceived by the outward senses, but by reflexion on the mind itself and its inward operations, are therefore called intellectual or moral objects. Hence the consideration of the former is stiled Physiology, or Natural philosophy; and that of the other is called Rational, or Moral philosophy. But however philosophy may be divided; nothing can be more evident, than, that the study of nature, whether in the constitution and oeconomy of the sensible world, or in the frame and government of the moral, must set out from the same first principles, and be carried on in the same method of investigation, induction, and reasoning; since both are enquiries into facts or real constitutions.

Natural philosophy described.

What is natural philosophy, how is it defined? or, how are its researches carried on? By it is understood an enquiry into the sensible world: that is "into the general laws, according to which its appearances are produced; and into the beauty, order, and good which these general laws produce." And therefore in such an enquiry the following maxims are justly laid down as the foundations on which all its reasonings are built; or as the first principles from which all its conclusions are inferred; and without supposing which it cannot proceed one step.

The principles it presupposes and proceeds upon in its enquiries.

First principle.

I. That if the corporeal world be not governed by general laws, it cannot be the object of enquiry or science; and far less of imitation by arts, since imitation necessarily presupposes knowledge of the object imitated; and science presupposes a certain determinate object; or fixed ascertainable relations and connexions of things. Upon the contrary supposition the corporeal world must be absolutely unintelligible. Nature, in order to be understood by us, must always speak the same language to us: it must

muſt therefore ſteadily obſerve the ſame general laws in its operations, or work uniformly and according to ſtated, invariable methods and rules. Thoſe terms, order, beauty, general good, and a whole, which are too familiar to philoſophers, to need any definition, or explication, plainly include in their meaning, analogy and conſtancy; uniformity amidſt variety; or in other words, the regular obſervance of general, ſettled laws in the make and oeconomy, production and operations, or effects of any object to which they are aſcribed. Wherever order, fixed connexions, or general laws and unity of deſign take place, there is certainty in the nature of ſuch objects; and ſo far therefore knowledge may be acquired. But where theſe do not obtain, there can be nothing but unconnected independent parts; all muſt be confuſion and diſorder; and conſequently ſuch a looſe disjointed heap of things muſt be an inexplicable chaos. In one word, ſcience, prudence, government, imitation, and art, neceſſarily ſuppoſe the prevalence of general laws throughout all the objects in nature to which they reach. No being can know itſelf, project or purſue any ſcheme, or lay down any maxims for its conduct; but ſo far as its own conſtitution is certain; and the connexion of things relative to it are fixed and conſtant; for ſo far only, are things aſcertainable; and therefore ſo far only, can rules be drawn from them.

" Nature's (*a*) operating according to general " laws (ſays a very ingenious philoſopher) is ſo ne- " ceſſary for letting us into the ſecret of nature, " and for our guidance in the affairs of life, that " without it, all reach and compaſs of thought, all " human ſagacity could ſerve to no manner of " purpoſe: it were even impoſſible there ſhould be " any ſuch faculties or powers in the mind. It is

(*a*) Principles of human knowledge.

INTROD. "this alone, gives us that foreſight which enables "us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life: "and without this, we ſhould be eternally at a "loſs; we could not know how to act any thing "that might procure us the leaſt pleaſure, or ſave "us from the leaſt pain. That food nouriſhes, "ſleep refreſhes, and fire warms us; that to ſow in "the ſeed-time, is the way to reap in harveſt; that "to give application is the way to improve and "arrive at perfection in knowledge, or in any moral "virtue; and in general, that to obtain ſuch or "ſuch ends, ſuch or ſuch means are conducive; all "this we know, and only can know, by the ob-"ſervation of the ſettled laws of nature, without "which we ſhould be all in uncertainty and confu-"ſion, and a grown man no more know how to "manage himſelf in the affairs of life, than an in-"fant juſt born."

This firſt principle in natural philoſophy, is therefore indiſputable. "That without the prevalence of general laws there can be no order; and conſequently no foreſight, no ſcience: and that as all appearances in the corporeal world, which are reducible to general laws are explicable, ſo ſuch as are not, are utterly inexplicable.". Or in other words, "ſuch effects as are not always produced in the ſame way and method, and have always the ſame conſequences and influences, are quite anomalous; they cannot be reduced to any rule or order, and for that reaſon, no concluſion can be inferred from them." 'Tis only connexions which take place conſtantly in the ſame invariable manner that are aſcertainable; or that can lay a foundation for ſcience Theoretical or Practical.

Second principle. II. Now thoſe are juſtly called by philoſophers, general laws in the ſenſible world. To which many effects are conformable. Or which, in other words, are obſerved to prevail and operate uniformly

formly in it; and regularly to produce like appearances. Thus, for inſtance, gravitation is concluded to be a general law throughout our mundan ſyſtem, becauſe all bodies are found to have gravity; not one body within the reach of our obſervation does not ſhew that quality: but even the moſt remote ones we are capable of obſerving, are found to operate according to it; that is, their appearances are reducible to it, as its natural and neceſſary effects.

This is very juſtly inferred, becauſe to ſay, that analogous, or like appearances are not produced according to the ſame general law; or that they do not proceed from the ſame general principle, is indeed to ſay, that they are and are not analogous. Wherever we find analogy, or ſimilarity of effects, there we find the ſame law prevailing; or ſo far do we find particular inſtances of the ſame property or law; or of the ſame method of production and operation (*b*) in nature. All this is really no more than aſſerting, for example, that whatever is produced conformably to a known principle, called gravity, is produced conformably to that principle. This ſecond maxim in natural philoſophy is therefore likewiſe indiſputable.

"That thoſe are general laws in a ſyſtem, which prevail and operate uniformly in that ſyſtem; or to which many effects in it are reducible and none are repugnant." Or in other words, "thoſe effects, however remote from us the objects are, to which they belong, may be juſtly attributed to that law or property, to which they are reducible, as its natural effects, that is known to be univerſal, ſo far as experience can reach;

(*b*) Here I multiply words, becauſe all theſe are uſed promiſcouſly by philoſophers. See the preface to Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s Principia, by *Rog. Cottes*, and the Principia, *Lib.* 3. Regulæ philoſophandi.

INTROD. for this very reaſon that ſuch a known property being ſufficient to produce them, is ſufficient to account for them." (*c*)

Third principle.

III. But in the third place, "Thoſe general laws of the corporeal world are good laws, which by their ſteady and uniform prevalency produce its good, beauty, and perfection in the whole." Thus, for inſtance, gravitation muſt be a good general law in the ſenſible or material world, if its uniform operation be conducive to the greateſt good, beauty, and perfection of that ſyſtem. 'Tis needleſs to define terms to natural philoſophers, which are ſo commonly uſed by them; and if theſe terms have any meaning, the following argument muſt hold good, "All the intereſts of intelligent beings "require that general laws ſhould prevail, ſo far "as they are concerned; nay, without general "laws, there could be no union, no general con-"nexion, and conſequently no general beauty, "good, or perfection, but all muſt be tumult, in-"coherence, and diſorder." It is therefore abſolutely good and fit, that general laws ſhould take place; and thoſe laws muſt be good in a ſyſtem, which produce in the ſum of things, the greater coherence, order, beauty, good, and perfection of that ſyſtem.

Now from this it neceſſarily follows, that no particular effects, which flow from good general laws, can be evils abſolutely conſidered, that is, with regard to the whole. No effect, for example, of gravitation can be evil, if gravitation be a good general law in the ſenſe above explained.

General concluſion concerning natural philoſophy.

There is therefore a third maxim in philoſophy, which is beyond all doubt. "That all the effects of general laws which are good with reſpect to a

(*c*) See *Newton*'s Principia, Lib. 3. Regulæ philoſophandi.

whole

whole, are good abſolutely conſidered, or referred to that whole."

We may then very juſtly conclude in general, that all effects or appearances in the natural world, are ſufficiently explained and accounted for in natural philoſophy, which are reduced to good general laws, as ſo many particular inſtances of their uniform operation; and that both phyſically and morally. They are ſufficiently explained and accounted for in the phyſical ſenſe, by being reduced to general laws: for what elſe is the phyſical knowledge of a fact in the ſenſible world, but the knowledge of an effect itſelf, in its progreſs, qualities, and influences: or in other words, the knowledge of the manner or order in which it is produced, and in which it operates on other things relating to it; the knowledge of the laws according to which it is produced, works, and is worked upon?

Such effects as are reduced to general laws, are accounted for phyſically.

"All philoſophers acknowledge (ſays an excellent "one) that the firſt cauſe, or producer of the "ſenſible world, muſt be a mind, whoſe will gives "ſubſiſtence and efficacy to all its laws and con- "nexions. The difference there is between natural "philoſophers and other men with regard to their "knowledge of natural phenomena, conſiſts not "in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cauſe, "that produces them; for that can be no other "than the will of a ſpirit: but only in a greater "largeneſs of comprehenſion whereby analogies, "harmonies, and agreements are diſcovered in "the works of nature and the particular effects "are explained, that is, reduced to general laws."

They are accounted for morally, if the laws they are reducible to be good.

But it is needleſs to dwell longer on this concluſion, ſince in the language of all natural philoſophers, (*d*) thoſe effects are reckoned to be fully explained in the phyſical way, which are ſhown to be particu-

(*d*) See Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s principia. Dr. *John Clark*'s ſermons on the origin of evil. The characteriſticks, *&c.*

INTROD. lar instances of a general law that had been already inferred from a sufficient variety of fair and unexceptionable experiments: and those effects only are said to be unexplained, which are not yet reduced to any known law, or the law of which is not yet understood and ascertained.

Such effects are sufficiently explained, and accounted for morally, when they are reduced to general laws which are proved to be good in the whole; because they are thus shown to proceed from laws that are morally good and just.

Natural philosophy in accounting for final causes, coincides with moral philosophy.

Tho' physiology be distinguished from moral philosophy, yet it was needless to suggest to any class of readers, before we used the words, *beauty*, *order*, *good* and *perfection*, that these are terms relative to beings capable of pleasure and pain, and of perceiving good order and beauty; or that laws cannot be said to be good or bad, right or wrong, beautiful or imperfect, but with respect to minds or perceiving beings: for pain or pleasure, good or ill, convenience or inconvenience, beauty or deformity, evidently presuppose perceptive faculties. On the one hand, an unperceiveable world cannot be the object of knowledge, or enjoyment of any kind; and, on the other, 'tis perceiving beings alone that can enjoy, or to whom existence can be happiness. But from this, it follows, that tho' natural philosophy be commonly distinguished from moral; all the conclusions in natural philosophy, concerning the order, beauty, and perfection of the material world, belong properly to moral philosophy; being inferences that respect the contriver, maker, and governor of the world, and other moral beings capable of understanding its wise, good and beautiful administration, and of being variously affected by its laws and connexions.

In reality, when natural philosophy is carried so far as to reduce phenomena to good general laws, it becomes moral philosophy; and when it stops short

ſhort of this chief end of all enquiries into the ſenſible or material world, which is, to be ſatisfied with regard to the wiſdom of its ſtructure and oeconomy; it hardly deſerves the name of philoſophy in the ſenſe of *Socrates*, *Plato*, Lord *Verulam*, *Boyle*, *Newton*, and the other beſt moral or natural philoſophers. (*e*)

Moral philoſophy deſcribed.

Having thus briefly ſhown what natural philoſophy propoſes to do, and upon what foundations it proceeds in eſtabliſhing any concluſions; let us now ſee what moral philoſophy muſt be. It is diſtinguiſhed from phiſiology, (as has been obſerved) becauſe it enquires chiefly about objects not perceiveable by means of our outward organs of ſenſe, but by internal feeling or experience; ſuch as are all our moral powers and faculties, diſpoſitions and affections, the power of comparing ideas, of reaſoning or inferring conſequences, the power of contracting habits, our ſenſe of beauty and harmony, natural or moral, the deſire of ſociety, &c. Even theſe, however, may very properly be called parts of nature; and by whatever name, they, or the knowledge of them be called, 'tis obvious, that an enquiry about any of them, and the laws and connexions eſtabliſhed by the author of nature, with regard to any of them, is as much a queſtion of natural hiſtory or of fact, as an enquiry about any of our organs of ſenſe, or about the conſtitution of any material object whatſoever, and the laws relating to it. And therefore the ſame principles juſt mentioned as the foundation of all enquiries and reaſonings in natural philoſophy, muſt likewiſe take place, and be admitted in moral philoſophy; that is, in all enquiries and reaſonings concerning the human mind, its

It muſt preſuppoſe and proceed upon the ſame principles.

(*e*) See Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s *Opticks*, *l.* 3. *p.* 345. and *Plato*'s *Phædon*; where we ſee what *Socrates* thought natural philoſophy ought to aim at, by what he ſays of the vanity of the natural philoſophy of *Anaxagoras*.

powers,

INTROD. powers, faculties, diſpoſitions and affections, and the laws relative to them, as well as in all enquiries into the properties of a body.

For theſe principles are of an univerſal nature.

In truth, theſe principles muſt neceſſarily take place in the explication of any piece of nature that can be underſtood or explained. They are principles of a general nature, which, if they be true in any caſe, muſt be univerſally true; and therefore they muſt be univerſally admitted, with regard to every conſtitution, ſyſtem or whole, corporeal or incorporeal, natural or moral, that is, body or mind. Whence it reſults, that with reſpect to the human mind; to the frame of any mind whatſoever, or in general with reſpect to any moral ſyſtem it muſt be true. (*f*)

Firſt principle of moral philoſophy.

I. That unleſs it be ſo conſtituted and governed, that all the effects and appearances belonging to it, are the effects of general laws, it muſt be abſolutely unintelligible; it muſt be complete confuſion, irregularity and diſorder; it cannot have a certain and determinate nature, but muſt be made up of analo-

(*f*) How an enquiry into human nature or natural philoſophy ought to be carried on, we learn from *Cicero de Finibus*. for tho' in that treatiſe, different ſyſtems are repreſented and defended, yet it is unanimouſly agreed amongſt all the interlocutors in theſe dialogues, that the natural end for which man is made, can only be inferred from the conſideration of his natural faculties and diſpoſitions as they make one whole; even as we can only know the nature of any animate or inanimate whole; of a vine, for inſtance, by enquiring into its ſtructure or conſtitution. This point is argued in all theſe books at great length. See a fine deſcription of moral philoſophy in *Perſius, Sat.* 3.

Diſcite, O miſeri, & cauſas cognoſcite rerum
Quid ſumus & quidnam victuri gignimur, ordo
Quis datus, aut metu qua mollis flexus & unde:
Quis modus argento, quid fas optare, quid aſper
Utile nummus habet; patriæ carique propinqui
Quantum clargiri deceat: quam te deus eſſe
Juſſit, & humana qua parte locatus es in re.

gous,

gous, ſeparate, incoherent parts, and operate in a deſultory, inconſtant manner: that is, it is not a whole; and cannot be the object of government or art, becauſe it cannot be the object of knowledge: for all that can be known of it in ſuch a caſe, is, that nothing can be aſcertained about it; or that it is a *Proteus*, whoſe changes are without rule, and therefore are abſolutely unaſcertainable. INTROD.

II. Thoſe muſt be received as general laws or principles in a moral frame or conſtitution, which are found by experience to operate uniformly or invariably in that ſyſtem. Thus, for inſtance, that habits are contracted by repeated acts, may be juſtly ſaid to be a general law in our frame, becauſe this law has its effects uniformly and invariably in our natures; or many effects do evidently ſhow a relation to that law as their common ſource and principle; and not one effect in human nature is repugnant to it; for, in like manner, is gravitation concluded to be a general law in the ſenſible world. Second principle.

III. Thoſe muſt be good principles or laws in the conſtitution of a mind, or in any moral whole, which are conducive by their ſteady and uniform operation and prevalency to the greater good, beauty, and perfection of that whole in the ſum of things. And therefore no effects which flow from ſuch laws can be evils abſolutely conſidered, or with reſpect to the whole. Thus the above-mentioned law of habits, muſt be a good general law in the conſtitution of the human mind, if its general tendency or influence be contributive to the greater good of the human mind in the ſum of things; and no effects of that principle can be abſolutely evil; becauſe it is fit and good, that general laws ſhould take place; and thoſe muſt be good general laws, which are good in the whole, or conducive to the greater order, beauty, and perfection of a whole. Third principle.

From

INTROD.

Moral effects are ſufficiently explained and accounted for phyſically and morally, by being reduced to good general laws.

From all which it muſt neceſſarily follow, that all thoſe effects, with regard to any moral conſtitution, are fully explained and accounted for phyſically and morally, which are reduced to ſuch general laws as have been mentioned, as ſo many particular inſtances of their uniform and general prevalency.

To know any moral object phyſically, can be nothing elſe but to know what it is, and how it is conſtituted; or to know its parts, and thoſe references of parts to one another, which make it a certain determinate whole, that works and is operated upon in certain determinable ways.

And to know the final cauſe, or moral fitneſs of any conſtitution, can be nothing elſe, but to know what good end in the ſum of things, all its parts, and all their mutual reſpects, with all the laws and connexions relative to it, tend to produce. In fine, as different beings as a man and a tree are, yet the knowledge of man and the knowledge of a tree muſt mean the ſame kind of knowledge; in either caſe it is to know what the being is, and to what end it is adapted by its make and texture, and in conſequence of the laws and connexions upon which it any wiſe depends.

Hence we ſee how moral philoſophy ought to be purſued, and how it will ſtand on the ſame footing with natural philoſophy.

All this is too evident to be longer inſiſted upon. And what is the reſult of all that has been ſaid? Is it not, that ſuch moral appearances as are reducible to good general laws, will ſtand upon the ſame footing in moral philoſophy, that thoſe appearances in the natural world do in natural philoſophy, which are reducible to good general laws? And that in der to bring moral philoſophy, or the knowledge of the moral world, upon the ſame footing with natural philoſophy, or the knowledge of the material world, as it now ſtands; we muſt enquire into moral phenomena, in the ſame manner as we do into phyſical ones: that is, we muſt endeavour to find out by experience the good general laws to which

which they are reducible. For this muſt hold good in general, that ſo far as we are able to reduce appearances to a good general law, ſo far are we able to explain them or account for them. As phenomena which are not the effects of general laws, are in the nature of things abſolutely unexplicable; ſo thoſe which are, can only be explained by reducing them to the general laws of which they are the effects. "Explaining or accounting for phenomena "can mean nothing elſe; it is not indeed now "pretended by any philoſopher to mean any thing "elſe."

A prejudice that may ariſe from treating natural philoſophy in this manner removed.

This concluſion manifeſtly enſues from what has been ſaid. But leſt any one ſhould be ſtartled at an attempt to treat effects in the ſame manner, which are evidently of ſo different natures, as corporeal and moral effects certainly are; or leſt any one ſhould have imagined that general laws can only take place with regard to matter and motion, and conſequently, that an eſſay to explain moral appearances by general laws, muſt involve in it all the abſurdity of an attempt to handle effects, which are not mechanical or material, as if they were ſuch: to prevent all ſuch objections, and to proceed more diſtinctly and ſurely in this eſſay, let us juſt obſerve here, that though no two things can be more different than a thinking being and a corporeal one; or than moral powers and operations are from paſſive unperceiving objects, and their qualities and effects; yet the exerciſes of all the moral powers, diſpoſitions and affections of minds, as neceſſarily preſuppoſe an eſtabliſhed order of nature, or general laws ſettled by the Author of nature with reſpect to them; as the exerciſes of our bodily ſenſes about qualities and effects of corporeal beings, do with regard to them. As we could neither procure nor avoid, by our will and choice, any ſenſation of our ſight, touch, or any other of our ſenſes, had not nature eſtabliſhed a certain order, with reſpect

Moral powers and the exerciſes of moral powers, neceſſarily ſuppoſe and require general laws.

to

INTROD. to the ſucceſſion or conveyance of our ſenſations, or the methods in which they are produced in us; ſo in like manner, we could neither acquire knowledge of any kind, contract habits, or attain to any moral perfection whatſoever; unleſs the Author of our nature had fixed and appointed certain laws relating to our moral powers, and their exerciſes and acquiſitions. Being able to attain to ſcience, to arts, to vertues, as neceſſarily preſuppoſes a fixed and appointed road to virtue, *&c.* as being able to move our hands or limbs, does an eſtabliſhed order of nature, with reſpect to theſe motions, and the ſenſations reſulting from them, or attainable by them.

We are not more certain that we have ſenſations, than we are certain that we have power, or a ſphere of activity.

We are not more certain, that ſenſations are conveyed into or impreſſed upon our minds, by means of certain organs of ſenſation in a certain order, than we are ſure that we have a certain extent of dominion, or a certain ſphere of activity and power allotted to us by nature: that is to ſay, that certain effects, both in the corporeal and moral world, are made to depend, as to their exiſtence or non-exiſtence, upon our will, that they ſhould exiſt or not exiſt. That we have ſuch a power, both with regard to ſeveral actions of our body and of our mind, is plain matter of experience.

It is not diſputed.

There is indeed no diſpute about this kind of liberty or dominion belonging to man: but how far it extends, is another queſtion, to be conſidered afterwards. Now wherever this liberty or dominion obtains, or whatever are its bounds, however wide, or however narrow and ſtinted it may be, this is certain, that ſo far as it extends, it neceſſarily preſuppoſes certain laws of nature relating to it; or to ſpeak more properly, conſtituting it. For this is no more than ſaying, that did not fire gently warm and cruelly burn, according to certain fixed laws aſcertainable by us, we could not know how to warm ourſelves without burning: and by parity of reaſon,

reaſon, were not knowledge, habits, and moral improvements, acquirable in a certain fixed way, we could not acquire them or attain to them. That is, we could have no liberty, no dominion, no ſphere of activity or power, neither in the natural nor moral world: or in other words, either with regard to objects of ſenſe, or moral objects, but upon ſuppoſition, that the natural and moral world are governed by general laws; or ſo far as they are ſo governed. INTROD.

But power, and a ſphere of activity, cannot take place but where general laws obtain.

If it could be proved that we have no dominion, no power properly ſo called, aſſigned to us by nature, that would not prove us to be mere ſtocks, mere pieces of mechaniſm; ſince even upon that ſuppoſition, this eſſential difference would ſtill remain between material objects and us, that we are conſcious, whereas the latter are quite void of perception. But on the other hand, if we really have a certain ſphere of activity, in the ſenſe above defined (as we moſt certainly have to a very conſiderable extent) this ſphere of activity muſt be allotted to us by our Maker; and it neceſſarily ſuppoſes, ſo far as it extends, a certain fixed dependance of objects upon our wills as to their exiſtence or non-exiſtence, conformably to which, and not otherwiſe, we may exerciſe that dominion.

Some remarks on the controverſy about liberty and neceſſity.

The queſtion about liberty and neceſſity has been violently agitated among metaphyſicians almoſt in all ages; but it no ways concerns this preſent enquiry, that I ſhould enter any further into it than juſt to obſerve, 1. That whatever way it may be determined in *abſtract metaphyſical ſpeculation*, this fact remains indiſputable, that many objects depend upon our will, as to their exiſtence or non-exiſtence, many objects without the mind as well as in it. And all ſuch objects are εφ' ἡμιν, that is, they are put by nature within our power, in any ſenſe, that any thing can be ſaid to be dependent on a being, within its power, or at its option and diſpoſal.

Such

INTROD. Such ways of ſpeaking are of univerſal uſe and extent: none are more ſuch: but to ſay that ſuch phraſes, received in all languages, and univerſally underſtood, have no meaning at all, is to aſſert an abſurdity no leſs groſs than this; that men may diſcourſe, hold correſpondence, and be influenced and determined in their correſpondence with one another, without underſtanding one another, without any ideas at all. Common language is built upon fact, or univerſal feeling. And every one underſtands what it is to be free, to have a thing in his power, at his command, or dependent upon him. It is only ſuch philoſophers, who ſeeking the knowledge of human nature, not from experience, but from I know not what ſubtle theories of their own invention, depart from common language, and therefore are not underſtood by others, and ſadly perplex and involve themſelves. But, which is more, nothing can be more certain than that pains and pleaſures are the conſequences of certain actions; may be foreſeen by us; and may be avoided or obtained accordingly, as we act in ſuch or ſuch a manner. But if this fact, which is matter of univerſal experience, be admitted to be true, we are certainly in reſpect of all ſuch pains and pleaſures, free. That is, having, or not having them, depends abſolutely on our exerting ourſelves to have them or not to have them, according to the connections of nature: ſo that, whether the conſtitution of nature be fortuitous, neceſſary, or the free choice of a free being, we are free, and have power; or our happineſs and miſery, as far as the connection of theſe with our actions reaches, totally depends upon ourſelves. If a fact be certain, there is no reaſoning againſt it; but every reaſoning, however ſpecious it may be, or rather, however ſubtle and confounding, if it be repugnant to fact, muſt be ſophiſtical. And the fact juſt now mentioned is as certain,

certain, as any matter of experience or conſciouſneſs can be. INTROD.

2. Any reaſoning from which it follows that men can neither deſerve blame nor praiſe for their actions, and that it is needleſs for us to take care either to procure goods, or avoid evils, muſt be falſe; becauſe it leads to a very abſurd and fatal miſtake in life and conduct. But truth cannot lead to abſurdity or error. For this reaſon, ſuch arguments were called by the antients λόγοι ἀργοι, *ignavæ rationes* (*g*) Sophiſms that lead to inaction: and they were juſtly reckoned abſurd upon that account; abſurd, becauſe to follow them would be ſure ruin. If certain pains and pleaſures depend upon our manner of acting and exerting ourſelves; upon our elections, determinations and purſuits; upon the exerciſes of our faculties, in conſequence of certain fixed connections in nature between our actions and certain effects; then it is our buſineſs, becauſe it is our intereſt, to endeavour to learn theſe connexions, and to act agreeably to them. And in like manner, if we are ſo made, that we cannot but approve ſome actions, and blame others in ourſelves and other perſons, then is it our proper buſineſs to maintain this natural ſenſe of right and wrong, in a ſound, uncorrupted ſtate, and to judge

(*g*) See *Cicero de fato*, Nec nos impediat illa ignava ratio quæ dicitur, appellatur enim ἀργὸς λόγος, cui ſi pareamus nihil agamus in vita, &c. So *Plutarch de fato*, Nam iſtæ argutiunculæ quæ ignava ratio appellantur, revera fallaces ſunt concluſiunculæ è diſputatione de fato tractæ. Where the ſame author obſerves, that *Fate* properly ſignifies, Leges quas de univerſi natura deus ſanxit, animis immortalibus præſertim. ——Legem appellari comitem naturæ univerſi, ſecundum quam omnia quæ fiant tranſiguntur. ——Ipſum autem Fatum tale eſſe è natura ejus & appellatione conſtat. Heimarmene etiam dicitur quaſi nexa & conſertu lex & ſanctio eſt, quia civili modo conſtitutum habet quid ex factis conſequatur, &c. The ancient phraſes to expreſs the liberty of agents are, Liberum nobis eſſe, in noſtra poteſtate eſſe, nobis parere, &c. For ſuch actions could one be praiſed or blamed?

INTROD. and act conformably to it. All principles and reasonings which have an oppoſite tendency, muſt be as falſe as they are pernicious. With reſpect to our natural diſpoſition to approve or diſapprove actions, or our ſenſe of good and ill deſert, it neceſſarily implies in it, or carries along with it, a perſuaſion of its being in the power of the perſon blamed or commended, to have done, or not done the action approved or diſapproved: for in every inſtance, when we know a perſon could not help doing or not doing a thing, we can neither blame nor approve him. Now ſuch a determination of our nature, which neceſſarily ſuppoſes certain actions to be in our power; were no actions really in our power, would be abſurd and deluſive; which there is no ground from the analogy of nature to ſuppoſe, that any diſpoſition or determination in our frame can be.

But it is not my buſineſs here to refute the doctrine of *neceſſity*, or to ſpeak more properly, the doctrine of *inactivity*, (for ſo was it called by the ancients;) but to ſhew that freedom, or power, as ſuch, ſuppoſes, nay neceſſarily requires, in order to its ſubſiſtence and exerciſe, eſtabliſhed general laws. And this is as evident, as that goods cannot be obtained, nor pains be avoided by us, unleſs there is a fixed way of getting the one, and ſhunning the other, which may be foreſeen and followed by us (*b*).

The enquiry in which mankind is chiefly intereſted, is the extent of his dominion, power, or ſphere of activity, that he may know how to regulate himſelf and his actions; not waſte his time and powers in vain, impoſſible attempts, to gain or change what is abſolutely independent of him, but employ himſelf in the right exerciſe of his powers,

(*b*) More is ſaid on this ſubject in the firſt Chapter, Law i. of power.

about

about objects ſubjected to his will. Accordingly, ancient philoſophers have commonly ſet out in their moral enquiries, by diſtinguiſhing and claſſing the τα εφ ἡμιν (*i*) and the τα ουκ εφ ἡμιν, the objects put by nature in our power, and thoſe that are not. We have an excellent catalogue of them in the beginning of *Epictetus's Enchiridion*; and in the following enquiry, there will be occaſion to take notice of the moſt important branches of our power, in the natural and in the moral world, that is, over external and ſenſible objects, or over moral and intellectual ones.

An account of the way in which the enquiry into human nature is to be carried on analogouſly to natural philoſophy.

But before I proceed to enquire into any of the general laws relative to human nature, and their effects and final cauſes; it is neceſſary, in order to give a clear view of the manner in which it is propoſed to carry on that enquiry, and of the ſtrict analogy between natural and moral philoſophy, to obſerve:

That as in natural philoſophy, though it would be but building a fine viſionary Theory or Fable, to draw out a ſyſtem of conſequences the moſt accurately connected from mere hypotheſes, or upon ſuppoſition of the exiſtence and operation of properties, and their laws, which experience does not ſhew to be really exiſtent; yet the whole of true natural philoſophy is not, for that reaſon, no more than a ſyſtem of facts diſcovered by experiment and obſervation; but it is a mixture of experiments, with reaſonings from experiments: ſo in the ſame manner, in moral philoſophy, though it would be but to contrive a beautiful, elegant romance, to deduce the beſt coupled ſyſtem of concluſions concerning human nature from imaginary ſuppoſitions, that have no foundation in nature; yet the whole of true moral philoſophy, will not, for that reaſon, be no more than a collection of facts diſcovered by experience; but it likewiſe will

(*i*) See Arrianus and Simplicius on Epictetus.

INTROD. be a mixed ſcience of obſervations, and reaſonings from principles known by experience to take place in, or belong to human nature.

Hypotheſes in either are only to be admitted as queſtions to be enquired into.

In neither caſe are hypotheſes to be any further admitted, than as queſtions, about the truth or reality of which it is worth while to enquire; but in both we may proceed in the double method of analyſis and ſyntheſis: by the former endeavouring to deduce from ſome certain ſelect effects, the ſimple powers of nature, and their laws and proportions; from which, by the latter method, we may infer or reſolve the nature of other effects (*k*). In both caſes equally, as ſoon as certain powers or laws of nature are inferred from experience, we may conſider them, reaſon about them, compare them with other properties, powers and laws; and theſe powers being found to be real, whatever concluſions neceſſarily reſult from ſuch compariſons or reaſonings, muſt be true concerning them; and do therefore denote as certainly ſome qualities, properties, attendants or conſequents of them, as if theſe had been immediately diſcovered by experiment, inſtead of being deduced by ſtrict reaſoning, and neceſſary inference from principles known to be really true by experience: Or if before any property or law was known to be real, perchance many concluſions had been inferred from the very nature or idea of it, compared with other ideas, by neceſſary conſequence; the moment ſuch laws and properties are found

But we may proceed in both by analyſis and ſyntheſis.

(*k*) See *Cotte*'s Preface to Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s *Principia*, and the *Principia*, L. 3. Regulæ philoſophandi. Qui ſpeculationum ſuarum fundamentum deſumunt ab hypotheſibus, etiam ſi deinde ſecundum leges mechanicas accuratiſſime procedant; fabulam quidem elegantem forte & venuſtam, fabulam tamen concinnare dicendi ſunt. —— Hypotheſes non comminiſcuntur, neque in phyſicam recipiunt niſi ut quæſtiones, de quarum veritate diiudicetur. —— Jam illud concedi æquum eſt quod mathematicis rationibus colligetur & certiſſime demonſtratur. —— Certe contra tenorem experimentorum ſomnia temere, confingenda non ſunt, nec a naturæ analogia recedendum, &c.

out

out to be real, then all the concluſions from them, which were before but mere abſtract, hypothetical theories, become real truths, applicable to nature itſelf, and conſequently a key to its operations. INTROD.

The thing will be ſufficiently plain if we take an example. One may draw ſeveral concluſions concerning gravity from the nature of the thing, without knowing that it is an univerſal law of nature; but the moment it is known to be ſuch, all theſe abſtract concluſions concerning the neceſſary effects of it in certain circumſtances, become inſtead of mere theories, real truths, that is, real parts of the law of gravity, as far as it extends: or though one had never conſidered gravity in abſtract, or made any neceſſary deductions from its nature and idea, before it was known to be an univerſal law of bodies; yet after it is found by experience to be ſuch, if any properties, effects or conſequences can be drawn from the very conſideration of gravity itſelf, compared with other properties; all ſuch concluſions, the moment they are found out, may be placed to the account of nature, and deemed parts of the natural law of gravity. Thus if the laws of centripedal forces have been determined with regard to an ellipſis, parabola, hyperbola, *&c.* it immediately follows, that if bodies move in ſuch or ſuch a curve, ſuch and ſuch muſt be the laws of their centripedal forces; and *vice verſa*, if the laws of the centripedal forces of bodies are found to be ſuch and ſuch, it immediately follows, that ſuch and ſuch muſt be the nature of the orbits deſcribed by bodies that have ſuch and ſuch centripedal forces. Illuſtration by examples in natural philoſophy.

In like manner in moral philoſophy, whatever can be proved to belong to, reſult from; or contrary wiſe, to be repugnant to the very definition of intelligence, volition, affection, habit, or any moral power; and a ſuppoſed law of ſuch power will become a part of moral philoſophy, ſo ſoon as ſuch power is known to exiſt: or *vice verſa*, any effects It muſt be the ſame in moral philoſophy.

INTROD.

fects that can only reſult from ſuch a law, being found by experience to take place, the law itſelf muſt be inferred; and ſo of courſe all belonging to that law will come into philoſophy, as appertaining to it, and be a key to moral nature and its phenomena, as ſuch. Now of this kind of reaſonings in moral philoſophy, many inſtances occur in the following enquiry, almoſt in every chapter, which for that reaſon above-mentioned, have the ſame relation to moral philoſophy, that abſtract mathematical truths have to natural philoſophy, and make part of it in the ſame way as theſe do of the latter.

Concluſions concerning moral philoſophy.

In fine, the only thing in enquiries into any part of nature, moral or corporeal, is not to admit any hypotheſis as the real ſolution of appearances, till it is found really to take place in nature, either by immediate experiment, or by neceſſary reaſonings from effects, that unavoidably lead to it as their ſole cauſe, law, or principle. But all demonſtrations which ſhew that certain moral ideas muſt have certain relations, that is, certain agreements and diſagreements, are in the ſame way a key to moral nature, that demonſtations relative to the agreements and diſagreements of ſenſible ideas, as gravity, elaſticity, circles, triangles, *&c.* belong, are applicable, or a key to natural philoſophy. So that as the explication of the mundan ſyſtem, being mixed of reaſonings and obſervations, is properly called mixed mathematics, or mixed natural philoſophy; ſo an account of human nature, mixed of principles inferred from immediate obſervation, and others deduced from ſuch principles, by reaſoning from ideas or definitions, may be called mixed moral philoſophy, or mixed metaphyſics; for demonſtrations about moral ideas are commonly called metaphyſical. But the word metaphyſick having fallen into contempt, inſtead of calling this treatiſe mixed principles, or metaphyſical principles, I have ſimply termed it, *The principles of moral philoſophy.* I

ſhall

ſhall not now enquire into the cauſes that have brought metaphyſical reaſonings, the name at leaſt, into diſrepute: but certainly no one will ſay, that intelligence, will, affections, or in one word, moral powers, and their relations, are not worth enquiring into, or collecting experiments and reaſonings about.

The following treatiſe is therefore made up partly of obſervations, or experiments, and of reaſonings from the very nature of moral powers.

I have only mentioned all this, to ſhew how moral philoſophy ought to go on, and to forewarn my reader, that he is not to expect in this treatiſe merely a collection of experiments, but a good deal of reaſoning from principles known to be true by experience, to effects; and reciprocally from effects known by experience to be true, to their cauſes or principles. And whatever may be thought of the execution (which I ſubmit to all candid judges, who are ever rather favourably than ſeverely diſpoſed) ſure none can look upon the deſign to be trifling, who underſtand what moral powers mean. For if any thing is worth man's attention, it is man himſelf, that is, his natural powers, end, dignity and happineſs.

The chief deſign of the following enquiry ſtated.

Having thus diſpatched all neceſſary preliminaries as briefly as I could, the queſtion now to be entered upon is, "*Are all the effects and appearances relative to the conſtitution of our minds, effects of powers, faculties, diſpoſitions and affections, which with all the laws and connexions belonging to them, tend to produce good, order, beauty and perfection in the whole?*" As in enquiring about the conſtitution of a horſe, for example, it belongs not properly to ſuch a queſtion, whether that animal be ſuperior or inferior to a lion; but that enquiry preſuppoſes the conſtitutions and ends of both theſe animals known; ſo in the preſent caſe, the firſt queſtion is not, whether there are not in nature more noble beings than man; but whether man deſerves his place in nature, as being well adapted to a very good and noble end; to a dignity, a perfection,

INTROD. fection, a happineſs, to have fitted and qualified him for which, proves great wiſdom and goodneſs in his Author, the Author of nature.

> " *Where all muſt* full, *or not coherent be*;
> *And all that riſes, riſe in due* degree;
> *Then in the ſcale of life and ſenſe, 'tis plain,*
> *There muſt be* ſomewhere *ſuch a rank as* man;
> *And all the queſtion (wrangle e'er ſo long)*
> *Is only this, If God has plac'd him wrong?*"
>
> Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 1.

I ſhall now endeavour to go through the more remarkable general laws of our conſtitution, to which the chief appearances relative to mankind ſeem to be reducible.

CHAP. I.

The law of power, or activity.

THE firſt thing to be obſerved with regard to our make and ſtate, is, " That we have a certain ſphere of activity."

Whatever diſputes there are among philoſophers about the freedom of our will, it is univerſally acknowledged, " That man has in ſeveral caſes a power to do as he wills or pleaſes. Thus, if he wills to ſpeak, or be ſilent, to ſit down, or ſtand, ride, or walk; in fine, if his will changes like a weather-cock, he is able to do as he wills or pleaſes, unleſs prevented by ſome reſtraint or compulſion. He has alſo the ſame power in relation to the actions of his mind, as to thoſe of the body. If he wills or pleaſes, he can think of this, or that ſubject, ſtop ſhort, or purſue his thoughts, deliberate, or defer deliberation; reſolve, or ſuſpend his deliberations as he pleaſes, unleſs

unleſs prevented by pain, or a fit of an apoplexy, or ſome ſuch interveening reſtraint or compulſion. And this, no doubt, is a great perfection for man to be able in relation both to his thoughts and actions, to do as he wills and pleaſes in all theſe caſes of pleaſure and intereſt. Had he this power or liberty in all things, he would be omnipotent." And in having this power or liberty to a certain extent, does his ſuperior excellence above the brute creation conſiſt. Were not man ſo made, he would neceſſarily be a very low and mean creature in compariſon of what he really is; as he is now conſtituted a free agent; or as he is inveſted with a certain extent of dominion and efficiency. CHAP. I.

Power conſiſts in dependence of effects upon the will.

The power or dominion of a Being cannot conſiſt in any thing elſe, but the dependence of certain effects (*i*) upon its will as to their exiſtence or non-exiſtence. Its ſphere of activity, liberty and efficiency is larger or narrower in proportion to the extent of this dependence on its will; for ſo far as it reaches does ones command or will reach. Now how far human power or activity extends; or, in other words, what are with reſpect to man the principal τα εφ ημιν, will appear as we advance in this enquiry. Mean time, it is certainly neceſſary, in order to our dignity and perfection, that we ſhould have a certain dominion and power in nature aſſigned to us. This, doubtleſs, is a greater perfection, than having no power, no command, no ſphere of activity. Without power, creatures cannot make any acquiſition: being capable of virtue and merit, neceſſarily preſuppoſes ſome power or dominion.

It is a perfection to have power.

Of human power.

It is matter of univerſal experience, that, in the preſent ſtate, a large ſhare of what we enjoy or ſuffer is put in our own power; or, in other words, that pleaſure and pain are the natural conſequences of our actions. And conſequently, the general me-

(*i*) See the chapter on power in Mr. *Locke's Eſſay on human Underſtanding*.

thod

CHAP. I.

thod of the author of nature, with regard to us, may be justly said to be teaching, or forewarning us by experience in consequence, of having endued us with the capacity of observing the connexions of things, that if we act so and so, we shall obtain such enjoyments, and if so and so, we shall have such and such sufferings. That is, the author of nature gives us such and such enjoyments; or makes us feel such and such pains in consequence of our actions. We find, by experience, our maker does not so much as preserve our lives independent of our own care and vigilance to provide for our sustenance, to ward against destruction, and to make a proper use of the means appointed by nature for our safety and well-being. And, in general, all the external objects of our various, natural appetites and affections, can neither be obtained, nor enjoyed without our exerting ourselves in the ways appointed to have them; but, by thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy those objects in which our natural good consists. In like manner, our progress in knowledge, in any art, or in any virtue, all moral improvements depend upon ourselves: they, with the goods resulting from them, can only be acquired by our own application, or by setting ourselves to acquire them according to the natural methods of acquiring them. This is really our state; such really is the general law of our natures.

With regard to animal life and its functions.

With respect to moral attainments.

Why it is so.

Now, if it is asked, why the author of nature does not give to mankind promiscuously such and such perceptions without regard to their actions, or independently of themselves, as nature seems to do with inferior creatures? The answer is obvious, 'Tis because he has made moral agents as well as lower animals. For it is self-evident, that nothing can be called a moral attainment or perfection, but what is acquired by one's own exercise or application to attain to it. There must be a very high and noble pleasure in considering any quality as one's own acquisition, which

which no Beings can have but thoſe who are capable of making improvements and advancements by their own application, or who have a certain power and dominion in nature by which they can make purchaſes. Such Beings alone can have the ſatisfaction of looking upon any thing as their own; the pleaſure of adding to their own happineſs, or to that of others; and of approving themſelves for the right uſe of their own powers in ſo doing; which are the higheſt of all enjoyments. In fine, without ſuppoſing the capacity of foreſeeing conſequences, and of willing and chuſing to act in ſuch and ſuch manners, in order to attain to certain ends; virtue, merit, good and ill deſert have no meaning at all. The capacity of attaining to certain goods, by our own powers duly exerciſed and applied, is the very baſis of moral perfection. It is in conſequence of our having power to make conſiderable acquiſitions by our induſtry; or by duly exerciſing our natural faculties, that man riſes in the ſcale of life and perfection, as a moral agent capable of virtue and merit, praiſe, or blame, above merely perceptive beings, who never act or acquire, but are in all caſes paſſive and acted upon. This is too evident to be longer inſiſted upon.

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Our natural perfection conſiſts in our being ſo conſtituted.

"It is therefore a perfection to have a certain ſphere of activity, power, liberty, or dominion."

II. "But a ſphere of power or activity, ſuppoſes the prevalence of general laws, as far as that ſphere of power or activity (*k*) extends." This is as plain, as it is, that goods cannot be obtained, nor pains be avoided by us, unleſs there is a fixed way of getting the one, and ſhuning the other, which may be foreſeen and purſued. What is attainable, ſuppoſes a capacity and a certain way of attaining it, and what is evitable, ſuppoſes a capacity

Such power ſuppoſes nature to be governed by general laws.

(*k*) Some thing hath been ſaid on this ſubject already in the *Introduction*.

and

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and a certain way of escaping it. But a capacity and a way of attaining to; and a capacity and way of escaping certain ends and consequences, suppose general fixed uniform connexions in nature between certain manners of acting and certain consequences: that is, they suppose fixed, uniform and general laws with regard to the exercises of powers or actions. Were there not a certain fixed way of having or avoiding certain sensations, we could not have them nor avoid them as we will. And, in like manner, were there not a fixed way of attaining to knowledge, we could not possibly acquire it: were there not a fixed way of moving the passions, there could be no art of moving them: were there not a fixed way of conquering appetites and desires, we could not obtain the command and mastership of them: and so on with regard to all our powers, dispositions and affections, and their exercises and attainments. The same Author of nature, who hath conferred certain faculties upon us, must have established certain laws and connexions with regard to the exercises of them, and their effects and consequences; otherwise we could not know how to turn them to any account, how to employ them, or make any use of them.

Conclusion.

The result of all this is in general, "That we can have no liberty, no dominion, no sphere of activity and power, natural or moral, unless the natural and moral world are governed by general laws: or so far only as they are so governed can any created beings have power or efficiency: so far only can effects be dependent on their will as to their existence or non-existence."

We are now to enquire into some of these general laws which constitute our power.

Now, it being fit that we should have a sphere of activity constituted by general laws regulating the dependence of certain effects on our will, it only remains to be enquired what these general laws, that make our sphere of activity, are; and what their consequences

consequences are with respect to good or evil, happiness or misery. CHAP. I.

III. The first thing remarkable with regard to our sphere of activity is, "that our power and dominion encreases with our knowledge." Our power in the natural world encreases with our knowledge of the natural world. Thus, by the augmentation of our knowledge of the connexions that make the material or sensible world; or, in other words, of the properties of bodies, how much is our empire over sea, air, fire, and every element encreased? when any property of matter becomes known to us, then are we able to render it subservient to some use in life. And therefore in proportion to our advances in the knowledge and imitation of nature, have arts been invented, that are really so many additions to our power and dominion in the sensible world. It is the same with regard to the moral world. All true observations relative to the human mind, its powers and operations, and the connexions of moral objects do in like manner add toour moral dominion; to our empire over ourselves and others. Thus the knowledge of the passions, and their natural bearings and dependencies encrease our power and skill in governing them, by shewing us how they may be strengthned or diminished; directed to proper objects, or taken off from the pursuit of improper ones; in short, how they may be variously regulated so as to answer certain ends. No connexion belonging to the human mind, no law relative to intelligence, or the affections has been discovered, which has not, or may not be made conducive either to the direction of our conduct, or to the improvement of some pleasant and useful art. It is not moral philosophy only, or the science of the conduct of life that depends upon the knowledge of the human mind; oratory, poetry, and all the fine arts which have it for their end and scope to touch the human heart:

First general law. Intelligent power must depend on knowledge, and encrease with it.

In the natural World.

And in the moral world.

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heart agreeably, do no leſs depend than morality and politics, upon the ſcience of the human affections, and their natural dependence and ballance.

In general therefore, the increaſe of knowledge is neceſſary to the encreaſe of dominion; or rather, it is really an enlargement of power and property. Power not guided and directed by knowledge is not properly power, it is brute or blind force. But intelligent power can only augment with knowledge, or intelligence. It is therefore becauſe knowledge is dependent on us, or may be acquired by us, that we can have any power, any ſphere of activity; were not the acquiſition of knowledge dependent upon us to a certain degree, we could not have any power at all, nothing could be dependent upon us.

It is becauſe knowledge depends on us that we have or can acquire power.

IV. But the encreaſe of our power depends upon the encreaſe of our knowledge; and therefore, if our knowledge muſt be ſucceſſive or progreſſive, ſo muſt our power be. Now, "that knowledge muſt be progreſſive is evident beyond all doubt." Being gradually acquired by our application to ſtudy nature, take in ideas and compare them, it not only gives us a ſucceſſion of growing pleaſures; but it cannot but be progreſſive. For, 1. Nature itſelf, the ſole object of all real knowledge, is ſucceſſive or progreſſive. What elſe can direct our conduct, enable us to imitate nature, or to perform any operation in order to attain to any end, but the knowledge of nature's laws? But nature is progreſſive in all its productions: and general rules or canons can only be inferred by induction, from the obſervation of many individuals, or from many experiments about particular objects. Creatures cannot poſſibly attain to the knowledge of analogies, harmonies and general laws, any other way, than by going over many particular effects which do not all exiſt at once, but are ſucceſſive; and by comparing them one with another. 2. And as for abſtract or theoretic knowledge,

If knowledge be progreſſive, intelligent power muſt likewiſe be ſo.

Knowledge cannot but be progreſſive.

ledge, (as mathematics for inſtance) which is collected from the compariſon of ideas and their relations amongſt themſelves; that muſt likewiſe be progreſſive; becauſe diſcoveries made this way are nothing but the different appearances, ideas and their relations offer to the mind in different views or juxta-poſitions. When the immediate juxta-poſition of known relations is not ſufficient to give the mind the view it deſires, but intermediate ideas muſt be employed in order to make the agreement or diſagreement in queſtion appear; then it is plain, however faſt the mind may mount, yet it muſt mount by ſteps. And even where the immediate juxta-poſition of ideas, without any intermediate mean of compariſon, is ſufficient, yet one and the ſame juxta-poſition can produce but one view, or one truth. In order to every diſcovery, there muſt be a different poſition of objects; for perceiving truth, is nothing but perceiving the agreement or diſagreement of ideas in conſequence of ſome one or other way of placing or diſpoſing them in reſpect to one another. It is perceiving the relations of ideas by comparing them; and no poſition can be any other poſition but that one which it is. In fine, all real knowledge muſt be progreſſive, becauſe nature is ſucceſſive; and the laws of nature can only be gathered from particular effects by induction. And all theoretic knowledge muſt be progreſſive, becauſe the mind cannot poſſibly ſee ideas in different ſituations or juxta-poſitions to one another at one and the ſame time. That is abſolutely impoſſible with regard to created minds.

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"Our knowledge therefore is progreſſive."

V. "This knowledge, which is in its nature progreſſive, muſt depend upon our ſituations to take in ideas or views." It muſt be different as theſe are different, narrow if theſe be narrow, and proportionably large as theſe are large and extenſive. 1. It is certain, that the knowledge of no being can poſſibly

Knowledge muſt depend on our ſituations for taking in ideas or views.

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sibly exceed or go beyond its ideas. Ideas are the materials of knowledge. It cannot therefore extend further than our ideas; and consequently it cannot reach beyond experience, the only source of all our ideas. 2. Now, if it is asked, why men are placed in different situations? it may be answered, 1. It is because men are made for society, which, as shall be proved in its place, requires that men should be placed in different situations for many wise reasons; and with respect to knowledge, and social intercourse in that way, (for that is all that belongs to the present question) there is this obvious good end for it, even that being placed as it were in various points of sight with regard to nature the common object of our contemplation and imitation, men might thus have different prospects or views of the same object to compare one with another, and only be able to make out a tolerably adequate idea of any object by mutual assistance. 2. In whatever situation any man is placed, he may take in ideas that will afford him an exhaustless fund of pleasing contemplation. For what object does not as it were defy our intellect to exhaust it? however far we advance in any enquiry, there will still remain a surplusage of research with regard to its object, that can never be wholly gone through. Every field of speculation widens and enlarges to our view in proportion as we make progress in it. But, 3. Let us consider well what is demanded, when it is asked, why all men are not in the same situations, or precisely equal, or like ones for taking in ideas? For, in reality, it amounts to asking, why all different places in nature are not the same: since every different one must be a different point of sight. Now, whatever may be the case with respect to spirits without bodies; corporeal beings cannot penetrate one another and occupy the same space; different bodies must have each its own proper place peculiar to it; and consequently, every embodied being must have its own point of sight, or place of obser-

Men must have different situations and views.

obſervation, which no other can poſſeſs at the ſame time. 4. Nor is this all, every embody'd being muſt have its own particular organization diſtinguiſhed by peculiar differences from that of every other of the ſame ſpecies, tho' ſimilar to them all, in ſuch a manner, that they all are of the ſame ſpecific ſort. And muſt it not neceſſarily follow from this, that the ſenſible world to each individual of the ſame ſpecies, will be juſt as ſimilar to the ſenſible world of any other, as their organizations are ſimilar, and juſt as different as their organizations are different? The external, material world, whether it be called the external cauſe, or occaſion of thoſe ſenſible ideas and their connexions, which make to each of us what we call the ſenſible world, is entirely out of the queſtion, when we ſpeak of ſenſations excited by it in each individual mind according to certain fixed laws. It may be the ſame, immutable thing in itſelf. But as for the ſenſations produced in us from without by means of a material organization, theſe muſt be as different as the organizations are, by which they are produced. And it is not more certain, that the organizations of men being ſo like, that they may be juſtly ſaid to be ſpecifically the ſame; our ſenſations conveyed from without, muſt likewiſe be ſo like, that they may be ſaid to be ſpecifically the ſame; than it is certain, that our organizations, notwithſtanding their ſpecifical agreement, being really ſo different, that every one is juſtly ſaid to have a peculiar organization, our ſenſations conveyed from without muſt likewiſe be ſo different, that every one of us may be ſaid to have different ſenſations. So that, in reality, there are not only as many different ſenſible worlds in ſpecies, as there are various ſpecies of ſenſitive beings; but there are as many different ſenſible worlds, as there are different or particular organizations of ſenſitive beings of any one ſpecies. It is ſimilarity amidſt vaſt variety with reſpect to ſenſations, and the orders in which they are conveyed, in conſequence of ſimi-

With reſpect to the ſenſible world.

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larity amidſt variety of organizations, that is the foundation of cloſe and intimate intercourſe among individuals of the ſame ſenſitive ſpecies. And the reaſon why there can only be a remote and very general intercourſe among ſenſitive beings of a different ſpecies is, becauſe there can only be a general ſimilarity between their ſenſations.

In like manner with regard to mental frame and the moral world.

V. But which is yet more, every individual of any ſpecies of rational beings, howſoever like it may be ſpecifically to the others of the ſame ſpecies, muſt however have its own particular fabrick of mind, and peculiar caſt of underſtanding; and conſequently, every one muſt take in views in a manner ſomewhat different from every other. The views of every one of the ſame ſpecies will be ſimilar, their fabrick of mind being ſimilar; but their views will likewiſe be different, every man's complexion, or caſt of underſtanding being different. Similarity of views in conſequence of ſimilarity of conſtitution is all that can conſtitute the ſame ſpecies of minds; and it will be a ſufficient foundation for a cloſe and intimate commerce among beings, that cannot poſſibly take place among minds differing from one another in ſpecies.

But if every body muſt have its particular organization, and every mind its particular fabrick, and conſequently the ſenſations, perceptions, ideas, and views of every individual embodied mind muſt be peculiar; not preciſely the ſame, but different; the only queſtion with regard to our fabrick and ſituations for receiving or forming ideas, or for taking in and forming views, muſt be, "Whether there is not ſuch a ſimilarity and agreement amongſt us in theſe, as makes our ſpecies capable of very much happineſs in the way of ſocial correſpondence and intercourſe?" Now, that we are ſo conſtituted, is very plain; ſince we are ſo made, that, notwithſtanding all the variety amongſt mankind, whether

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in mental ſtructure or bodily organization, it is hardly poſſible for us to miſtake one another in our correſpondence with regard to our ſenſations conveyed from without; and it is very poſſible for us to come to a right underſtanding with one another about all the other objects of our contemplation, enquiry and mutual commerce. But this reaſoning will be better underſtood when we come to conſider the effects of our relation to a ſenſible world by means of our bodies. CHAP. I.

Thus then we have ſeen, that "our knowledge, without which we can have no power, muſt be progreſſive, and muſt depend upon our ſituation for taking in views or ideas."

VI. But "it muſt likewiſe depend upon our application to make progreſs in it." For, as it hath been ſhewn, this is the general law with regard to our nature; that the greater part of our happineſs, ſhall be our own purchaſe. And what depends upon a being's own purchaſe, muſt neceſſarily depend upon its exerting itſelf with more or leſs vigour and activity to make that purchaſe. It is therefore needleſs to dwell upon this head. Knowledge muſt depend upon induſtry to acquire it.

VII. But there are yet two other remarkable circumſtances, with regard to our capacity of making progreſs in knowledge. 1ſt. The difference amongſt men in point of powers and abilities. 2dly, The dependence of our progreſs in knowledge upon our ſituations for receiving aſſiſtances by ſocial communication.

Now as to the firſt, it will be eaſily granted that a difference in powers muſt make a difference with reſpect to progreſs in knowledge. And that all men have not equal abilities, for making proficiency in knowledge, is a fact beyond diſpute. Wherefore the only remaining queſtion on this head is with regard to the fitneſs of inequalities among mankind, in reſpect of powers; but this cannot be called into doubt, without denying the It muſt depend upon difference with reſpect to natural abilities.

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fitneſs of making man a ſocial creature, or of intending him for ſociety and ſocial happineſs: ſince the interchange of good offices, in which ſociety conſiſts, neceſſarily ſuppoſes mutual dependence in conſequence of mutual wants; and not only variety of talents, as well as of taſtes, and tempers; but likewiſe ſuperiority and inferiority, in reſpect of powers. Without ſuch differences and inequalities, mankind would be, in a great meaſure, a number of independent individuals: or at leaſt there would be no place for the greater part of thoſe various employments and reciprocal obligations, without which, or ſome others analogous to them, there can be no community. This is as certain and obvious, as that giving ſuppoſes a receiver, as well as a giver; and that giving can only be neceſſary, where there is ſomething wanted: One cannot beſtow, or give what he has not; and he who is ſupplied or redreſſed, muſt have been in want or diſtreſs, previouſly to the relief received.

Progreſs in knowledge muſt depend on ſocial aſſiſtances.

As for the other, it is beyond all doubt. For in converſation, how does fancy warm and ſprout! It is then that invention is moſt fertile, and that imagination is moſt vigorous and ſprightly. The beſt way of getting to the bottom of any ſubject is by canvaſſing and ſounding it in company: then is an object preſented to us by turns in all its various lights, ſo that one is able, as it were, to ſee round it. As iron ſharpens iron, ſo does converſation whet wit and invention. Ideas flow faſter into the mind, and marſhal themſelves more eaſily and naturally into good order in ſociety, than in ſolitary ſtudy. In fine, to be convinced of the happy effects of ſociety in this reſpect, we need only compare a peaſant confined to his hut and herd in the country, with a mechanic of the loweſt order in a great city (*n*). And when

(*n*) Mr. *Locke on the conduct of the underſtanding.*

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we look into the history of arts and sciences or of mankind in general, nothing is more evident, than that learning of whatever sort, and arts and sciences, never made any great progress but in places of large and extensive commerce. There always was and always will be such a connexion; because men were intended by nature to arrive at perfection in a social way; or by united endeavours. Now as for that fitness, it cannot be called into question no more than the other just mentioned, unless it be said, it is not fit that men should be made for partnership, or for social happiness. For, how can beings be made for society without being so formed as to stand in need of one another; so made as to have pleasure in social communication; and to receive mutual benefits and assistances, or succours from one another in the exercises of their powers; or, unless their perfection and happiness be such a one as can only be acquired by social union and united force? But what relates to society shall be more fully considered in another place. CHAP. I.

From what hath been said, it is clear, 1. "That it is the general law of our natures with regard to our dominion, power or liberty, that it shall depend upon our progress in knowledge." 2. That it is the general law of our natures with regard to knowledge, "That being in the nature of things progressive, it can only be acquired by experience in proportion to our application, and to our situation for taking in ideas and views, and to our situation for receiving assistances by social communication." So that if men's natural abilities be equal, their progress in knowledge will be in proportion to their situation for receiving ideas, and for receiving assistances by social communication: and if their situations are equal in both these respects, their progress in knowledge will be in proportion to their natural abilities, or their industry and application. But as one's knowledge is, so will his capacity or skill be of employing all his other Recapitulation.

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powers. Intelligent power ſuppoſes intelligence or knowledge.

The laws with reſpect to our intelligent power and progreſs in knowledge are good.

Now all theſe laws or circumſtances relative to knowledge and intelligent action, having been proved to be either neceſſary or fit; it muſt follow, that all the phenomena which are reducible to theſe laws of nature are good, being the effects of good general laws. For without general laws there can be no power or ſphere of activity; and all the intereſts of intelligent beings require, that the laws relative to them be general, that they may be aſcertainable by them.

But we ſhall have yet a clearer view of our make and conſtitution with reſpect to knowledge, if we conſider a little the faculties and diſpoſitions with which we are provided and furniſhed for making progreſs in knowledge.

Inſtances of the care and concern of nature about us, with regard to knowledge conſiſtently with the preceeding laws.

Let us, however, before we go further, obſerve; that tho' knowledge be progreſſive and dependent on our diligence and application to improve in it, yet the care of nature about us with regard to knowledge is very remarkable in ſeveral inſtances.

First inſtance.

I. The wiſdom and goodneſs of nature appears with great evidence, in making a part of knowledge, which it is neceſſary for us to have in our infant ſtate, and before we can think, meditate, compare and reaſon, as it were unavoidable, or impoſſible not to be acquired by us inſenſibly; while, at the ſame time, knowledge is in the main progreſſive, and can only be acquired gradually in proportion to our diligence to improve in it. For how ſoon, how exceeding quickly do we learn by experience to form very ready judgments concerning ſuch laws and connexions in the ſenſible world, as it is abſolutely neceſſary to our well-being, that we ſhould early know; or be able to judge of betimes with great readineſs, or almoſt inſtantaneouſly? How ſoon do we learn to judge of magnitudes, diſtances and forms, and of the

the connexions between the ideas of ſight and touch, as far, at leaſt, as the common purpoſes and conveniencies of life require; in ſo much, that when we are grown up and begin to reflect, we have quite forgot, how we learned theſe connexions, and became able to judge of them ſo readily. Nay, when we come to play the philoſopher about them, it is very difficult for us not to confound thoſe ideas, which are however totally diſtinct from one another, and only connected together by the inſtitution of the Author of nature. It is indeed with wonderful facility that we learn any language in our tender years; but this moſt uſeful of all *languages* for us to know, the *language* of nature, as it may very properly be called, is what we learn ſooneſt, and as it were neceſſarily and inſenſibly. (*o*) CHAP. I.

II. The wiſdom and goodneſs of nature does no leſs evidently appear in directing and admoniſhing us by uneaſy ſenſations to provide neceſſary ſupplies for our bodies, and to defend them againſt what is hurtful to them. For thus, nature teaches and inſtructs us in the knowledge of what is prejudicial to us, or neceſſary for our preſervation; and how highly inconvenient it would have been, not to be thus admoniſhed by nature, ſince knowledge muſt be progreſſive, and can only be acquired gradually from experience and obſervation in proportion to our application to advance in it, is too manifeſt to need any proof? But of this afterwards in its proper place. Second inſtance.

III. The wiſdom and goodneſs of nature likewiſe diſcovers itſelf, in giving us a rule to guide us in our moral conduct, diſtinct from and antecedent to all our knowledge acquired by reaſoning, which is a moral ſenſe of beauty and deformity in affections, Third inſtance.

(*o*) See *an eſſay on viſion*, and *a treatiſe concerning the principles of human knowledge, by the Biſhop of* Cloyd.

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actions and characters, by means of which, an affection, action or character, no ſooner preſents itſelf to our mind, than it is neceſſarily approved or diſapproved by us. Human nature is not left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue to form itſelf, obſervations concerning the advantages and diſadvantages of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. Reaſon muſt be grown up to very great maturity, and be very conſiderably improved by exerciſe and culture, before men can be able to go through thoſe long deductions, which ſhew ſome actions to be in the whole advantageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. But the Author of nature has much better furniſhed us for a virtuous conduct than many philoſophers ſeem to imagine, or, at leaſt are willing to grant, by almoſt as quick and powerful inſtructions as we have for the preſervation of our bodies. He has given us ſtrong affections to be the ſprings of each virtuous action, and made virtue a lovely form that we might eaſily diſtinguiſh it from its contrary, and be made happy by the purſuit of it. As the Author of nature has determined us to receive by our outward ſenſes, pleaſant or diſagreeable ideas of objects, according as they are uſeful or hurtful to our bodies, and to receive from uniform objects the pleaſures of beauty and harmony, to excite us to the purſuit of knowledge, and to reward us for it; in the ſame manner, he has given us a moral ſenſe to direct our actions, and to give us ſtill nobler pleaſures; ſo that while we are only intending the good of others, we undeſignedly promote our own greateſt private good. (*q*)

Fourth inſtance.

IV. The wiſdom and goodneſs of nature ſhews itſelf very clearly, in wonderfully adapting our minds to be ſatisfied with evidence ſuited to our external condition and circumſtances. We are made

(*q*) See *an Enquiry into the origine of our ideas of beauty*, by *Mr. Hutchinſon*, whoſe words I have here copied.

for

for acquiring knowledge or information concerning the frame of nature, and the connexions of things from experience; but we must in innumerable cases act upon probability, that is, upon presumptions founded upon analogy or likeness: and accordingly, in this kind of evidence, we feel great satisfaction and contentment of mind. That we must, in innumerable cases, act upon probable evidence, is a fact too evident to need any proof; and that acting upon probable evidence, is acting upon presumptions founded upon analogy or likeness, will likewise be readily acknowledged by all who will allow themselves to consider what *probability* means. That which chiefly constitutes it, is expressed in the word *likely*; that is, (*r*) like some known truth or true event; like, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its circumstances. Now, it belongs to the subject of *logick* to enquire into the nature, the foundation and measure of probability, or to reduce the extent, compass or force of analogical reasoning, to general observations and rules; and thus to guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable: but if we enquire from whence it proceeds, that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, or full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it; and which it does necessarily produce in every one proportionally to its various degrees. This question contains its own proper and full answer. It is because the mind is formed to receive satisfaction from it, and acquiesce in it proportionally to its several degrees. And the final cause of this formation is no less evident; since our present state makes our acting upon such evidence

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(*r*) See Dr. *Butler's* (Bishop of *Bristow*) *Analogy*, &c. where probability is excellently discoursed of. See *Cicero de inventione rhetorica*, Lib. 1. *probabilis erit narratio, si in ea videbuntur in esse ea, quæ solent apparere in veritate.* ——— *Ac veri quidem similis ex his rationibus esse poterit, &c.* ——— *Necessarie demonstrantur, ea quæ aliter ac dicuntur, nec fieri, nec probari possunt.* ——— *&c.*

necessary,

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neceſſary. When demonſtration is ſaid to force our aſſent, the meaning is, that by it, we have a clear perception of the neceſſary agreement or diſagreement of certain ideas; an agreement or diſagreement that cannot but take place, But where ſuch a neceſſary agreement or diſagreement of ideas cannot be perceived, as it cannot be with reſpect to any connexions of nature of poſitive inſtitution, of which ſort are, for inſtance, the connexion between the ideas of ſight and touch, and almoſt all, if not all the connexions of the ſenſible world. In ſuch caſes, nothing but various degrees of likelihood or unlikelihood can be perceived; and ſuch perceptions do not ſo properly operate upon our underſtanding producing aſſent, as upon our temper producing ſatisfaction and complacency; the contraries of which are wavering and miſtruſt, or diffidence. But not to ſeem to diſpute about words, let the effect of probability, that is, of likeneſs, be called an effect upon the underſtanding, or upon the will; a judgment or a tendency to determine ourſelves to act this or the other way, or not to act at all, according to the various force of preſumption; yet the effect of it upon the mind cannot be ultimately accounted for, without ſuppoſing an aptitude or diſpoſition in our natures to be influenced by preſumptions or appearances of likeneſs. 'Tis the ſame here, as with regard to the perception of beauty; when we have analyſed it into its conſtituent and concomitant parts; we have in that caſe a clearer and more adequate notion of it; yet it muſt ſtill remain true with reſpect to it, that its conſtituent and concomitant parts make a perception that affects the mind in a certain manner, merely becauſe the mind is intended and fitted by nature to be ſo affected by it. We muſt in all ſuch caſes at laſt come to an ultimate reaſon, which can be no other than the adjuſtment of the mind to certain objects. But ſo far as we ſee and find our minds ſuited to our ſtate and circumſtances;

ſo

so far do we see clear proofs of wisdom and goodness in our make and contrivance, or of care and concern about our welfare. 'Tis almost unnecessary to remark here, that to say, the mind often presumes rashly, and makes false judgments about probability, is no more any objection against its right formation in our circumstances with respect to its natural aptitude to be influenced by probability, than it is against certainty and scientific evidence, wherever that is attainable, to say many philosophers have been deceived, and have mistaken absurdities for demonstrations. CHAP. I.

V. The care of nature about us, with respect to knowledge, appears by its giving us considerable light into some more necessary parts of knowledge; or, at least, considerable hints and helps for discovering several useful arts, by the operations and productions of inferior animals directed by their natural instincts. For these acting as nature impels them, shew us some how to build, others to swim, others to dive and fish, some how to spin and weave, some how to cure wounds and diseases, others how to modulate the voice into melody, *&c.* Fifth instance.

This truth is charmingly represented by an excellent poet, in a poem (that must be highly valued while moral science and true harmony are relished in the world) which I shall have frequent occasion to quote.

See him from nature *rising slow* to art!
To copy instinct *then was* reason's *part*;
Thus then to man the voice of nature spake—
" Go! from the creatures thy instructions take;
Learn from the birds what food the thickets yield;
Learn from the beasts the physic of the field:

Thy

Thy arts of building from the bee *receive*;
Learn of the mole *to plow, the* worm *to weave;*
Learn from the little nautilus *to ſail,*
Spread the thin oar and catch the driving gale.
Here too all forms of ſocial union find,
And hence let reaſon, late inſtruct mankind:
Here ſubterranean works and cities ſee,
The towns aerial on the waving tree.
Learn each ſmall people's genius, policies;
The ants republic, and the realm of bees;
How thoſe in common all their ſtores beſtow,
And anarchy without confuſion know,
And theſe for ever, tho' a monarch reign,
Their ſep'rate cells and properties maintain.
Mark what unvary'd laws preſerve their ſtate,
Laws wiſe as nature, and as fix'd as fate,
In vain thy reaſon finer webs ſhall draw,
Entangle juſtice in her net of law.
And right too rigid, harden into wrong,
Still for the ſtrong too weak, the weak too ſtrong.
Yet go! and thus o'er all the creatures ſway,
Thus let the wiſer make the reſt obey,
And for thoſe arts mere inſtinct could afford,
Be crown'd as monarchs, or as gods ador'd.

(*r*) Eſſay on man, epiſt. III.

Sixth inſtance.

VI. Add to this, that as it is from nature only that the real knowledge of nature can be learned, ſo the connexions of nature lie open to our view (*ſ*). It is only becauſe men have wilfully ſhut their eyes a-

(*r*) See *Plutarch de ſolertia animantium.*

(*ſ*) Artes vero innumerabilis repertæ ſunt, docente natura, quam imitata ratio, res ad vitam neceſſarias ſollerter conſecuta eſt. Ipſum autem hominem eadem natura non ſolum celeritate mentis ornavit; ſed etiam ſenſus tanquam ſatellites attribuit & nuntios: & rerum plurimarum obſcuras & neceſſarias intelligentias enudavit; quaſi; fundamentum ſcientiæ.——— *Cicero de legibus*, Lib. I.

gainſt

gainſt nature, and have vainly ſet themſelves to de- CHAP I.
viſe or gueſs its methods of operation, without tak-
ing any aſſiſtance from nature itſelf, that natural knowledge has made ſuch ſlow advances. Whence it comes about that men have at any time been miſled into the fooliſh attempt of underſtanding nature by any other method, than by attending to it, and carefully obſerving it, is a queſtion I ſhall not now enter upon. But ſo obvious are the greater part of nature's connexions to all thoſe who ſtudy nature, that ſo ſoon as the right, the only method of getting into its ſecrets was purſued, great improvements were quickly made in that knowledge; and all diſcoveries in it, after they are found out, appear ſo ſimple and ſo obvious, that one cannot help wondering how it came about that they were not ſooner ſeen and obſerved.

Now nature, in order to put us into the right way of coming at real knowledge, has not only implanted in our minds an eager deſire or thirſt after knowledge, but likewiſe a ſtrong diſpoſition to emulate all the works of nature that fall more immediately under our cogniſance, and in a manner to vie with nature in productions of our own. This diſpoſition to emulate nature, as it adds conſiderable force to our deſire of knowledge, ſo it ſerves to aſſiſt us in acquiring it; for it neceſſarily leads and prompts us to copy what is done by nature, and thus makes us attend very cloſely to the object or phenomenon we would imitate, and try experiments about it; by which means alone, it is obvious, any real knowledge can be acquired. But not only is the knowledge of nature owing to this imitative principle in our minds, together with our deſire of knowledge; but hence likewiſe proceed all the imitative arts, Poetry, Painting, Statuary, *&c.* Whatever we ſee performed by nature, we are emulous and reſtleſs to perform ſomething like it, and ſo to rival nature. And hence all the bold and daring efforts of the human

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man mind, in the various ways or arts of imitating, or rather excelling nature. (*u*).

A review of our natural furniture for knowledge.

But as conſiderable as theſe aſſiſtances are which have been mentioned, they amount but to a ſmall ſhare of what nature hath done for us, in order to fit us for progreſs in knowledge, and the manifold pleaſures ariſing from truth, and the ſearch after it.

Knowledge naturally agreeable to the mind.

I. Progreſs in knowledge is rewarded by itſelf every ſtep it makes; for darkneſs is not more diſagreeable to the natural eye, than ignorance is to the mind: the breaking in of knowledge upon the underſtanding, is not leſs refreſhing and chearing than the appearance of day after a gloomy, weary night to a traveller. Every diſcovery we make; every glimpſe of truth, as it begins to dawn upon the mind, gives high delight. And thus every acquiſition in ſcience recompences our labour, and becomes a ſtrong incitement to greater application, in order to make further improvements, bring in freſh purchaſes, and ſo procure new pleaſures to ourſelves. The reaſon of all this can be no other, than that truth or knowledge is naturally as agreeable and ſatisfactory to the underſtanding, as light is to the eye; and that there is really implanted in our natures an appetite after knowledge. It is indeed a miſtake to imagine that we have no appetites of the moral kind. The deſire of ſociety, and the impatient thirſt after knowledge, are as properly appetites, as hunger and thirſt, *&c.* The mind of man is naturally anxious and inquiſitive; uneaſy while it is in the dark about any thing, and anxious to un-

We have a natural appetite after knowledge.

(*u*) See *Ariſtotle's Poeticks*, cap. 4. Nam & imitari, innatum hominibus a pueris eſt; atque hac re differunt ipſi ab aliis animalibus, quod homo ſit animal maxime aptum ad imitandum; primaſque rerum perceptiones ſibi ipſi faciat per imitationem, non magiſtrorum præceptis, ſed exemplis aliorum ductus: et gaudere omnes rebus imitatione expreſſis naturale eſt veluti picturis, ſculpturis & ſimilibus, &c.

derſtand

derſtand it; and when it comes to a ſatisfactory knowledge of any object, it then looks upon it in a great meaſure as its own; as ſubdued by its underſtanding, and at its command; and thus it triumphs in its own power and force. And the oftner and more intenſely this pleaſure has been felt, the deſire of knowledge waxes ſtronger and keener. It grows in proportion as it has been exerciſed and gratified by ſtudy and contemplation. But let us obſerve how this natural deſire of knowledge is excited, ſupported, gratified and directed (*x*). CHAP. I.

II. New or uncommon objects greatly attract our minds, and give us very high pleaſure. Now by this means we are prompted to look out for new ideas, and to give all diligence to make freſh diſcoveries in ſcience. "Every thing that is new or uncommon (ſays an excellent writer (*y*), raiſes a pleaſure in the imagination, becauſe it fills the ſoul with an agreeable ſurprize, gratifies its curioſity, and gives it an idea of which it was not before poſſeſſed. We are indeed ſo often converſant with one ſet of objects, and tired out with ſo many repeated ſhows of the ſame things, that whatever is new or uncommon, contributes not a little to vary human life, and to divert our minds for a while with the ſtrangeneſs of its appearance; it ſerves us for a kind of refreſhment, and takes off from that ſatiety we are apt to complain of, in our uſual and ordinary entertainments. It is this that beſtows charms on a monſter, and makes even the imperfections of nature pleaſe us. It is this that recommends variety, New or uncommon objects wonderfully attract our attention.

(*x*) See *Cicero de officiis*, Lib. 1. In primis que hominis eſt propria veri inquiſitio, &c. Tantus eſt igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor & ſcientiæ ut nemo dubitare poſſit, quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. *De finibus*. Lib. 5.

(*y*) See the eſſays on the pleaſures of imagination, *Spectator*, Vol. 6.

when

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when the mind is every inſtant called off to ſomething new, and the attention not ſuffered to dwell too long, and waſte itſelf on any particular object. It is this likewiſe, which improves what is great or beautiful, and makes it afford the mind double entertainment. Groves, fields, meadows, are at any ſeaſon of the year pleaſant to look upon, but never ſo much as at the beginning of the ſpring, when they are all new and freſh, with their firſt gloſs upon them, and not yet too much accuſtomed and familiar to the eye. For this reaſon there is nothing more enlivens a proſpect, than rivers, jetteaus, or falls of water, when the ſcene is perpetually changing, and entertaining the ſight every moment with ſomething that is new: We are quickly tired with looking upon hills and valleys, where every thing continues fixed and ſettled in the ſame place and poſture; but find our thoughts not a little agitated and relieved at the ſight of ſuch objects as are ever in motion, and ſliding away from beneath the eye of the beholder."

The final reaſon or cauſe why it is ſo.

After this deſcription of ſeveral effects of novelty, it will be eaſy to every one to run over many more of the ſame claſs in his imagination; and the reaſon why we are ſo made, is becauſe we are made for motion and progreſs: not to ſtand ſtill, but to go forward and proceed; we are made for encreaſe, and gradual advancement; and therefore variety is naturally ſo agreeable, that we cannot be eaſy without making ſome new acquirements.

How this itch of novelty is checked and ballanced by the power of habit.

But by way of counterpoiſe in our frame to this uſeful deſire of novelty, and delight in variety, leſt it ſhould render us too ſuperficial in our attention to objects, and too rambling and deſultory in our queſt of knowledge, it is ſo ordered by our make, that by continuing a little while our attention to the ſame object, a liking to it is contracted: an object, by being frequently preſent to our view, becomes

comes familiar to us, we form an intimacy with it (z). And thus, as the pleaſure of friendſhip retains us from continually running about in ſearch of new faces, ſo the habitude of ſtudying in the ſame train, or of conſidering the ſame kind of ideas, by rendring them more agreeable to us, contributes to make us more fixed and ſteady in our application to the conſideration of an object, till we have fully examined it. It prevents our becoming too changeable and unſettled in our purſuit of knowledge, ever to make great advances in any kind of it. Such is the power of habit, which ſhall be more fully conſidered afterwards: and hence the ſage advice given by philoſophers with regard to the choice of one's buſineſs or profeſſion in life, "To chooſe the beſt, that is, the moſt advantageous, and cuſtom will make it agreeable." CHAP. I.

III. The mind naturally delights in comparing ideas, and in traceing their agreements and diſagreements, their reſemblances and differences; and it is thus that knowledge is acquired. But which greatly contributes at once to give pleaſure to the mind in the purſuit of knowledge, and to direct it to the proper objects and methods of inquiry, is the natural delight of the mind in uniformity amidſt variety; or in other words, in unity of deſign, and the conſent of parts to one end. The objects of contemplation that pleaſe immediately, or at their firſt appearance to the mind, are thoſe that are found upon after-examination, to be regular, to have unity, or to make ſyſtems eaſily taken in and comprehended by the mind. Every ſuch form naturally attracts the mind, and is wonderfully agreeable to it. It could not do ſo, were we not ſo formed as

The natural delight of the mind in beauty.

In natural beauty.

(z) Habit is more fully conſidered afterwards in a particular chapter.

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to receive a particular, distinguishing pleasure from such objects: for whatever pleases, necessarily presupposes an aptitude or disposition in our nature to be agreeably affected by it. Now being so framed as to be naturally and necessarily affected by such objects as have been described, in an agreeable manner, we are thus prompted by nature to delight in the contemplation of such objects, and to seek after them. We are by this means led, impelled and directed to resolve every object into its constituent parts, and to refer these parts to one another, and to their common end; or to consider a thing as a whole, and to look out for its principal meaning, scope and intent, and to enquire how that is accomplished; by which means, by the simplest, and those that are merely necessary, or by too complex a way and superfluous toil. It is thus we are led to enquire into nature, trace its analogies and harmonies, or general laws, and to admire its simplicity and frugality. And in like manner in abstract science, as in mathematics, for example, we are conducted by the same principle, to aim at universal conclusions, or such general theorems and canons, as contain in them a great variety of particular cases. It is the same taste that enables us to distinguish what we call ease and grace, whether in external motion, or any composition of wit and genius; namely, our sense of the beauty which consists in the due medium between the *nimium & parum*, the too little and too much; for so the *decorum* is defined by the antients; and all beauty, whether in nature itself, or in the arts that imitate nature, ultimately resolves itself into the observance of this maxim, "*Frustra fit per plura quod per pauciora fieri potest.*" Nature is beautiful, because nature "*nihil frustra facit.*" Nature is simple, and we are most aptly contrived to delight in nature, to find out the proper way of studying and imitating it, by

Thus we are led to enquire after analogies and general laws in nature.

our

our natural delight in the beauty which results from simplicity and regularity (*b*).

The natural delight of our mind in moral beauty.

But besides our natural sense of beauty and harmony in material objects, arising from unity amidst variety, we have analogous to it another sense, *viz.* a sense of beauty in affections, actions and characters. Beauty in merely corporeal forms is indeed exceeding entertaining to the mind. "There is nothing that makes its way more directly to the soul than beauty, which immediately diffuses a secret satisfaction and complacency through the imagination, and gives a finishing to any thing that is great or uncommon. The first discovery of it strikes the mind with secret joy, and spreads a chearfulness and delight through all its faculties." But does not every one feel that beauty of the moral kind is yet more charming and transporting than any corporeal beauty! And what is that, but such a tendency of an action to publick good, as shews generous intention, and benevolent affection in the agent. Now as by the former sense we are impelled and pointed to look out for unity of design, simplicity and consent of parts, and therefore to trace analogies in nature, and to reduce like appearances to general laws; so by the latter, we are prompted and directed to enquire after the goodness and fitness of general laws, that is, their tendency to the good of the whole to which they belong, or which

Thus we are led to enquire after good final reasons.

(*b*) This maxim is well explained by Sir *Isaac Newton*, Natura superfluis causis non luxurat. All beauty natural or moral consists in this. See what *Cicero* says of our natural and moral sense of beauty, in the beginning of his first book of Offices; and compare it with several other passages, that in particular, Lib. 1. Cap. 28. where he treats of the *Decorum* at full length. See likewise what he says of the *nimium & parum* ad M. Brutum Orator. N. 22. Ed. Schrivelii. See likewise *Theages Pythagoreus, de virtutibus*. Decorum autem est quod esse decet, id quod nec addi quicquam, nec demi postulat, quandoquidem, ipsum quod esse decet: Indecori vero species duæ sunt *nimium & parum*. Illud plus quam decet habet, hoc minus, &c.

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is conſtituted and regulated by them. This taſte of the mind as naturally leads us to ſuch reſearches as any other appetite impells us to gratify it. And do not theſe two diſpoſitions in our nature, ſo analogous to one another, make an excellent proviſion or aſſiſtance for our making progreſs in knowledge? They naturally point us towards the objects, and methods of enquiring, that will be at once moſt pleaſing and uſeful. They tell us, as it were, what we ought chiefly to employ our enquiries about, and how we ought to manage them.

The natural delight of our mind in great objects.

IV. To conclude. We are conſiderably aided and directed in our reſearches after knowledge, by our natural delight in great objects, or ſuch as wonderfully dilate and expand the mind, and put its graſp to the trial. For thus we are prompted not only to admire the grandeur of nature in general, or in the large and aſtoniſhing proſpects its immenſity affords us; and in the greatneſs of ſome particular objects of nature, of an enlivening and ſublime kind; but in that greatneſs of manner which appears every where in its methods of operation, even in the minuteſt objects of ſenſe; and to copy after this greatneſs of nature in our imitations of it by arts (*). The mind being naturally great, and

(*) See the *Spectators* upon the pleaſures of imagination, Vol. 6. where all theſe ſources of pleaſure are handled, novelty, beauty and greatneſs. See particularly what is there ſaid of the laſt. By greatneſs, I do not only mean the bulk of any ſingle object, but the largeneſs of a whole view, conſidered as one entire piece. Such are the proſpects of an open champain country, a vaſt uncultivated deſart, of huge heaps of mountains, high rocks and precipices, or a wide expanſe of waters, where we are not ſtruck with the novelty or beauty of the ſight, but with that rude kind of magnificence, which appears in many of theſe ſtupendous works of nature. Our imagination loves to be filled with an object, or to graſp at any thing that is too big for its capacity. We are flung into a pleaſing aſtoniſhment at ſuch unbounded views, and feel a delightful fulneſs and amazement in the

and fond of power and perfection, delights highly in trying its ſtrength, and in ſtretching itſelf, and therefore is exceedingly pleaſed with thoſe objects, CHAP. I.

the ſoul at the apprehenſions of them. The mind of man naturally hates every thing that looks like a reſtraint upon it, and is apt to fancy itſelf under a ſort of confinement, when the ſight is pent up in a narrow compaſs, and ſhortened on every ſide by the neighbourhood of walls or mountains. On the contrary, a ſpacious horizon is an image of liberty, where the eye has room to range abroad, to expatiate at large on the immenſity of its views, and to loſe itſelf amidſt the variety of objects that offer themſelves to its obſervation. He illuſtrates this remark afterwards by examples from gardening,——from architecture. See what he ſays there of greatneſs of manner. In the ſecond place we are to conſider greatneſs of manner in architecture, which has ſuch force upon the imagination, that a ſmall building when it appears, ſhall give the mind nobler ideas than one of twenty times the bulk, where the manner is ordinary and little. Thus perhaps, a man would have been more aſtoniſhed with the majeſtick air that appeared in one of *Lyſippus*'s Statues of *Alexander*, though no bigger than the life, than he might have been with mount *Atlas*, had it been cut into the figure of the hero, according to the propoſal of *Phidias*, with a river in one hand, and a city in the other. Let any one reflect on the diſpoſition of mind he finds in himſelf, at his firſt entrance into the *Pantheon* at *Rome*, and how his imagination is filled with ſomething great and amazing; and at the ſame time conſider how little in proportion he is affected with the inſide of a gothic cathedral, though it be five times larger than the other; which can ariſe from nothing elſe but the greatneſs of the manner in the one, and the meanneſs in the other.——See the obſervation he adds from Mr. *Freart*'s parallel of the ancient and modern architecture.—— Compare with theſe obſervations what *Longinus* ſays *de Sublimitate*, Cap. 35. Naturam non humile nos quoddam, aut contemptum animal reputaſſe.—— Sed invictum una ſimul & inſuperabile mentibus noſtris omnis magnæ rei, & humanam conditionem excedentis, adeoque divinioris, ingeneraviſſe deſiderium. Atque hinc fieri, ut humanæ mentis contemplationi & conjectui ne totus quidam orbis ſufficiat, ſed ipſos ſæpenumero ambientis omnia cæli terminos immenſa animi agitatione tranſcendat.——inde intelliget, cui nos rei nati ſimus. Itaque inſtinctu illo ducti naturæ non exiles miramur rivulos, quamvis puro pellucidiores vitro & humanis magis apti ſint uſibus: verum a conſpectum vel Danubii vel Rheni reſiſtimus attoniti; maxime omnium ad ipſius intuitum oceani. Ad eundem modum non igniculum aut flammulam, &c.

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that dilate it, or give it occaſion and excite it to expand itſelf.

The imagination a moſt uſeful power.

Let us now proceed to conſider a little ſome of our faculties or powers, by which we are fitted for knowledge. And here we may obſerve, 1. That the imagination is a faculty of wonderful uſe in our frame: it is by this faculty that we have memory, and are able to recal abſent objects to our mind, ſet lovely pictures of them before us, and thus contemplate and examine them, as if they were actually preſent with us. 2. It is this faculty that renders us capable of many delightful imitative arts, which for that reaſon are called arts of imagination. Both theſe facts are too obvious to need any proof. 3. But it is well worth while to remark how it comes about, that imagination is capable of affording us ſuch a vaſt variety of pleaſures, and of inventing ſo many fine arts, as rhetoric, poetry, painting, *&c.* for it is evident, that without the imagination theſe arts would be abſolutely unknown to us. Now it has been often obſerved on that ſubject, that ſuch is the analogy between ſenſible and moral objects, that there is none of the latter ſort that may not be cloathed with a ſenſible form or image, and repreſented to us as it were in a material ſhape and hue. So true is this, that not only are wit and poetry owned to take place only in conſequence of this analogy or reſemblance of moral and natural ideas; but even all language is confeſſed to be originally taken from ſenſible objects, or their properties and effects. But the real truth of the matter perhaps is not very generally attended to, which is, "That moral ideas could not at all be expreſſed by words, if they could not be pictured to us by means of analogous ſenſible objects." Not only are thoſe the beſt words to expreſs moral objects in oratory or poetry, which ſuggeſt the livelieſt, the ſtrongeſt, the cleareſt images or pictures of them

It is neceſſary to render us capable of ſocial commerce by diſcourſe.

We could not have mutual commerce by diſcourſe, were not the moral world analogous to the natural world.

them derived from ſenſible forms: but in general, words cannot expreſs any moral objects, but by exciting pictures of them in our minds. But all words being originally expreſſive of ſenſible qualities, no words can expreſs moral ideas, but ſo far as there is ſuch an analogy betwixt the natural and moral world, that objects in the latter may be ſhadowed forth, pictured or imaged to us by ſome reſemblances to them in the former. It is imagination therefore that renders us capable of ſocial intercourſe and commerce, even about moral ideas, and their relations, by mutual diſcourſe. And ſo far as language can go in communicating ſentiments, ſo far have we an indiſputable proof of analogy between the ſenſible and the moral world; and conſequently of wonderful wiſdom and goodneſs, in adjuſting ſenſible and moral relations and connexions one to another; the ſenſible world to our minds, and reciprocally the connexions of things relative to our moral powers to the connexions of things that conſtitute the ſenſible world. It is this analogy that makes the beauty, propriety, and force of words, expreſſive of moral ideas, by conveying pictures of them into the mind; ſo little attended to in teaching languages, whereby the ſtudy of language is rendered ſo jejune and inſipid; whereas, if rightly taught, by it great inſight would early be got into one of the moſt entertaining and uſeful parts of knowledge; and that clearly manifeſts the wiſdom and goodneſs of nature in our fabric; namely, the analogy or conſent between the moral and natural world, in conſequence of which, words primitively ſignifying ſenſible ideas, may convey moral ones into the mind by analogy.

The right method of teaching language would teach us this analogy.

But whatever may be thought of this aſſertion, it it plain from the conſideration of poetry, oratory, or any of the arts which are capable of touching or moving the heart agreeably, that nature has given us the imaginative faculty on purpoſe to enable us to

It is by fancy that our paſſionate part is reached.

CHAP. I. give warming as well as enlightening colours to truths; or to embelliſh, recommend and enforce them upon the mind. For tho' truths may be rendered evident and certain to the underſtanding by reaſoning about them, yet they cannot reach our heart, or beſtir our paſſionate part but by means of the imagination. The fine arts are, indeed, but ſo many different languages by which truths may be repreſented, illuſtrated and recommended to us. And theſe arts ſhow us the power and uſe of fancy, by making us feel its influence on the heart, or how directly it makes its way to it. But the moral power of imagination, muſt be evident to every one who reflects how it is, for inſtance, that any abſent object is able to outweigh a preſent pleaſure in our mind. For how elſe is it that the remote one receives ſtrength, but by the lively affecting manner in which imagination repreſents it, ſo as to render it as it were preſent, or, at leaſt, tho' abſent, ſo efficacious, that no interveening ſelf-denial, or ſuffering is ſufficient to retard the mind from purſuing it, with the utmoſt intenſeneſs? 'Tis a lively picture drawn by the fancy that does all this.

Why we are ſo conſtituted.

Now, if it be asked, why we are ſo conſtituted? Perhaps if we had a fuller knowledge of the human mind, we might be able to ſee many reaſons for it: mean time, 'tis ſufficient to vindicate nature for having ſo framed us, that we plainly ſee, how in conſequence of ſuch a conſtitution, we are able to become *Poets*, in the proper ſenſe of the word, that is, *Creators*; able to vie with nature and rival it; and that to it we owe a vaſt variety of very noble pleaſures, far ſuperior to thoſe of meer ſenſe, even all thoſe which genius, wit, refined fancy, and the fine arts that imitate or contend with nature afford us.

Imagination is not ingovernable.

IV. With regard to imagination, let it be obſerved, that tho' it be thought by ſuch as have not taken proper pains to form and improve it, a meer rambler,

rambler, and utterly incapable of governance; yet ancient philoſophers have aſſured us from their experience, "That if habitual temperance be added to juſt care to cultivate the imagination, and give it a right turn, ſuch a command may be obtained over it, that its employments even in dreams ſhall not only be pure and chaſte, but very regular as well as highly entertaining." It is indeed not to be wondered at, conſidering how egregiouſly the formation of fancy is neglected in education, that it ſhould be ſo irregular, deſultory and turbulent a faculty, inſtead of a pleaſant, governable and uſeful one. Philoſophers ſatisfy themſelves with railing at it, as a pernicious rather than an advantageous part of our frame; as being inſtead of an aſſiſtant in the purſuit of ſcience, an enemy to truth; a miſleader, a ſophiſt, and corrupter: but were it not capable of being not only regulated, but highly refined and improved by due care, mankind had been utter ſtrangers to all the entertaining and embelliſhing arts of fancy, which give ſuch luſtre, beauty and taſte to human life; to all the ingenious productions of men of wit and fine imagination: the advances that have been made towards its improvement, to which we owe ſo many great genius's, and their delightful productions and compoſitions, are a ſufficient argument, that by timely care duly perſevered in, it might be habituated to order regularity and wholeſome as well as pleaſant exerciſe. Is it to be wondered, that thoſe whoſe waking thoughts are ſo irregular and unprofitable, ſhould have very idle and impertinent viſions in their ſleep? But ſo true is the antient maxim about the correſpondence or analogy between our dreams and our employments throughout the day, that I believe no temperate man, much given to ſtudy, (*d*) is not rather entertained than

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(*d*) Jubet igitur Plato, ſic ad ſomnum proficiſci corporibus affectis, ut nihil ſit quod errorem animis, perturbationemque afferat.

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than moleſted by his night reveries, provided he be in a good habit of body. As for the dependence of body and mind, it ſhall be conſidered in another place. And the dependence of the imagination upon culture, or our care to improve it, and exerciſe it rightly, hath been already accounted for, by ſhewing, that according to the general law of our nature in conſequence of which we have dominion, a ſphere of activity, and are capable of making acquiſitions, and by that means of virtue and merit; the improvement of all our faculties depends on ourſelves; and it is the dependence of the improvement of the underſtanding, reaſon, imagination, and all our faculties upon our care to improve them, that makes us a ſpecies of beings ſuperior to thoſe who have no activity, but only receive ſenſations from without independently of their own will, choice or foreſight.

The other faculty of our minds, that remains to be conſidered under this article of knowledge, and power, and the laws relative to them, is invention.

Invention what it is and how improveable.

Now with reſpect to it I would obſerve,

I. That the phenomena of invention appear to us very irregular and whimſical, merely becauſe, for want of a hiſtory of them, we cannot reduce them to general laws. Every thing muſt appear to us caſual, anomalous, and as it were detached from nature, while we do not know the general laws on which it depends, or from which it reſults. And

rat. Ex quo etiam Pythagoricis interdictum putatur, *ne faba veſcerentur*, quod habet inflationem magnam is cibus, tranquilitati mentis, quærenti vera, contrariam.

Cicero de Divinat, Lib. I. No. 30.

Omnia quæ ſenſu volvuntur vota diurno,
Pectore ſopito reddit amica quies;
Me quoque muſarum ſtudium ſub nocte ſilenti,
Artibus aſſuetis ſollicitare ſolet.

there-

therefore till we be at more pains, than hath yet been taken, to collect a history relating to invention, there can be no other reason to call any of them casual and irregular, than there was to call several other phenomena of nature such, while their laws were not known, which now that they are found out, do no more appear to us to be such. On the contrary, there is good reason to think, that the phenomena of invention may have their general laws; since in whatever case almost we have taken right methods of tracing effects to their general laws, such laws have been discovered; and then the effects which before appeared irregular, immediately changed their face, and assumed, as it were, another mein: they now no more seem uncouth and marvelous, but ordinary and according to rule. It is only in the way of experiment, that either the science of the human mind, or of any material system can be acquired. And by the discoveries made in natural philosophy, we know, that no sooner are facts collected, and laid together in proper order, than the true theory of the phenomenon in question presents itself. And hence, we have reason to think, that knowledge of the qualities and operations of bodies, would quickly make very great and profitable advances, far beyond what it has yet arrived to, by pursuing the same method that has brought it to the present degree of perfection. Now when we consider that moral knowledge can only be carried on in the same way, is it any wonder that the human mind is so little known, since men have not studied it with due care, but have rather been more misled in this philosophy, than in natural, by fictitious hypotheses and romantic, visionary theories? For such are all theories that are not the result of well ranged phenomena.

A history of it, and the phenomena relating to it, is much wanted.

II. But tho', without all doubt, it is highly reasonable to expect very great assistances for the promotion

What discovery of new truths is.

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on and improvement of all sciences and arts from an acurate knowledge of our inventive powers, that is, from a full history of their operations and productions; yet, in the mean time, 'tis plain, that invention is nothing else but the habit acquired by practice of assembling ideas or truths, with facility and readiness, in various positions and arrangements, in order to have new views of them. For no truths can be placed in any position or order with respect to one another, but some agreement or disagreement, some relation or quality of these ideas must appear to the mind. And discovery of a new or unknown relation can be nothing else but the result of placing truths, objects or ideas, in some new or unobserved position.

And how they are made.

But, if this be the case, then the great business with regard to invention and its improvement, must be to accustom ourselves to look round every idea as it were, and to view it in all possible situations and positions; and to let no truth we know pass, till we have compared it with many others in various respects; not only with such, as are like or a kin to it, but with its seeming contraries, opposites, or disparates. Every different juxtaposition of ideas, will give us a new view of them, that is, discover some unknown truth. And the mind by such exercise alone can attain to readiness, quickness and distinctness, in comparing ideas in order to get knowledge.

How it becomes easier to make progress in knowledge by progress.

III. Now, this leads me to the last remark I shall make upon our natural furniture for knowledge, which is, that knowledge being progressive and dependent on ourselves; it, by that means, becomes easy to us to make advances in it, in the best and propereſt way that it can become so, that is, in the way that is qualified to give us the greatest pleasure. For it becomes easier to improve in knowledge, in proportion to the improvements we have made in it. Our inventive, imaginative, comparing and reasoning powers become stronger, more alert, and vigorous

ous by proper exercise. The habit of reasoning well, that is, readily and solidly, is acquired by practice in reasoning. And which is more, in consequence of having inured ourselves to accurate thinking, and of having made several advances in science, we become able to form rules to ourselves for our further progress in knowledge in the best, that is, the clearest, quickest, and surest manner. In other words, knowledge may be made easy to us by ourselves, because after we have made some progress in it, after we have exercised our enquiring, comparing and reasoning powers, for some time, about different objects; we can then make enquiring, comparing, reasoning, inventing, and laying truths together in proper order, to bring out new conclusions, the objects of our consideration; and thus we can form a science concerning science and making progress in it. A science, by the by, which ever since *Plato*'s time has been very much neglected in education; and very little cultivated, notwithstanding all Lord *Verulam* has said in his works of its nature and usefulness. (*e*)

And by that science which is properly the art of reasoning.

Thus then we see how excellently we are furnished (*f*) by nature for the pleasures of knowledge, and for improving in sciences and arts; so that we may conclude, "That with regard to knowledge, (the foundation of intelligent power, dominion and activity) we are very well constituted; or that all the most important circumstances, or laws relative to our understanding, are very fitly chosen, being necessary to very great goods or perfections."

General conclusion concerning the laws of knowledge, and our natural furniture for it.

(*e*) See *Cicero de finibus*, l. 5. *de legibus*. l. 1. Animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum memor, plenum rationis, & consilii, quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione a supremo Deo natum esse, &c.

(*f*) See my Lord *Bacon*'s works, his *Essay on the advancement of learning*; and his *Novum organum*. *Milton*'s *Letter on education*. *Plato de republica*, Page 533, 34, 39.. Ed. Step. And my *treatise on ancient painting*, Chap. 1.

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The laws relative to our embodied ſtate, and our connexion with a material world.

LET us now conſider our relation to the material world, and the reciprocal dependence of our body and mind with the chief effects that reſult from this ſource.

I. Firſt, it is evident, that relation to or connexion with a ſenſible world, muſt conſiſt in a certain dependence on its laws, ſo as to be variouſly affected by them with pleaſure and pain; or, a certain bodily organization, by means of which, certain perceptions and affections are excited in the mind. Exiſtence would be thrown away upon a material ſyſtem, if it were not perceived by minds or enjoyed by them. But the bodily fabric which is neceſſary to our communication with matter, muſt neceſſarily be ſubject to the laws of that matter. Whatever the frame and ſtructure of it may be, or of whatever materials this body is compoſed, it muſt be liable to the common laws, to which the whole material part of the creation, to which it is related, is ſubject. Now by the late diſcoveries in natural philoſophy, it has been proved, that the centripedal and centrifugal forces which hold our mundan ſyſtem in that perfect order, which it is ſo beautiful to behold and contemplate, are the beſt in every reſpect that can be imagined: inſomuch that no alteration can be ſuppoſed with regard to them that would not be attended with much greater irregularities and inconveniencies, than all thoſe put together which reſult from the preſent laws.

Communication with the materialworld neceſſarily ſuppoſes dependence on its laws.

Theſe laws are good.

In like manner, with reſpect to our earth, gravitation, coheſion, fermentation, to which general principles almoſt all its phenomena are reducible, have been ſhewn to be excellent laws, and that no o-

thers

thers could be ſubſtituted in their room, which would not be exceedingly for the worſe. In a word, it has been proved, that our mundan ſyſtem in all its parts is governed by excellent general laws, in ſo much that all objections that have been made againſt its conſtitution and oeconomy, have either taken their riſe from ignorance of its real ſtate and frame, and of the laws by which it is actually governed; and conſequently only ſerve to ſhew the abſurdity of (*g*) imaginary theories in natural philoſophy; or they really terminate in demanding ſome change greatly to the worſe. But ſuch concluſions quite deſtroy all objections that can be made againſt our being related to and connected with the ſenſible world; for to be related to it, and connected with it, without being ſubject to its laws, is utterly impoſſible. It is to depend without dependence: it is to be united without any connexion. But a dependence or a connexion that produces greater good in the whole, muſt be a good dependence. Let us therefore ſee what goods, advantages or pleaſures ariſe from our having bodies, and being capable of commerce with a material world.

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This proved by natural philoſophers.

II. But let it be obſerved before we proceed, that as a material world cannot be ſaid to have order and beauty; or to be wiſely contrived, but with reſpect to beings, who perceive it, and are affected by it; or cannot indeed be created for any end, but ſo far as perceptive beings have communication with it: ſo were there not in nature ſuch a kind of beings as we are, nature could not be full or coherent: there would be a chaſm or void in nature which could not but render it deformed and imperfect to the view of any being capable of perceiving it; who hath, like us, any idea of richneſs, fulneſs, and perfection in nature. For ſo are we made, that we cannot repre-

A material world without being perceived could be of no uſe.

(*g*) See *Diſcourſes on the origine of evil, natural and moral*, by Dr. *John Clark*.

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Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, nature would not be full and coherent.

fent nature to ourſelves as perfect and beautiful, without conceiving it to be full and coherent: we cannot ſuppoſe any degree of perfection wanting in the ſcale of life, that can exiſt, without being ſhocked at the thought of ſuch a deficiency, ſuch incompleteneſs, ſuch a void and breach.

By our commerce with a material world we receive a great many pleaſures of the ſenſitive kind.

III. But not only is ſuch a being as man neceſſary to make the gradation in nature full and complete; but the ſenſible pleaſures we are ſuſceptible of by means of our bodily organization, or our ſenſes, do well deſerve their place in the ſcale of life and being. The more pleaſures a creature is by nature made capable of, the larger proviſion is certainly made for its happineſs: now the enjoyments we are made capable of receiving from a corporeal world, by means of our ſenſitive organs, are not a few: the variety of them belonging to any of our ſenſes, as for inſtance, to the ſight or ear, is almoſt innumerable. And all theſe ſenſes, with all their appurtenances, are admirably adjuſted to one another, to our external condition, and to our whole bodily texture, made up of them, and preſerved entire by their equal nouriſhment and ſuſtentation. Thus, for example, our ſight, at the ſame time that it is capable of receiving conſiderable aſſiſtances from artificial inſtruments, is wonderfully well adapted to judge of magnitudes, diſtances, and other tangible qualities; it being by contact and motion only, that the mechaniſm of the body can ſuffer any injury.

Our ſenſes are admirably adjuſted to one another, and to our whole frame.

In like manner, all our other ſenſes are very well adjuſted to one another, and to our ſituation, as has been often obſerved by ſeveral philoſophers. This is delightfully told by our excellent poet already quoted.

Why has not man a microſcopic eye?
For this plain reaſon, man is not a fly:

Say,

Say, what the uſe, were finer opticks giv'n?
T' inſpect a mite, not comprehend the heav'n.
Or touch, *ſo tremblingly alive all o'er?*
To ſmart and agonize at ev'ry pore.
Or quick effluvia darting thro' the brain?
Die of a roſe in aromatic pain.
If nature thunder'd in his opening ears,
And ſtunn'd him with the muſic of the ſpheres,
How would he wiſh that heav'n had left him ſtill
The whiſp'ring zephyr, and the purling rill?
Who finds not providence all-good and wiſe,
Alike in what it gives, and what denies?

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 1.

But though the pleaſures our ſenſes afford us be very many, and far from being deſpicable in their kind; yet the chief advantages our ſenſes bring us, are, as they are means and inſtruments of ſciences and arts; and the means, occaſions and ſubjects of many excellent virtues.

Our ſenſes are inſtruments of noble ſciences and uſeful arts.

I. Our communication with the ſenſible world is not only the ſource of very conſiderable enjoyments to us, as ſenſitive beings; but it is yet a ſource of more noble pleaſures to us, as we are capable of knowledge and imitation.

By our bodily ſenſes, our minds are rendered capable of contemplating, and of imitating by ingenious arts, many parts of a very wonderful ſyſtem; many parts of a moſt beautiful diſpoſition and arrangement of infinitely various objects. For how immenſe is the variety of the ſenſible world? Can there be a more delightful, or a more capacious field of ſtudy and ſpeculation, than what the riches, the ſimplicity, the grandeur and perfect order of the natural world afford us? What is greater, or more elevating, than the contemplation of nature, when we are able to take in large views of it, and comprehend its laws? How agreeably do an-

Of natural philoſophy.

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cient philoſophers expatiate upon this topic! (*b*) The ſtudy of nature, according to them, is the natural food of the ſoul. And they indeed juſtly placed a great part of man's beſt happineſs in contemplating and imitating the regularity, wiſdom, goodneſs and harmony of the ſenſible world. They with good reaſon concluded from the ſtructure of our ſenſes, conſidered together with our intellectual powers, that we are made, "*Ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum.*" To contemplate, admire and imitate nature. What diſtinguiſhes our ſenſes (*i*) from thoſe of the brutes, is, (as theſe philoſophers have obſerved) that ſenſe of beauty, order and harmony, with which they are united in our frame, by means of which they are not merely ſenſitive, but rather rational faculties. For by theſe outward and inward ſenſes, as they are conjoined in our frame, we are capable of underſtanding the regularity and wiſdom of nature; of inveſtigating its general laws, and admiring the wonderful con-

And many imitative arts.

(*b*) So *Cicero de natura Deorum*, Lib. 2. Ipſe autem homo natus eſt ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum. Idem *de ſenectute*. Sed credo, Deos immortaleis ſparſiſſe animos in corpora humana, ut eſſent, qui terras tuerentur, quique cæleſtium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitæ modo ac conſtantia.

Academ. Queſt. Lib. 2. Eſt enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quaſi pabulum, conſideratio, contemplatioque naturæ, erigimur, latiores fieri videmur, humana deſpicimus, &c.

(*i*) So *Cicero de nat. Deorum*, Lib. 2. Ad hanc providentiam naturæ tam diligentem tamque ſolertem adjungi multa poſſunt, e quibus intelligatur, quantæ res hominibus a Deo, quamque eximiæ tributæ ſint, qui primum eos humo excitatos, celſos, & erectos conſtituit, ut Deorum cognitionem, cœlum intuentes, capere poſſent. Sunt enim e terra homines non ut incolæ, atque habitatores, ſed quaſi ſpectatores ſuperarum rerum, atque cæleſtium, quarum ſpectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Senſus autem, interpretes, ac nuntii rerum, in capite; tanquam in arce, mirifice ad uſus neceſſarios & facti & collocati ſunt ——Omniſque ſenſus hominum multo antecellit ſenſibus beſtiarum. Primum enim oculi in iis artibus, quarum judicium eſt oculorum, in pictis, fictis, cælatiſque formis, &c.

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ſent of all its various parts to make one beautiful whole. Nor is this all, for we are likewiſe qualified by them for divers imitative arts, as poetry, painting, ſtatuary, muſic, architecture, gardening, *&c.* from which arts do indeed ariſe pleaſures very nearly allied to virtue, very aſſiſtant to it; and which, next to its exerciſes, are our nobleſt and moſt pleaſing enjoyments.

They are means and ſubjects of many virtuous exerciſes.

II. But our ſenſes are yet of further and higher uſe in our frame, as they afford us means, occaſions and materials for exerciſing many virtues; many kindly, benevolent and generous affections.

Of the ſocial kind.

It is in conſequence of our having a corporeal frame, or of being cloathed with bodies, that we are viſible, audible, and embraceable one to another; all which are ſources of pleaſures of a very agreeable kind, as well as of a ſocial nature and tendency. How unembodied ſpirits have intercourſe, is a queſtion we cannot poſſibly ſolve; but this is certain, that our mutual correſpondence is by means of our bodies. And ſcarcely will any one object againſt our frame, merely for our being thus made fit for commerce with one another, by the eyes and touch, and by the faculties of hearing and ſpeech.

And of rational dominion over the ſenſitive appetites.

But which is yet more, in conſequence of our having bodies, various occaſions ariſe of our mutually aiding, relieving, comforting, pleaſing and gratifying one another, and of interchanging many good and friendly offices, for which there could not otherwiſe in the nature of things be room. And not to add more on this head, is not the regulation of our ſenſes, and their appetites after the gratifications ſuited to them, a moſt noble exerciſe for our reaſon and moral diſcernment? By this means, our guiding part hath ſomething to guide and govern: ſubjects committed to its truſt, keeping and management; ſubjects to provide for, and to rule and maintain in decent and good order and

CHAP. II. discipline. We have therefore, in consequence of our having bodies, a moral dominion committed to us, in which to acquit ourselves honourably, that is, wisely and prudently, or according to truth, reason, and the fitness of things, is certainly the noblest employment we can form any notion of. The spheres or employments of other beings cannot be higher in kind; the difference can only be in species, or rather in degree. For what can be conceived more great or excellent, than to have business of importance to our own happiness, and that of our kind, to manage by reason; subjects to rule and conduct for the good of the whole? And such are we ourselves to ourselves by our make; that is, such are the inferior parts of our constitution, or our bodily appetites, to that which is principal in us, our reason and moral conscience (*k*).

Thus therefore, in consequence of our having bodies, we are not only capable of contemplating and imitating the sensible world, and of various other pleasures; but our reason hath very proper practical employment. For thus is it that we are capable of all the virtues which are justly divided by ancient moralists into *Sustenence* (*l*) and *Abstinence*; or the power of being able to with-hold from the most inviting pleasures, if they be either pernicious in their consequences, or unbecoming our dignity: and the power of suffering any pain with magnanimity, rather than forego our reason, and contradict

(*m*) So *Cicero* and all the ancient moralists. See *Plutarch*, in particular, *de virtute morali*. Plato sensit hominis animam non simplicem esse, aut eodem per omnia modo affectam: sed aliam ejus partem intelligentem esse ac rationatricem qua hominem regi naturæ sit conveniens; aliam quæ variis motibus obnoxia, bruta, vaga, & incomposita, & suapte naturâ gubernante opus habeat—quando autem bruta pars contra rationem contendat—Statim animus quasi in duas partes dividitur & manifesta sit discordia.

(*l*) See *Epictetus*, *Arrian* and *Simplicius*.

our

our moral conſcience, by yielding to what theſe pronounce baſe and unworthy. CHAP. II.

All this, it is plain, ſuppoſes a moral ſenſe in our conſtitution, of which ſomething hath been already ſaid, and that ſhall afterwards be conſidered more fully. Mean time, if it be true, that our relation to the ſenſible world is conducive, or rather neceſſary to the excellent purpoſes above-mentioned, it plainly follows, that a reciprocal union between our body and mind, muſt be morally fit and good.

But this will be yet more evident, if we conſider a little ſome other effects, reſulting from this reciprocal connexion, or from our dependence upon the laws of the ſenſible world, from which we receive ſo many pleaſures, not merely of the ſenſitive kind.

I. It is plain from experience, that with reſpect to every ſenſitive being, within the reach of our obſervation, with reſpect to ourſelves in particular, this is the general law of nature, "That the ſimple productions of nature, which are uſeful to us, are alſo agreeable to us (*m*); and the pernicious, or uſeleſs, are made diſagreeable, or give pain. Our external ſenſations are, no doubt, often painful, when our bodies are in a dangerous ſtate, when they want ſupplies of nouriſhment, or when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it appears that the general laws are wiſely inſtituted, and it be neceſſary to the good of a ſyſtem of agents to be under the influence of general laws, upon which there is occaſion for prudence and activity; the particular pains occaſioned by a neceſſary law of ſenſation, can be no objection againſt the goodneſs of the author. Now that there is no room for complaint that our external ſenſe of pain is made too acute, muſt appear from the multitudes we daily ſee

The general law with reſpect to ſenſible pains.

Senſible pains whence they ariſe.

(*m*) See *Hutcheſon* on the *conduct of the paſſions*, and Dr. *J. Clark* on the *origine of evil*.

CHAP. II. so careleſs of preſerving the bleſſing of health, of which many are ſo prodigal as to laviſh it away, and expoſe themſelves to external pains for very trifling reaſons. Can we repine at the friendly admonitions of nature, joined with ſome auſterity, when we ſee they are ſcarce ſufficient to reſtrain us from ruin?" To this let it be added, that the external and ſuperficial parts of our bodies are the moſt ſenſible, and cauſe the greateſt pain when they are in any wiſe hurtfully affected; becauſe they are expoſed to many various external objects, and do thus give us immediate notice ſo ſoon as they are affected by them; whereas the internal parts being more remote, cannot be ſo eaſily come at, and conſequently are not liable to ſo many interruptions from without, and therefore need not ſuch ſubtle ſenſation. Thus we experience (ſay anatomiſts) that the veins, arteries, bones, and the like, have little or no ſenſation at all (*n*).

Several pains the neceſſary effects of a bodily organization.

II. But further, let it be conſidered, that of whatever materials a body be compoſed, or whatever its particular organization may be, it muſt in the nature of things, be liable to as many diſorders as there are means of preventing or diſturbing its natural courſe. In general, upon the ſuppoſition of our being capable of agreeable ſenſation, a proportionable degree of pain muſt enſue, upon any defect or exceſs whatſoever: becauſe, if health conſiſt in a certain balance or order, every deviation from that order, muſt be ſickneſs or diſeaſe. Pleaſant ſenſation muſt be produced in ſome order and method; that is, in order to it, a body muſt have a certain texture, and there muſt be a certain adjuſtment of external objects to that texture: but the reſult of this muſt be, that in a habitation like our earth, not made for any one ſpecies of animals, but fitted

(*n*) See Dr. *J. Clark* on the *origine of evil.*

for

for a variety of beings, ſomethings being adjuſted to bodies of a different texture from ours, cannot but be contrary in their natures to ours, and ſo tend to a *ſolutio continui* in reſpect of them. This is as plain and as neceſſary, as it is, that two parts of matter cannot tally, unleſs they are fitted by their make to one another. In other words, it is neceſſary in the nature of things, that bodies ſhould have each a particular mechaniſm fitted for a certain end, or for certain enjoyments: and to every material mechaniſm, as there muſt be ſomething congruous, in order to the having agreeable ſenſations; ſo in a tural world, repleniſhed with various animals, in order to make nature as rich and full with good as poſſible, ſome things will of neceſſity be incongruous, and conſequently in ſome manner and degree pernicious to our particular mechaniſm, by being fitted to different bodies. For it is impoſſible but thoſe objects, which are ſuitable to certain organizations, in order to affect them agreeably, muſt be incongruous to organizations of different forms; and being incongruous to them, they muſt have ſome tendency to hurt them. This is inevitably the reſult of the neceſſity of a thing's having a certain texture, and certain qualities in a determinate degree, in order to its being ſuitably proportioned or congruous to another certain texture, with its qualities. All things cannot poſſibly be equally congruous to all different ſorts of organization. CHAP. II.

III. But if our organization be liable to be deſtroyed or hurted by certain objects, in conſequence of the impoſſibility, "That the ſame texture ſhould be equally well fitted to all ſorts of external impreſſions, that may happen through the influence of thoſe very laws of matter and motion, which are acknowledged to be neceſſary to the general good and beauty of the material world, and to our receiving many pleaſures of various kinds from it:" if this be Pains are uſeful and proper monitors.

CHAP. I.

the caſe, it is certainly fit that whatever external object is pernicious, or tends to diſturb and hurt the mechaniſm of our bodies in any conſiderable degree, ſhould be ſignified to us by ſome means or other: Now the method that nature takes is this; "It is generally ſome pleaſant ſenſation which teaches us what tends to our preſervation and well-being; and ſome painful one which ſhews us what is pernicious;" "we are directed by uneaſy appetites when our bodies ſtand in need of nouriſhment;" "and in like manner, it is by a ſenſe of pain excited in us, that we are warned of the dangerous tendency of bruiſes, wounds, violent labour, and other ſuch hurtful cauſes."

Now the fitneſs of our being thus warned and admoniſhed appears, becauſe ſome warning is neceſſary; and there can be no other but what has been mentioned, except by knowledge of the natures of things, and their aptitudes to affect us agreeably or hurtfully. But knowledge is in the nature of things progreſſive, and can only be acquired gradually, as has been ſhewn, from experience, in proportion to our ſituation for making obſervations, and taking in ideas, and to our application to gather knowledge. The knowledge of nature is wiſely left to be our own acquiſition; and therefore ſome other warning, even that mentioned by painful ſenſations, is abſolutely neceſſary to us. It is only ſome intuitive kind of knowledge of bodies, by immediate inſpection (which is hardly conceivable) that could ſupply the place of admonitions by pain, in order to ſelf-preſervation. And if we had ſuch an intuitive knowledge of things as is neceſſary to this purpoſe; then no part of knowledge could be left to be our own acquiſition by obſervation and reaſoning. For what does not the intuitive knowledge, neceſſary to be our warner of dangerous applications or approaches to our bodies, include in it? It plainly comprehends in it an intuitive knowledge of our own body, and of all ſurrounding

rounding objects to the influences of which it is exposed: that is, it comprehends an intuitive knowledge of the whole of nature. And consequently, having such knowledge (could we, or any creatures possibly have it, as 'tis plain from the nature of knowledge we cannot) is absolutely inconsistent with the dependence of any part of the knowledge of nature upon ourselves; or with such knowledge being in any degree our own acquisition; that is, with any thing's being left to be matter of observation and enquiry to us, or subject of exercise to our reason. All parts of natural or real knowledge are so connected together and involved in one another, that if any part of it were attainable by us otherwise than it now is, no part of it could be attainable, as it now is, *i. e.* by induction, and by reasoning from properties so discovered. And would we not thus be deprived of one of our pleasantest and noblest employments and acquisitions?

From the necessity there is, that bodily appetites should be attended with uneasy sensations arises the necessity of all the other uneasy sensations accompanying our desires which are called Passions.

IV. Thus then we see the fitness of our being admonished by uneasy sensations of dangers to our bodies of bodily necessities and wants: because thus we are directed and impelled to relieve and preserve ourselves in such a manner, that reason, neither hath, on the one hand, little or no employment; nor, on the other, a very disagreeable and almost insurmountable task. But it is well observed by an excellent philosopher on this head, that when a necessity of adding strong uneasy sensations to one class of appetites appears, there must appear also a like necessity of strengthning the rest in the same mind by like sensations, to keep a just ballance. And thus accordingly, our bodily appetites being for good reasons accompanied with uneasy sensations, our moral desires and affections are strengthened in like manner by uneasy strong sensations to maintain a just balance; so is plainly the Στοργὴ, or natural affection to children, so is compassion or pity to the distressed, and many other moral

CHAP. II.

ral paſſions, that thus the public and ſocial ones might not be too weak and feeble in proportion to thoſe which terminate more directly and immediately in the preſervation or gratification of our ſenſes. In a conſtitution, where one degree of force is requiſite, a proportionate degree of force in other parts becomes alſo neceſſary; otherwiſe the conſtituent parts would not bear that proportion to one another, which an equal and ſound balance in the whole requires. It is the ſame here as with regard to antagoniſt muſcles to counterpoiſe one another in the body. (*o*)

The laws of matter make an infant ſtate of body neceſſary.

V. Let me juſt add upon this head, that as for our coming into the world by the way of propagation we now do, and with weak, neceſſitous, infant bodies: It is a neceſſary reſult of the conſtitution of this material world to which we are related by our bodies; and beſides the many good effects of it of the ſocial kind which are very evident, "There is an abſolute fitneſs, that beings made for progreſs in knowledge, and in every perfection by their own application and induſtry conjointly with aſſiſtances from ſociety, and who conſequently muſt enter upon the world with infant minds, ſhould likewiſe enter upon it with infant bodies." How very unequally otherwiſe would our bodies and minds be yoked? How improper companions and mates would they be? As for death, what may be inferred concerning it, ſhall be conſidered, when having enquired into all the other principal laws relative to our preſent ſtate, we are able to take a complete view of it. In the mean time, it is obvious, that death, or the diſſolution of our bodily texture, in whatever way it happens, is always the reſult of our ſubjection to ſome of the laws of matter and motion, to which our union with the ſenſible world neceſſarily ſubjects

And the law of progreſſive perfection makes infant minds neceſſary.

(*o*) See *Hutcheſon, on the conduct of the paſſions*, in whoſe words I have given this obſervation.

us,

us, and to which are owing all the pleaſures we receive from it in our preſent embodied ſtate. CHAP. II.

The dependence of mental powers and diſpoſitions on the body.

II. The other remarkable phenomenon with reſpect to our union with a material world is, "The dependence of genius, temper, and mental abilities upon the temperature of the body, air, diet, and other ſuch phyſical cauſes." That a variety of mental temperatures, turns, diſpoſitions and abilities prevail among mankind, will not be called into doubt. And as it is certain, that different textures of eyes muſt ſee differently; or every object muſt neceſſarily partake of the colour with which the eye itſelf is tainted: ſo variety in temperature, texture and mould, (ſo to ſpeak) among minds, muſt neceſſarily produce great variety of conceptions, ſentiments and judgments, and conſequently of inclinations, appetites and diſpoſitions. For, ſuch as the ſoil is, ſuch will the flavour of the fruit be in the natural world; and by like neceſſity in the moral, all the impreſſions, ſentiments, judgments, and paſſions of a mind will be correſpondent to its prevailing humour and character: they will neceſſarily partake in ſome degree of it. And, hence it is, that every man's turn of thinking is as diſtinguiſhable as his face or gate from that of every other: there are as few minds as faces that have not very peculiar and diſtinguiſhing features (*p*).

A great variety in reſpect of theſe among mankind.

How far that variety ariſes from and depends on phyſical cauſes.

Now, that differences among minds, in texture and character, abilities and diſpoſitions, are no leſs neceſſary to the well-being of ſociety, and variety of beauty and good in it, than differences in complexions and countenances, is very evident at firſt ſight, has been already hinted, and will appear more fully when we come to conſider the laws of our nature relative to ſociety. All therefore that belongs to the preſent queſtion is, how far differences among minds

(*p*) See what is further ſaid on this Subject, in the Chapter *on the aſſociation of ideas.*

depend

CHAP. II. depend upon different textures, and temperaments of bodies, and physical causes, and how and why it is so?

I. I do not indeed pretend, that there may not be a great variety of genius's, characters and abilities among pure, unembodied spirits of the same species: on the contrary, wherever there is community, such diversity is absolutely requisite: a moral, as well as a natural whole, must consist of various parts, fitted by their very differences to one another, and to one common end. But it is manifest that the diversity among mankind in genius, temper and abilities, depends, if not totally, yet to a very great degree and extent, upon bodily constitution and mechanical causes. This is so true, that many philosophers have from hence contended, that all is matter and motion; or that we are wholly body. Such an inference is indeed absurd, but the facts from which it is drawn are beyond all dispute; so palpable are they to every one's feeling and experience. "Each different nation has its national characteristic, (*q*) not merely in the features of the face and texture of the body, but likewise in temper and turn of mind." "Every man is hot or cold, slow or active, phlegmatic or choleric, lively or dull, amorous and delicate, or dull and insensible, correspondently to the temper of his body, his native climate, *&c.* "Air and diet change men's dispositions as much as their bodily habit; a disease, or a blow, do not make a greater alteration in the outward than in the inward man." Government, civil policy, and religion more especially, have no doubt a very great influence in

The great extent of this dependence is generally owned.

(*q*) So *Cicero de lege agraria, contra Rullum.* Non ingenerantur hominibus mores tam a stirpe generis, ac seminis, quam ex iis rebus, quæ ab ipsa natura loci, & a vitæ consuetudine suppeditantur: quibus alimur, & vivimus. Carthaginienses, fraudulenti, & mendaces, non genere, sed natura loci, &c. See *Barclaii satyricon*, pars quarta, icones animorum, *Charron sur la sagesse*. And *reflexions sur la poesie & la peinture*, Part II.

forming

forming men's tempers; but, on the other hand, it was never queſtioned, that the temper of the body, the ſoil, climate, and many other phyſical cauſes have had a very conſiderable ſhare in originally determining different people into different forms of goverment, and diſtinct eſtabliſhments with regard to civil and religious policy, by their influences upon genius and temper. CHAP. II.

In fine, it is undeniable, that imagination, memory, and the ſtrength of appetites, very much depend upon bodily habit; and, on the other hand, bodily temperature and habit, depend exceedingly on the exerciſes of the imagination and appetites; upon the employments, habits, and character of the mind. "Let phyſicians and anatomiſts, (ſays an excellent author (*r*) explain the ſeveral motions of the fluids and ſolids of the body which accompany any paſſion; or the temperaments of body, which either make men prone to any paſſion, or are brought upon us by the long continuance or frequent returns of it. 'Tis only to our purpoſe, in general, to obſerve, That probably certain motions of the body do accompany every paſſion by a fixed law of nature, and alternately, that temperament which is apt to receive or prolong theſe motions in the body, does influence our paſſions to heighten or prolong them. Thus a certain temperament may be brought upon the body by its being frequently put into motion by the paſſions of anger, joy, love or ſorrow; and the continuance of this temperament make men prone to theſe ſeveral paſſions for the future." Were this dependence of the body and mind more ſtudied, and its effects collected and ranged into proper order; no doubt, we would be able to form a better judgment of it, and ſee further into the good purpoſes to which it ſerves; for the greater advances have hitherto been made in any branches of phyſi-

It is well worth while to enquire more fully into it.

(*r*) See *Hutcheſon on the paſſions.*

cal

CHAP. I.

cal philoſophy, the more inſtances do we perceive of excellent contrivance and kind oeconomy.

Mean time, it is evident, that ſuch a dependence is involved in the very idea of union of mind with body.

II. Mean time, as the fact, in general, is certain from many experiments, ſo it is evident, there can be no mutual union of body and mind without reciprocal dependence; and their reciprocal dependence cannot take place without laws, fixing and determining connexions between all the poſſible changes in the body, and certain correſpondent changes in the mind; and alternately between all poſſible conditions of the mind, and certain correſpondent alterations in the bodily part. All this is involved in the very notion of regular and mutual dependence. Conſequently the only queſtion with regard to our preſent union with a material world by means of our bodies is, 1. Whether, in conſequence of theſe laws, we are not capable of very conſiderable pleaſures, which otherwiſe could not poſſibly have place in nature? for did we not exiſt, in the preſent embodied ſtate we are now in, the ſenſible world we are capable of enjoying in ſo many different ways, as rational as well as ſenſitive beings, could not exiſt. And, 2. Whether the pains we ſuffer, in conſequence of this union, be not the neceſſary effects of the union itſelf, and the beſt, that is, the fiteſt admonitions we can have of what is neceſſary to our ſuſtenance and well-being? for ſuch pains cannot be called evils with reſpect to the whole ſyſtem; but, on the contrary, being the effects of good general laws, are goods. To both which queſtions a ſufficient anſwer hath been given.

The good conſequence of this dependence of our minds on body and phyſical connexions.

III. To all which let it be added, that from the dependence of our mind upon body and phyſical cauſes, there ariſes this good conſequence, "That, whereas the tempers, characters, abilities, and diſpoſitions of our minds, would be utterly unalterable by us, if they were not dependent in that manner upon us; being

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ing so dependent, they may in a great measure be changed by our own proper care; or to do so only requires, that we should give due attention to the natural connexions on which they depend; and conformably to them take proper measures to make fit changes." That is to say, changing and reforming our minds, as far as mind depends upon body, depends on ourselves, because it depends upon knowledge of nature we may acquire, and right use of such knowledge. It is often regreted by ancient philosophers, (*f*) that the dependence of body and mind, as evidently as its extent discovers itself in many cases, is so little studied and enquired into by philosophers. Were it, say they, more carefully attended to and considered, the medicinal art would extend further than to the body: it would be able to do great services to the mind, by proper applications to the body, or by proper external *regimens* and discipline. Upon this occasion, they have expressed a very high opinion, not only of certain gymnastic exercises, but of the power of music in particular; and seem to think, that very advantageous uses might be made of that art, in several cases, for delivering the mind from disorders; or for purging and refining the passions; calming, quieting, cheering, and strengthning the mind.

True morality must therefore consider man as a compound creature; or his body and mind as reciprocally dependent.

But let that be as it will, tho' the science we have now been speaking of (the medicine of the mind, and that part of natural knowledge, from which alone it can be deduced) be very much neglected, yet from what hath been said of the dependence of

(*f*) See *Plutarch de musica, & de educandis liberis. Plato de legibus & de republica*, passim. See a fine passage to the same purpose, in *Timæus Locrus de anima mundi*. Ad hos animi impetus, multum adjumenti adferunt corporis temperamenta, &c. See a fine passage to this purpose, in *Cicero de Fato*. Ed. schr. No. 5. Sed hæc ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt: extirpari autem & funditus tolli, ut is ipse, qui ad ea propensus fuerit a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in naturalibus causis, sed in voluntate, studio, disciplinâ, &c.

body

CHAP. II. body and mind, it plainly appears, why the beſt ancient moraliſts, as well as the chriſtian religion, recommend ſevere bodily diſcipline, in order to form, eſtabliſh, preſerve, and corroborate virtuous habits. Such muſt the morality be that belongs to beings of our compound make. Precepts not inferred from the human conſtitution, muſt be idle and vain, they cannot appertain to us. To forget in directions about our conduct, that we are rational beings, is indeed to forget our moſt eſſential and noble part: but, on the other hand, to forget in moral precepts, that we are likewiſe ſenſitive, embodied beings, is to leave out in morality, which ought to be founded upon the nature of beings, a very eſſential and important part of our make. It is therefore no wonder, if ſuch morality preſcribes rules to us, that are either above our practice, or inſufficient to gain that purpoſe which ought to be the end of all rules relative to our conduct; namely, acting agreeably to our frame, or in a manner becoming our rank and conducive to our happineſs. That muſt neceſſarily be the caſe, when our make is not ſtrictly kept in view, in laying down precepts for our obſervance. Now this is plainly our rank; we are neither wholly moral, nor wholly ſenſitive beings; but a compound of moral and ſenſitive powers and affections reciprocally dependent upon one another: man is, as ſome philoſophers have very properly expreſſed it; *Nexus utriuſque mundi*. And the excellence of the chriſtian morality conſiſts in this, that in all its precepts man is conſidered and adviſed as ſuch a being.

> " *The bliſs of man (could pride that bleſſing find)*
> *Is not to act, or think* beyond *mankind*;
> *No pow'rs of body, or of ſoul to ſhare,*
> *But what his nature, and his ſtate can bear.*"
>
> Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 1.

All

All the obſervations that have been made by natural philoſophers upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, the different bodily oeconomies of other animals ſuited to their various ſtates, and, in general, upon the wiſe contrivance and good order of the ſenſible world might very properly have been collected and inſerted here. But the preceeding remarks will prepare every intelligent reader for making a proper uſe, and ſeeing the full extent of ſuch obſervations; and from what has been ſaid, we may juſtly conclude, "That the laws relating to our embodied ſtate, and our connexion with the material or ſenſible world, are either neceſſary or fit: many excellent effects reſult from them, and none of the effects of good general laws can be evil, abſolutely conſidered, that is, with reſpect to the whole."

CHAP. II.

General concluſion concerning their laws.

CHAP. III.

LET us proceed to conſider the laws of our nature relative to the aſſociation of ideas, and the formation of habits.

CHAP. III.

A third claſs of laws. Theſe relative to the aſſociation of ideas and habits.

There are two things very remarkable in our nature; "The aſſociation of ideas, or the difficulty with which ideas that have been often preſented to the mind together are afterwards disjoined;" and, "The formation of habits by repeated acts; or a facility in doing, and a propenſion to reiterate the ſame action contracted by frequent doing it."

Theſe two effects are very ſimilar or like: they both include in their nature a certain kind of coheſion with the mind, formed by reiterated conjunction or co-exiſtence between objects really ſeparate and diſtinct from one another; *i. e.* that do not neceſſarily co-exiſt, or are not naturally parts of one

Both theſe take their riſe from one principle.

CHAP. III. whole. And as they are like to one another, ſo they muſt go together; or neither of them can take place in a mind without the other. If habits are contracted by repeated acts, ideas will be joined or mixed by repeated concurrence: and reciprocally, if ideas contract a ſort of coherence by being often joined, habits muſt be formed by frequent repetition of acts. This is plain. For,

They muſt both go together.

I. Unleſs the mind were ſo framed, that ideas frequently preſented together to it, ſhould afterwards naturally continue to recal one another, to blend or return together, habits could not be contracted. Thus, for inſtance, the habit of taking ſnuff, could not take place, did not the returns of certain perceptions recal the idea and deſire of ſnuff. And the caſe muſt be the ſame with regard to all other habits; for all habits, of whatever kind, operate the ſame way. The reaſon is, becauſe all actions of the mind are excited by and employed about ideas; and an action cannot be reiterated, unleſs its object and motive be revived. A propenſion to any action is nothing elſe but the frequent return of a certain deſire, which neceſſarily ſuppoſes the equally frequent returns of the ideas which excite it, and are the ſubject of it: and facility in acting, in like manner, ſuppoſes the eaſy and quick return of the ideas that induce to the action, and are its ſubject. The formation of ideas therefore ſuppoſes the aſſociation of ideas to take place. But,

II. If aſſociation of ideas take place, habits muſt neceſſarily be formed by repeated acts. For, if we attend to the matter ſtrictly, we ſhall immediately find, that the whole courſe of what is called *action*, or a ſeries of action, (the wills to act or make efforts to act alone excepted) is nothing but a train of paſſive perceptions or ideas. But ideas, as often as they return, muſt excite certain affections, and the affections

affections which lead to action, muſt, as often as they are revived, diſpoſe and excite to act; or, in other words, produce will to act. And if will to act be ſucceſsful, the train of perceptions called *action*, muſt ſucceed; and, by frequently ſucceeding in this manner, coheſion or aſſociation muſt be formed of this kind, that is, aſſociations that terminate in action muſt be contracted.

Thoſe effects called the aſſociation of ideas and formation of habits, do therefore reſolve themſelves into the ſame general law or principle in our nature, which may be called the (*t*) *law of cuſtom.*

But, whether they are reduced to one or different principles, nothing can be more certain; than that ideas are aſſociated by being frequently conjoined, in ſuch a manner, that it is not eaſy to prevent their mixing ſo together as to make one perception, or, at leaſt, their coherence and joint return to the mind; and that habits are formed by repeated acts. Now, nothing can be of greater uſe in our frames, than the principle or principles from which theſe effects ariſe. For, what can be more evident, than that were we not ſo conſtituted, we could not attain to perfection in any ſcience, art, or virtue? It

But whatever the cauſe be, one or more, theſe effects are certain.

Both proceed from a moſt uſeful principle.

(*t*) Thus, for inſtance, in the whole action of taking ſnuff, what is there that is active, beſides the firſt will to take it, and the other intermingling volitions to move the hand, open the box, &c? The perception, uneaſineſs, itch, or whatever it is that excites the will to take it, and the moving the hand, opening the box, taking ſnuff between the fingers, putting it to the noſe, drawing it up, and being irritated or pung'd by it; what is there in all theſe but mere ſenſation or paſſion? The whole effect, the volitions to take it, open the box, &c. excepted, is but a ſucceſſion of paſſive ſenſations. And it is ſo with reſpect to every other active habit, becauſe it is ſo with reſpect to every action. There is nothing in any one action beſides volition, but ſenſation or impreſſion. Volition is all that can be called active: and action therefore is nothing elſe but a train of ideas, ſubſequent to, or brought into exiſtence by a ſeries of volitions. But volitions are excited or moved by ideas: and therefore aſſociations of ideas exciting volitions, are active habits.

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would not be in our power to join and unite ideas at our pleaſure, to recal paſt ones, or to lay up a ſtock of knowledge in our minds to which we could have recourſe upon any occaſion, and bring forth, as it were, ready money for preſent uſe. Nor would it be in our power by all our reiterated acts to become more ready, alert, and expeditious in performing any operation than at our firſt attempt; but, in every thing, and on every emergence, after ever ſo much paſt labour, all our work would conſtantly be to begin again. In one word, habits are perfected faculculties: or faculties perfected by exerciſe are habits. So that the law of habits is really the *law of improvement to perfection*; and is therefore a moſt excellent, a moſt uſeful law.

A principle that may juſtly be called the law of perfection.

All this is very obvious. But ſo extremely, ſo univerſally uſeful is this part of our frame, that its well worth while to examine it more fully, and take a larger view of its effects. We ſhall therefore firſt conſider ſome of the principal phenomena belonging to the aſſociation of ideas.

I. And, in order to proceed diſtinctly, let us be ſure that we carry along with us a clear idea of the thing itſelf.

Aſſociated ideas defined, and diſtinguiſhed from complex ideas, &c.

Senſible ideas or qualities, which by their co-exiſtence make the ſame object, (as, for inſtance, it is a particular ſhape, ſize, colour, taſte, and other combined qualities in the ſame ſubject that make a peach) are not ſaid to be aſſociated, becauſe they naturally and really co-exiſt, or naturally and really make the ſame object (*u*).

Nor is the complex idea which we have of a peach, after having taſted ſeverals, that is immediately excited in us by the ſight of it, before we touch or taſte it, called *an aſſociated idea*; tho' the greater part of it conſiſts of ideas not perceived, but ima-

(*u*) See *Locke on the human underſtanding*. The Chapter *on the aſſociation of ideas*.

gined;

gined; becauſe the qualities imagined do really belong to the peach. We are much indebted to the wonderful quickneſs of our fancy, in adding ſeveral qualities on ſuch occaſions to thoſe really perceived, to compleat our ideas. But ſuch ſupplies, by the imagination to any of our ſenſible ideas, as intimately as they unite and blend with them, are not called *ideas of aſſociation*, becauſe whatever is thus added by the imagination to the perceptions of ſenſe, is a copy of a ſenſible quality really appertaining to the object perceived.

But, if a peach having been often preſented to us on agreeable occaſions, ſhould become ever afterwards exceedingly more deſireable than before, by recalling to our mind theſe agreeable circumſtances; then is the whole idea of a peach that thus excites our deſire and greatly pleaſes us, compounded of the real qualities of a peach, and of theſe other delightful ideas not belonging to it, but ſuggeſted to, or excited in our imagination by it. Or contrariwiſe, if a peach which was formerly very agreeable, having been frequently preſented to us on melancholly occaſions, ſhall ever afterwards recal to our minds theſe diſagreeable circumſtances, and ſo become hateful to us; then the idea of a peach is compounded of uneaſy ideas that overballance all its good and formerly deſireable qualities, or that ſo entirely poſſeſs the mind, that there is no room for theſe qualities to enter into it.

In both theſe and all ſuch caſes our ideas are made up of real and aſſociated ingredients, or compounded of parts, ſome of which do really belong to the object, and others do not, but are added by the mind itſelf: they are made up of ingredients that have no natural or neceſſary coherence, but that cohere or are mixed by cuſtomary aſſociation.

Almoſt all our ideas have ſomething in them of the aſſociated kind.

III. The inſtances that have been given, in order to determine the meaning of aſſociation, are indeed

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but trifling and of little moment. But the thing itſelf in its full extent is of the greateſt conſequence. For if we conſider our ideas with due attention, and take the trouble to analyſe them, we ſhall find that very few, if any of the ideas, that excite our warmeſt and keeneſt affections, are quite free from aſſociated parts. The greater number of our perceptions, however agreeable or diſagreeable, are of the aſſociated kind in ſome degree. How many, how very many of them are like the peaches we have mentioned, chiefly agreeable or diſagreeable in conſequence of ſome things united with them, that do not belong to them? We can ſcarcely name any one that offers itſelf quite pure and unmixed; or which has no conſtituent parts of the kind we are now ſpeaking. But affections, that is, deſires or averſions, will always be proportioned to the good or evil qualities comprehended in the ideas by which they are excited.

Where this neceſſarily happens.

That few or none of our ideas can eſcape ſome mixture by aſſociation, if we are not continually upon our guard to prevent it, is obvious. For where the law of aſſociation takes place, the concomitant circumſtances in which ideas have frequently occurred to the mind, muſt become conſtant parts or attendants of theſe ideas, if we are not aſſiduouſly upon the watch againſt ſuch aſſociation. This is the natural reſult, or rather the direct meaning of the law. But, what is the whole frame and courſe of nature, or what elſe indeed can it be but a conſtant occaſion to us of aſſociation, *i. e.* of mixture or coherence of ideas? It cannot but be ſo, becauſe no idea can be preſented to the mind ſingly, that is, without preceeding, concomitant and ſucceeding circumſtances; and in a world governed by uniform laws, and filled with beings of analogous natures and employments, no idea can fail of being often preſented to the mind in the ſame or like circumſtances. There are many aſſociations that are entirely of our own making;

It is the neceſſary effect of the world's being governed by general uniform laws.

making; but, suppose we made none, it would be sufficient employment for us, either in order to have true knowledge or well proportioned affections, to be inceſſantly upon our guard to prevent the blendings and coheſions of ideas, that the regular courſe of things in the world naturally tends, in conſequence of the law of aſſociation, to form or engender in our minds. Every one who is acquainted with philoſophy, knows, that the great difficulty in attaining to the true knowledge of things, take its riſe from the difficulty of ſeparating ideas into the parts that naturally belong to one another, and thoſe which are added by aſſociation. For without ſuch analyſis, no object can be defined, diſtinguiſhed, nor conſequently examined, and ſo underſtood. And yet ideas, in conſequence of the law of aſſociation, muſt, from the very beginning of our exiſtence, ſo blend and mix with others totally and eſſentially diſtinct from them, that it muſt become extreamly difficult not to confound together qualities that being different, can never be philoſophiſed about, till we are not only able to diſtinguiſh them, but to keep them before the mind without intermingling and quite ſeparate. In reality, the greater part of philoſophy conſiſts in ſeparating ideas, that the natural courſe of things, in conſequence of the law of aſſociation, hath conjoined, or rather confounded. Many inſtances might be given to prove this, were it at all neceſſary. The jangling about beauty among philoſophers, whether it is diſtinct or not from utility, is a ſufficient proof of it; and yet into what ſcience does not this diſpute neceſſarily enter? There is no reaſoning about poetry, painting, or any of the polite arts, or indeed about morality, without being led into it. But what ſufficiently proves it, is the difficulty moſt perſons find in their entrance upon philoſophy in diſtinguiſhing the qualities perceived by any one ſenſe from thoſe perceived by any other. How few, not very much accuſtomed to philoſophy, are not ſtartled to hear that

Natural philoſophy conſiſts in a great meaſure, in ſeparating aſſociations which the order of nature neceſſarily produces in our minds.

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distance is not an idea of sight, but an idea of touch suggested by ideas of sight! And yet, till this is clearly understood, and the difference is become familiar to the mind, it is impossible to have a clear notion of very many important truths in perspective and optics. But if philosophers find a difficulty arising from the effect of the law of association in analysing ideas; we all find a much greater one from the same source in the conduct of the passions. For here, how difficult, how extreamly difficult is it to separate associations early made and long unquestioned? Or, what indeed is the whole of our labour in regulating the passions; in correcting, reforming, or directing them; but an endeavour to render our passions suitable and proportioned to the natures of things, as they are in themselves distinguished from all wrong associations? What else is discipline or government with respect to the love of wealth, of power, of show, of fame; or any one of our desires private or public, but an effort to have just opinions of objects; and so to have affections suitable to their true values? But, how can we have suitable affections till their true values are known? And, how can the true values of objects be ascertained, till the ideas of them are scrutinized, and every superadded ingredient by association is separated from the qualities that belong to the thing itself? Then only can the objects themselves be understood, or their moments be measured either with respect to quantity or duration.

Separating associations one great business in moral philosophy.

Now, I say, a great number of those associations, which it is of such importance either in philosophy or moral conduct to be able to distinguish to be such, are the necessary effects of the law of association, in consequence of the natural course of things, which we cannot alter. And it is no otherwise therefore in our power to prevent them, than by constant attendance to the manner in which ideas enter, and so are apt to mix or cohere; or by assiduous practice

This must needs be the effect of general laws upon minds made likewise to associate ideas.

tice in examining our ideas daily received. For the circumstances in which ideas are presented to us, are in many instances absolutely independent of us. And yet such is the nature of the law of association, that ideas, ever so few times offered to us in certain circumstances, have a tendency as often as they return, whether by being recalled by our own will, or without being so recalled, to return with more or fewer of the circumstances with which they had formerly occurred. But a late excellent author hath so fully treated of association, so far especially as the conduct of the passions is concerned, that I need not be more particular (*a*).

IV. But perhaps it will be said, that what hath hitherto been suggested, is rather an objection against the law under consideration, than a defence of it. For are not all the difficulties it necessarily involves us in, so many evils or inconveniencies arising from it?

These difficulties arising from the law of association, are no objections against its fitness.

But let us observe the concatenation of things with regard to the human make, or how the several laws of the moral world hang and must hang together. Knowledge must, in the nature of things, be progressive; and our excellence consists in its being acquirable gradually by our own industry to improve in it. The laws of nature make it necessary that we should come into the world with infant bodies; and the law of progressiveness makes it necessary that we should enter into the world with infant minds; and in this respect, the laws of matter and motion, and the laws of the moral world, are admirably adjusted one to another. But if the law of association likewise take place with these other laws; then, in consequence of all these laws operating together, it is impossible but several associations of ideas must be formed in our minds, before reason is grown up by culture, and we are able to attend to the entrance of our ideas, and the manner

(*x*) See *Hutcheson on the nature and conduct of the passions.*

in

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in which they associate; that is, mix, join and cohere. The course of nature's laws with respect to the material world, is found, upon enquiry, to be very regular, beautiful and good, the best that can be conceived. But any uniform course of things must produce associations of ideas, in minds where that aptitude called the associating one obtains. Now that the law of association is an excellent law, has been already proved: it is *The law of improvement to perfection.*

But its fitness and goodness will yet more fully appear from the following considerations.

Several good effects of this law.

I. It is plainly in consequence of this law, that we so quickly learn the connexions established by nature between the ideas of different senses, those of the sight and touch, for instance; so as that we are very soon able, even in our infant state, to judge of such appearances and connexions with great facility, ease and quickness, and with as great accuracy as the exigencies of our life require. Those connexions and appearances, by which we judge immediately of magnitudes, distances, forms, and other qualities, may be called the language of nature, signifying these qualities. And it is by means of the law of association, that appearances, found by repeated experience to be connected with effects, do recal those effects to our minds, with which they have been found to be connected, so soon as they recur, or are re-perceived. It is, indeed, in consequence of the law of association, that we learn any of the connexions of nature; or that any appearance with its effects, is not as new to us at all times as at first; that is, as unfamiliar to our mind. It is owing to it that any appearance immediately suggests its concomitants and subsequents to us; and that we thus become acquainted with nature, in proportion to the attention we give to the course of things

Without it we could never become acquainted with the course of nature; every thing would for ever be new to us

things in it; and so are able, by means of one or more perceptions, to recal a great many connected with it, before they appear; or while they are yet at a distance from us, and to be brought about by many intermediate steps. But what could we do, how miserable, how ignorant would we be, without this faculty? without it we would plainly continue to be in old age, as great novices to the world as we are in our infancy; as incapable to foresee, and consequently as incapable to direct our conduct.

Unravelling ideas of association is a very agreeable employment.

But, *secondly*, The examination of our ideas when we are grown up, is a very pleasant employment to us. What can be more entertaining, than to trace our ideas, as far as we can, to their origine; to the various manners of their entrance into our minds; and to resolve them into their constituent parts; and so separate the associated ones from those which by natural and essential existence make an object itself. A regular course of things will necessarily produce associations of ideas in minds so formed as to have an associating quality or aptitude. But one of the pleasanteſt and noblest employments of reasonable beings must consist in studying nature. And studying nature must in a great measure consist in separating our ideas received from experience, into those that are ideas of qualities making particular objects by their co-existence or real combination; and those that are compounded, partly of such really co-existing qualities, and partly of other ideas blended or cohering with them, in consequence of associations formed by their having been often presented to the mind at the same time with other real qualities. For thus alone can we distinguish connexions in nature that are really inseparable, and make a fixed, regular course or succession of causes and effects, from every thing that does not appertain to such connexions; but however it may be joined

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joined to anyſuch in our minds by cuſtom, is no part of them; but is, with reſpect to them, wholly accidental.

It is in conſequence of the law of aſſociation, that we are capable of ſtrengthening or diminiſhing our deſires, of adding to our pleaſures, and of alleviating our pains.

III. Which is yet of greater moment to us; it is by means of the law of aſſociation, or of our aſſociating power, that we are able to ſtrengthen or diminiſh our deſires; and to encreaſe our pleaſures, or diminiſh our pains. For the aggregate of pleaſure or pain an idea gives us, will be in proportion to the quantity of pleaſure or pain it contains: that is, it is the ſum of the pleaſures or pains which are its component parts: and our deſires or averſions will be ſtronger or weaker, according as the ideas exciting them are more or leſs agreeable or diſagreeable. Now pleaſures aſſociated to an idea will encreaſe the quantity of agreeableneſs in that whole complex, blended or mixt idea. And in like manner, pains aſſociated to an idea will encreaſe the quantity of diſagreeableneſs or uneaſineſs ariſing from that whole complex, blended or mixt idea; as parts make up a whole: ſo that had we not the power of adding to, or taking from our ideas, we could have no power over our affections or deſires: for theſe muſt always be according to our ideas; but all the power we can have over ideas is by compounding, aſſociating, and ſeparating. And how great power we have in theſe reſpects, almoſt every virtuous or vicious affection amongſt mankind is a proof. For what, on the one hand, are luxurious fancies, exceſſive love of ſplendor, voluptuouſneſs, romantic love, and the immoderate luſt of power, but extravagant deſires, excited by ideas of grandeur and happineſs, ſomehow blended with natural pleaſures, and the deſires theſe excite? Or what, on the other hand, are patience, magnanimity, a contented mind, and other ſuch vertues, but affections towards certain natural objects, duly moderated by the conſideration of their intrinſic values, and of the ſtrength of deſire proportioned to them; by ſeparating

Becauſe deſires are excited by ideas, and our power over ideas lies chiefly in aſſociating and ſeparating.

parating from them all ideas that tend to encreaſe deſire beyond that due proportion; and by aſſociating to them all the ideas, opinions and judgments, that tend to maintain and preſerve deſire in a juſt tone and ballance, with relation to true happineſs? How does patience work? How can it work, but by alleviating conſiderations? And what is it, for inſtance, makes poverty doubly painful to one, and to another a very ſupportable ſtate, but different ideas in their minds, connected with mediocrity of circumſtances in reſpect of outward enjoyments, by means of different aſſociations? But indeed Mr. *Hutcheſon* hath quite exhauſted this ſubject. We ſhall therefore only obſerve further on this head, CHAP. III.

Another circumſtance with reſpect to aſſociation.

IV. That as aſſociations of various ſorts muſt neceſſarily be formed in the mind, by the natural courſe of things, abſolutely independent of us; ſo various aſſociations muſt produce various tempers and diſpoſitions of mind; ſince every idea, as often as it is repeated, muſt move the affection it naturally tends to excite; and ideas, with their correſpondent affections, often returning, muſt naturally form inclinations, propenſions, or tempers: for temper means nothing elſe. But with reſpect to the law of aſſociation, there is a circumſtance which we have not hitherto taken notice of; (becauſe aſſociation ſtrictly conſidered, is no more but a league, or coheſion, formed by frequent conjunction in the mind) and that circumſtance is likeneſs or reſemblance of ideas. Though frequent concurrence be ſufficient, as has been obſerved, to produce the effect called aſſociation, yet nothing is more certain, than that aſſociation is more eaſily engendered between ideas that have ſome affinity or likeneſs; than between thoſe which have no kindred, no reſemblance; as we may feel in a thouſand inſtances. Now if we carefully attend to the human mind, we ſhall find, that the aptitude to aſſociate like ideas that have the ſmalleſt reſemblances; and the aptitude

Like ideas are eaſily aſſociated.

Wit and judgment defined.

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tude to separate ideas which have the minuteſt differences, not only make a very great diverſity in minds with reſpect to genius, but likewiſe with regard to moral temper. Wit is juſtly defined to conſiſt in the quick and ready aſſemblage of ſuch ideas as have any analogy, likeneſs, or reſemblance, eſpecially in thoſe circumſtances which are not commonly attended to, ſo that the reſemblance, when it is pointed out, at once ſtrikes by its evidence, and ſurprizes by its uncommonneſs. Judgment, on the other hand, is rightly ſaid to lie in nicely diſtinguiſhing the diſagreements and variances or differences of ideas; thoſe eſpecially which lie more remote from common obſervation, and are not generally adverted to. The witty perſon may therefore be ſaid to be one, who hath an aptitude of mind to aſſociate ideas which have any affinity, or rather a quick diſcernment of the reſemblances of ideas, in reſpects not abſolutely glaring to all perſons, and yet evident and pleaſing to all, when pointed out to their obſervation by ſuch a ſtrict and acute diſcerner of likeneſſes. On the other hand, the man of judgment or diſcretion (for ſo diſcretion properly ſignifies) may be defined to be one who has a particular aptitude to deſcry differences of all kinds between objects, even the moſt hidden and remote from vulgar eyes. Now however theſe different aptitudes may be acquired, or in whatever reſpects they may be original, cogenial or unacquired; it is manifeſt that they make a very real difference in character or genius. They have very different effects, and produce very different works; and they preſuppoſe the law of aſſociation. The improvement of the one, certainly very much depends upon accuſtomance to aſſemble and join, and the improvement of the other upon accuſtomance to diſunite, break and ſeparate. But there is in reſpect of moral character a parallel variety: ſome are propenſe to aſſociating, and others to disjoining. Nay as the great variety of genius's may

Both ſuppoſe the law of aſſociation to take place.

It is therefore in conſequence of the law of aſſociation that there are different genius's.

nay be in general divided into the aptitude to associate, and the aptitude to dissociate: so, perhaps, almost all the different moral characters among mankind may be reduced to the like general division, that is, to the associating and dissociating aptitude. For as a turn to assemble resemblances of different kinds (suppose of the soft and tender, or of the horrible and violent, the serious or ridiculous) makes different species of genius, the epic, comic, tragic, humorous, &c. so dispositions to conjoin ideas of different kinds, will necessarily make an equal variety of moral tempers and characters; the chearful, the melancholy, the cowardly and timorous, or the daring and adventurous, and so forth. But one who naturally delights, or by usage comes to delight, in any one kind of assemblages, will be averse to its opposites: and excessive delight in any one, will become a particular extravagance to be guarded against. In like manner, a turn or propension to disunite ideas admits of as great variety as there is variety of differences to be discerned, and consequently there may be as great a diversity of minds each bent towards distinguishing, as there are separations of various sorts to be made. And every one of these separating propensions, may by over-indulgence run into extravagance; and often does. By pursuing this reflexion, we may see how far variety of tempers and genius's among mankind depends upon, and may take its rise from the associating power natural to the mind, in consequence of different circumstances calling it forth, or employing it in different ways, or contrariwise, checking it, disappointing and thwarting it, and thus obliging the mind to make frequent dissociations; and so using it to the separating practice, till it comes to take delight in it, insomuch that it is ever disposed to act that part, and rather chuses to distinguish than to join, on every occasion. But not to stay longer on this observation, let me only add, that on the

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It gives rise to an equal diversity of moral characters.

But so far as temper depends on association, it depends on ourselves.

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the one hand, from what has been said of wit, it is plain, that it could not take place, were it not for the associating power of the mind. And how, indeed, do poetry or oratory entertain or agitate, or wherein does their chief excellence consist, whether with respect to soothing and extending the imagination, or bestirring and moving the passions, but in associating the ideas, which being assembled together make agreeable, pleasant, charming, well suited company; in associating ideas which enlighten and set off one another, and by being fitly and closely joined, create great warmth in the mind, or put it into agreeable motion. *Simile* is likeness of ideas, pointed out, as it were, by the finger: and *metaphor* is a resemblance of ideas, that presents itself to the mind without any forewarning, and is doubly agreeable, like good company, by surprizing. On the other hand, from what hath been said of judgment, it is evident that its work supposes likewise the law of association, because it consists in separating; and the philosophical turn being towards scanning, sifting and distinguishing, when carried to excess, must become an enemy to all joining and uniting, as ordinarily happens.

Metaphor and simile are association.

Philosophy is separating work.

Both may run into extravagances.

But whatever be as to these things, it is certain from the nature of the law now under consideration,

Practical philosophy, or the conduct of the affections, consists in the assiduous examination of our ideas, fancies and opinions.

I. That true practical philosophy consists (*y*) in what it was placed by the ancients: in the assiduous examination of our fancies, ideas or opinions. For

(*y*) See *Epictet. enchiridion*, and *Arrian* and *Simplicius* upon him, and *Marcus Antoninus's meditations, or self-conversation.* This is the self examination recommended to us even by the poets, as absolutely necessary to self-command, and true wisdom, or good conduct. So *Horace, Lib.* 1. *Satyr.* 4. And, again, *Epist.* 2. *Lib.* 2. Quo circa meum loquor, &c. See *Cicero, Tuscul. quest. Lib.* 3. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero ægritudinis solum, sed etiam reliquarum perturbationum, &c.

by

by these our desires are guided or influenced: all our desires, whether those which are properly called appetites, having a previous, painful or uneasy sensation, antecedently to any opinion of good in the object; or those which necessarily presuppose an opinion of good and evil in their objects: all our desires, whether after external pleasures, pleasures of the imagination, or pleasures of the public and social sense. For this must hold in general concerning all our desires and aversions, that according to the opinion or apprehension of good or evil, the desire or aversion is increased or diminished. Now if this be true, our great interest and concern lies in taking care of our opinions, that they be true and just. This ought to be the whole business of our life; our continual, our daily employment: otherwise we cannot be masters of our desires, or keep them in just and proportionate order. And how happy would it be for men, if education was rightly managed, so as to give us early just notions of things, as far as life is concerned; or but even to establish early in our minds the habit of calling our ideas and opinions daily to a strict account! But all this, it is obvious, supposes a reasonableness and unreasonableness in associations; or a rule and standard for associating and dissociating. And if it is asked what this rule or standard may be? the answer is, It is the faculty by which we are able to judge both of our happiness, and of what is becoming us, of which we are afterwards to treat, and where it shall be shewn, "That these two, happiness or interest, and becoming or virtue, are the same, or at least inseparably connected." We are to associate and dissociate, join and separate according to that rule; or as our happiness and dignity require.

Education ought to establish that habit of self-examination.

II. But, *secondly*, let it be observed, an association is made by joining ideas with one another frequently, and by accustoming ourselves to contemplate them

Associations cannot be broken by mere confutation of false opinions.

CHAP. III. them ſo joined and united. But the confutation of falſe opinions is not ſufficient to break an aſſociation, ſo that the deſire or paſſion ſhall not continue after our underſtanding has ſuggeſted to us that the object is not good, or not proportioned to the ſtrength of the deſire. Thus we may obſerve, that perſons who by reaſoning have laid aſide all opinion of *ſpirits being in the dark* more than in the light, are ſtill uneaſy to be alone in the dark. And it is ſo in general, with reſpect to all aſſociations: we muſt firſt, indeed, correct the falſe opinion, from which the unreaſonable deſire or averſion proceeds: but this is not enough: the aſſociation cannot be broken in any caſe, but, as in that inſtance juſt mentioned; by accuſtoming ourſelves to walk in the dark, with the abſurdity of the opinion upon which our averſion or fear was formerly founded preſent to our mind. Ideas which have been long aſſociated, can only be disjoined by frequently acting in oppoſition to the unreaſonable aſſociation. Now if it ſhould be enquired why, whereas aſſociations are ſo eaſily formed merely by ideas being frequently preſented conjunctly to the mind; diſſociations however are not brought about without great ſtruggle and difficulty. The reply to this is at hand: were not this the caſe, the law of aſſociation would not gain its end: for it is the difficulty of breaking the aſſociation, which is the very end of the law, or produces all its good effects.

But by contrary practice.

Why it is ſo.

Of active habits properly ſo called.

II. I now proceed to conſider ſome effects, which though habits and aſſociation of ideas are really one and the ſame thing, and really reſolve into one principle; yet are in common language called active habits. For by that name are all aſſociations of ideas called, which terminate inwhat is termed action either of the mind or of the body. Now provided, on this head, we make mention of the moſt remarkable phenomena belonging to it, it is but of

little

little consequence in what order effects so nearly related to one another are proposed. CHAP. III.

Hence memory, habitual knowledge.

I. It is in consequence of a propension to do, and a facility and readiness in doing, acquired by repeated exercise called the *Law of habits*, that we have memory and habitual knowledge, learn languages with tolerable ease, attain to grace of body, as in dancing; to a good ear in music, a good eye in painting or architecture, and a good taste of any ingenious composition, as in oratory or poetry. For what else is memory, but the power of recalling with facility and quickness ideas and truths we had formerly discovered or perceived? and how is it strengthened or improved but by exercise? without memory there can be no invention, judgment, nor wit, because without memory ideas cannot be readily and quickly laid together, in order to be compared, that their agreements and resemblances, or disagreements and differences, may be discerned. And what is taste, but the power of judging truly with quickness acquired by frequent consideration and practice: that is, confirmed into habit by repeated acts? In fine, it is in consequence of this law, or formation of our mind, that the reiterated exercises of any of our faculties are not lost labour, but produce perfection. Attention, judging, reasoning, writing, speaking, composing, in one word, all our powers and actions in their perfection are so many respective habits: and therefore, to ask why the mind is so framed, is to ask, why perfection of any kind is attainable by us, or within our power. Instruction and education presuppose this frame of mind in the rules laid down with regard to them: and the effect of education, or early accustomance is well expressed by the common proverb, which calls it, *A second nature*. To exemplify this observation, and at the same time to shew what true *logic* ought to be, and really was among the

Taste of every kind.

And perfection of whatever faculty.

Instruction and education presuppose the power of habit.

CHAP. III. ancients, I shall just mention two observations of *Cicero* (z), with regard to the improvement of memory by due exercise. 1. The way, says he, to be able to retain ideas and judgments, so as to have the use of them always at our command, is to accustom ourselves to attend to things with great closeness and stedfastness; and to ask ourselves before we quit the consideration of any object, whether it is not worth while to store it up in the mind. And if it be, we ought (says he) as it were, formally to charge our memory with the custody of it, for certain particular reasons and uses, to be at the same time laid up in the mind with it. Did we take this method, we should have but little reason to complain of the slipperiness and treachery of memory. But we, it seems, expect it should be strong and perfect, without our taking pains to improve it: that is, we expect a habit to be formed, otherwise than by repeated exercise. 2. What would be of great help to memory, according to the same author, is, not letting any object of importance pass, till we have considered its analogies, relations, and oppositions, with respect to several other objects or truths already of our acquaintance. For by so doing, there necessarily would be, in consequence of the law of habits and association of ideas, various securities for our being able to recal it, in proportion to the variety of analogies, relations, agreements, differences and oppositions to other objects we had observed in it. Technical rules for assist-

An observation on memory to illustrate this.

(z) *Cicero de inventione rhetorica. De oratore*, &c. There is a fine passage to the same purpose, in the *Dissertationes incerti cujusdam pythagorei dorico sermone conscriptæ*. Published in a collection of *Greek* tracts, by Mr. *Gale*. *Dissertation* 5. An virtus & sapientia doceri possint. Sed optimum fuit, & in vitæ commoda pulcherrimum inventum memoriæ artificium, ad omnia utile. ——Hoc autem in eo consistit, primo si animum admodum advertas. ——Secundo si mediteris quæcunque audieris. ——Tertio si rerum quas audis, imagines reponere noveris, &c.

ing

ing and improving memory, are founded upon the same principle, *viz.* the law of habits. But there is this manifeſt difference between them, and thoſe rules of *Cicero*: That while, in order to help memory, we are imployed in conſidering many real analogies and oppoſitions, we really are at the ſame time increaſing our ſtock of uſeful knowledge, and improving our inventive faculty. For does not a great part of ſcience conſiſt in the knowledge of analogies and oppoſitions among objects? What elſe is knowledge? And wherein does the perfection of the inventive faculty conſiſt, but in being able to aſſemble ideas together into proper order, with great facility and quickneſs, in order to diſcover hitherto unobſerved relations of ideas, by ſeeing them in new poſitions? CHAP. III.

We are imitative creatures, but it is in conſequence of the law of habits, that imitation hath its effect. And that example hath influence.

II. It is in conſequence of the law of habits, that imitation paſſes into cuſtom, and that example has ſuch powerful influence upon our temper and behaviour. Nature hath wiſely made us imitative creatures, *apes*, if I may ſo ſpeak. But our diſpoſition to imitate would be of no uſe to us, did not repeated imitations produce habitual conformity to what we imitate. *Quintilian* gives an excellent advice with regard to imitation, when ſpeaking of ſtage-actors he tells us, that among them it frequently happens, "*imitatio in mores tranſit.*" He on this occaſion ſagely adviſes, for that reaſon to be extremely cautious, and to take good heed what we allow ourſelves to imitate or copy after, in writing or ſtyle for inſtance, but above all in life and manners.

Habit renders that agreeable which was formerly diſagreeable.

It is a very remarkable effect of the law of habits, that what is at firſt very uneaſy and diſagreeable, becomes by uſe, or aſſociation of ideas and habit, exceeding pleaſant and agreeable. Hence it is that we come to like the train of buſineſs we have been for ſome time inured to, however diſagreeable

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it might have been at firſt. Upon this is founded the ancient ſage advice to young people about the choice of a profeſſion in life, "To chuſe that which is likelieſt to be moſt advantageous to them, provided they have abilities for it, even though they ſhould have preconceived ſome prejudice againſt it, or averſion to it, becauſe cuſtom will make it agreeable (*a*)." It is owing in ſome meaſure to this law of habits, that people of the ſame buſineſs in life, or of the ſame rank and ſtation, do ſo readily aſſociate together. It is very fit it ſhould be ſo on many accounts; but chiefly becauſe people of the ſame profeſſion will by converſation about their common art, which will naturally be the ſubject of their diſcourſe, mutually learn from one another, and mutually excite emulation one in another. And ſo true is the fact, that it is become an univerſal proverb, *Birds of a feather flock together.*

It ballances our natural deſire after novelty.

We obſerved before, that a fondneſs after novelty is neceſſary in our nature (*b*), to ſpur us to ſeek after new objects, and new knowledge; but that this deſire of novelty is ballanced in our frame by the liking contracted to an object by habitual commerce with it, leſt our itch after novelty ſhould render us too unſteady, too deſultory, and conſequently too ſuperficial and heedleſs in our attention to an object, to be able to attain to the full knowledge of it. Now it is in conſequence of the law of habits, that this liking to an object is formed. By long or frequent converſation with an object, we become more pleaſed with it: the more narrowly and attentively we have conſidered it, the more we delight in it; for we find by frequently reaſoning about the ſame object, that it is not new objects only that can afford us freſh entertainment; but that

(*a*) *Plutarch de ſanitate tuenda.*

(*b*) In the firſt chapter, upon our furniture for progreſs in knowledge.

every

every object is an endleſs fund of new diſcoveries: and we at the ſame time experience, that the more we employ ourſelves about the ſame object, the more eaſy it becomes to us to make progreſs in new diſcoveries about it; and thus a fondneſs for the ſame object, or the ſame train of ſtudy, is contracted, ſo that we are not eaſily prevailed upon, even by quite new ones, to deſert it: or if we are, yet we return to it again with ſuch a reliſh, as one renews converſation with an old acquaintance he had not ſeen for ſome time. CHAP. III. How it does ſo.

III. But one of the moſt remarkable advantages of the law of habits is, (*I ſhall give it in the words of an excellent author* (*c*), a power with regard to pleaſure and pain in reſpect of practical habits. As practical habits are formed and ſtrengthned by repeated acts; ſo paſſive impreſſions are found to grow weaker by being repeated on us. Whence it muſt follow, that active habits may be gradually forming and ſtrengthning by a courſe of acting upon ſuch and ſuch motives; while excitements themſelves are proportionably by degrees becoming leſs ſenſible, that is, are continually leſs and leſs felt, as the active habits ſtrengthen. Experience confirms this. For active principles at the very time they are leſs lively in perception than they were, are found to be ſomehow wrought into character and temper, and become more powerful in influencing our practice. Thus perception of danger is a natural excitement of paſſive fear, and active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the ſame time that the former gradually leſſens. Perception of diſtreſs is a natural excitement, paſſively to pity, and actively to relieve it. But let a man ſet himſelf to attend to, enquire out and relieve diſtreſſed perſons, and he

By the law of habit paſſive impreſſions grow weaker, in proportion as practical habits are ſtrengthned.

Inſtances.

(*d*) Dr. *Butler* (the Biſhop of *Briſtol*) upon analogy.

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cannot but be less and less affected with the various miseries of human life, with which he must become acquainted: but yet, at the same time, benevolence considered, not as a passion, but as a practical principle of action will strengthen; and whilst he passionately compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. It is the same with all other affections which may be worked by exercise into active principles, and being settled and established as such in the mind, constitute a habitual character or temper that exerts itself calmly and regularly.

'Tis in consequence of the law of habits that temper is formed.

IV. It is indeed, in consequence of the law of habits that temper or character is formed, for tho' all the affections of mankind be, and must be originally from nature; and art, or exercise, cannot create, but can only make some change to the better or worse upon what nature hath implanted in our breasts; yet habit is the nurse of all affections: it is by repeated acts that any one is wrought into temper or becomes habitual. Whatever temper we would form, we must do it not merely by enforcing upon our minds, a strong conviction of its usefulness and reasonableness; but chiefly by exerting ourselves to call forth into action the affections which constitute it; by exercising them frequently, or by various acts; and that without intermission till the point is gained; that is, till these affections are become strong, ready to go out into action on any proper occasion; and we have contracted a propension to exert them. This is the way temper or character is formed. And by this means, it is in our power to change any temper we may have contracted, and to form ourselves to any desireable one. And this leads me to observe, that the chief benefit of the law of habits, is our being able in consequence of it to acquire the *deliberative temper or habit:* that is, the habitual power of enquiring and judging before we choose or act;

In consequence of that law, we are able to form and establish in our minds the deliberative habit.

act; the oppoſite to which is the habit of acting precipitately, and in blind, ſlaviſh obedience to every fancy or appetite that aſſails us. Whatever metaphyſical janglings there have been about the freedom of our will; our moral dominion, liberty, and maſterſhip of ourſelves certainly conſiſt in the eſtabliſhed habit of thinking well before we act; inſomuch as to be ſure of ourſelves, that no fancy or appetite ſhall be able to hurry us away into action, till reaſon and moral conſcience have pronounced an impartial ſentence about them. It is this command over ourſelves, this empire over our paſſions, which enables us to put truſt or confidence in ourſelves, and renders us ſure and truſt-worthy in ſociety to others. In it do true wiſdom and freedom lie. And as it ought to be the chief buſineſs of education to form early this deliberative habit and temper in young minds; and the conſtant employment of every man to preſerve and maintain it in due ſtrength; ſo the only way to attain to it, or uphold it, is, 1. By inculcating upon ourſelves the excellence and uſefulneſs of it, and the manifold diſadvantages that redound from the want or weakneſs of it. And, 2. by practicing ourſelves in chooſing and acting after the deliberative judicious manner; in habituating ourſelves to call all ſorts of ideas, fancies, and motives to a ſtrict account; or in accuſtoming whatever opinion or deſire claims our purſuit, to give in its reaſons at the bar of reaſon, and to wait patiently its examination and ſentence. Thus alone is the right moral temper formed. And theſe two exerciſes will be the conſtant employment of every one, who aims at the improvement and perfection of his mind; or at acting like a rational creature, and with true inward liberty and ſelf-dominion, which, like every other habit, can only be acquired by practice and cuſtom. 'Tis no matter as to the preſent caſe, how the will is determined, by motives or by deſires, by the laſt act of the judgment, or by the mind itſelf, that is, by

Which is ſelf-command and true moral liberty.

How it is eſtabliſhed or formed and ſtrengthened.

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by its own self-motive power. For whatever be the meaning of such phrases, 'tis as certain, that *command* over ourselves is *liberty*, as that being so *enthralled* by any appetite, as not to be able so much as to examine its pretensions before we yield to it; or being so *habituated* to desultoriness and thoughtlessness, and blind rash choice, as not to have it in our power to think or judge before we act, is *vile slavery and impotence.*

It is therefore this law of our nature that renders us capable of liberty or of being free moral agents.

Thus therefore it is really in consequence of the law of habits, that we are capable of liberty, or are free agents (*e*).

Now, I think from what has been said of the association of ideas and of habits, we may justly conclude, "That the laws relating to them are of great use in our nature, either necessary, or fitly chosen. And consequently, that no effects which take their rise from them, are evils absolutely considered, or with regard to the whole frame and constitution of the human mind."

Conclusion from the whole.

But there is a truth, which necessarily results from what hath been laid down, that may justly be added to this article, by way of *corolary*; and it is this, "That even in an absolutely perfect constitution of things, where the law of habit and association takes place, if knowledge be progressive, and gradually acquireable in proportion to application to improve in it, and consequently minds must be in an infant state at their entrance upon the world; some associations and habits must be early formed by minds in such a state

A useful *corolary*.

(*e*) So the ancients define liberty. Soli enim hi vivunt ut volunt, qui quid velle debeant didicerunt. Ineruditæ autem & rationis expertes animi imitationes atque actiones exilem quandam ignobilemque voluntatis libertatem multa cum pœnitentia conjunctam habent, &c. *Plutarch* de auditione libellus. So *Cicero*, paradox. 5. Quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis. Quis igitur vivit, ut vult? nisi qui recta sequitur, qui officio gaudet, cui vivendi via considerata atque provisa est, &c. See a fine description of this moral freedom by *Persius*, *Satyr.* 5. Libertate opus est, &c.

of

of things, which ought to be broken, and yet which cannot be broken or diſſolved by reaſon without difficulty and ſtruggling. For it is impoſſible, but ſome ideas, by being frequently preſented to the mind conjointly muſt aſſociate, which ought not to be aſſociated; or the aſſociation of which is contrary to happineſs and reaſon." But this obſervation, ſo plainly follows from what has been proved, that it is needleſs to dwell longer upon it. I ſhall therefore but juſt add, that if any one will purſue it in his own mind through all its conſequences, he ſhall find a ſolution ariſing from it to many objections made againſt the preſent ſtate of mankind; to thoſe eſpecially which are taken from the prevalence of vice in the world: for wrong opinions muſt produce wrong choice and action: and yet of moſt wrong choices, it may be ſaid, *Decipimur ſpecie recti.* CHAP. III.

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Another claſs of laws relative to our guiding principle and our moral conduct.

LET us therefore proceed to examine the laws relative to our reaſon, moral ſenſe, and the rule and ſtandard of our moral conduct with which we are provided and furniſhed by nature.

We have already conſidered our conſtitution with regard to knowledge. But in an enquiry into human nature, it is certainly proper to take yet a further view of our frame with reſpect to our moral conduct and guidance; or of the powers we are endued with, to direct us in the management of our affections, and in all our actions; and of the rules or laws nature hath ſet before us for our meaſure and guide. Reaſon, as it relates to our moral conduct, may be defined to be, "(*f*) Our power of making a

Our excellence conſiſts in our having reaſon and a moral ſenſe to guide our conduct.

(*f*) So *Cicero* defines it, in the beginning of the firſt book of his Offices. Homo autem quod eſt rationis particeps, per quam conſe-

CHAP. IV. a juſt eſtimate of human life, and its principal end, by connecting things paſt and to come with what is preſent; and thus of computing our true intereſt, and diſcovering what is beſt and fitteſt to do in any caſe; or contrariwiſe, what is oppoſite to our intereſt, and unbecoming our natural rank and dignity." Now, that we have ſuch a faculty is readily owned: nor does any one heſitate to aſſert, that our chief excellence above lower animals void of reflexion conſiſts in our having it. 'Tis for this reaſon we aſſume to ourſelves the name and character of moral agents. We may obſerve a nice, ſubtle and uninterrupted gradation in nature from the loweſt degree of meer perceptivity to this perfection man is diſtinguiſhed by, thro' many intermediate ſteps gradually aſcending one above another, without any chaſm or void. Thus, nature is full and coherent.

What moral reaſon is.

How we riſe in the ſcale of being by our reaſon: it is all our force, or at leaſt our chief one.

Far as creation's ample range extends,
The ſcale of ſenſual, mental pow'rs aſcends:
Mark how it mounts to man's imperial race,
From the green myriads in the peopled graſs!
What modes of ſight, between each wide extreme,
The mole's dim curtain, and the lynx's beam:
Of ſmell the headlong lioneſs between,
And hound, ſagacious on the tainted green;
Of hearing, from the life that fills the flood,
To that which warbles through the vernal wood:
The ſpider's touch, how exquiſitely fine,
Feels at each thread, and lives along the line:
In the nice bee, what ſenſe ſo ſubtly true,
From pois'nous herbs extracts the healing dew.

conſequentia cernit, cauſas rerum videt, earumque progreſſus, & quaſi anteceſſiones non ignorat, ſimilitudines comparat, & rebus preſentibus adjungit, atque annectit futuras: facile totius vitæ curſum videt, ad eamque degendam præparat res neceſſarias, &c. So *de legibus*, l. 1. Etenim ratio qua una præſtamus belluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, reſellimus, differimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus —— quid eſt divinius, quæ cum adolevit, atque perfecta eſt, nominatur rite ſapientia, &c.

How

How inſtinct *varies! in the groveling ſwine,*
Compar'd half reas'ning elephant with thine.
'Twixt that, and reaſon, *what a nice barrier,*
For ever ſep'rate, yet for ever near:
Remembrance, and reflexion, how ally'd;
What thin partitions ſenſe from thought divide:
And middle natures, how they long to join,
Yet never paſs th' inſuperable line!
Without this juſt gradation, *could they be*
Subjected theſe to thoſe, or all to thee?
The pow'rs of all ſubdued by thee alone,
Is not thy reaſon all thoſe pow'rs in one?

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 1.

It is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as ſuch.

But if reaſon be acknowledged to be a perfection or power ſuperior in the ſcale of life to meer ſenſitive being, the conſequence muſt be, "That reaſon ought to be upon the throne within us, ſet up and maintained by us, as the judge and ruler, from which all appetites, fancies, affections and purſuits ought to receive their commands, and to which they ought to be ſubject and accountable (*g*)". This ſeems to need no proof. One may as reaſonably ask, why we ought to open our eyes, make uſe of them, and take care to preſerve them from all diſeaſes and imperfections; as why, having reaſon, we ought to exert it, give it its proper place, and preſerve it pure and untainted, and in full poſſeſſion of its natural right, to guide, direct, and command all our inferior appetites and all our aſſociations. It is as evident, that our appetites and affections are made to be guided by reaſon, as that reaſon is a

(*g*) Eadem ratio habet in ſe quiddam amplum atque magnificum ad imperandum magis quam ad parendum accommodatum. *Cicero de finibus*, Lib. 2. No. 14. Duplex enim eſt vis animorum atque naturæ: una pars in appetitu poſita eſt, quæ eſt ὁρμὴ græce, quæ hominem huc & illuc rapit: altera in ratione, quæ docet & explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque ſit. Ita fit ut ratio præſit; appetitus vero obtemperet, &c. *Cicero de officiis*, Lib. 1. No. 28 and 29.

judging

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judging power, and as such, our distinguishing, our supreme excellence. If reason be our natural dignity, or that which constitutes us a superior rank of beings above those which have no such governing principle; it must be true, that we only maintain our natural dignity in proportion as reason presides and rules within us; and that we fall below the rank of men, in proportion as reason is weak, impotent, over-powered, and unable to act as a ruling or commanding faculty. in truth, to ask, why man is obliged to act according to his reason, or to be ruled by it, is to ask, why reason is reason. It cannot be denied, without asserting, that it is not a higher rank of life to be endowed with it, than to want it; upon which supposition, man is not one step removed in dignity or perfection above meer animals and a gradation or scale of being, are words without any meaning.

There are two things to be considered with respect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct.

Our sense of right and wrong.

And our sense of happiness.

But there are two things which deserve our particular attention with regard to our natural capacity and furniture for directing our conduct, or for the regulation of our appetites, desires, affections and actions. "We have a moral sense, or a sense of right and wrong. And we have a sense of interest and happiness." Now if it shall appear, that these two senses do not contradict one another; but that they agree in pointing out to us the same course of management and action; then must it be granted, that our nature is very well constituted with respect to our moral conduct. Were these, indeed, at variance, our frame would be very unaccountable, or rather monstrous; but if virtue and interest be really the same, then is every part of our moral frame consonant to every other part of it; and so it is a good or well composed whole. I have used the word *virtue*, to express what our sense of right and wrong recommends to our choice, because it is universally so used and understood: to use that term, in that sense, is not to beg the question; or to suppose a difference between virtue and vice before we have proved it: it is no more

That these do not disagree shall be shewn afterwards.

more than forewarning, that we are to uſe *virtue* and *vice*, with theſe other words *right* and *wrong* in the ſame ſenſe, becauſe we think theſe words are very generally employed as equivalent terms. That we have a ſenſe of virtue and vice, or of right and wrong, is now to be proved.

Our ſenſe of right and wrong, or our moral ſenſe.

This is a queſtion about fact, and conſequently it can only be reſolved in the ſame way, that other faculties or powers may be proved to belong to our nature. But I am apt to think, that every one ſhall immediately perceive, that he has a moral ſenſe inherent in him, and really inſeparable from him; if he will reflect, "Whether he is not ſo conſtituted as to be neceſſarily determined by his nature, to approve and diſapprove certain affections and actions?" For if that be owned, then are there certain affections and actions which he is neceſſarily determined by his nature to pronounce *right*, and certain affections and actions which he is neceſſarily determined by his nature to pronounce *wrong*. The queſtion now under conſideration can be no other than whether we have a determination in our nature to approve and diſapprove affections and actions; and what we are thus determined to approve and diſapprove. For if there are certain affections and actions which we are conſtantly ſo determined to approve or diſapprove that we cannot chuſe but approve the one kind and diſapprove the other; then, whatever theſe may be, they are with reſpect to us neceſſary objects or motives, the one kind, to approbation, and the other, to condemnation or diſapprobation. Hardly will any one ſay, that we have no determination to approve or diſapprove. "Approbation (‖) is a ſimple idea "known by conſciouſneſs, which can only be ex- "plained by ſynonimous words, or by concomitant "or ſubſequent circumſtances. Approbation of our "own action, denotes or is attended with a pleaſure "in the contemplation of it, and in reflexion upon "the affections which inclined us to it. Approba-

Election diſtinguiſhed from approbation.

"tion

(‖) See Mr. *Hutcheſon on the paſſions.*

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We have an approving and disapproving sense.

"tion of the action of another is pleasant, and is "attended with love toward the agent. And that "the qualities exciting to election, or moving to "action, are different from those moving to appro-"bation, every one upon reflexion must feel. For "we often do actions which we cannot approve, "and approve actions which we omit. We often "desire that an agent had omitted an action which "we approve, and wish he would do an action which "we condemn. Approbation is often employed a-"bout the actions of others where there is no room "for our election." (*b*) But if we experience approbation and disapprobation, then must we have an approving and disapproving faculty; a determination to approve and disapprove: and there must likewise be objects to excite our approbation, and objects to move our disapprobation. So that the remaining question is, what these objects are?

The qualities that excite approbation or disapprobation.

Actions must be done with freedom, affection and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemnation.

I. Now it is plain, that we never approve or disapprove, neither with respect to ourselves or others, but when we are sensible an action is done voluntarily, by choice, with reflexion, and without external compulsion or necessity. Thus we neither approve nor disapprove what is done by a brute, an ideot, or changeling; nor even what a rational creature does, not of itself, but when externally forced and compelled. Approbation and disapprobation always suppose their object to be matter of voluntary and free choice and affection. We neither approve nor disapprove ourselves, but when we are conscious that what we do is our own voluntary deed. And with regard to other beings, in like manner, we can neither approve nor disapprove, but when we imagine an action is performed by them with like choice, affection and free-

(*b*) Our sense of honour and shame supposes this faculty: such affections can only spring from it: they are absolutely unaccountable on any other hypotheses, because they cannot be resolved into any other principle.

dom;

dom, as when we approve or disapprove ourselves for doing or omitting. It is not merely because actions are advantageous or disadvantageous, that we approve or disapprove them; actions must be free, in order to move such sentiments and affections. If they are not, we regard them as the fall of a beam or a tile. This is too evident to be longer insisted upon.

Of these veracity, candour, benevolence, &c. excite our approbation, and their contraries our disapprobation.

II. But of free actions, or actions excited to by affections, and done with reflexion, some cannot be reflected upon without approbation, nor others without dislike and condemnation. Now, what are those, which move our approbation, and by what characteristic are they distinguished from the others? It is experience that must determine this question. And therefore let any one consider (*b*), how benevolent actions; how truth, candour, veracity, benignity, and such like dispositions, with their proper exertions in action affect us, so soon as we reflect upon them, or contemplate them: and what we think, on the other hand, of their contraries, falshood, dissimulation, treachery, instability, narrowness of mind, selfishness, malice, &c. Creatures capable of reflection, can, nay must make all the affections they experience in their breasts, and by which they are moved to action, the objects of their understanding: they must perceive them, and perceiving them there will naturally and necessarily arise in their minds a new class of affections towards these affections they feel themselves to be moved by. What then are the affections which we experience to accompany the different sorts of affections which have been just mentioned? How do they affect

(*b*) See *Cicero* epist. ad Atticum, l. 14. epist. Dolabellæ Cos. suo. Nihil est enim, crede mihi virtute formosius, nihil pulchrius, nihil amabilius, &c. *De finibus*, l. 2. Et quoniam eadem natura cuiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi.—His initiis ducti; omnia vera diligimus, id est, fidelia, simplicia, constantiâ: tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem perjuriam, malitiam, injuriam, &c.

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or move us? Are they pleasant to us on reflexion and contemplation, or disagreeable, or do they no way touch or move us; but are we quite neutral and indifferent to them: or when we are agreeably affected by the one sort, and disagreeably affected by the other sort, as we certainly are, whether we will or not, when they are present to our mind, and reflected upon. Is it the same sort of pleasure or pain we perceive when we reflect upon a beautiful and useful plant or an ugly and pernicious one? One or other of these must be said. But surely it will not be affirmed, that we are quite unmoved by such contemplation, and that no affections, whether of the generous or ungenerous kind, do either excite our like or dislike, our approbation or disapprobation; for this would be to assert, that no one character is more agreeable to us than another; but that the mind is equally indifferent to all sorts of characters and tempers. Far less will it be said, that the false, deceitful, mercenary man is agreeable to us; and that the faithful, trusty, and benevolent man moves our hatred. And to say, that tho' we are differently affected by these opposite characters, yet it is no otherwise than as we are differently affected with fruit, for instance, according as it is pleasant or disagreeable to our taste, is absurd. For however much we may like or dislike a particular sensation of taste fruit may affect us with; yet surely we do not like and dislike, approve and disapprove fruits, in the same way we like and dislike, approve and disapprove characters. Do we like or approve our generous friend in no other way than we like or dislike our dinner?

But if we are affected by such actions and characters, as have been described, agreeably or disagreeably, in a different way from the agreeable or disagreeable manner in which meats and drinks affect us; then it must follow, that we are fitted and determined by our nature to receive from the consideration of such actions and characters a particular kind

kind of agreeable or disagreeable sentiment, properly expressed by approbation and disapprobation. For this must be true, in general, that no one thing can give us pleasure or pain unless we are fitted by our make to be so affected by it. We could not, for instance, have the pleasures which the modifications of light and colours give to the eye, if we were not so framed as to perceive them and be agreeably affected by them. Now if we are determined by our nature to approve or disapprove characters, in the way that has been mentioned, we may give and ought to give, this aptitude, this determination in our nature a particular distinguishing name to denote it. Let it therefore be called a sense of the difference between actions or characters, or more shortly, a moral sense. CHAP. IV.

Let us reason about this matter as much as we will, all we can do is but to turn this question into various shapes, *viz.* "Whether we are not necessarily determined to approve the public affections in ourselves or others, which lead to such conduct as promotes the good of our fellow creatures, and to disapprove their opposites; and that immediately, so soon as any one of them is presented to our mind." For the question is about a fact, a part of our constitution; about something felt and experienced within us, in consequence of our frame; and it cannot possibly be decided, but by consciousness, or by attending to our mind, in order to know how we are affected on certain occasions by certain objects. But if any matter of experience merits our attention, this does, and therefore I shall offer the following considerations about it.

Whether we have a moral sense or not, is a question of fact.

Arguments to prove we have it.

I. Did not affections, actions and characters, when they are contemplated by the understanding, and are thus made objects of thought and reflection, move us agreeably or disagreeably, there would be an analogy in nature wanting, which we have no reason from nature to think can be wanting. For there is no-

From analogy.

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thing more certain, than that all ſenſible forms, ſo ſoon as they are preſented to the mind, do affect it with the agreeable perception of beauty, or the diſagreeable perception of deformity. Some objects of ſenſe do indeed ſo little affect us, that the perception produced by their contemplation is ſcarcely attended to; but every perception, as ſuch, muſt be in ſome degree either pleaſant or painful; tho' it is only when perceptions have a conſiderable degree of pleaſure or pain, that they conſiderably intereſt us, and we are therefore at any pains to claſs them, and give particular names to their effects upon us. However, ſetting aſide that conſideration, it is evident, in fact, with regard almoſt to all bodies or ſubjects of ſenſe, that they give us either the idea of beauty or deformity according to the different diſpoſition, meaſure or arangement of their ſeveral parts. It is the ſame with reſpect to ſounds; from every combination of them, there neceſſarily reſults either harmony or diſcord. Now, did not moral ſubjects affect us in like manner with the ſenſe of beauty and deformity, as ſenſible ſpecies or images of bodies do (*i*), there would

For we have a ſenſe of beauty in ſenſible forms.

(*i*) See *Cicero*'s *offices*, lib. 1. Nec vero illa parva naturæ vis rationiſque quod unum hoc animal ſentit, quid ſit ordo, quid ſit quod deceat, in factis dictiſque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipſorum quæ adſpectu ſentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venuſtatem, convenientiam partium ſentit; quam ſimilitudinem natura, ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem; conſtantiam, ordinem in conſiliis factiſque conſervandam putat, &c. So *de finibus*, lib. 2. No. 14. and *de finibus*, lib. 5. No. 17. Quid, in motu, & ſtatu corporis nihilne eſt quod animadvertendum eſſe natura judicat? Quemadmodum quis ambulet, ſedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque ſit: nihilne eſt in rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum eſſe putemus? Non odio dignos multos ducimus, qui quodam motu aut ſtatu videntur naturæ legem & modum contempſiſſe? Et quoniam hæc deducuntur de corpore, quid eſt, cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipſa propter ſe expetenda ducatur? Nam ſi pravitatem imminutionemque corporis, propter ſe fugiendam putamus, cur non etiam, & fortaſſe magis, propter formæ dignitatem ſequamur——Quoniam enim natura ſuis omnibus

would not be that analogy between the natural and moral world, or between the fabric of our mind with relation to ſenſible and to moral objects, that one is naturally led to apprehend muſt take place by the univerſal analogy of nature to itſelf obſerved throughout all its works. No object can indeed be preſent to the underſtanding or perceived by it, without affecting it in ſome manner as an object of the underſtanding, or as an intelligible ſpecies. And therefore every moral object muſt be fitted to affect the mind with ſome affection ſuited to it as a moral ſpecies, or an intelligible form. But not to lay any ſtreſs at all upon that abſtract truth. How can we acknowledge a ſenſe of beauty and deformity with reſpect to corporeal ſubjects, and no analogous ſenſe with reſpect to mental ones? Can we allow the mind to have an eye or an ear for bodily proportions and harmonies; and yet imagine it has no eye or ear by which it can diſtinguiſh moral appearances and effects? No ſenſe, whereby it can ſcan thoughts, and ſentiments, and affections, or diſtinguiſh the beautiful and deformed, the harmonious and diſſonant, the agreeable and diſagreeable in them. Does the bodily eye afford us perceptions of pleaſure and pain diſtinct from the ſenſations of touch? And has the underſtanding or eye of the mind, when it is employed about moral forms, no ſuch diſcernment? Has it no claſs of pleaſures and pains belonging to it, as a ſeeing or diſcerning faculty? Are all the pleaſures or pains excited in or perceived by the mind, with relation to affections and ſentiments, only pleaſures and pains of mental touch or feeling, ſo to ſpeak? Is there nothing of the agreeable and diſagreeable kind reſult-

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omnibus partibus expleri vult hunc ſtatum expetit, &c. See *de legibus*, lib. 1. numb. 19. An corporis pravitates, ſi erint perinſignes, habebunt aliquid offenſionis, animi deformitas non habebit? Cujus turpitudo ex ipſis vitiis facillime percipi poteſt. Quid enim fœdius avaritia, quid immanius libidine, quid contemptius timiditate, quid abjectius tarditate & ſtultitia dici poteſt, &c.

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ing from the contemplation of moral ſubjects, from their viſible, *i. e.* intelligible proportions, ſhapes and textures? Is all, I ſay, that affects the mind with pain or pleaſure of the moral kind merely analogous to our ſenſible pleaſures conveyed by outward touch; and has it, indeed, with reſpect to moral objects, no claſs of perceptions analogous to thoſe of the eye; none at all which properly belong to the underſtanding, and are excited in it by the moral ſpecies, in like manner as viſible ones affect the ſenſe of ſeeing? Surely it is contrary to analogy to fancy ſo. But if there really be any ſuch thing as being affected by the appearances of moral ſubjects to the underſtanding as ſuch; in language, which is, and muſt be originally taken from ſenſible objects, and their effects upon us, the perceptions conveyed to the underſtanding by moral forms, will very properly be called by the ſame names, as the analogous ones produced in us by viſible forms; that is, beauty and deformity, regularity and irregularity, proportion and diſproportion, *&c.*

From languages, for theſe ſuppoſe it.

II. Language, not being invented by philoſophers, but contrived to expreſs common ſentiments, or what every one perceives, we may be morally ſure, that where univerſally all languages make a diſtinction, there is really in nature a difference. Now all languages ſpeak of a beautiful and a deformed, a fair and foul in actions and characters, as well as of advantageouſneſs and diſadvantageouſneſs, profitableneſs and hurtfulneſs. But all languages which uſe ſuch words, ſuppoſe a moral ſenſe, or a capacity of diſtinguiſhing actions and characters from one another, by their appearances to the underſtanding independently of all their other tendencies, effects or conſequences. For at the ſame time that theſe words, beauty, deformity, *&c.* are uſed, there is in all languages a great variety of other words to expreſs all that can diſtinguiſh actions and characters from

from one another, upon ſuppoſition that they are no otherwiſe different than with relation to their advantageous or diſadvantageous effects. Intereſt, convenience, good, profitable, and innumerable other ſuch terms, and their contraries, ſufficiently denote theſe latter differences; and there re the words taken from viſible perceptions, are q te ſuperfluous, if there are indeed no moral differences diſcernible by the eye of the mind or underſtanding, ſignified by them in diſtinction from others. But now is it conceiveable that words abſolutely ſuperfluous, but founded upon and derived from a ſuppoſition of an analogy between viſible appearances to the eye and moral appearances to the underſtanding, could have univerſally inſinuated themſelves into all languages, were there no ſuch analogy in nature? Nothing correſpondent to the perceptions of beauty and deformity by the eye in material ſubjects, in immaterial, or moral and intelligible forms to the underſtanding. This is hardly conceiveable. CHAP. IV.

III. But to go on. Oratory, poetry, painting, and all the imitative arts, prove the reality of a moral ſenſe: they ſuppoſe it, and could not have their agreeable effects upon us, were we not endued with it. If they ſuppoſe a ſublimity, a beauty, an excellence, a greatneſs, an irreſiſtable amiableneſs, in characters (*k*) abſolutely diſtinct from all the conſequences of actions, with regard to profit or loſs, advantage or diſadvantage; then do they prove a moral ſenſe, or that there are certain actions or characters which we cannot chuſe but approve, love and admire; and others which we cannot chuſe but diſapprove, condemn and abhor, in- From the fine arts, for theſe ſuppoſe it.

(*k*) See *Ariſtotle*'s *Ars Poet.* and *Longinus.* Archeveque de *Cambray* ſur l'eloquence. La tragedie roulat ſur deux paſſions: ſcavoir la terreur, qui doivent donner les ſuites funeſtes du vice; & la compaſſion, qu'inſpire la vertue perſecutée & patiente, &c. *Dial.* 1.

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dependently of all other conſiderations, beſides their lovely or vile forms, their charming and agreeable, or diſagreeable and deteſtable appearances to the underſtanding. And ſhall we then, rather than acknowledge ſuch a ſenſe in our make, give up the foundation of all thoſe delightful arts, to which we owe ſuch noble entertainments? Or if we ſhould be tempted ſo to do, is it not the utmoſt length we can go, to ſave our being forced to own a moral ſenſe; to ſay, that though there be no real amiableneſs or deformity in moral acts, there is an imaginary one of full force, upon which theſe arts work?

It muſt be from nature.

But what is this but to ſay, that though the thing itſelf cannot be allowed in nature, yet the imagination or fancy of it muſt be allowed to be from nature: for if there be ſuch a fancy of full force in our nature that upon it can be raiſed ſuch high admiration, warm affection, and tranſporting approbation by theſe arts; whence elſe can ſuch fancy be, but from nature alone? It is eaſy to conceive, if the thing itſelf, or the imagination of it, be natural, how it comes about that nothing beſides art and ſtrong endeavour, with long practice, and much violent ſtruggling, can overcome our natural prepoſſeſſion or prevention in favour of this moral diſtinction, without which poetry or oratory would in vain attempt to intereſt our love and approbation, or excite our averſion and diſlike by characters. But if it be not from nature, art muſt be able to create; it muſt be able to do more than operate upon ſubjects laid to its hand; it muſt be able to give exiſtence to what nature knows nothing of, or hath laid no foundation for.

The imitative arts not only prove to us, that we have public affections; and that theſe regularly excited and wrought up to certain proper degrees, afford us very noble entertainment in the way of paſſion or feeling: but they likewiſe prove, that characters cannot be exhibited to our view without effectually

ally moving us; without deeply concerning us in their fates and fortunes; without exciting our warmeſt approbation, and keeneſt emulation. What elſe does all that is ſaid of ſublimities, greatneſs, beauty, dignity, and lovelineſs of ſentiments, affections, actions, and characters mean? They are indeed words without meaning. And the effects they produce in our minds, what are they? In truth, any one who will but reflect how he is moved by a fine character in a poem, muſt own theſe arts are a demonſtration, 1. That we are originally ſo conſtituted, as that from the moment we come to be tried with ſenſible objects, pity, love, kindneſs, generoſity, and ſocial affection are brought forth. But how could they be ſo, if they were not in our nature? Can any art educe from any ſubject qualities which it has not? 2. That we are ſo conſtituted, that the moment we come to be tried by rational objects, and receive unto our mind images or repreſentations of juſtice, generoſity, truth, magnanimity, or any other virtue, we are not able to remain indifferent toward them, but muſt approve and like them. And indeed it is impoſſible to imagine, a ſenſible creature ſo ill framed and unnatural, as that ſo ſoon as he is tried by proper objects, he ſhould have no one good paſſion towards his kind: no foundation either of compaſſion, complacency, or kindly affection. And it is equally impoſſible to conceive a rational creature, coming firſt to be tried by moral ſpecies, or the repreſentations of good and virtuous affections, ſhould have no liking of them, or diſlike of their contraries; but be found abſolutely neutral, towards whatever is preſented to them of that ſort. "A ſoul (*l*) indeed may as well be without ſenſe as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledge: coming

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The abſurdity of ſuppoſing it is not.

(*l*) See *Shaftsbury's eſſay on virtue*, whoſe words theſe are.

therefore

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therefore to a capacity of seeing and admiring in the moral way, it must needs find a beauty and a deformity as well in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figures, sounds, or colours." Let the philosophers, who are for resolving all our publick affections, and all our liking and disliking of actions and characters into certain subtle, nimble reflexions of self-love upon private interest, try whether they can thus account for the love, admiration, esteem and concern excited by a fictitious representation: but if they find the attempt vain here, must it not likewise be so in the original life, from which fictitious representation must be copied, in order to be natural? Sure there is not one nature for life, and another for fiction.

Without supposing or owning it, we must have recourse to very subtle reflexions (of which the mind is not conscious and for which it hath not time) to account for several phenomena; which is absurd.

IV. But who can consider human nature, and deny that we have public affections towards the good of others; or assert that all our passions spring from self-love and desire of private advantage; and that we have no moral sense. For take away a moral sense and public desires, how very small a share of our present excitements to action would remain with us? It is owned, that the affections *called* public, make indeed the greater part of our employments; or, that without them we would be almost reduced to absolute indolence. But when they are said not to be really social or public affections, but modes or arts of self-love, how are they accounted for?

How are our natural affection to parents and offspring; our compassion to the distressed; our gratitude, our benevolence; or whatever, in one word, hath the appearance of social in our frame, or of affection to public good: how are they reduced to self-love, but by supposing us, when the objects, which excite these affections are represented to us, immediately to make some very cunning reflexions upon self-interest or private good, which

there

there is neither time for, nor are we conſcious of? And can we think that to be true philoſophy, or a juſt account of human nature, which is forced to have recourſe to the ſuppoſition of many refined ſubtle reaſonings on every occaſion, in every honeſt farmer or peaſant? That one conſideration is ſufficient to refute it, and to ſhew it to be falſe and unnatural. But what puts the reality of public affections in our nature, the immediate object of which is the good of others, and of a moral ſenſe by which we are neceſſarily determined to approve ſuch affections, beyond all doubt, is, that whatever motives there may be from the ſide of pleaſure or intereſt, by which we may be bribed to do an action; yet we cannot poſſibly be bribed to approve it contrary to our inward ſenſe: or whatever motives of fear there may be to terrify us from doing an action, yet we cannot be terrified into the approbation of the omiſſion, if it be not really approveable. If a moral ſenſe be owned, the reality of public affections in our nature will be acknowledged; for it is only about actions proceeding from public affections, that there is any diſpute as to our determination to approve or diſapprove: but if we have no moral ſenſe, agreeably to which we muſt approve, and contrary to which we cannot approve or diſapprove; whence comes it about, that though we may be allured, or frighted into doing an action, yet we can neither be allured nor frighted into approving or diſapproving an action, no more than we can be bribed or terrified into aſſenting to a propoſition which we perceive to be falſe; or into refuſing our aſſent to a propoſition which we perceive to be true. If that be the caſe, then approbation or diſapprobation depends (*m*) as abſolutely upon the appearances

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We can no more be bribed to approve an action, than to aſſent to a propoſition.

(*m*) Nam ut vera & falſa, ut conſequentia & contraria, ſua ſponte, non aliena judicantur: ſic conſtans & perpetua vitæ ratio,

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appearances of actions to our minds, as aſſent and diſſent do upon the appearances of propoſitions to our minds. But that it is ſo, every one will feel by asking himſelf, whether an eſtate can bribe him to approve any degree of villany, though it may perſwade him to perpetrate it; or whether he can poſſibly think treachery, ingratitude, diſſimulation or any ſuch actions laudable and approveable in themſelves, whatever evils may be averted by them in certain circumſtances? Conſequences cannot alter the moral differences of actions no more than they can alter the nature of truth and falſhood. As a propoſition muſt be true or falſe in itſelf, independently of the loſs or gain the profeſſion of the belief of it may bring; ſo actions muſt be the ſame in themſelves with reſpect to their moral natures and qualities, with whatever circumſtances relative to intereſt, the doing or not doing may be accompanied. But as truths could not be underſtood or aſſented to, had we not a faculty of diſtinguiſhing the appearances of truth from falſhood; ſo actions could not be diſcerned to be morally beautiful and fit, unleſs we had a faculty of diſtinguiſhing the moral differences of actions.

Farther reflexions on moral ſenſe.

But all that relates to a moral ſenſe in our nature, hath been ſo fully handled by ſeveral excellent writers (*n*), that I ſhall only ſubjoin a few further reflexions upon it, with a view to ſuch philoſophers as do not deny the thing, but ſeem to quarrel with the name; which however will be of conſiderable uſe

tio, quæ eſt virtus, itemque inconſtantia, quod eſt vitium, ſua natura probatur. Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque diſſentio; & quia non idem contingit in ſenſibus, &c. *Cicero de legibus. Lib.* 1. No. 17. & deinceps.

(*n*) By *Crouzaz*, in his *traite de beau. Hutcheſon* in his *enquiry into the origine of beauty*, and his *illuſtrations on a moral ſenſe. Shaftsbury* in his *characteriſtics*. And Dr. *Butler*, Biſhop of Briſtol, in his *admirable ſermons*.

to

o ſet our moral ſenſe itſelf and its uſefulneſs yet in clearer light. CHAP. IV.

I. Firſt of all, it is no great matter for the name, f the thing itſelf in queſtion be acknowledged. And it certainly is by all, who acknowledge the difference between good and evil; however, they may huſe to expreſs that difference by calling it truth, eaſonableneſs, fitneſs, or by whatever other appelation. For if there is truth, fitneſs, or reaſonableneſs in actions with regard to us, it is perceivable by us; and if we perceive it, we are capable of perceiving it; that is, we have the faculty requiſite to perceiving it, or which enables us to perceive it. Let herefore the capacity or faculty of perceiving moral differences of actions or characters, be called reaon, as it is exerciſed about actions and their moral lifferences, moral diſcernment, or moral conſcience; we ſhall not diſpute for any word: All we want to eſtabliſh, is, that as we are capable of diſtinguiſhng truth from falſehood, ſo we are capable of diſtinguiſhing good and approveable actions, affections, and characters from bad and diſapproveable ones: And that we are not more neceſſarily determined by our nature, to aſſent or diſſent according to the appearances of things to our underſtanding, than we are neceſſarily determined by our make to approve or diſapprove affections, actions, and characters, according to their appearances to our underſtanding. Now as all, who own a neceſſary and eſſential difference of the moral kind between any action and its oppoſite, (as between gratitude, for example, and ingratitude) muſt own the neceſſary determination of our minds to approve the one, and diſapprove the other, ſo ſoon as theſe moral differences are preſented to the mind; ſo every one muſt be obliged to acknowledge certain neceſſary and eſſential differences of actions in the moral kind, reſulting neceſſarily from their natures, according

'Tis not worth while to diſpute about a name or appellation, if the thing be owned.

And it muſt be owned by all who acknowledge moral differences of actions and characters.

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according to which the mind muſt approve or diſapprove, ſo ſoon as the images of them are repreſented to it; or he muſt ſay that the mind in no caſe approves or diſapproves, but that it is quite a ſtranger to all ſuch ſentiments as theſe words expreſs. For it is ſelf-evident that if ever approbation and diſapprobation be excited, there muſt be an exciting quality. It is not more true, that when there is election there is ſome quality exciting to it; than it is neceſſarily ſo, that wherever there is approbation, there is a ground, a reaſon, a motive of approbation, ſome quality, ſome appearance to the mind that excites it. As we cannot have or conceive pleaſure of any kind, without affection to it, nor alternately affection, without ſome pleaſure towards which it tends; ſo we cannot conceive delight in approving, without ſomething which creates that delight or complacency; nor alternately any thing fitted to excite delight or complacency felt in approbation, and yet the mind not affected by it in that manner. But it is no uncommon thing to find philoſophers aſſerting propoſitions which neceſſarily terminate in affirming, "There may be pleaſures without affections, and affections without objects; though hardly will any one philoſopher make that aſſertion in direct terms." I think an excellent philoſopher has reduced moſt of the objections againſt a moral ſenſe to ſuch concluſions (*o*).

However it is proper, nay neceſſary to give this ſenſe in our natures a diſtinguiſhing name.

II. But if the determination in our nature to approve public affections and virtuous actions, and to diſapprove their contraries, be acknowledged, though it is of no importance by what name that determination be expreſſed; yet it is certainly neceſſary, that ſome one ſhould be given it, and fixed to it by philoſophers who own the thing. If there is any reaſon for concluding from the pleaſures of

(*o*) *Hutcheſon* in his *illuſtrations on a moral ſenſe.*

harmony

harmony we receive by the ear; from the pleasures of light, and colours, and visible beauty we receive by the eye; from the pleasures of truth and knowledge we receive by the exercise of the understanding about speculative matters; or from the pleasures of affection and passion we receive by having our pathetic part agreeably moved and stirred: If there be any reason to conclude from these perceptions that we really have the faculty of delighting in music, distinct from that of enjoying visible beauty, and both distinct from the faculty of comparing the relations of ideas, and perceiving their agreements or disagreements, and consequently of delighting in truth; and all these distinct from the capacity of receiving pleasures from our affections duly moved (as by a good tragedy for instance): There must be good reason to conclude from the manner in which we are differently affected by the moral appearances of actions and characters, when presented to our mind, either in real life, or by imitation, that we really have a faculty of discerning the moral differences of actions and characters, distinct not only from all our outward senses, but also from the capacity of perceiving the truth and falshood of propositions.

This is no less necessary then it is to give distinguishing names to our other senses and faculties.

And for the same reason that it is not only a proper and distinct way of speaking in philosophy, but a necessary one, to say, we have a sense of harmony, a sense of visible beauty, a capacity of discerning truth from falshood, *&c:* For the same reason it must not only be a proper and distinct, but a necessary way of speaking in philosophy, to say, that we have a sense of moral beauty and fitness in affections, actions, and characters, as distinct from all these as they are from one another; provided we really are so made, that affections, actions, and characters do necessarily excite our approbation, or dislike and condemnation, according to their moral differences. If there be such a faculty or determination

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determination in our nature, it ought to have its distinct name; as well as our other faculties have. We cannot treat of it distinctly no more than of any other of our powers, capacities, and affections, without having some determinate word to express it. But moral sense, moral taste, moral discernment, or moral conscience, well express it; and seem to be the propereſt phrases in our language, to answer to those used to signify the same determination in our nature by ancient philosophers (*p*).

That we are determined by pleasure and pain in all our motions is true in a certain sense.

III. Some philosophers seem to be excessively fond of the words *pleasure* and *pain*, and to have great satisfaction in repeating over and over again, that it is only pleasure and pain that can excite desire, or move and affect the mind. But though that proposition be very true, when pleasure and pain are taken in a large sense, comprehending all the objects which affect the mind agreeably or disagreeably; yet of what use can it be in philosophy? or, what truths can we discover by its help, till all various sorts of pleasures and pains; that is, all objects which affect the mind agreeably and disagreeably are distinguished and classed, that they may be estimated and apprized? One may as well think of carrying on philosophy distinctly without distinguishing the various pleasures of the senses from one another, because it is the mind perceives them all; and they may for that reason be all called perceptions and pleasures of sense; as think of carrying on philosophy distinctly without distinguishing not only moral pleasures from sensible ones; but the various kinds of moral ones from one another, according to their different values, degrees,

But this general proposition is of little use in philosophy, till all our pleasures are classed and distinguished.

(*p*) Δικαιως αγαθοειδης. Sensus decori & honesti, sensus veri ac pulchri, *and sometimes*, sensus communis. So *Juvenal*, *Satyr* 8. and *Satyr* 15. See *Casaubon*, *Salmasius*, *Gataker*. So *Horace*, *Satyr* 3. l. 16. See Lord *Shaftsbury*'s *Characteristics*, T. 1. *Essay on the freedom of wit and humour.*

and

nd natures. Pleaſures of ſenſe, pleaſures of imagination, pleaſures of contemplation, pleaſures of entiment, and ſeveral other claſſes, that might be amed, are all of them but different ſorts of pleaures; but becauſe they are different ſorts, they ught to be diſtinguiſhed. Or till they are ſo, how an they be compared and have their moments etermined? If any philoſopher aſks, "if one can lect or approve without being pleaſed?" I will nſwer, "That we cannot be pleaſed without being leaſed." But that election and approbation are s different perceptions or pleaſures as any two he an name. If he continues to urge, "That one ay ſay what he will, but one cannot be determind to act but by pleaſure, for nothing can pleaſe ithout pleaſing." I anſwer, "Pleaſure is pleaſure, nd nothing can be pleaſure but pleaſure. But elight in a good action by approbation is as difrent a pleaſure from delight in any advantage it ay bring, as pleaſure in a picture is from pleaſure muſic, or as both are from the pleaſure of a inner, a good picture or a fine tune may procure. ur determination to approve or diſapprove actions nd characters, renders us capable of a ſett of leaſures far ſuperior to any which ſenſe can afford in ie moſt proſperous circumſtances of outward enyment: and it likewiſe renders us capable of a tt of pains far more inſupportable than any we n poſſibly have from any other quarter. For hat pleaſures are equal to thoſe of ſelf-approbaon, and the conſcience of having acted agreeoly to the relations of things, to moral beauty and neſs, the dignity and excellency of our nature, nd in concert with that amiable temper and diſpoſion of the Author of nature, which appears through ut the whole of his works? And what pains, on the her hand, can be compared with thoſe of a ſelfondemning mind? But it is our ſenſe of agreeableneſs and diſagreeableneſs in actions, and our

And our moral ſenſe renders us capable of a peculiar ſett of them, the higheſt we are ſuſceptible of, or can conceive.

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neceſſary determination to approve or diſapprove according to the moral differences of affections and actions, which alone renders us, or can render us ſuſceptible of theſe higheſt of pleaſures or pains. They are and muſt be peculiar to creatures capable of reflecting upon the images of actions and characters, and of approving or diſapproving, according to a natural ſenſe of amiableneſs and its contrary. And in fine, for any one to ſay, "That he who does good and virtuous actions becauſe he has pleaſure in doing them, and an averſion or abhorrence of their contrary, as much purſues his own pleaſure as any other perſon can be ſaid to do, whatever he takes pleaſure in; and conſequently that all men are equally ſelfiſh, though nothing be more true than what the poet tells us, *nec voto vivitur uno* (*q*)." This is indeed no more than telling us, that pleaſure is pleaſure. And we ſhall not ſcruple to grant them all they demand, provided they will but allow, *Firſt*, That no man can be ſaid to be virtuous, unleſs he does virtuous deeds from good affections, and with an approving ſenſe of what he does. And therefore, *Secondly*, That virtue and vice ſuppoſe a determination in our nature to approve the one and to diſapprove the other, both which I think have been ſufficiently proved.

The caution of the ancient moraliſts in uſing the words good and evil very commendable.

IV. But after all that has been granted with regard to ſaying, "That it is always pleaſure which determines us to elect or approve;" I believe, all who acknowledge the reality of virtue, if they have attended to the importance or rather neceſſity of uſing diſtinct determinate terms, and keeping cloſely to definitions, eſpecially in moral philoſophy, in order to avoid all ambiguity and colluſion; will

(*q*) Mille hominum ſpecies, & rerum diſcolor uſus
Velle ſuum cuique eſt, *nec voto, vivitur uno.*
Perſius.

very

very readily approve the *cautiouſneſs* of the better ancient moraliſts, " When they would not allow ſenſual gratifications, which ſo often come into competition with virtue and the pure ſolid ſatisfaction which virtuous conſciouſneſs alone can give, to be called by the ſame name of pleaſure *(voluptas,)* nor any pain to be called by the ſame term evil *(malum)* deſigned to ſignify the greateſt of all evils and diſorders, to avoid any ſteps towards the introduction of which into the mind, all other pains or evils ought to be undergone with fortitude: even the corruption of the mind by vice". Such caution is very neceſſary in moral philoſophy. And the reaſons ſo often given for it by ancient philoſophers, by *Cicero* in particular, in his reaſonings againſt the Epicurean ſyſtem, in which it was the fundamental and favourite maxim, that all our determinations to act, proceed from pleaſure, *Omnia initia agendi à voluptate proficiſcuntur*; is beautifully engliſhed to us by an excellent modern philoſopher, who was indeed a perfect maſter of all true ancient learning (*r*). " To bring (ſays he) the ſa- " tisfactions of the mind, and the enjoyments of " reaſon and judgment under the denomination of " pleaſure is only a colluſion and a plain receding " from the common notion of the word. " They deal not fairly with us, who in their phi- " loſophical hour admit that for pleaſure, which " at an ordinary time, and in the common prac- " tice of life is ſo little taken as ſuch. The ma- " thematician who labours at his problem, the " bookiſh man who toils, the artiſt who endures " voluntarily the greateſt hardſhips and fatigues; " none of theſe are ſaid to *follow pleaſure*. Nor

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(*r*) See the *Characteriſtics*, T. 3. and ſee *Cicero de finibus*. l. 1. and l. 2. At negat Epicurus (hoc enim veſtrum lumen eſt) qui honeſte non vivat, jucunde vivere poſſe. Quaſi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget. Illud quæro, quid ei, qui in voluptate ſummum bonum putet, conſentaneum ſit dicere, &c.

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" will the men of pleaſure by any means admit
" them to be of their number. The ſatisfactions
" which are purely mental, and depend only on
" the motion of a *thought*, muſt in all likelihood
" be too refined for our *modern Epicures*, who are
" ſo taken up with pleaſures of a more ſubſtan-
" tial kind. They who are full of the idea of
" ſuch a *ſenſible*, *ſolid good*, can have but a ſlender
" fancy for the more *ſpiritual* and *intellectual ſort*.
" But this latter they ſet up and magnify upon
" occaſion, to ſave the ignominy which may re-
" dound to them from the former: this done,
" the latter may take its chance, its uſe is pre-
" ſently at an end. For it is obſervable, that
" when men of this ſort have recommended the
" enjoyments of the mind under the title of *plea-*
" *ſure*, when they have thus dignified the word,
" and included in it whatever is mentally good
" and honeſt, they can afterwards ſuffer it con-
" tentedly to ſlide down again into its own ge-
" nuine and vulgar ſenſe; whence they raiſed it
" only to ſerve a turn. When pleaſure is called
" in queſtion and attacked, then reaſon and virtue
" is called on to her aid, and made principal parts
" of her conſtitution. A complicated form ap-
" pears and comprehends ſtreight all which is ge-
" nerous, beautiful, and honeſt in human life. But
" when the attack is over, and the objection once
" ſolved, the ſpectre vaniſhes: *pleaſure* returns a-
" gain to her former ſhape; ſhe may even be
" pleaſure ſtill, and have as little concern with dry
" ſober reaſon, as in the nature of the thing,
" and according to common underſtanding ſhe
" really has. For if this reaſonable ſort of enjoy-
" ment be admitted into the nature of good, how
" is it poſſible to admit withal that kind of ſen-
" ſation, which in effect is rather oppoſite to this
" enjoyment? 'Tis certain, that in reſpect of the
" mind and its enjoyments, the eagerneſs and irri-

" tation

" tation of mere pleasure is as disturbing, as the CHAP. IV.
" importunity and vexation of pain. If either
" throws the mind off its biass, and deprive it of
" the satisfaction it takes in its natural exercise and
" employment, the mind, in this case, must be a
" sufferer, as well by the one as by the other; if
" neither does this, there is no harm on either
" side."

V. In fine, if we have a moral sense, then have we not only the power of examining our appetites and affections, and of judging and computing them; or of determining the bounds within which their gratifications ought to be pursued, and how they ought to be regulated, that none of our pleasures may be too dearly bought.

Hence it is that we are not only capable of computing our advantage and interest;

———*Nocet empta dolore voluptas.*

But we have also a sense of moral order, decency, fitness and unfitness in affections, actions and characters, which is analogous to our sense of beauty and regularity in outward forms; or which, more properly speaking, is the same sense employed about moral objects. For as had we not sensitive appetites and affections towards sensible objects implanted in us by nature, reason could not compare and estimate sensible pleasures; or rather, there would be no such pleasures to apprize and reason about: in like manner, without a sense of moral beauty and fitness, reason could not compare and compute the moral differences of natural objects; or rather, there would be no such objects known to us, for reason to exercise itself about. " For it must be true in general, that without appetites, dispositions, faculties and affections suited to particular objects, no one thing could give us more pleasure than another;" and it is fully as true, " That ultimately no other reason can be given why any object pleases us,

but likewise of rising higher, and taking in what is worthy and laudable in itself into the account.

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us, gives delight, affects us agreeably, or excites our approbation, but that we are so framed by nature; or nature hath so constituted us, and so appointed things." So that if there be a moral sense in our constitution, it must be from nature; there must be the same reason to ascribe it to nature, as to attribute any of our senses or faculties to it.

On the one hand, if there be no such sense in our make, virtue is really but an empty name, that is, the fitness or approveableness of affections, actions and characters in themselves, is an idle dream that hath no foundation; but advantage or interest is all that we have to consider or compute in our determinations. But, on the other side, if there be really a sense of beauty, fitness, or agreeableness in affections, actions and characters in themselves, independently of all other considerations, then it plainly follows that we are made, "Not merely to consider our private good, or what quantity of external safety, ease, profit, or gratification an action may bring along with it; but to rise higher in our contemplation, and chiefly to enquire, "What is fit and becoming, agreeable, laudable and beautiful in itself;" and thus to ask one's heart in all consultations about actions. But is it fit, is it becoming, is it good to do so, whatever advantage may accrue from it?——Or, is it not base, to whatever dangers not doing it may expose? Shall I betray my trust, treat my friend ungratefully, forfeit my integrity, desert my country; or do any such unworthy action, even to save life itself; to gain an uninterrupted succession of sensual joys, or to avoid the most exquisite torments? By this sense we are taught and obliged to distinguish between life, and the causes of living which are worthy of man; or between life and those noble enjoyments arising from a sense of virtue and merit, without which life is vilely prostituted——— etween

It is only by a moral sense we can judge or have a notion of any thing, besides mere external advantage.

—*Vicam*,

——*Vitam, & propter vitam vivendi perdere cauſas.*

Now in order to be convinced that we have ſuch a ſenſe, let any one but aſk himſelf, (for it is, as hath been often ſaid, a queſtion that depends upon inward experience) whether there be not a very wide, a total difference, between doing a good action becauſe it is good, or from love and affection to good, and a thorow feeling of its excellence, and doing it merely becauſe it will gain him ſome external advantage or pleaſure. Let him take the poets catechiſm, and ſtrictly examine himſelf and his natural ſentiments by it.

But we have a nobler reliſh.

And therefore we have a moral ſenſe.

Elſe what foundation have the poet's queſtions? by which if we try ourſelves, our moral ſenſe will ſoon ſpeak out its real ſentiments.

Falſus honor juvat, & mendax infamia terret,
Quem, niſi mendoſum & mendacem? Vir bonus eſt quis?
Qui conſulta patrum, qui leges juraque ſervat.——
Sed videt hunc omnis domus & vicinia tota,
Introrſum turpem, ſpecioſum pelle decora.
Nec furtum feci, nec fugi, ſi mihi dicat
Servus: habes precium, loris non ureris, aio:
Non hominem occidi: non paſces in cruce corvos.
Sum bonus & frugi: renuit, negat atque Sabellus.
Cautus enim metuit foveam lupus accipiterque,
Suſpectos laqueos, & opertum milvius hamum.
Oderunt *peccare boni virtutis amore.*
Tu nihil admittes in te formidine pœnæ.
Sit ſpes fallendi, miſcebis ſacra profanis.
Hor. Epiſt. Lib. I. 16.

Let him aſk his heart, whether he can approve himſelf; or think he will be approved by any being who hath a ſenſe of worth and integrity, however cunning, prudent and ſagacious he may be to ſecure his outward intereſts; unleſs he hath a heart that contains all villany; and would not ſacrifice integrity in any one indulgence to the higheſt pleaſures.

No man can put himſelf to a proper trial by examination, without feeling he has a moral ſenſe.

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sures of sense: The "*jus fasque animo sanctosque recessus mentis & incoctum generoso pectus honesto?*" Whether he can chuse but detest all treachery, all villany, all baseness, all dishonesty, however profitable it may be in the ordinary way of sensual appetite and gratification. Whether he can represent to his mind the images of veracity, truth, honesty, benevolence, a sincere, unaffected regard to honour and virtue; and the calm regular presidence of reason and moral conscience in the heart, without approving and loving them. And whether, finally, he can conceive a greater plague than that imprecated by the satyrist's direful curse,

Virtutem videat intabescatque relicta.

To be satisfied of the universality of this sense, let one but try the lowest of mankind in understanding, and fairly representing to him the virtues and vices, bring forth his natural, his first sentiments about them; for he shall find that even the most illiterate have a strong moral sense. *Quæ enim natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum & beneficii memorem diligit, quæ superbos, quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos non aspernatur non odit?*

It is absurd to suppose a moral sense not to be from nature.

Indeed, if these sentiments of virtue and vice common to all men, and which none can fully extirpate from their minds, are not from nature, but are the *offspring of flattery upon pride*, and begot by the devices of *cunning politicians*; we are, that is, society is much more indebted to such politics than to nature: for such sentiments are the bond, the cement which holds society together, without which nothing that is truly great or noble could subsist in human life. But how ridiculous is it to ascribe them to any thing else but nature? For how can custom, education, example, or study, give us new ideas? "They might make us see private advantage in

in actions whose uselessness did not at first appear; or give us opinions of some tendency of actions to our detriment, by some nice deductions of reason; or by a rash prejudice, when upon the first view of the action we should have observed no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend actions as amiable or odious, without any consideration of our own advantage." (‖) Let such philosophers consider, that it must be a determination previous to reason, which makes us pursue even private good as our end. No end can be intended without desire or affection, and it is nature alone can implant any appetite, any affection or determination in our nature, whether toward private good or publick good; whether toward pleasure of outward sense, or pleasure of inward approbation. It is equally absurd in the natural and moral world, to suppose that art can create; it can only work upon subjects according to their original properties, and the laws of nature's appointment, agreeably to which certain effects may be produced upon them. No art can therefore educe from our natures an affection or determination that is not originally there, no more than art can give bodies a property which they have not.

CHAP. IV.

Art cannot create.

To assert a determination in our mind to receive the sentiments or simple ideas of approbation or disapprobation from actions so soon as they are presented, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them, is not to assert innate ideas, or innate knowledge; it is only to assert an aptitude or determination in our nature to be affected in a certain manner so soon as they occur to the mind. And this must be true with regard to the mind in respect of every pleasure it receives, that it is fitted by nature to receive it. But it is well worth observing, "That though we have no innate ideas, in the sense now commonly affixed to these words; yet as in the sensible kinds of objects, the species,

A moral sense does not suppose innate ideas.

(‖) See *Hutcheson on the passions.*

CHAP. IV.

But moral ideas are continually haunting our mind.

species, the images of bodies, colours and sounds are perpetually moving before our eyes, and acting (*f*) on our senses, even when we sleep, so in the moral and intellectual kind, the forms and images are no less active and incumbent on the mind at all seasons, and even when the real objects themselves are absent. But in these vagrant characters or pictures of manners, which the mind of necessity figures to itself, and carries still about with it, the heart cannot remain neutral, but constantly takes part with one or other: however false and corrupt it may be within itself, it finds the difference as to beauty and comeliness between one heart and another, one turn of affection, one sentiment, one behaviour from another; and accordingly, in all disinterested cases must approve in some manner what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt." Whether we will or not, moral ideas are always haunting and assaulting us: we must not only shun the world, but shun and avoid ourselves to get entirely rid of them. And let the most hardened, callous wretch, the most abandoned to all sense of honour, shame and integrity that ever existed say, if he dares in a serious conversation with himself approve one vice, or disapprove one virtue, however profitable the one, or disadvantageous the other may be.

Nature therefore hath not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice.

Thus then we see how we are constituted, with regard to a rule and standard of action, and that nature has not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice (*t*), but hath planted in us a natural sense, which

(*f*) See *Shaftsbury*'s *enquiry concerning virtue*; whose words these are.

(*t*) Est quidem vero lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omneis, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet, aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero, aut per senatum,

which as often as consulted, will not fail to tell us our duty and set us right; and which, let it be opposed or born down with ever so much violence, or lulled asleep by whatever delusive arts, will often uncalled upon, tell the villain to his face he is such, and bitterly tear his guilty mind with agonizing remorse, terrible beyond expression. And who can bear the horrid pangs of a guilty, self-condemning heart, conscious of the worth and excellence of abandoned virtue, and of the baseness, the enormous baseness of every vice, whatever advantages it may bring? We had therefore good reason to say with respect to knowledge, in the first chapter, that nature hath kindly provided us with a natural sense which leads and prompts us to enquire after good, final causes in the administration of nature, and thus directs us to an enquiry the most assistant to virtuous temper, and of the most pleasing kind; and which at the same time directs us in every case, if we will but consult it, to our duty, or to what is excellent, laudable and praise-worthy in itself, independently of all computations with respect to private good, or interest. This sense is therefore justly said to be engraven on our hearts, innate, original, and universal. CHAP. IV.

But then such is our excellent make in general, that this rational sense or moral conscience common to all men, must, like all our other faculties, depend for its strength and improvement upon our culture; But our moral sense, like all our other faculties, must depend on our own culture or care to improve it.

tum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius: nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac: sed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore, una lex & sempiterna, & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister & imperator omnium deus ille, legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur, atque hoc ipso luet pœnas maximas etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. *Ciceronis frag. in Lactantio*, Lib. VI. Cap. 8.

(*u*), upon

CHAP. IV. (*u*), upon our care to preſerve, to nouriſh and improv it. Such, as has been obſerved, is our frame in ge neral; and therefore, though this ſenſe can no mor be produced by education, where it is wanting, tha an ear for muſic; yet as the latter, ſo the former i greatly improveable by inſtruction and exerciſe both may be rendered leſs delicate, nay, almoſ quite dead and inſenſible; or at leaſt they may b conſiderably vitiated by wrong practice, by unna tural aſſociations of ideas, through the influence o bad example, and other depraving methods; bu both are improveable to a great pitch of perfection by proper pains, and both require cultivation to their improvement. And certainly, with regard to the latter, it is the great buſineſs of education, and the great buſineſs throughout the whole life of every one, to keep it in due exerciſe, to preſerve it from being corrupted by bad opinions and wrong aſſocia- tions of ideas, or over-powered by contrary, cor- rupt, head-ſtrong affections: and for this reaſon very often to reflect ſeriouſly upon it, as the dignity of our nature, and to recal to our mind all the motives and conſiderations which tend to uphold and corroborate it; to accuſtom ourſelves to review our actions, and to paſs judgments, not only upon what we have done, but upon what we ought to do in circumſtances that may occur: and in fine, thus to accuſtom our moral ſenſe to work and act, that it

(*u*) See *Plutarch de liberis educandis.* Quod de artibus & ſcientiis dicere ſolemus, idem & de virtute pronunciandum eſt; ſcilicet ad ejus perfectionem tria concurrere opportere: naturam, rationem & aſſuefactionem. Natura enim ſi abſque diſciplina ſit cæca eſt. Diſciplina ſi a natura deſtituatur defecta: exercitatio, his duobus demptis imperfecta eſt. Et quemadmodum ad agriculturam, &c.——And therefore he adds, the moral virtues are very properly expreſſed in the *Greek* language by a word which ſignifies *aſſuefactio ad virtutem.*

Cicero de agritudine levienda. Tuſc. queſt. Lib. III. Sunt enim ingeniis noſtris ſemina innata virtutum: quæ ſi adoleſcere liceret ipſa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret.

may

may be rendered by the law of habits habitual to us, and may become larger, and more comprehensive than it can be at firſt; that is, abler to take in complex ideas, and ſo to judge of wide and extenſive objects: till like a well formed ear or eye, it is capable to judge eaſily and readily, as well as truly, of any the moſt complicated piece of harmony. Now nothing is more conducive to ſuch improvement of it, next to exerciſing it about examples, in judging and pronouncing ſentence, (which muſt be the chief thing) than the philoſophical conſideration of its analogy to our ſenſe of beauty in material forms, and of the connexion in both caſes between beauty and utility. In this ſenſe, and in this ſenſe only, can the love of virtue be taught. But this leads me to enquire, how intereſt and virtue agree, according to the conſtitution and laws of our nature. For if it ſhall be found, that in the moral world, as well as in the natural, utility or advantage is inſeparately connected with beauty; then muſt our frame be an excellent whole. "For hitherto we have found our nature to be admirably well conſtituted, with regard to virtue and vice, or moral conduct."

Concluſion.

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Another claſs of laws.

LET us therefore enquire into the laws of our nature, relative to utility or intereſt, to private and publick good; the natural end and happineſs of every man in particular, and of ſociety or our kind in general.

Thoſe relative to intereſt or private and public good.

One of the beſt modern writers on morals has given us a very accurate diviſion of the chief queſtions relative to morality. (‖) The firſt is, to know (ſays he) whether there are not ſome actions or affections which obtain the approbation of any ſpectator or obſerver,

(‖) See *Hutcheſon on the paſſions*.

CHAP. V.

observer, and others which move his dislike and condemnation. Now this question, as every man can answer for himself, so universal experience and history shew that in all nations it is so; and consequently the moral sense is universal. 2. Whether there be any particular quality, which, whenever it is perceived, gains approbation, and the contrary raises disapprobation? Now we shall find this quality to be kind affection or study of the public good of others. And thus the moral senses of men are generally uniform. About these two questions there is little reasoning: we know how to answer them by reflecting on our own sentiments, or by consulting others. 3. But what actions do really evidence kind affections, or do really tend to the greatest public good? About this question is all the special reasoning of those who treat of particular laws of nature, or even civil laws. This is the largest field, and the most useful subject of reasoning, which remains upon every scheme of morals. 4. What are the motives, which even from self-love, would excite each individual to do those actions which are particularly useful. Now it is probable, indeed, no man would approve as virtuous, an action publickly useful, to which the agent was only excited by self-love, without any kind affection: it is also probable, that no view of interest can raise that kind affection which we approve as virtuous; nor can any reasoning do it, except that which shews some moral goodness, or kind affections in the objects; for this never fails, when it is observed or supposed in any person to raise the love of the observer; so that virtue cannot be taught. Yet since all men have naturally self-love, as well as kind affections, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former: in each case, the agent is in some degree uneasy and unhappy. The first rash views of human affairs often represent private interest as opposite to the public: when it is apprehended self-love

The several enquiries about morals classed.

ove may often engage men in public hurtful actions, CHAP. V.
vhich their moral ſenſe will condemn, and this is the
ordinary courſe of vice. To repreſent theſe mo-
ives of ſelf-intereſt to engage men to publickly uſe-
ul actions, is therefore the moſt neceſſary point in
norals." Now this is what I proceed to conſider, in
order to ſhew that by the laws of our nature, what
he moral ſenſe approves or virtue is private, as well
as public good; and what the moral ſenſe diſap-
proves or vice is private as well as public ill.

I. And firſt of all I would obſerve, that there is no philoſophical ſubject which affords more pleaſure to the mind, than the conſideration of the ſtrict union and connexion between beauty and utility prevailing throughout nature (*x*), as far as we are able to pry into it; and which therefore muſt be carefully attended to, and obſerved in all the arts which imitate nature. It is this union and connexion, (as I have obſerved in my treatiſe on *ancient painting*) between beauty and advantage, or utility in all ſubjects, natural and moral, throughout the whole of nature that renders nature one, or a beautiful coherent analogous ſyſtem; and for the ſame reaſon renders all the ſciences and arts one body, or makes them ſo intimately related and ſo inſeparable one from another.

Beauty is inſeparably connected with utility throughout all nature.

Tho' beauty be an agreeable perception excited in us, neceſſarily and immediately on the firſt ſight or contemplation of certain objects qualified by nature

It is ſo in all the imitative arts, architecture, painting, *&c.*

(*x*) This obſervation is taken from *Cicero*. See it explained by him at great length, *de oratore*, Lib. 3. No. 45. *Edit. Schrevel.* Sed ut in pleriſque rebus incredibiliter hoc natura eſt ipſa fabricata: ſic in oratione; ut ea quæ maximam utilitatem in ſe continerent eadem haberent plurimum vel dignitatis, vel ſæpe etiam venuſtatis. Incolumitatis ac ſalutis, omnium cauſa videmus hunc ſtatum eſſe totius mundi atque naturæ——Referte nunc animum ad hominum vel etiam cæterarum animantium formam & figuram——linquamus naturam arteſque videamus, &c. Compare this paſſage with what he ſays, *Orat. ad Marc. Brutum.* No. 22, 23, 24, 25.

to

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to affect our mind with that pleaſing idea; yet when we come to examine theſe objects attentively, we find, that wherever we perceive beauty, there is truth, proportion, regularity and unity of deſign to bring about, by a proper variety of parts, one advantageous end: one uſeful end that could not be accompliſhed by ſimpler or fewer means. That is to ſay, wherever we find beauty we find utility. Whatever is beautiful is advantageous, conſonant or well contrived for a good end.

Every one who has any notion of architecture, painting or ſtatuary, will immediately perceive that in all theſe arts, this connexion is ſo neceſſary, ſo unalterable, that it is not poſſible to deviate from utility without falling proportionably ſhort of beauty to the ſight: or alternately, the rules in architecture which produce beauty are all founded on utility, or neceſſarily produce it. And in the other arts of deſign, the truth and beauty of every figure is meaſured from the perfection of nature in her juſt adapting every limb and part to the activity, ſtrength, dexterity, and vigour of the particular ſpecies deſigned. Now, what is the reaſon of this? But, becauſe it is ſo in nature, where univerſally the proportionate and regular ſtate is the truly proſperous and natural one in every ſubject. Health of the body is the juſt proportion, truth and regular courſe of things, or the ſound ballance of parts in our conſtitution. The ſame features which produce deformity, create incommodiouſneſs and diſeaſe. And as it is in the human body, ſo is it every where throughout nature. The ſound ſtate is the beautiful one. Whence it is juſtly laid down, by the ancients, as an univerſal canon with regard to arts and ſciences, and with regard alſo to moral conduct, becauſe it is every where true or an univerſal law of nature, "That juſt proportions and beauty are inſeparably connected with utility." *Nunquam a vero dividitur utile.* What is beautiful

Becauſe it is ſo in nature the ſtandard of truth.

It is ſo in our mundan ſyſtem.

beautiful is good and useful, and what is good and useful is beautiful. CHAP. V.

Is not the order of our mundan system most transportingly beautiful and pleasant in idea or contemplation? But do not the same general laws which produce that delightful ravishing beauty, order and greatness, likewise tend to the greatest good and advantage of the whole system? What law can be altered without introducing inconveniencies proportionable to irregularity? And what is it that charms us when we survey with rapture the beauty of the mundan system? Is it not the simplicity and the consent of the few laws which hold such a vast complication of mighty orbs in due and advantageous order? And when we contemplate the human body, or any other animal structure; or in general, wherever we see beauty and order in nature, what is it we find to be the basis of all that beauty and order which so strongly attracts us? — Is it not the simplicity, the frugality, the analogy, and constancy of nature, in bringing about an useful end; or, in disposing, adjusting, and compounding various parts, so as may best serve a particular good end, without either too little or too much? All that we admire, as has been already observed, is fitly expressed in this general rule observed steadily by nature. *Nil frustra natura facit* (*y*). Which *frustra* is likewise very well defined by

And on the bodies of all animals.

(*y*) This maxim is well explained by Sir *Isaac Newton*, in these words. "*Superfluis causis non luxuriat.*" See moral beauty explained by *Cicero* in several parts of his *offices*; some of the passages have been already quoted. See what is said of it in the Chapter *of knowledge*. It consists in the middle between the *nimium* and *parum*. There is a *decorum* belonging to every particular character, and therefore to every man; for every man has his distinguishing peculiar character. This is treated of at large by *Cicero*. But the *decorum* belonging to a virtuous affection or action, consists in its being duly proportioned to its end, neither too little, nor too much; analogously to what is called *ease and grace*, in dancing, in any other exercise, or in any art. All the phrases among the ancients, used to signify the beauty, harmony, and consistency of virtuous manners, are taken from the beauty of

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by *Frustra fit pluribus quod fieri potest paucioribus.* And therefore with regard to all arts which imitate nature, poetry, painting, architecture and statuary; and even with regard to all reasonings, arrangements of truths, or demonstrations in the sciences, this is the only rule to attain to beauty, truth and utility.

Denique sit quodvis simplex duntaxat & unum.

It is, and must be so likewise with respect to the fabrick of the human mind, affections, actions, and characters.

Now, as it is with regard to the sensible world, and to all arts and sciences, so is it also with respect to our mental fabrick: its health, soundness, and beauty, consist in the due ballance of all its powers and affections, or in just subordination to a well improved moral sense. This produces moral beauty in affections, in actions, and in character or temper; and this temper is the most advantageous one: It is the sound, the healthful, the natural, the most pleasant state: Every exercise of the affections and powers, in such a constitution is beautiful, and it is pleasant: Agreeable in immediate feeling, and good and agreeable in its consequences: every deviation, by whatever affection, from this temper or state, is proportional deformity, disease and suffering. And, finally, in proportion as the mind is nearer to this its perfect state, or further removed from it, so it is in all its exercises more happy or more wretched.

The proof of this must be fetched from the anatomy or texture of the mind.

II. To prove this, we must consider the nature of our affections, their operations, and their mutual bearings, dependencies and connexions. The soluti-

sensible forms in nature, or in the arts which imitate nature, music, painting, &c. Such as *Numeros modosque vitæ, est modus in rebus. Decorum, quid verumatque decens*; and innumerable such others. So that here we have a clear proof of that analogy between the moral world or moral effects, and the natural world or sensible effects, without which language could not be a moral paintress, or paint moral sentiments, and affections and their effects.

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on to this queſtion muſt be fetched from the anato- CHAP. V.
my or ſtructure of the mind, in like manner, as the anſwer to any queſtions about the natural, or ſound, and advantageous ſtate of the body, muſt be brought from the ſcience of its oeconomy and texture. Now, my Lord *Shaftſbury*, in his *enquiry concerning virtue*, has fully demonſtrated, "That, according to our make and frame, or the laws of our nature, the ſame affections which work towards public good, work likewiſe towards private good, and the ſame affections which work towards public ill work likewiſe towards private ill." I ſhall not repeat his arguments to prove this, but 'tis well worth while to take particular notice of the manner in which he proceeds; becauſe its an excellent example of the way in which moral philoſophy ought to be carried on, and in which alone indeed it can bring forth ſolid concluſions.

Lord *Shaftsbury*'s reaſoning to prove it.

Firſt, he takes notice, that no animal can properly be ſaid to act otherwiſe, than through affections or paſſions, ſuch as are peculiar to that animal. For, in convulſive fits, when a creature either ſtrikes himſelf or others, it is a ſimple mechaniſm, an engine or piece of clock-work that acts, and not the animal. Whatſoever then is done or acted by an animal as ſuch, is done only through ſome affections, as of fear, love, or hatred moving him: and as it is impoſſible that a weaker paſſion ſhould overcome a ſtronger; ſo it is impoſſible when the affections or paſſions are ſtrongeſt in the man, and form in general the moſt conſiderable party either by their force or number, but thither the animal muſt incline. Nothing therefore being properly goodneſs or illneſs in a creature, except what is from natural temper; a good creature is ſuch a one as by the natural bent of its temper or affections, is carried preſently and immediately, not ſecondarily and accidentally to good and againſt ill. And an ill creature is juſt the contrary, *viz.* one who is wanting in right affections of force enough to

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carry him directly towards good, and bear him out againſt ill, or who is carried by other affections directly to ill and againſt good. 2. But to proceed, ſays he, from what is eſteemed meer goodneſs, and lies within the reach and capacity of all ſenſible creatures, to that which is called *virtue or merit*, and allowed to man only. In this caſe alone, it is that we call any creature worthy or virtuous, when it can have the notion of a public intereſt, and can attain the ſpeculation or ſcience of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For tho' we may vulgarly call an ill horſe vicious, yet we never ſay of a good one, or of any meer beaſt, ideot or changeling, that he is worthy or virtuous. So that if a creature be generous, kind, conſtant, compaſſionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himſelf does, or ſees others do, ſo as to take notice of what is worthy or honeſt; and make that notice or conception of worth and honeſty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous: for thus, and no otherwiſe he is capable of having a ſenſe of right and wrong, a ſentiment or judgment of what is done, through juſt, equal, and good affection, or the contrary.

Having thus defined and diſtinguiſhed goodneſs and virtue, he obſerves, that the affections or paſſions which muſt govern the animal, are either, 1. The natural affections which lead to the good of the public. 2. Or the ſelf-affections which lead to the good of the private. 3. Or ſuch, as neither of theſe, not tending to any good of the public or private; but contrariwiſe: and which may therefore be juſtly ſtiled *unnatural affections*.

So that according as theſe affections ſtand, a creature muſt be either virtuous or vicious, good or ill; the later ſort of theſe affections, 'tis evident, are wholly vicious; the two former may be vicious or virtuous according to their degree.

It

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It may ſeem ſtrange, ſays our author, to ſpeak of natural affections as too ſtrong, or of ſelf-affections as too weak: but to clear this difficulty, we muſt call to mind, that natural affection may in particular caſes be exceſſive, and in an unnatural degree; as when pity is ſo overcoming as to deſtroy its own end, and prevent the ſuccour and relief required: or as when love to the offspring proves ſuch fondneſs as deſtroys the parent, and conſequently the offspring itſelf. And, notwithſtanding, it may ſeem harſh to call that unnatural and vicious, which is only an extream of ſome natural and kind affection; yet it is moſt certain, that whenever any ſingle good affection of this ſort is over great, it muſt be injurious to the reſt, and detract in ſome meaſure from their force and natural operation. This he illuſtrates at great length. But having ſhewn what is meant by paſſions being too high or in too low a degree, and that to have any natural affection too high, and any ſelf-affection too low, tho' it be often approved as virtue, is yet ſtrictly ſpeaking a vice and imperfection; he now comes to the plainer and more eſſential part of vice, and which alone deſerves to be conſidered as ſuch, that is to ſay. 1. When either the public affections are weak and deficient. 2. Or the private and ſelf-affections too ſtrong. 3. Or that ſuch affections ariſe, as are neither of theſe, nor in any degree tending to the ſupport either of the public or private ſyſtem.

Otherwiſe than this, it is impoſſible any creature can be ſuch as we call ill or vicious. So that if once we prove that 'tis not the creature's intereſt to be thus viciouſly affected, but contrariwiſe; we ſhall then have proved, that it is his intereſt to be wholly good and virtuous in his action and behaviour: our buſineſs therefore, ſays he, will be to prove,

1. That to have the natural, kindly or generous affections ſtrong and powerful towards the good of the public, is to have the chief means and power of

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self-enjoyment, and that to want them is certain misery and ill. 2. That to have the private or self-affections too strong, or beyond that degree of subordinacy to the kindly and natural, is also miserable. 3. And that to have the unnatural affections, (*viz.* such as are neither founded on the interest of the kind or public, nor of the private person or creature himself) is to be miserable in the highest degree.

Now all these points he has clearly proved, in the way of moral arithmetic, by a full examination of all our affections, private or public, and their effects and consequences. Whence he concludes, that virtue is the good, and vice the ill of every one by our natural constitution. But for his arguments, I must refer the reader to himself. I have only taken notice of his way of proceeding, to shew by this example how enquiries into the human mind ought to be carried on.

Another train of reasoning to prove that virtue is private interest.

That virtue is the natural good, and vice the natural evil of every one, has been evinced by several different ways of reasoning. And I think the few following propositions, which are universally owned to be true, not only amount to a full proof of it, but likewise shew that the truth is universally received and admitted.

1. It will not be disputed, that wherever the natures and connexions of things are fixed, there must be real differences with regard to greater and less; this must hold true in every case, as necessarily as in any one case. If therefore the natures and proportions of moral objects are fixed and determinate things, there must necessarily be in the nature of things with regard to them, as well as any other kinds of quantity, a truth and falshood of the case, a true and a false account or estimation. And therefore with respect to them, it must be our business to attain to as full a knowledge of their true values as we can, in order to make a just judgment or estimation of them. This is prudence: and prudence necessarily

ceſſarily ſuppoſes wherever it can take place, the natures or moments of things to be aſcertainable. 2. But ſuch prudence with regard to our moral conduct we can attain to; for, notwithſtanding all the diverſity there is among mankind in conſtitution, and conſequently in ſenſibility with reſpect to ſentiments, affections, paſſions, deſires, uneaſineſſes, and, in one word, ſenſations of whatever kind, inward or outward; yet there is obviouſly ſuch a conformity in feeling, and ſentiment amongſt mankind (z), that it is unanimouſly agreed, that there is not only a real ſatisfaction in every exerciſe of ſocial and kindly affections, but a pleaſure which never cloys or ends in diſguſt, and which is, in that reſpect, ſuperior to all the enjoyments of meer ſenſe. And, on the other hand, the unnatural paſſions, ſuch as hatred, envy, malice, miſanthropy, or utter averſion to ſociety, are allowed with univerſal conſent, to produce compleat miſery, where they are habitual and wrought into temper. But, 3. If that be true, then every ſtep in the nature of things towards the eſtabliſhment of bad and unſocial temper, muſt be a ſtep toward the introduction of compleat miſery into the mind; and contrariwiſe, every indulgence of ſocial affection, CHAP. V.

(z) Etenim ratio —— certe eſt communis, doctrina differens, diſcendi quidam facultate par, nam & ſenſibus eadem omnia comprehenduntur: & ea quæ movent ſenſus, itidem movent omnium: quæque in animis imprimuntur; de quibus ante dixi, inchoatæ intelligentiæ, ſimiliter in omnibus imprimuntur; interpreſque eſt mentis oratio, verbis diſcrepans, ſententiis congruens. Nec eſt quiſquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus, ad virtutem pervenire non poſſit. Nec ſolum in rectis, ſed etiam in pravitatibus inſignis eſt humani generis ſimilitudo. Nam & voluptate capiuntur omnes: quæ etſi illecebra turpitudinis, tamen habet quiddam ſimile naturalis boni. Quæ autem natio non comitatem non benignitatem, non gratum animum & beneficii memorem diligit, quæ ſuperbos quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos non aſpernatur? Quibus ex rebus cum omne genus hominum ſociatum inter ſe eſſe intelligatur, illud extremum eſt quod recte vivendi ratio meliores efficit. *Cicero de legibus*, Lib. 1. No. 11.

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every virtuous exercise, must be an advancement toward fixing and settling that benign, generous, good temper, which is compleat joy, chearfulness and self-contentment; and therefore is commonly called *the happy temper*. Where there is an absolute degeneracy, a total apostacy from all candor, equity, trust, sociableness, or friendship, there are none who do not see and acknowledge the misery which is consequent: but the calamity must of necessity hold proportion with the corruption of the temper. It is impossible that it can be compleat misery, to be absolutely immoral and inhuman, and yet be no misery or ill at all to be so in any however little degree. But, besides, it is beyond all controversy, that habitudes are formed by repeated acts. Every indulgence therefore to any passion, has a tendency to fix and and settle it in the mind, or to form it into temper and habit. And thus, tho' there were no considerable ill in any one exercise of immoral affection; yet it must be contrary to interest, as it necessarily tends in consequence of the structure of our minds, that is, the dependence of our affections, to bring on the habitual temper; which is owned to be compleat misery: so far therefore our prudent part is easily discernible. Now, 4. With respect to all outward conveniencies and advantages, by the unanimous consent of all mankind, temperance is allowed universally, not only to be the best preservative of health, without which there can be no enjoyment; but to be necessary, to be able to relish pleasures in the highest degree; *to be sauce to them*, if one may use that vulgar phrase. *And honesty is likewise owned to be the best policy:* or the safest, the securest way of living and acting in society; nay, indeed the only way of securing to ourselves any solid or durable happiness. But these two truths being owned, they together with the foregoing propositions prove, "That, by the unanimous consent of mankind, founded upon universal experience, it is prudent to be

e virtuous, and fooliſh to be vicious ; or that virtue CHAP. V.
; the private good of every one, in all views, whether
ith reſpect to temper of mind, or outward ſecurity and
dvantage." Indeed ſuch is the univerſal agreement
mong mankind with reſpect to the good conſequen-
es of virtuous behaviour, and the bad ones of eve-
y vice, that there is no country in which at all times
ne chief virtues have not been recommended from
he advantages naturally redounding from them ;
nd, on the other hand, almoſt all vices are con-
emned on account of the diſadvantages naturally
eſulting from them, by familiar proverbs in every
ne's mouth ? This we ſhall find to be true, if we
ut look into the collections of proverbs of diffe-
ent nations. For where, for inſtance, or in what
ation however barbarous, is not cunning diſtinguiſ-
hed from true prudence ; and are not temperance,
oneſty, faithfulneſs and generoſity or benevolence,
trongly inculcated by ſome very expreſſive apo-
hegm ? Nor can it indeed be otherwiſe, ſo plain
nd evident are the good effects of virtue, and the
ad conſequences of vice ; and ſo clearly diſtinguiſh-
ble is virtue in every caſe from its contrary.

" *Aſk your own heart, and nothing is ſo plain,*
'Tis to miſtake them, coſts the time and pain."

But the queſtion we are now upon is of ſuch mo-
ment, that it is well worth while to give a ſhort
view of ſome of the different ways ancient philo-
ſophers have taken to ſhew, that virtue is man's na-
tural end ; at once his dignity and his happineſs.

The way *Cicero* reaſons about our natural end, dignity and happineſs, ſhewing that all theſe muſt mean the ſame thing.

I. If we would know (ſays *Cicero*) for what end man is made and fitted, let us analyſe his ſtructure, and conſider for what end it is adapted ; for thus only can we know the end of any conſtitution, frame, or whole. Now if we look into the frame and conſtitution of man, and carefully examine

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examine its parts and their references to one another, we shall plainly see, says he (*a*), that it is fitted for those four virtues, prudence, benevolence, magnanimity, and moderation, or harmony and decorum; for these four virtues are nothing else but his four most distinguishing natural powers and dispositions, brought by due culture to their perfection. There are, says he, in our constitution, together with the desire of self-preservation, common to all perceptive beings, four distinguishing principles which render man capable of a peculiar dignity, perfection and happiness, superior to what merely perceptive beings can attain to. "The desire of knowledge, or the love of truth, and the capacity of attaining to it; a social disposition, or the love of public good, and the capacity of intending and pursuing it." The desire of power and dominion, *principatus*, or of making ourselves great and able to do much good to ourselves and others, and the capacity of attaining to great esteem, power, and authority among mankind. And lastly, the sense and love of harmony, order, beauty, and consistency in our behaviour, and the capacity of attaining to a regular and orderly administration of our appetites.

These are the endowments, dispositions, and capacities which constitute our distinguishing excellence, or give us a higher rank in being, than the merely sensitive appetites which we have in common with other animals: but if it be so, then must the im-

(*a*) *Cicero de officiis, l.* 1. Compare with that *de finibus*, Lib. 2. N. 15. and 34. and *de inventione rhetorica*, Lib. 2. N. 53. where he defines all the virtues. So all the ancients. Virtus enim in cujusque rei natura supremum est & perfectio——tum oculi, in oculi natura, supremum & perfectio; tum hominis, in hominis natura, supremum & perfectio. *Timæus Locrus de anima mundi.* So *Metopus Pythagoreus, in libro de virtute.* Hominis virtus, est hominis naturæ perfectio——nam & equi virtus est ea, quæ naturam ejus ad supremum perducit, &c.

provement

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ovement of these powers and principles in our ure to the highest pitch of perfection they can brought to, be our highest end, our duty, our gnity, our happiness, if these words have any eaning at all. And accordingly all the virtues d graces which adorn man, or make him per- t and happy, may be reduced to four, which nothing else but the best improvements of ese our four abovementioned distinguishing powers d principles; prudence, benevolence, magnanimi- and moderation. 'Tis these virtues mixing and ending together, which make up the beauty and eatness of actions, the beauty and greatness of e, and the proper happiness of man as man: at is, it is in the exercise of these virtues in pro- ortion to their improvement, that all the happiness e can enjoy which is peculiar to us as intelligent tional beings of a higher order than meer sensi- ve animals consists. This reasoning must be just, these principles do really take place in our na- re; for if they do, they must be placed there, order to work together jointly in proper pro- ortions, or with forces duly and proportionally gulated and combined; and the perfection of ur nature must necessarily consist in their so work- g; that is, in our taking care that they be all uly improved, and have all of them due exer- se. If these principles do really belong to us, hen it as necessarily follows that we are made by ature for acquiring and exercising prudence, be- evolence, and magnanimity, and for reducing all ur sensual appetites into comely and decent order; s that the perfection of any piece of mechanism, nust lie in its operating regularly towards the nd for which its whole structure consisting of arious powers, proportioned to one another, and luly combined, is fitted. It cannot be more true, hat the perfection of clockwork consists in its ptitude to measure time regularly, than that the

perfection

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perfection of a being, endowed with the powers and diſpoſitions fitted for acquiring knowledge, perceiving public good with delight and complacency, and for regulating all its appetites and affections, according to a ſenſe of order, fitneſs, decency, and greatneſs, muſt lie in exerciſing all thoſe powers and diſpoſitions. To acquire theſe virtues and exerciſe them is therefore, with regard to man, to follow nature, and live agreeably to it; for it is to follow and live agreeably to his conſtitution. Virtue is therefore man's natural end or excellence, in any ſenſe that any thing can be ſaid to have a natural end or excellence.

Now having fixed this point, *Cicero* (*b*), after explaining fully the ſeveral exerciſes of theſe powers which by being duly improved to their perfection are the human virtues or duties, and the imperfections to which theſe powers are liable, thro' neglect of proper culture and diſcipline, or miſguidance; he proceeds to ſhew, that credit, reputation, eſteem, love, power, authority, health, ſelf-enjoyment, and all the advantages of life, are the natural effects and conſequences of prudence, benevolence, fortitude of mind, and rightly moderated appetites; and that every vicious indulgence or neglect is as dangerous and hurtful, according to the natural courſe of things, as it is baſe and contrary to the perfection to which we are made to attain. And indeed it cannot be diſputed, that it is the real intereſt of every man to be good, ſince the villain finds himſelf obliged to aſſume the ſemblance of virtue; and it is much eaſier to be really good, than to act the counterfeit part ſucceſsfully; for how rarely is one able to carry on a ſcheme of villany under a maſque,

(*b*) See the ſecond book of *the offices*, and the books *de finibus*, where virtue is proved to be happineſs. And *Tuſc. quæſt.* De virtute ſeipsâ contenta. De ægritudine lenienda, &c.

without

thout being discovered; and what are all the vantages of life, if reputation is lost? CHAP. V.

For riches, can they give but to the just
His own contentment, or another's trust?
Judges and senates have been bought for gold,
Esteem and love were never to be sold.
Essay on man, Epist. 4.

Virtue is the surest way, according to the natural ourse of things to health, safety, peace, esteem, and o all the goods of life: it of itself makes or causes o unhappiness; it naturally produces no hurtful onsequences, and even from the vicious, virtue ommands esteem and respect. But without the ove and esteem of mankind, how miserable must nan be! (*c*) He is a disjointed limb, forlorn and estitute; for no limb is more dependent on the vell-being of the rest, and its union with the whole ody, than every man is upon society.

Upon what the arguments of ancient philosophers, to prove that virtue is private good, chiefly turn or depend.

But the main stress of ancient reasoning to prove hat virtue is happiness lies upon this, "That man s so made that the pleasures of the mind, *i. e.* of knowledge and virtue, are far superior to those of sense; and that even the best enjoyments of sense are those which the virtuous man receives from his temperate and well regulated gratifications. Not only is it in consequence of our make the highest satisfaction which one can enjoy, to be able to approve our conduct to reason and to a moral sense; but so are we also framed, that social exercises, virtuous affections, and the temperate use of bodily pleasures are the gratifications which afford us the most exquisite touches of joy and satisfac-

(*c*) That emphatical sentence of *Homer* hath the air of a proverb familiar in his time.

Never, never, wicked man was wise.
Odysse. B. 2. L. 320. of *Pope*'s transl. tion

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tion in the way of immediate ſenſation, and the contraries are really painful. Whatever may be the courſe of outward circumſtances, it is virtue alone that can make truly happy, even in immediate enjoyment, abſtracting from all the pleaſure of reflection upon good conduct. For external goods or means of happineſs are only miniſters of true ſatisfaction to thoſe, whoſe reaſon and moral conſcience preſide over all their purſuits and preſcribe all their enjoyments. This is evident if we take a complete view of our frame; and to prove it, I think, among many other conſiderations, the following are ſufficient: and they are all taken from ancient writers; for the advantageouſneſs or utility of virtue is no new diſcovery.

The happineſs of an inſect or brute can only make an inſect or brute happy. A nature with further powers muſt have further enjoyments. The happineſs of a being muſt be of a kind with its faculties, powers and diſpoſition; or, in one word, with its conſtitution, becauſe it muſt reſult from it. Man therefore, conſidering the powers and diſpoſitions he is endowed with, muſt have another happineſs, another ſet of enjoyments in order to be ſatisfied, than a being merely conſiſting of ſenſes, without reaſon, conſcience of merit, a public ſenſe and generous affections. It is only a reaſonable and moral happineſs that can ſatisfy moral powers and diſpoſitions; ſo that a man muſt firſt diveſt himſelf of his moral powers and diſpoſitions before he can be made happy by mere ſenſe alone. 'Tis true, he is not merely made for moral or intellectual happineſs, being a ſenſitive as well as a rational creature, or a compound of theſe two natures. But being a compounded being, even his ſenſitive happineſs muſt be rational as well as ſenſitive, in order to be fitted to his conſtitution; that is, his ſenſitive appetites, and their gratifications muſt be guided and ruled by his rational part, and partake of it. Accordingly

Accordingly we have many a plain, inconteſtible experiment of the inſufficiency of the moſt advantageous circumſtances of outward enjoyment to make happy. But we have none of unhappineſs produced by a well regulated mind, or well governed affections; none of unhappineſs produced by the preſidence of reaſon and virtue over our conduct. For how many are extremely happy through virtue, not only in mean but in diſtreſſed circumſtances; and who are they whom affluence and wealth alone, without any aſſiſtance from virtue, have made ſo much as eaſy and contented? How tireſome is the circle of mere ſenſual indulgences to man in conſequence of his frame! Let the fretfulneſs, the peeviſhneſs, the ſpleen, the diſguſts of thoſe, who with large eſtates are ſtrangers to the luxury of doing good witneſs! All their complaints are ſo many demonſtrations that virtue alone is happineſs, and that they who ſeek it any where elſe do indeed labour in vain.

We are not made for ſenſual pleaſures, but for them of the mind, or rational pleaſures.

(*d*) If we conſider our frame, we ſhall find that the end of man is not to ſeek after merely ſenſual pleaſures; but, on the contrary, he is made to raiſe his mind above them, and to receive more

(*d*) Quod ſi etiam beſtiæ multa faciant duce ſuâ, quæque natura, partim indulgenter, vel cum labore, ut in gignendo, in educando facile appareat, aliud quiddam iis propoſitum, non voluptatem?——Ergo in beſtiis erunt ſecreta a voluptate humanarum quædam ſimulacra virtutum: in ipſis hominibus niſi voluptatis cauſa virtus nulla erit?——Nos vero, ſiquidem in voluptate ſunt omnia longe multumque ſuperamur a beſtiis:——Ad altiora quædam, & magnificentiora mihi crede, Torquate, nati ſumus: nec id ex animi ſolum partibus, in quibus ineſt memoria.——Tu autem etiam membra ipſa, ſenſuſque conſidera: qui tibi ut reliquæ corporis partes, non comites ſolum virtutum, ſed miniſtri etiam videbuntur. Quid ſi in ipſo corpore multa voluptati præponenda ſunt, ut vires, valetudo, velocitas, pulchritudo? Quid tandem in animis cenſes? *De finibus*, lib. 2.——Compare lib. 5. Atqui perſpicuum eſt, hominem è corpore animoque conſtare, cum primæ ſint animi partes, ſecundæ corporis, &c.

ſatisfaction

CHAP. V. satisfaction from nobly despising them, than from enjoying them in the way of ordinary appetite. It is not only greater, but it is pleasanter because it is greater to contemn all pomp, pageantry, and sensuality, than to possess the means of them. Virtue, in its original signification, means strength of mind, or such firmness as is able to withstand all temptation, whether from the side of enchanting pleasure, or from terrifying pain, rather than contradict our natural sense of what is fit and becoming; and there is not only a pleasure arising from the conscience of such strength of mind upon reflexion which is ineffable, but there is a divine satisfaction in every act of such fortitude.

Some of the ancients divided virtue thus defined into two principal parts or branches (*e*), "Being able to deny ourselves any sensible pleasure, if reason or our moral sense forbid the indulgence: being able to withhold from the fairest promises of pleasure, till we have fully considered their pretensions, and what our moral conscience says of the fitness or unfitness of the pursuit. And being able, on the other hand, to endure with magnanimity any pain rather than counteract our sense of honour, esteem and true merit." And man, instead of being made for voluptuousness, is made for those virtues, *sustinence* and *abstinence*. In exerting these he feels more sincere delight, than in wallowing in sensuality; because he is made to love power. We cannot have these virtues in perfection, but as all other perfections and habits

(*e*) See *Epictetus* and his *ancient commentators*. See particularly *M. Antoninus Philosophus*. Atqui vide, ne cum omnes recti animi affectiones *virtutes* appellantur, non fit hoc proprium nomen omnium, sed ab ea, quæ una cæteris antecellit, omnes nominatæ sint. Appellata enim est ex viro virtus: viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo. Cujus munera duo sunt maxima,——mortis doloriſque contemtio. Utendum est igitur his, si virtutis compotis, vel potius si viri volumus esse, quoniam a viris virtus nomen est mutata. *Cicero Tuscul. Quæst.* lib. 2. No. 18.

are

are acquired, but we are made to attain to them by exercise and application. Virtue is, and must be, in the nature of things, a progress. But tho' it be a progress, a study, a struggle, a violent struggle, in like manner as getting to perfection in any science or art is; yet it is a pleasant exercise, a pleasant struggle in every step. Man is made for exercise, for making acquisitions by labour and industry. And therefore exercise is necessary to the welfare and pleasant feeling, so to speak, both of body and mind. And this is the exercise for which man is best fitted, and in which he feels the highest pleasure, even the vigorous efforts of his mind to improve his rational powers, to keep his sensitive appetites in due subjection to reason, or to obtain the mastership and command of them, and of himself. Virtue is therefore at the same time, that it is asserted to be man's pleasantest employment, very justly represented by the ancients as a warfare, as a striving for victory, as contending after perfection, and mounting up towards it. It indeed chiefly consists in conquering our sensual concupiscences; and in submitting them to the rule and government of reason: but it does not follow from this, that virtue is not happiness. This brave warfare is at once our honour and our happiness; For thus alone can the natural greatness of the human mind, or its ardent desire of power, dominion and independency be satisfied. It is true, virtue is not so delightful in its first steps, as it becomes in proportion as it improves. We must distinguish here in the same manner as with regard to any science or art: as there the first elements are harsh and only afford pleasure to students, because they know they must ascend by degrees to perfection; and that the science, when once they have made any considerable advances in it, will well reward their labour and become easier, and that they are suitably employing

The virtuous pursuit alone can gratify our natural desire of power and dominion engrafted in us for that purpose.

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their time and talents: ſo is it likewiſe in the firſt ſteps of virtue, eſpecially if one has bad habits and long indulged, impetuous, paſſions to grapple with and conquer. But virtue, like ſcience or art, becomes more pleaſant as one improves or proceeds in it. When one is become maſter of his paſſions, and virtuous inclinations are become, as it were, the bent of the ſoul, then all goes ſmoothly and equally on; and in the mean time the gradual advancement recompenſes all the labour it requires, becauſe the mind feels itſelf greaten, feels itſelf ſuitably employed, and feels its power and dominion increaſe. We have already mentioned ſome good effects of the greatneſs of our mind, with relation to knowledge; but herein chiefly does its uſefulneſs conſiſt, that it moves us to ſeek after true ſtrength of mind; and no power, no dominion affords ſatisfaction to the mind of man equal to that power over ourſelves and our appetites, to excite us to endeavour after which the deſire of greatneſs was implanted in us. It is becauſe the natural deſire of power muſt be ſatisfied in ſome manner that other power is ſought; and it is becauſe this true power, the ſweeteſt and pleaſanteſt of all power, is not earneſtly contended for, that the mind, if it is not employed in the purſuit of ſome falſe ſpecies of power, preys upon itſelf, frets and ſours; and becomes at laſt quite languid and inſenſible, or quite cankered and inſupportable. But the mind gradually greatning and expanding itſelf, as it advances in the dominion which virtue gives, is ever pleaſed and happy; for thus a natural and eſſential appetite of our nature is gratified, even the deſire of power, (*principatus*, as *Cicero* calls it. (*f*) The extenſive power to

(*f*) We had occaſion already to mention the natural greatneſs of our mind in ſpeaking of knowledge. It is the deſire of liberty and power, or the diſpoſition of the mind, to expand and dilate itſelf and prove its force, which is the foundation

to which inward independence and self-command is absolutely requisite. CHAP. V.

Some other considerations on the same subject, taken from ancient authors.

Let me subjoin to all this, in order to illustrate a point of the greatest importance in the philosophy of our nature, the three following considerations, all of which are likewise urged by ancient authors with a beauty and force of expression I am not able to approach.

Virtue saves and delivers from many evils, it brings no pains along with it; it is the only support under accidental calamities, and frequently brings good from them, and converts them into real benefits to ourselves and others. Its enjoyments never fade or become insipid, but on the contrary wax more pleasant and delightful by use and practice. And as true virtue knows no reward, but in the exercises and fruitions of more improved and exalted virtue, so it is pregnant with the most comfortable, joyous hopes.

I. Virtue saves from many terrible evils, the natural concomitants or followers of vice. Ignorance is full of doubts and fears, from which knowledge of nature, or of the real connexions of things, delivers: for he who encreaseth in knowledge, increaseth in strength; the wise man is strong; he is steady and immoveable, but the ignorant are weak and feeble, a reed shaken with every wind. And it is the calm undisturbed empire of reason over the appetites that saves from inward riot and tumult, and preserves the mind in that serene chearful state, without which it is impossible to relish any pleasure in the happiest circumstances of outward enjoyment: that chearful estate which is health to

foundation of all the great arts, and of all the great virtues. Virtue is really pleasant, because it brings forth the strength of the mind into action, and makes the mind feel its own power to enlarge itself.

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(*g*) This is *Homer*'s phraſe ſpeaking of a melancholy perſon, θυμὸν κατεδων. *Ipſe cor ſuum edens.* See *Cicero Tuſcul. Queſt.* B 3. from whence all theſe arguments are taken. See *Horace's Epiſtles*, Lib. III. Epiſt. 2.

Semper *avarus eget*——
Invidus *alterius macreſcit rebus opimis.*

He uſes the ſame phraſe —— *Si quid eſt animum, &c.* Therefore philoſophy is called *Medicina mentis. Cicero Tuſcul. Quaſt.* Lib. III. *Eſt profecto animi medicina philoſophia.* See a fine deſcription of it in *Plutarch de educandis liberis.* See *Horace Epiſt.* Ep. 1. *Sunt certa piacula, &c.*

ings

ings of its exhauſtleſs gall and diſcontent. Now virtue, or well regulated affections, ſave from all thoſe miſeries of body and mind, which vice pulls upon us inevitably, in conſequence of the frame of our minds, and the connexions of things, that the mind may fly from every tendency towards the immoral ſtate: that it may guard againſt vice as its greateſt enemy, as well as debaſer, and run to virtue as its health and peace, its preſerver, upholder and comforter, as well as its exalter and ennobler.

What pain does temperance bring along with it? What diſturbance did ever goodneſs and generoſity produce within the breaſt? Or what miſchievous conſequence, can we ſay any of the virtues hath naturally and neceſſarily attached to it? Do regularity, good humour, and ſweetneſs of temper, and generous affection, incapacitate for the pleaſures of ſenſe? Do they not rather double them? And what ſignifies it to be ſurrounded with all the beſt means of pleaſure, if the mind is uneaſy, or galled and fretted by evil conſciouſneſs, or by turbulent peeviſh appetites and paſſions. If it be diſſatisfied with itſelf, and keenly ſet upon ſomething without its reach. And what is there within our power, or abſolutely dependent on ourſelves, beſides the regulation of our paſſions and appetites, and their happy effects within ourſelves? It is the joys of virtue only which nothing can take from us. The happineſs of the ſenſualiſt is as independent upon him as the wind or the tide. For do not *riches make to themſelves wings and fly away?* whereas a good conſcience abideth for ever. Does virtue either bring diſeaſes upon the body, or introduce uneaſineſs into the mind? Does it render us hateful to others, or deprive us of their eſteem, truſt and confidence? Does it not, on the contrary, command reſpect, and excite love, and truſtful reliance, ſelf-approbation, and the gladſome ſenſe of merited affection. Muſt not the vicious man put on the

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mask, the semblance of virtue, in order not to be marked out for a common enemy; and to gain his selfish, base ends? Dare he declare his inward thoughts to others? Or can he approve of them to himself? Can we be said to be fitted for luxury, debauches and voluptuousness, since the gratifications of sense, when they exceed the bounds which reason prescribes, produce uneasiness, consume the body, and are not more opposite to the exercises of reason and understanding, or even to the pleasures which imagination, when it is well formed and refined yields, so far superior to those of mere sense; than it is to a continued flow of agreeable bodily sensations? Are not a very great share of the very worst distempers and pains with which the body is sometimes so violently tormented, justly attributed to excessive sensual indulgences? Whence else come broken constitutions? Whence else comes rottenness, corruption and insensibility so early upon those who live in riot and wantonness? whilst the sober, the industrious and temperate, are generally healthful and easy, and truly venerable in their old age. The old age in which a well spent life naturally terminates, is full of satisfaction, fit for council, and highly honourable (*b*).

II. Virtue is the only support under calamities, but vice adds to every torture. By accidental calamities, I mean all such, as arising either from the laws of matter and motion, or from our social connexions, are inevitable by prudence and virtue. A disease may be entailed by a father on a son. Virtue often suffers in society through the vices of others; and distempers or losses which flow from the constitution of the air, and other material causes which work uniformly and invariably, must

(*b*) See *Cicero de senectute.* ——— Sua enim vitia insipientes, & suam culpam in senectutem conferunt, &c.

happen

happen alike to all men, good and bad: but under such distresses, virtue can alleviate pain, and bear up the mind. It hath many cordials to relieve and strengthen the soul; but whither can the vicious fly for ease and comfort in such cases? since he dares not look within his own breast, without being yet more exquisitely tormented; nor can he have any satisfaction from the sense of merited esteem and love, but must consider every one of his fellow creatures at best as his despisers: and since spurning and fretting but augments his suffering. A man may sustain bodily infirmities, *but a wounded spirit who can bear?* The horrors of a guilty mind are truly insupportable. On the contrary, wherever the virtuous man is able to turn his thoughts, every object, whether within or without him, affords him pleasant matter of reflexion; and his being able to withhold himself from complaining and fretting is itself a very comfortable consciousness of becoming strength of mind, or manly patience. But which is more, wisdom and virtue are able not seldom to extract goods out of such evils, and to convert them into blessings. In distresses that leave room for thought, the virtuous make reflexions which are of great use to the temper: this all the good, who have been afflicted, know; nor can it be doubted by any, seeing even the vicious are often brought by distress to a just sense of things; and come forth out of the furnace of affliction purified from much dross and corruption: made fitter for the offices of society, better friends and neighbours, more prudent, regular and virtuous in their conduct, and consequently much happier. CHAP. V.

III. In fine, the pleasures of virtue never fade or become insipid: who was ever weary of acts of generosity, friendship and goodness? or who was ever disturbed by the consciousness of order, and worth,

CHAP. V. and of merit, with all good and wise beings? Whence proceed dissatisfaction, fickleness of appetite, and nauseating amidst the greatest affluence of outward enjoyments, but from selfishness and sensuality, from seeking pleasure where it is not placed by nature, and cannot therefore be found; from endeavouring to derive more satisfaction from external objects than they are capable to afford; and from overstraining our bodily senses, while in the mean time the exercises of reason and social affection are quite discarded, and have no place in our pursuits and employments? Ambition of doing good may not have means equal to its generous desires, or may be disappointed; but the inward sense of good intention, sufficiently rewards all its scheming, all its activity. But selfishness is tormented with continual disappointments, and by the want of means equal to its insatiability; and if it reflects upon itself, is yet more so by the inward consciousness of its worthless, base, sordid demands. It has been often justly observed, that with regard to the pleasures of the body and the mind, the virtuous man, or he who is acquainted with the exercises of reason and virtue, is the propereſt judge to make a decision as to the preference; since none can say the pleasures of sense are less satisfactory to him, and he alone hath fully experimented the other. But we may appeal even to the vicious, the most sensual and selfish, whether their joys are durable, and do not commonly terminate in disgust and discontent? or whether, if at any time they have felt the workings of the good affections excited in them, and they have indulged them for a little, these were not the happiest moments they ever enjoyed; the only moments which they take delight to call to mind and reflect upon. No man is so corrupt, so lost to all sense of humanity, as not to have, on some occasions, felt so much of the pleasure attending virtuous affections, as to be able to judge

idge of the happineſs the habitually good muſt njoy; how pure, how conſtant and unchanging it ıuſt be: and he who is thoroughly acquainted with ıe pleaſures of knowledge, of the contemplation of rder and beauty, and above all of benevolence, laces his happineſs ſo entirely in them, that he an deſire no reward, but better opportunities of xerciſing and improving virtue. The only long- ıgs of his ſoul are after more knowledge, larger iews of nature, and better occaſions of exerciſing riendſhip, goodneſs, and ſocial love. What other ıappineſs, wholly diſtinct from this, can be offered o him which he would look upon as a recompence? Would he prefer larger draughts of merely ſenſual oy to an improved mind, and more entenſive nſight into the beauty, order, wiſdom and good- ıeſs in nature? Or would he imagine himſelf bet- tered for all his generous, benign, ſocial, public- ſpirited endeavours, by any change of circumſtances, into eaſe and ſoftneſs, in which he ſhould never a- gain feel thoſe amiable, tranſporting workings of a good mind, which are now his ſupreme delight? Virtue alone can be its own *reward:* There can be nothing in nature ſuperior to virtue, either in worth and excellence, or in pleaſure and ſatisfaction, but higher and more enlarged virtue; and therefore to ſuppoſe it recompenſed by any other enjoyments, of whatever kind (*i*), is to ſuppoſe it rewarded by being ſunk into a merely animal ſtate, conſiſting of no higher gratifications than thoſe of ſenſe, with- out the exerciſes of reaſon and generous affection. For all other enjoyments are neceſſarily as much inferior to virtue, as merely animal or vegetative life is to reaſon and intelligence.

(*i*) Præmia virtutis & officii, ſancta & caſta eſſe oportere: neque ea aut cum improbis communicari, aut in mediocribus hominibus pervulgari. *Cicero de inven. rhetorica,* Lib. II.

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CHAP. IV. In whatever light therefore we conſider virtue, it is man's higheſt excellence and happineſs, and the end to which his whole moral ſtructure points and prompts him. Tho' one may ſuffer by the vices of others, ſince no evil in ſociety can be ſingle, but as in the natural body, ſo in every ſyſtem, where one member ſuffers, the whole muſt ſuffer in ſome proportion, the more adjacent parts chiefly. And tho' one may alſo ſuffer with all his virtue by means of the neceſſary operation of thoſe very laws on which many portions of his happineſs, as a certain ſpecies or a part of a ſyſtem, depend; yet without virtue no perſon can have any happineſs of the rational kind, and but very little even in the ſenſitive way, or by gratifying common lower appetites. The reaſon is, as hath been ſaid, becauſe in the nature of things the happineſs of an inſect or brute will only make an inſect or brute happy: A nature with further powers muſt have further enjoyments; and therefore, man, conſidering the powers he is endowed with, muſt have another happineſs, another ſet of enjoyments, in order to be ſatisfied, than a being merely conſiſting of ſenſes without reaſon, conſcience of merit, a public ſenſe and generous affections.

All I have been now ſaying, is moſt feelingly expreſſed by our excellent *moral Poet.*

What nothing earthly gives, *or can deſtroy,*
The ſoul's calm ſun-ſhine, and the heart felt joy,
Is virtue's prize: —

And again,

Know, all the good that individuals find,
Or GOD and nature meant to meer mankind;
Reaſon's whole pleaſures, all the joys of ſenſe
Lie in three words, health, peace, *and* competence.

But

But health consists with temperance alone;
And peace, O virtue! peace is all thy own:
The good or bad the gifts of fortune gain;
But these less taste them, as they worse obtain.
Say, in pursuit of profit or delight,
Who risque the most, who take wrong means or right?
Of vice or virtue, whether blest or curst,
Which meets contempt, or which compassion first?
Count all th' advantage prosp'rous vice attains,
'Tis but what virtue flies from, and disdains;
And grant the bad what happiness they wou'd,
One they must want, which is, to pass for good.
Essay on man, Epist. 4.

Thus then it appears that we are made for virtue; and that it is our truest interest; and that whether we are to subsist after this life or not; it is present happiness, the only present happiness which bears any proportion to our constitution.

Conclusions concerning virtue; that it is interest or private good.

I shall conclude this article with observing, that philosophers, ancient and modern, have taken routs, which at first view appear very different in establishing the nature of human duty and happiness, but all these terminate in the same conclusion. Whether we consider the fitness of things, the truth of the case, our interest or our dignity, 'twill still come out, that virtue is what man is made for. As for the quibling and jangling about *obligation*, it is sufficient for us to remark,

Some observations on the disputes among modern moralists about obligation.

I. If by it is meant a moral necessity arising from the power of a superior to enforce his commands, by rewards and punishments, then obligation being so defined, a man cannot be said to be *obliged* to virtue, but simply in respect of his being under the influence of a superior, who commands him to be virtuous by laws, which he has sufficient power to enforce by rewards and punishments. If by it is meant a moral necessity arising from natural connexions, which

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which make it our intereſt to behave virtuouſly, there is man *obliged* to virtue ſimply in this reſpect (that being then the definition of *obligation*) becauſe ſuch is the natural order and eſtabliſhment of things, that virtue is his intereſt. If by it be meant the ſame as more reaſonable, more becoming, more perfect, *&c.* then is man *obliged* to virtue for the ſake of virtue, or on account of its becomingneſs and excellency.

II. Now in all theſe different views may *obligation* be taken if philoſophers pleaſe. And in all theſe different ſenſes have philoſophers proved man to be *obliged* to virtue: whence it muſt follow, that when it is owned, that virtue is fit, becoming, reaſonable, and our perfection, if man is not allowed to be *obliged* to virtue in that ſenſe, it muſt only be becauſe *obligation* is thought more properly to mean one or other, or both of the other moral neceſſities, and not the laſt one named; and ſo the debate is merely about the uſe of the word *obligation*.

III. But it is obvious, that in all reaſonings to prove that man is *obliged* to virtue in the firſt ſenſe, the fitneſs or becomingneſs, or the natural beauty and excellence of virtue, muſt be laid down as the principle upon which they proceed and are founded. For how elſe can we know the will of the Deity with regard to our conduct; but by knowing what is in itſelf beſt and fitteſt? For how indeed can we prove the Being of a GOD, unleſs we have firſt formed and eſtabliſhed, adequate and clear ideas of moral excellence and perfection? 'Till we have conceived what virtue or merit is, we cannot have any idea of GOD, or conſequently of what he wills and approves.

IV. With regard to the other ſenſe of *obligation* in which it means the ſame as intereſt. As all reaſonings

ings about the obligations to virtue, which sup-
se its excellence must be highly assistant to virtue,
d consequently are of the greatest importance in
oral philosophy; so, on the other hand, what-
er pretences are made to supporting virtue by any
ilosophers who deny the dignity of virtue, they
e but such adherents to it as some are said to have
en to the doctrines of JESUS CHRIST, who fol-
wed him for the sake of the loaves with which he
d them. I use this similitude, because if there be
real difference between esteem, love and friendship,
r the sake of one's amiable temper, and great and
ood qualities, and that hypocritical pretended affec-
on which only eyes some selfish advantage, there
ust likewise be a real difference between the in-
ard esteem and love of virtue for its own intrin-
c beauty, and meer outward conformity to its rules
r the sake of some conveniencies and advantages,
ithout any inward liking to it (*k*). If there be any
al difference in the one case there must be a real
ne in the other. He alone can be said to do a vir-
ous action, who does it with delight and compla-
ency in it as such; otherwise one who inwardly
ates the person he caresses and flatters in order to
et his confidence, and then betray him, is his real
iend till the moment he hurts him, notwithstand-
ng his dissimulation and evil intention; and he who
bstains from robbing for fear of the gallows is as
oneſt as he who would rather suffer the cruelest tor-
nents than commit the least injury to any one in
hought, word or deed.

But all that hath been said, (from which it clear-
y follows, that the laws of our nature with regard
o virtue, and private and public good are so fitly

(*k*) See *Cicero de finibus*, Lib. 2. No. 22. Nemo pius est qui ietatem metu capit, &c. ——And, *de legibus*, Lib. 1. No. 4. Tum autem qui non ipso honesto movemur, ut boni viri mus sed, utilitate aliqua atque fructu, callidi sumus non boni, c.

chosen)

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chosen) will be yet clearer when we consider our constitution or frame with regard to society. Mean time we may conclude with my Lord *Shaftsbury*. "Thus the wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good of every one, to work towards the general good; which if a creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare. He is, on this account, directly his own enemy: nor can he otherwise be good or useful to himself, than as he continues good to society, and to that *whole* of which he is himself a *part*. So that virtue, which of all excellencies and virtues is the chief and most amiable; that which is the prop and ornament of human affairs; which upholds communities, maintains union, friendship and correspondence amongst men; that by which countries as well as private families flourish and are happy; and for want of which every thing comely, conspicuous, great and worthy, must perish and go to ruin; *that single quality*, thus beneficial to all society, and to mankind *in general*, is found equally a happiness and good to each creature *in particular*; and is, *that* by which alone man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable."

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Another class of laws. Those relative to society and the dependence of human happiness and perfection on social union and rightly united force.

LET us consider another law of our nature. "The law of society. In consequence of which all men are not only led to society by several strong affections and dispositions; but man is so framed for society, that private and public happiness and perfection exceedingly depend upon our uniting together in a proper manner, or under proper laws,

...s, and a right form of government, for promot-
...g our common happineſs, dignity and perfecti-
...."

A general view of our ſocial make or form.

We are led to ſociety by an appetite after it, which ...not be ſatisfied without company, fellowſhip, and ...cial communication: nay, ſo ſocial is our make, ...at neither the pleaſures of the body, nor thoſe of ...e mind, ſeparated from ſociety or public affection, ...n afford us any laſting enjoyment.

Remember, man, " *The univerſal cauſe*
Acts not by partial, but by gen'ral laws."
And makes what happineſs we juſtly call
Subſiſt, not in the good of one, but all.
There's not a bleſſing individuals find,
But ſome way leans and hearkens to the kind.
No bandit fierce, no tyrant mad with pride,
No cavern'd hermit, reſt ſelf-ſatisfy'd;
Who moſt to ſhun or hate mankind pretend,
Seek an admirer, or would fix a friend:
Abſtract what others feel, what others think,
All pleaſures ſicken, and all glories ſink;
Each has his ſhare, and who would more obtain
Shall find, the pleaſure pays not half the pain.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 4.

We have all the affections which are neceſſary to the maintenance of ſociety, and to receiving happineſs by ſocial correſpondence and participation: an inclination to propagate our kind; natural affection to our offſpring and to our parents; diſpoſition to friendſhip; tenderneſs to the ſex; regard to reputation, or deſire of fame and eſteem; gratitude, ſympathy and compaſſion; delight in the happineſs of others, in that particularly which is of our own giving or procuring to them; ſatisfaction in whatever preſents us with the agreeable idea of the power, improvement and perfection belonging to our nature. All theſe affections and diſpoſitions are deeply emplanted

CHAP. VI. planted in us, as we may be as ſure, or rather ſurer by experience, than we can be of any properties belonging to external objects of ſenſe. And ſuitably to theſe affections and diſpoſitions, men have different turns, capacities, genius's and abilities, inſomuch that they are as diſtinguiſhable from one another by their different moral features, as by their outward airs, ſhapes and complexions; and as are dependent upon one another as they can be conceived to be, in order to render ſociety at the ſame time neceſſary and yet agreeable or the object of voluntary choice. For if we were not united together at once by ſuch affections, and by ſuch reciprocal wants as neceſſarily reſult from diverſity of intereſts, abilities and tempers; ſociety would only be merely neceſſary or merely agreeable; but being ſo tied and connected together as we are, ſociety is neither ſolely neceſſary, nor is it merely matter of choice; but it is equally requiſite and ſatisfactory.

It is needleſs to dwell long upon proving, that we are formed and made for ſociety, and dependent one upon another: our very manner of coming into the world, and education to the ſtate of manhood, the ſource of many endearing relations, and agreeable affections and offices ſufficiently prove it. And what can be more obvious, than that no conſiderable improvements can be made in the arts and ſciences, or in true grandeur and elegance, without ſocial union and rational virtuous confederacy? In order, however to give a juſt view of the extent and uſefulneſs of this law, and of the phenomena belonging to it, I ſhall offer the few following obſervations (*l*).

I. We

(*l*) ——— Quæ quidem omnia contingent, ſi quis remp. bene conſtitutam nanciſcatur. Id quod quidem *Amalthææ* quod dicitur cornu voco. Etenim in recta legum conſtitutione ſunt omnia; neque maximum naturæ humanæ bonum vel exiſtere abſque ea, vel comparatum & auctum permanere poſſit. Nam & virtutem & ad virtutem viam hæc in ſe continet, quandoquidem

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1. We cannot more certainly pronounce, that a watch or any other machine is formed for a certain end from the consideration of the parts of which it is formed; than we may conclude from all the parts of our constitution, and their mutual references to one another, that we are formed for society and for social happiness: and if it be fit, wise and good that it should be so, then must our constitution as such, be wise and good.

Man is in as proper a sense made for society as any machine for its end.

Hardly will any one call into doubt, the fitness, the wisdom and goodness of our being designed and made for society, of our being made one kind, and our having as such a common stock, a common end, a common happiness. One of the greatest objections brought against our frame and constitution is, that society is not natural but adventitious, the meer consequence of direful necessity; men being naturally to one another wolves; that is, not as wolves to wolves for there a kind of union and society takes place, but as wolves to sheep, devourers and destroyers. Men, say they, are made for rapine and plunder; to fight for victory, and to subdue and enslave each as many of his fellow-creatures as he can by force or stratagem. In one word, men, according to this scheme, are made to be a prey one to another: The only natural principle or instinct those philosophers acknowledge in our nature is, the lust of power and dominion, and an insatiable desire of tyranizing: And were this a true account of our nature, and of the state for which our author has intended us by our make, a state of perpetual war; then indeed it would be impossible to conceive a good opinion of his disposition towards

The fundamental error of *Hobbs* consists in his considering the desire of power which is natural to man as his only natural passion or instinct.

dem in ea partim naturæ bona procreantur, partim & mores, studia, leges optime se habent & recta ratio, pietas, sanctimonia, magnopere vigent. Quamobrem qui beatus futurus & feliciter victurus est, eum in bene constituta repub. & vivere necesse est & mori, &c. *Hyppodamus Thurius Pythag. de felicitate.*

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his creatures. But so far is this from being a true description of human nature, that nothing is more repugnant to feeling and experience (*m*). *Cicero*, indeed, and all the best ancient philosophers, have taken notice of a very laudable *greatness* in the human mind, which makes its capacity for great virtues and noble efforts, in consequence of its natural desire of *principatus*, as *Cicero* calls it: that is, of power and rule or independence. But this disposition or instinct is not the only one in our frame; it is ballanced by several others which serve each in its turn as a counterpoise to it. All these natural dispositions or instincts are enumerated and explained by *Cicero*, in the first Book of his *Offices* at the beginning, as the foundation of all the virtues which constitute human dignity, perfection and happiness, as we have already had occasion to shew: *viz.* the desire of knowledge, the desire and love of society, and a moral sense, or a sense of beauty and deformity in affections and characters, analogous, as he observes, to our sense of beauty and proportion in corporeal forms. Now our desire of power and rule, as it is united with these other dispositions, is so far from being a hurtful principle in our nature, that it is of admirable use. It serves to push us on to improve all our powers and faculties; it impels us to exert ourselves with all our might to attain to the highest perfection in knowledge, and in every ability we are capable

Our natural desire of power as it is conjoined in our frame with other equally natural desires is a most noble and useful instinct.

(*m*) See the first Book of *Cicero*'s *offices*. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adjuncta est appetitio quædam *principatus*, ut nemini parere animus bene a natura informatus velit, nisi præcipienti, aut docenti, aut utilitatis causa, juste & legittime imperanti: ex quo animi magnitudo exsistit, humanarumque rerum contemptio. ——Omnino fortis animus & magnus, duabus rebus maxime cernitur: quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum sit, nihil hominem nisi quod honestum, decorumque sit, aut admirari, aut optare, aut expetere oportere: nullique neque homini, neque perturbationi animi nec fortunæ succumbere. Altera est res, ut cum ita sis affectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas, illas quidem & maxime utiles, &c.

of.

Greatneſs of mind or love of power, how uſeful in our frame.

f. It ſerves to excite us to take a very high aim; to eſpiſe mean and low objects, and to delight in whatever preſents us with a very high idea of our own capacity, force and perfection. Without ſuch principle, man would indeed be a low, a timid, unaſpiring creature, incapable of fortitude and magnanimity: incapable of ruling his ſenſitive appetites; incapable of great attempts, and of deſpiſing dangers for the ſake of virtue. But then, on the other hand, were not this loftineſs of mind, this deſire of power and rule checked by the love of ſociety, by generous public affections, and by a ſenſe of beauty in good affections and actions, it would indeed make every man naturally a tyrant; and produce all the horrible evils, which *Hobbs* ſays, muſt be the product of men's natural diſpoſition, till they reſolve to live quietly, and make a voluntary league for the ſake of ſafety and peace. It is impoſſible to have a juſt idea of any whole by conſidering any part of it ſingly or abſtractedly from all the other parts. But if we conſider our diſpoſition to ſeek after power, as it is joined in our frame with the other equally natural and ſtrong diſpoſitions in our nature which have been mentioned, we ſhall be led immediately to *Cicero*'s concluſion, That by theſe diſpoſitions, as they are united together in our conſtitution, we are made to acquire prudence, to exerciſe benevolence, and to ſtudy order and beauty in *our moral behaviour*, and for fortitude and magnanimity. This natural greatneſs of mind, conſidered with regard to our equally natural appetite after knowledge, conduces to prompt us to ſeek after large and comprehenſive views of nature; knowledge of the moſt enlarging, ennobling and exalting kind; ſuch knowledge as will be moſt conducive to increaſe our power and dominion: It makes us delight in contemplating great objects; objects which wonderfully fill and delate the mind; objects which prove its force and put its graſp to the trial: hence the origine of the ſublime in ſenti-

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ments, in discourse, and in actions, and of all the pleasure it gives, as *Longinus* has observed. This natural greatness considered with respect to our love of society, serves to save it from degenerating into too tame and simple submissiveness for the sake of ease and quiet to every proud usurper of dominion: and it excites us to aim at power in order to do good, in order to spread happiness round us with a liberal hand. Our natural greatness of mind or desire of Power is indeed the source of ambition: but of what ambition is it naturally the source; as it is conjoined in our mind with benevolence and generous affection? Thus it tends to excite the great and God-like ambition of being able to do glorious and meritorious services to our fellow-creatures: it excites us to seek after inward liberty and independency. To no other ambition does it, or can it excite us as it is directed by the love of society, and the benevolent principle with which it is united in our frame, that it might co-operate with it. For it is that different springs or movements may work jointly that they are placed together in any piece of mechanism: and it must be so likewise in moral constitutions. Finally, this natural desire of power and rule, or independency, when it is considered together with the love of order, and regularity in affections, conduct and society, prompts us to pursue regularity and good order in all our behaviour, and to subdue all the passions which tend to introduce irregularity and disorder into our own breasts, inconsistency and irregularity into our own outward actions, and proportionable disorder and irregularity into society. All these instincts or dispositions therefore as they are contrived by nature to ballance one another, and to co-operate in our minds, make a very beautiful constitution, or a constitution adapted to very noble ends and purposes. If any of them be too strong or vehement, then is the ballance disturbed, and so far is our frame disordered: but that any one of them which is most indulged

ılged ſhould become ſtronger than the reſt which e leſs ſo, is the effect of an excellent general law ith regard to temper and habitude of mind already :plained. It is juſt ſo in natural compoſitions or achines, in which ſome particular ſpring may ac- iire too much force in proportion to the reſt, and ıe end of the whole, by various cauſes: and as it in mechaniſm, ſo is it in moral nature. When all ıe ſprings and wheels are ſound and right, and in a ſt ballance, then and then only all will go right. 'he happineſs as well as the proper buſineſs of man ; a rational agent, conſiſts in exerting himſelf to un- erſtand his frame; and underſtanding it, to give ue attention and diligence to keep all his moral ›rings and movements in their due and proportioned rength, as benevolence and his love of beauty and rder direct, and as ſelf-love itſelf requires for inte- eſt's ſake: virtue and happineſs being the ſame, as as been proved.

(*n*) Our affections, no doubt, one and all of them re often matter of uneaſineſs to ourſelves, and ometimes occaſion miſery to others; it muſt be ſo when any one is indulged and nouriſhed into a egree of ſtrength above its proper tone; but the queſtion is, which of them we could have wanted without greater loſs and ſuffering in the whole. They are by nature ballanced one againſt another, is the antagoniſt muſcles of the body, either of which ſeparately would have occaſioned diſtortion and irregular motion, yet jointly they form a machine moſt accurately ſubſervient to the neceſſi- ties, conveniencies, and happineſs of the whole ſyſtem. We have already obſerved whence the ul- timate neceſſity ariſes of adding certain uneaſy ſenſations to all our deſires, from which they have the name of paſſions‖. And we have a power of

All our affections, not only the public ones, but even the private, reſpect ſociety, and are formed with a view to it.

(*n*) See Mr. *Hutcheſon* on *the paſſions*, whoſe words I here uſe.

‖ In the ſecond chapter.

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reason and reflexion by which we may discern what course of acting will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable sort of gratifications of all our desires, and prevent all intolerable or unnecessary pains, or provide some support under them. Nay we have wisdom sufficient to form right ideas of general laws and constitutions, so as to preserve large societies in peace and prosperity, and promote a general good amidst all the private interests. Now as to take away our passions and affections would be to deprive us of all the springs and motives, all the principles necessary to action, and to leave nothing to our reason to govern and guide; so, on the other hand, to rob us of our reason, would be to deprive us of a guiding principle, and to reduce us to the lowest condition of animals impelled and driven by instinct and appetites, without any foresight, without capacity of chusing, and consequently without all capacity of virtue or merit. As well therefore may one deny that we are made for walking erect, and not to grovel on the ground, as that we are made for society; since all our powers and affections are contrived for the good of our kind. Even those of the private sort are plainly so; for do they not then only work towards private good when they preserve that due proportion which the common good of mankind requires? and becoming too strong or too weak with regard to the general good of our kind, do they not likewise become disproportioned with regard to the private system and its well being? This is plain from the very principle of self-preservation, or the love of life, that becomes unable to answer its end in the private system, producing inability to save ones self when it is too strong; and when it is too weak, is the occasion of equal mischief to ourselves and others. For as the timorous and fearful cannot help themselves and others, so the rash and adventurous do not bring more hurt upon others than

an upon themſelves. Thus therefore the private CHAP. VI.
fections are equally well adjuſted to private and
iblick good. But if they ſhould be ſaid to be-
ng merely to the ſelfiſh ſyſtem, and to have no
rther reſpect in their contrivance and tendency,
ere are however many other affections in our
ıture, which do not immediately purſue merely
ivate good, but which in many caſes lead us di-
ctly beyond ourſelves, violently intereſting us in
e concerns and for the affairs of others in their
lverſity as well as proſperity, and conducing to
ıake us regardleſs of ourſelves, or at leaſt to make
; prefer the intereſt of our fellow creatures to our
wn private eaſe. What elſe are our compaſſion
ıd friendly ſenſe of ſorrow, but the alarms and
npulſes of kind nature, watchful (*o*) for the whole,
) engage us in the intereſt of others, and to
rompt us to fly to the relief of a ſuffering brother?
What are the στοργη ; *i. e.* natural affection to off-
ring, ſympathy, friendſhip, the love of ones coun-
y; or, in one word, all our ſocial feelings, which
ıake up (*p*), or lay the foundation for ſo much
f our happineſs, but ſo many neceſſary ties by
hich we are linked together and make one ſy-
tem? By theſe each private agent, is originally
nd independently of his own choice, made ſub-
ervient to the good of the whole. And in con-
equence of this mechaniſm of our nature, he who
oluntarily continues in that rational union, culti-
ates it, and delights in employing his powers
nd talents for the general good of his kind, makes
ımſelf happy ; and he who does not continue this
natural union freely, but voluntarily endeavours

(*o*) See Mr. *Hutcheſon on the paſſions.*

(*p*) See *Cicero, de legibus*, lib. 1. And *de officiis*, lib. 1. No. 7. Sed quoniam ut præclare ſcriptum eſt a platone non nobis——ſolum nati ſumus——in hoc naturam debemus ducem ſequi & communes utilitates in medium afferre, &c.——See how he refutes towards the end of this book thoſe who held that we are not of a ſocial make.

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to break it and disunite himself from mankind, renders himself wretched; and yet he cannot totally burst the bonds of nature. His moral and public sense, his desire of honour and esteem, and the very necessities of his nature will continue to make him dependent on his kind, and oblige him to serve it whether he inclines to it or not.

Society or variety of social happiness requires variety of talents and characters.

II. But let it be observed in the second place, That men could not be made fit for society, or for the social happiness which arises from partnership, from communication and participation, and the reciprocal interchange of friendly offices, without being so constituted that they should mutually stand in need of each other; and hence it follows that in order to society, not only diversity, but inequality of talents, mental as well as bodily, is absolutely necessary; for otherwise there would be no dependence, and consequently no place for social affections to exert themselves, or for the mutual contribution toward public good, which is involved in the very idea of society and community. Now this diversity and inequality which partnership,

(q) *Cicero* often takes notice of the likeness among mankind to one another in their frame, whence it plainly appears that we are, as he expresses it, *ad justitiam nati.* Id jam patebit si hominum inter ipsos societatem conjunctionemque perspexeris. Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par quam omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus, &c. *De legibus*, lib. 1. But see what he says of our personal differences. *De officiis*, lib. 1. n. 30. Intelligendum est etiam, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis, quarum una est communis————altera autem quæ proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnæ dissimilitudines————sic in animis existunt etiam majores varietates. He gives instances, and then (which no other moralist hath done) he explains the decorum belonging to every particular character. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa sed propria quo facilius decorum illud quod quærimus retineatur, sic enim faciendum, ut contra universam naturam non contendamus: ea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur, &c. This lays a foundation for great

ɛrſhip, communication, and ſocial intercourſe re- CHAP. VI.
ɹire, is in our caſe in a great meaſure (as has been ‖
ɔſerved) the neceſſary reſult of our being related to
ſenſible world; or of that mutual union between
ur minds and bodies which is requiſite to our hav-
ɪg the pleaſures of every kind we are ſuſceptible
f in that way, which have been enumerated. So
trict and cloſs is the concatenation of things with
egard to our make, that whatever is found to
ɔe fit or neceſſary in one reſpect, is ſo in all re-
gards and views. The bodies by which we have
ɹ communication with a ſenſible world, and are
capable of enjoying it, muſt be ſupported, nouriſh-
ed, and defended by methods which require di-
verſity and inequality of powers; diverſity and in-
equality of ſituations; ſuperiorities and inferiori-
ties ariſing from ſeveral varieties and differences.
Minds united with bodies muſt be affected with
the laws of matter and motion; and their different
manners of being affected with theſe laws muſt be
uniform and fixed, ſo that like effects may always

The exigencies of our animal life require diverſity.

great variety of beauty in human life. Hence in poetry what is called *decorum*, as *Cicero* obſerves in the ſame place, or truth and conſiſtency of characters, which makes ſo eſſential a part of poetical imitation. Let us imagine human ſociety diveſted of this variety, and by conſequence of the different duties and decorums ariſing from it, and we reduce ſociety to a very uniform lifeleſs ſtate.——See *Homer*'s *Odyſſey*, B. 8. line 185. *Pope*'s *Tranſlation*.

With partial hands the gods their gifts diſpenſe,
Some greatly think, ſome ſpeak with manly ſenſe.
Here heav'n an elegance of form denies,
But wiſdom the defect of form ſupplies:
This man with energy of thought controuls,
And ſteals with modeſt violence our ſouls;
He ſpeaks reſerv'dly, but he ſpeaks with force,
Nor can one word be chang'd but for a worſe. &c.

How fade and inſipid would human life be without that pleaſant beautiful variety of colours, which different characters ariſing from various cauſes caſt upon it.

‖ In the ſecond and third chapters.

proceed

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proceed from like cauſes and connexions. But all theſe dependencies on matter are the foundations of ſocial exerciſes, and neceſſary to the pleaſures and advantages of united ſocial life. So complete then is the whole building, if I may ſo ſpeak, that if any one part is altered, the whole can no longer ſtand or ſubſiſt, but muſt fall to the ground. What is neceſſary or fit for our progreſs in knowledge, and to our enjoyment of a ſenſible world, is likewiſe requiſite to our moral perfection and to ſocial happineſs; and reciprocally whatever is neceſſary to the latter is neceſſary to the former; for ſocial happineſs muſt in the nature of things be a happineſs of participation and communication; it muſt be a happineſs that is reflected, as it were, from one creature to another, and that admits of various changes and modifications. Now different textures of bodies are not more neceſſary to the various reflexions, refractions, and tranſmiſſions of light, which conſtitute all the viſible beauty of the corporeal world, than different ſtructures and modifications of human minds are to the various reflexions and refractions, ſo to ſpeak, of ſocial happineſs, which are requiſite to the beauty and happineſs of ſociety. The only queſtion with regard to the latter is, Whether they are not the propereſt to produce in the whole of things as equal a diſtribution of happineſs, as thoſe in the ſenſible world do of light and heat; that is, as equal a diſtribution as is conſiſtent with the very nature of reflected happineſs itſelf, and with the other uſeful laws relative to our frame? But hardly can we conceive better proviſion made for the equal diſtribution of reflected and participated happineſs conſiſtently with it as ſuch, than by the ſtrength which nature hath originally given to our generous affections and to our moral ſenſe: that is, to our deſire of ſpreading happineſs, and to our delight in the contemplation of that beautiful order which the regular

Moral happineſs require the ſame diverſity.

A variety of different tempers and characters is requiſite to make various reflexions or modifications of ſocial happineſs.

gular exercise of benevolent affections naturally nds to produce. CHAP. VI.

By means of different moral qualities, tempers, id situations, the same kind of happiness has no s various effects than light by its various reflexions and transmissions in the sensible world. Happiness is thus modified or changed into various appearances and effects no less useful as well as beautiful than the variety of colours which make the armony of the visible world. But by means of moral sense and of a social disposition, mankind re as firmly tied together as they can be consistently with the power of regulating themselves, or with the dependence of their temper upon their own care to form it, or upon habits of their own contracting. There can be no society, no mutual dependence, without supposing mutual wants; for all social exercises may be reduced to *giving* and *receiving*. But these two necessarily suppose differences among mankind, and insufficiencies in every one to be happy by himself. And in fact, such amidst great diversity is the equality of mankind, that none can ever be without wants which he himself is utterly incapable to supply, however extensive his power of giving may be. But what can be happier than deficiencies and wants, which are the foundation of so many and so great goods; of social union, of love and friendship, of generosity and kindness, gratitude and reliance, and sympathy? If these are removed, what remains in human life worth enjoying? Even the gratifications of sense, as has been observed, dwindle into nothing; as is plain from considering one, which will readily be acknowledged to be none of the least; where the *spes mutui credula animi* is felt to be the principal ingredient.

All social virtues suppose mutual dependencies and wants, for they may all be reduced to these two, *giving* and *receiving*.

Order is heav'n's first law; and this confest,
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest,

More

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More rich, more wiſe : but who infers from hence
That ſuch are happier, *ſhocks all common ſenſe.*
Heav'n to mankind impartial we confeſs
If all are equal in their happineſs :
But mutual wants this happineſs increaſe,
All nature's diff'rence keeps all nature's peace.
Condition, circumſtance is not the thing :
Bliſs *is the ſame, in ſubject or in king,*
In who obtain defence, or who defend ;
In him who is, or him who finds, a friend.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 4.

And again,

Heav'n, forming each on other to depend,
A maſter, or a ſervant, or a friend,
Bids each on other for aſſiſtance call,
'Till one man's weakneſs grows the ſtrength of all.
Wants, frailties, paſſions, cloſer ſtill allye
The common int'reſt, or endear the tye :
To theſe *we owe true friendſhip, love ſincere,*
Each home-felt joy that life inherits here.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 2.

Natural diverſities make different materials for a variety of good by our own improvement, or of our own acquiſition.

If we take an impartial view of mankind, we ſhall find, that with all the inequalities which ſocial happineſs or intercourſe of good and kindly offices require, there is however ſuch an equality, that every man does in reality bring into the common ſtock, together with his ſhare of the natural affections common to all men, a certain *peculium*, ſomething proper to himſelf, which is of great uſe or rather neceſſity to the common welfare of the kind: and that can be nothing elſe but ſome particular ability, or ſome peculiar modification of the natural and common affections. This will plainly appear if we diſtinguiſh well between what is natural and what is acquired; and remember that, as nothing could be acquired were there nothing natural,

ſince

nce art or exercise can only diversify what was originally of nature's growth or implantation, and nat according to settled methods and connexions xed by nature for making acquisitions of any ind by exercise and art possible; so were nothing eft to art and exercise, nothing would of course e left to ourselves to do; we could make no acquisitions at all. There are indeed acquired dispositions which are very prejudicial to society; but these are affections in themselves exceeding useful, perverted by wrong associations of ideas and bad habits: and what diversity is there among mankind with respect to ability, genius and temper, that there is ground to think natural, which is not necessary to the various employments and pursuits without which there cannot be merit of different kinds, nor a sufficient variety of happiness and perfection in human life? What natural talent or turn of mind is not a good foundation to work upon, or may not be improved to the great advantage of society? Let us but think what an insipid state ours would be, were there not that diversity of turns and casts of mind, so to speak, among mankind which now obtains; or if all men had the same qualities precisely in the same degree; and there were no differences among them at all? Variety is as necessary to general beauty, perfection and good, as uniformity: it is uniformity amidst variety, which produces beauty and good in the sensible world. And it is uniformity amidst variety amongst mankind, which alone could render them capable of similar beauty and good in the moral way; or make them a system of beings in which variety of beauty and good of the moral sort could have place, equal or analogous to that variety of beauty and good, which constitutes the riches and greatness, the magnificence and fulness of the corporeal world. In fine, 'tis as impossible that there can be society amongst mankind without great diversity of powers, abilities, and

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and diſpoſitions, as it is that there can be a whole without parts, of various natures adjuſted to one another by their differences, and ſo making a whole.

Benevolence or ſocial affection naturally works in theſe proper proportions which the general good of ſociety requires.

It operates like attraction in the material world.

III. Let it be remarked, in the third place, with regard to our natural qualifications for ſociety and ſocial happineſs; that the ſocial or uniting principle in us is fitted by nature to operate in thoſe proportions, which are moſt conducive to the common good of our kind. I cannot better explain this than by comparing the uniting, benevolent principle in our nature to attraction in the material ſyſtem. It is indeed moral or ſocial attraction (*r*), and operates like the other proportionally, as beſt ſuits to the upholding of the whole fabric in perfect order: it is ſtrongeſt and moſt ſenſible when cloſe coheſion is abſolutely neceſſary, as betwixt parents and offspring: and it diminiſhes in proportion as we are removed from one another. Yet ſo are we framed, that with regard to our whole kind, when that idea is reflected upon or preſented to us, it is experienced to be exceedingly warm and ſtrong. We all feel that the general good cannot be conſidered without ſuch due affection towards it, that there is a diſpoſition and tendency in our breaſts to ſubmit all particular connexions and attachments to it, with a ſtrong conviction of the fitneſs of ſuch ſubmiſſion. Man muſt firſt be able to conceive a large whole, and to conſider mankind as one family, before he can feel affection to his kind as ſuch: but as one can hardly think at all without being led to perceive the common relation of men to one another as one kind; ſo every one ſoon attains to this idea, or rather it obtrudes itſelf upon all men whether they will or not; and the idea of one's own child does not more neceſſarily excite natural

(*r*) See an excellent paper in the *Guardian* to this purpoſe.

affection,

affection, than the notion of one kind begets ſtrong public affection toward it as ſuch. Hence it is that no perſon capable of reflexion is not touched with the diſtreſs of a man as man, without any other attachment; and does not, on the other hand, rejoice and perceive pleaſure, even at the recital of happineſs enjoyed in any part of the world, or at any period of time, however remote from all his private intereſts. Now this is the cement or attraction towards a common center, which together with the particular attractions between perſons nearly joined and related, or particularly adapted and ſuited one to another, holds the whole ſyſtem of mankind together, or by which it coheres. This is indeed the natural progreſs of the human mind.

God loves from whole to parts: but human ſoul
Muſt riſe from individual to the whole.
Self-love *but ſerves the virtuous mind to wake,*
As the ſmall pebble ſtirs the peaceful lake,
The centre mov'd, a circle ſtrait ſucceeds,
Another ſtill, and ſtill another ſpreads,
Friend, parent, neighbour, firſt it will embrace,
His country next, and next all human race;
Wide, and more wide, th'o'erflowings of the mind
Take ev'ry creature in, of ev'ry kind;
Earth ſmiles around, with boundleſs bounty bleſt,
And Heav'n beholds its image in his breaſt.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 4.

The notion of a public good, or of the univerſal happineſs of our kind, is a complicated idea, which is not immediately apprehended ſo ſoon as one ſees or feels, but requires ſome reflexion and a progreſs of the mind to form it; whereas particular generous affections are immediately excited by their proper objects, ſome of which are ever aſſailing the mind; (as in the caſe of natural affection, properly ſo called, ſympathy with the diſtreſſed,

The notion of a public good is no ſooner formed than due affection ariſes towards it.

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ſtreſſed, and complacency with the happineſs of others, naturally dear and near to us.) But nature has fitted the mind to form the idea of our kind, and of its general good; for every particular exerciſe of the mind in the benevolent ſocial way, naturally tends to beget and eſtabliſh ſuch a prevalency of good humour, tenderneſs, and benevolence in the general temperature of the mind; as when it is formed, muſt naturally diſpoſe it to ſeek for exerciſe and entertainment to itſelf in the moſt enlarged way; and thus the inclination to extend benevolence growing with every particular exertion of it, the idea of good to be purſued, will naturally expand itſelf, till it not merely comprehends our own kind, but takes in and embraces all beings in general, or the whole ſyſtem of nature. As the excitement of every particular object naturally ſuppoſes its object preſent to the mind, either really or in fancy; ſo the notion of public good muſt precede the deſire and purſuit of it; but in proportion as the temper is ſweetned by particular exerciſes of generous affection, the mind will enlarge and open itſelf to make more room for benevolence to exert all its benignity; and ſo a more comprehenſive object will naturally be imagined. And when the idea of public good is but once ſo far extended as to take in our own ſpecies as one kind, it naturally, and as it were neceſſarily inflames the breaſt with affection, large, extenſive and overflowing, in proportion to the greatneſs and comprehenſiveneſs of the idea which beſtirs it.

And our mind is ſo fitted by nature to form that notion that we cannot avoid forming it.

But benevolence, like other affections, is liable to changes, and may be diminiſhed or ſtrengthened.

This will be ſtrongly felt, if one who hath experienced any of the particular and more limited outgoings of the mind in natural affection, compaſſion, or friendſhip, will but aſk his own heart.—And if this be duty, what then does my country require at my hands?—Hath the public no claim upon me?—For if he but underſtands theſe queſtions, and can put them to himſelf; nature will quickly give the anſwer

anſwer by a ſudden overflowing of the warmeſt affection towards the public (*s*), to which he will feel every other paſſion ſubmitting itſelf, as conſcious of its fit ſubordinacy or inferiority to it.

Let it however be remarked, that the analogy between moral and natural gravitation muſt fail in this reſpect, that whereas the latter is only a mechanical principle which we cannot change; the former is a moral principle, and therefore ſubject to diverſities ſuperinduceable by ourſelves, in conſequence particularly of the law of habits and aſſociations of ideas already mentioned; inſomuch that benevolence may be exceedingly weakened and diminiſhed, thro' the prevalence of other paſſions. If therefore in ſome conſtitutions benevolence is very weak, and ſelf-love is almoſt the only prevailing principle, let it be called to mind that in other conſtitutions ſelf-love is really too weak, and ſome generous affection is too ſtrong. From hence it follows, that as in the latter caſe it would be abſurd to argue from ſome few inſtances, that the principle of ſelf-love had originally no place in our frame; ſo, by parity of reaſon, it would be equally abſurd to infer from a few particular inſtances, where ſelf-love is too ſtrong, and benevolence almoſt quite extinct, that originally there was no ſocial principle in our nature. Such changes are all accountable whether on the one ſide or on the other, and in general with regard to all paſſions, in the ſame way; that is, from different aſſociations of ideas, and different contracted habits. The only inference, experience leads to with regard to them is, "That paſſions are overpowered by paſſions; and that paſſions grow more powerful in proportion as they are indulged; or

It is difficult to determine the original forces of any affections in our hearts.

(*s*) See *Cicero*'s *offices*, Book 1. No. 16. &c. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque luſtraris, omnium ſocietatum nulla eſt gravior, nulla carior, quam ea, quæ cum repub. eſt unicuique noſtrum: cari ſunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares: ſed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa eſt.

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as circumstances have conduced to excite and employ them; since by repeated acts all passions are proportionably wrought into temper." It may indeed be difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine the original forces of benevolent passions in any particular constitution antecedent to all particular exitements and exercises; since from the beginning objects which naturally excite and employ them are continually affecting us, and calling them forth into exercises or acts: but then it is no less so for the same reason to determine precisely the forces of the private or selfish affections. We see variety in both cases, and we know how this variety must arise from circumstances of exercise and action in either case. But he who denies any social tendency in our nature to our kind, or the original implantation in us of any principles besides the meer selfish affections, and ascribes all that is social or kindly in us to education, custom and superinduced habits, is obliged to give an account of moral phenomena, which are absolutely inexplicable upon that supposition; since we may appeal even to the most selfish person, to him who has studied and laboured the most to make himself such, and to extinguish all regards to others, whether he has been able to succeed: whether he can attain to his ends, so as never to feel any stirrings within him of social and public affections; and whether he can ever seriously and deliberately, in conversation with his own heart, approve to himself such an aim. If benevolence is superinduced, and not originally from nature, whence comes it universally that this customary and superinduced nature, is stronger than original nature itself; insomuch that, far from being capable of being totally destroyed, it is ever thwarting the selfish passions, and creating discontent and remorse in a narrow, sordid breast. This truly cannot otherwise be explained, unless it is affirmed that habits may be contracted by repeated acts, without

But it cannot be asserted that there is nothing social in our nature, without denying the most evident truths or facts.

without any design or appointment of the Author of nature that it should be so) but by saying, that though nature has not planted in us originally any social propensions, yet the circumstances of human life are so ordered by the Author of it, that these propensions must necessarily arise in every mind to such a degree of strength, that nothing shall be able afterwards to eradicate them; nay, so much as to hinder them from exciting bitter dissatisfaction with ones self in the selfish mind whether he will or will not; or at least, from creating horrible disturbance and remorse within such breasts, as often as they sincerely ask themselves, whether the selfish conduct be right or wrong, approveable or disapproveable. If he says, the part that man *ought* or *ought not* to act, *right* and *wrong*, *fit* and *unfit*, are cheats, or meer words without any meaning, he is not one bit nearer to the solution required of him for the phenomena now under consideration. Because the question still returns, why are human affairs so ordered; if these words express no moral immutable differences of affections and actions, and correspondent obligations, that yet universally every thinking man, as often as he thinks, must approve or disapprove, according to that deceit or false imagination, and cannot possibly approve (*t*) or

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(*t*) See how charmingly *Cicero* argues this point, *de legibus*, Lib. I. No 15, &c. Atqui, si natura confirmatura jus non erit, virtutes omnes tollantur. Ubi enim liberalitas, ubi patriæ caritas, ubi pietas, ubi aut bene merendi de altero, aut referendæ gratiæ voluntas poterit existere? Nam hæc nascuntur ex eo, quod *naturâ propensi sumus ad diligendos homines*, quod fundamentum juris est. —— Atqui nos legem bonam a mala, nulla alia nisi naturæ norma dividere possumus. Nec solum jus & injuria a natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta, ac turpia. Nam & communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Hæc autem in opinione existimare, non in natura posita, dementis est. Nam nec arboris, nec equi virtus, quæ dicitur (in quo abutimur nomine) in opinione sita est, sed in natura. Quod si ita est; honesta quoque, & turpia, naturâ, dijudicanda sunt, &c.

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disapprove according to any other rule, however he may act? For this is as certain as attraction, elasticity, or any other quality of bodies perceived by our senses, that no person ever can, at any time of life, reflect upon his actions, and approve of falsehood, dissimulation and dishonesty, not to say barbarity and cruelty: or not approve truth, veracity, candour, gratitude and benevolence, and public spirit.

How the mind is differently affected by any ideas or objects, is matter of experience, and therefore the fact rests upon the same indubitable evidence which ascertains other facts, that is, experience. But in accounting for this fact, it is necessary to resolve it ultimately into our being originally so framed as to be so affected; in which case, the original sociality of our nature is acknowledged; or it must be resolved into a secondary intention of nature, to bring about our being so affected by moral objects, which, so far as it has any meaning at all, must be, to all intents and purposes, the same with a primary and original intention or appointment of nature. There is no middle hypotheses between these two, to explain the matter by. And to say that this, or any influence of objects upon the mind, may be totally the effect of education, custom, exercise, or art, or any cause whatsoever, without any intention or appointment of nature that it should be so, must terminate ultimately in saying, that effects may be produced without causes, or without any appointed manner of their being produced. Now how absurd would it appear to every one, if a person should say, that an artist may work matter into any intended form, any how, at random, without any means, or by whatsoever means he pleases; or that he could do it, though there were no certain knowable way of doing it. This would unanimously be owned to shock all common sense: and yet it is the very same thing that must be

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The abſurdity of ſuppoſing ſocial or any affection to be produced by art.

be ſaid by thoſe who aſcribe all that is ſocial in our nature to art, cuſtom, and ſuperadded habit, without nature's having at leaſt appointed the way in which art, cuſtom, and ſuperadded habit may produce ſuch an effect. For were there not originally in us certain qualities for art and exerciſe to operate upon, according to certain fixed methods of nature's inſtitution, there would be no materials for art to work upon; nor no means of operating by any moral art or exerciſe. In moral nature, as well as in the material world, no quality can be ſuperinduced which is entirely the product of art. All arts of the one kind, as well as of the other, are but certain methods of bringing forth into action qualities naturally belonging to ſubjects, according to the means appointed by nature for bringing them forth into action, in this or the other degree or proportion, and with theſe or the other appearances. I ſhall conclude this head with an admirable deſcription of nature, our ſocial nature in particular, by the excellent moral poet ſo often quoted.

GOD, in the nature of each being, founds
Its proper bliſs, *and ſets its* proper bounds:
But as he fram'd a whole, the whole to bleſs
On mutual wants *built mutual happineſs:*
So from the firſt eternal order *ran,*
And creature link'd to creature, man to man.
Whate'er of life all-quick'ning æther keeps,
Or breathes thro' air, or ſhoots beneath the deeps,
Or pours profuſe on earth; one nature feeds
The vital flame, and ſwells the genial ſeeds.
Not man alone, but all that roam the wood,
Or wing the ſky, or roll along the flood,
Each loves itſelf, but not itſelf alone,
Each ſex deſires alike, till two are one:
Nor ends the pleaſure with the fierce embrace;
They love themſelves, a third time, in their race.

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Thus beaſt and bird their common charge attend,
The mothers nurſe it, and the ſires defend;
The young diſmiſs'd to wander earth or air,
There ſtops the inſtinct, and there ends the care;
The link diſſolves, each ſeeks a freſh embrace,
Another love ſucceeds, another race.
A longer care man's helpleſs kind demands;
That longer care contracts more laſting bands:
Reflection, reaſon, ſtill the ties improve,
At once extend the int'reſt, and the love:
With choice we fix, with ſympathy we burn,
Each virtue in each paſſion takes its turn;
And ſtill new needs, new helps, new habits riſe,
That graft benevolence on charities.
Still as one brood, and as another roſe,
Theſe nat'ral love maintain'd, habitual thoſe;
The laſt ſcarce ripen'd into perfect man,
Saw helpleſs him from whom their life began:
Mem'ry and forecaſt, juſt returns engage,
That pointed back to youth, this on to age:
While pleaſure, gratitude, and hope combin'd
Still ſpread the int'reſt, and preſerv'd the kind.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 3.

The neceſſary dependence of ſocial happineſs and perfection on right ſocial union.

IV. I ſhall now take notice of ſomething that is yet more particularly the reſult of our ſocial make, or of our being formed to promote common happineſs by joint endeavours. And it is, that in conſequence of ſuch an end, and of the make proper to that end, the perfection and happineſs of human ſociety muſt depend on the aptitude of the union into which it is formed, that is, upon its fitneſs and propriety to promote that end. If happineſs muſt be promoted by joint endeavours, or united application, as ſocial happineſs muſt be according to the very definition of it, then is uniting neceſſary to it: but joining or uniting in one method, or according to one form, cannot be ſo proper to promote the end of union, which is public hap-

happineſs, as joining or uniting in another form. Need I ſtay to prove what is as evident, as that there may be a better and a worſe mechaniſm for the end of a watch? Yet if this be true, it evidently follows, that the greateſt common happineſs and perfection of ſociety cannot be effected, but in proportion to the fitneſs of the form in which ſociety is conſtituted, to procure that end. Accordingly, the moſt remarkable differences among ſocieties are ſuch as reſult from their political forms, or from the natural tendency of their laws, government, and civil policies. There are, indeed, other differences, as with regard to climate, ſoil, and other ſuch things depending on phyſical cauſes. But are not the chief differences confeſſed to be ſuch as reſult from civil conſtitutions, or the various forms of government? If, for example, the flouriſhing of all the ingenious arts, of philoſophy in all its branches, of poetry, ſtatuary, painting, ſculpture, architecture, *&c.* conſtitute a very conſiderable part of the happineſs and grandeur of ſociety, as being the propereſt methods for employing men's nobleſt faculties, and all the wealth that may be purchaſed by commerce: If it be true, that it is the polite arts which give taſte and luſtre to human life, or add elegance and a due poliſh to it; that they are the *grandeur and grace* (*u*), *and comely pride of mankind, without which wealth rots a nuſance:* if this be true, it is at the ſame time equally certain, that one form of government is fit for promoting theſe arts, and another is quite the reverſe. "Hence it is that theſe arts have been delivered down to us in ſuch perfection by free nations, who from the nature of their government, as from a proper ſoil, produced the generous plants; whilſt the mightieſt bodies and vaſteſt empires, governed by force and deſpotic power, could, after ages of peace and leiſure, produce no other than what was deformed and barba-

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(*u*) *Liberty*, by Mr. *Thomſon*.

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Some ſtates are adjuſted to one end, ſome to another.

rous of the kind." It was in conſequence of this natural fitneſs or unfitneſs of certain moral means with reſpect to certain moral ends, that the laws of *Lycurgus*, according to the confeſſion of *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, and other wiſe and obſerving politicians, tended to make men ferocious, and to prevent their being civilized and poliſhed by the humanizing arts: there was no proviſion made by that inſtitution for their culture and advancement; but, on the contrary, all was calculated to exclude them; and therefore they could not poſſibly be engendered, far leſs could they come to perfection in ſuch a ſtate: whilſt, on the other hand, at *Athens* they flouriſhed, becauſe every thing concurred to promote them. But it is not my buſineſs now to examine different forms of government. All that belongs to our preſent purpoſe is, to remark that men are capable of a very great degree of grandeur and happineſs, as we feel by experience, in conſequence of our own moſt happy conſtitution, and its aptitude to promote public ſpirit, virtue, and arts, beyond any other in the world: and that the perfection and happineſs of mankind muſt depend upon the natural fitneſs of the form of government they live under, or of their civil and religious conſtitution, in order to produce that end, is as certain as that there are proper and improper means with relation to any end; or that no end can be accompliſhed, but by the means fit to attain it: an univerſal ſelf-evident truth in moral as well as natural mechaniſm, or with reſpect to moral ends as well as natural ones. In conſequence of which it is that the ſcience of politics conſiſts in judging of the propriety and fitneſs, moral and political, of means to bring about and promote the ſole end of government, the happineſs of ſubjects. And hence it is accordingly that philoſophers and politicians have been able, in many inſtances, to form ſuch true judgments of the different forms of government, laws and policies, as

Every moral end, as well as every natural one, hath its natural and neceſſary means, by which alone it can be accompliſhed.

(like

(like *Polybius* (z), with regard to the *Roman* republic) to foretel the revolutions and changes of government which muſt happen, merely from the exact knowledge of the neceſſary effects of moral cauſes. Here, as well as in the natural world, effects may be with certainty inferred from their cauſes; for in both caſes, from a certain concurrence of circumſtances or cauſes, certain conſequences neceſſarily reſult. To be ſatisfied of this, one needs only look into the political reaſonings of any good writer on politics, *Ariſtotle*, *Polybius*, or our own *Harrington*. So that we may lay down all that is requiſite for our purpoſe to make out as an indiſputable truth. That ſuch is the natural dependence of men upon each other, that they cannot attain to the perfection and happineſs for which they are intended by nature, but by their uniting together, in order to promote it by their joint application: and that there are in the nature of things, improper and proper means of acting for obtaining that end. We are certainly intended by nature for whatever happineſs and perfection we are qualified to purſue and attain to, whether ſingly or by united force. But all means and manners of uniting together, can no more be equally proper for attaining to an end in moral combinations of powers and qualities, than in natu-

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Hence it is that politics is a ſcience.

(z) Hence it is that the political ſcience is able to amount to what *Cor. Nepos* ſays in his Life of *Atticus*, concerning *Cicero*'s Letters to him.——Quæ qui legat non multum deſideret hiſtoriam contextam, illorum temporum. Sic enim omnia de ſtudiis principum, vitiis ducum, mutationibus reipub. perſcripta ſunt, ut nihil in iis non appareat: & facile exiſtimari poſſit, prudentiam quodamodo *Divinationem*. Non enim Cicero ea ſolum quæ vivo ſe acciderunt futura prædixit: ſed etiam que nunc uſu veniunt, cecinit vates. To be ſatisfied of the truth of this remark, one needs only look into the ſixth book of *Polybius*, and obſerve from what principles he reaſons. And if we conſult our own *Harrington*, we ſhall ſee from his reaſonings in one ſingle inſtance, *viz.* about property, how neceſſarily the happineſs of mankind depends upon a good conſtitution, ſagely and honeſtly adminiſtred.

ral

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ral ones. And the wisdom and goodness of our Author clearly appears in making us social, and reciprocally dependent; in fitting us for attaining to a very great degree of happiness and perfection in that way; in prompting us by our natural benevolence, and other dispositions, to establish ourselves into the best form for that end; and in directing us to find it out by our moral sense.

Nature could not have dealt more kindly with us than it hath done, by making us social creatures, and by pointing and prompting us to right union by our natural disposition to society, and by our moral sense.

This is all the provision nature could make for uniting us together in the propereſt form, consistently with making our chief interest dependent on ourselves, or happiness to be our own acquisition. And thus nature appears to be exceeding kind, especially when we call to mind, that though social happiness makes social dependence absolutely necessary; yet at the same time, the chief happiness of every private man, as far as it can be acquired singly, or independently of society rightly constituted and modelled, consists in the exercise of the same virtuous temper, which fits for and points to the proper manner of uniting, in order to promote general happiness or perfection; it being in every one's power, considered as one individual, to regulate his affections according to the real nature of things or truth; from which government of opinions and affections no unhappiness results; but from it, on the contrary, do many goods naturally spring, in comparison of which, all other enjoyments are of very little consideration or importance, equally gross and unsatisfactory, as has been already observed. "Thus, then, it plainly appears that we are excellently formed for procuring to ourselves that true perfection and happiness, which must, in the nature of things, be the effect of right government, or well constituted society." Let us now consider, whether man, who is made for virtue and society, hath any further respect; or whether he is not likewise made for the pleasures of true religion and pure devotion.

Conclusion.

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Another class of laws. Those relative to religion.

MAN cannot open his eyes to consider the stupendous frame of nature, to contemplate his own make, or indeed any other object which strikes his sense or understanding, without apprehending or conceiving some mighty power that made, upholds and governs all. The idea of a creating and sustaining power or principle immediately presents itself to his mind. He cannot escape forming it; so strongly does nature, every thing in nature, bespeak and proclaim it to him (*y*). Hence that idea may be called *innate*; that is, an intelligible form or conception, which offers itself naturally to the mind as soon as it reflects; an idea the mind cannot avoid if it thinks, but that necessarily occurs to every one. That it is so is plain from universal experience; for no fact is more certain, than that no nation ever was so barbarous, but that it acknowledged a supreme, independent, creating power, the father of the world and of mankind.

Man is made for religion as well as for virtue.

We

(*y*) All the reasoning in this chapter is chiefly taken from *Cicero*. See *de legibus*, Lib. I. No. 7. & sequ. ——— Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque & in homine, & in deo; prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porrò est communio legis, inter eos communio juris est. —— Ut jam universus hic mundus, una civitas communis deorum, atque hominum, existimanda. ——— Cumque alia quibus cohærent homines, è mortali genere sumserint, quæ fragilia essent, & caduca; animum tamen esse ingeneratum à deo: ex quo verè vel agnatio nobis cùm cæleſtibus. ——— Itaque ex tot generibus nullum est animal, præter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei: ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiam si ignoret, qualem ha-

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He can hardly avoid forming the idea of a supreme power, upon which he absolutely [illegible]

We are neceſſarily led by the conſideration of our own exiſtence, which is felt to be derived and dependent, to perceive our dependence upon the Author of nature. And our moral ſenſe, ſo ſoon as we think of a creating principle, naturally diſpoſes us to aſcribe the beſt diſpoſition and temper to ſuch a mind. So are we framed, that every effect leads us to apprehend a cauſe; and conſequently, the exiſtence of the world leads to apprehend an Author of it. And every thing great, regular or proportioned, excites admiration, either towards itſelf, if we imagine it animated; or, if not animated, towards ſome apprehended cauſe. No determination of our mind is more natural than this; no effect more univerſal: one has indeed better reaſon to deny the connexion between the ſexes to be natural, than to deny a diſpoſition in man to admire the Author of nature, which is a diſpoſition to religion (‖).

And our moral ſenſe naturally leads us to aſcribe not only intelligence, but the love of order and benignity of temper, to the firſt or original mind

Our ſenſe of natural and moral beauty neceſſarily leads us to enquire into and admire the order, beauty, grandeur, wiſe and good oeconomy of the world; and to apprehend that our diſpoſition to underſtand and love order and goodneſs cannot but proceed from an Author whoſe mind is perfect order and goodneſs. And, indeed, it is as certain as that we have intelligent powers, and a moral ſenſe implanted in us, that our Creator muſt have intelli-

habere deum decet, tamen habendum ſciat. Ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoſcat Deum, qui, unde ortus ſit, quaſi recordetur, ac noſcat. Jam vero virtus eadem in homine, ac deo eſt. ——Si autem virtus nihil aliud, quàm in ſe perfecta, & ad ſummum perducta natura. Eſt igitur homini cum deo ſimilitudo. Quod cum ita ſit, quæ tandem poteſt eſſe proprior certiorve cognatio? Quid eſt enim verius, quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe rationem, & mentem, putet eſſe, in cœlo, mundoque non putet? Aut ut ea, quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? quem vero *aſtrorum* ordines, &c. Compare *de natura deorum*, Lib. II. Let tamen ex ipſa hominum ſolertia eſſe aliquam mentem,

(‖) *Hutcheſon on the Paſſions.*

telligence, and benevolent, generous affections towards public good. For if the contrary is ſuppoſed, then are we more perfect than our maker; then have we in our nature a better, a more noble diſpoſition than our Author, the contriver and creator of all our moral powers and diſpoſitions, and of all the beauty, order, and good we ſee and admire. Nay, if the Author of nature has no perception of order, good and beauty, nor no diſpoſition to approve it, then we have an excellent diſpoſition in our frame of which he could not have any idea, and which is therefore blindly and undeſignedly implanted in us. This reaſoning is not above the reach of any one; it is what every perſon who thinks at all, is naturally led to by the turn and diſpoſition of the human mind. For how can we avoid ſaying to ourſelves, when we look upon the immenſe power, wiſdom and goodneſs the creation manifeſts; when we look into our own minds, and conſider our natural delight in analogy, harmonies, general laws, and the good that reſults from them; that whatever power or excellency, wiſdom or order is derived, the Author from whom it comes, muſt poſſeſs ſuch power, intelligence or virtue, in a degree far ſuperior to all his creatures. He who gave us underſtanding, does he not underſtand? He who gave us reaſon, has he not ſupreme and perfect reaſon? He who gave us capacity of per-

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tem, & eam quidem acriorem, & divinam, exiſtimare debemus. *Unde enim hanc homo arripuit?* ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates.—Ut ſi quis in domum aliquam. aut in gymnaſium, aut in forum venerit: cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum diſciplinam, non poſſit ea ſine cauſa fieri judicare, ſed eſſe aliquem intelligat, qui præſit, & cui pareatur: multo magis in tantis motionibus, tantiſque viciſſitudinis, tam multarum rerum, atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil umquam immenſa, & infinita vetuſtas mentita ſit, ſtatuat neceſſe eſt, ab aliqua mente tantos naturæ motus gubernari. — Si enim, eſt aliquid in rerum natura, quod hominis mens, quod ratio, quod vis, quod poteſtas humana efficere non poſſit: eſt certe id, quod illud efficit, homine melius. Atqui res cœleſtes———Quid vero? tanta rerum con-

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perceiving order and delighting in it, does he not underſtand and love order? He who made us ſo that we muſt approve truth, veracity, benevolence, greatneſs of mind, and every virtue, and diſapprove the contrary affections, does not he like thoſe virtues, has he not a ſenſe of their excellence? Does he not delight in them? Whence can he have copied the ideas of them but from his own mind? Had he not theſe excellencies originally in himſelf, whence could he have formed the notion of them; or whence could he have been moved and determined to give them to us, or to implant them in us? Could he form thoſe, or any diſpoſitions in our natures without having an idea of what he was doing? Or could he have been moved to plant ſuch diſpoſitions in us by a temper quite the reverſe of what he was doing? By a temper quite the reverſe of all excellency and goodneſs? We may therefore be no leſs ſure, that our Creator has underſtanding, reaſon and benevolence, as well as creating power, in the moſt perfect, pure, unalloyed, unlimited degree, than we are ſure that what we have is derived underſtanding, reaſon and benevolence.

Such reaſonings are natural to the human mind.

Now theſe reaſonings are not only juſt, but they are natural to the mind: it as naturally tends to form them, as it tends to delight in any object which is adjuſted to its frame, but is not an immediate object

conſentiens, conſpirans, continuata cognatio, quem non coget ea, quæ dicuntur a me comprobare? ——— Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter ſe concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non poſſent, niſi ea uno divino, & continuato ſpiritu continerentur. ——— Talis igitur mens mundi cum ſit, ob eamque cauſam, vel prudentia, vel providentia appellari recte poſſit, hæc potiſſimum providet, & in his maxime eſt occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptiſſimus ſit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxime autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo ſit, atque omnis ornatus. ——— Multæ autem aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis eorum beneficiis, & à Græciæ ſapientibus, & a majoribus noſtris conſtitutæ, nominatæque ſunt. Quidquid enim magnam utilitatem generi afferret

ject of ſenſe. And indeed all the opinions of philoſophers about chance, mechanical blind operation of matter, or whatever other ſtrange hypotheſes, if they are not abſurd, (as they plainly are) they are at leaſt ſubtleties, which lie very remote from the human mind, and to which it can never yield. Religion is therefore as natural to the mind as a moral ſenſe. But, like it, or being but a part of it, it muſt be improved by culture, by contemplation and exerciſe. Where there is a moral ſenſe, reflexion muſt ſoon lead to apprehend an infinitely good mind, the cauſe of all things. And where there is a moral ſenſe, an infinitely good mind cannot be apprehended, without the higheſt love and admiration, without ſupreme complacency and delight: but the idea muſt be improved to its perfection, like every other object of contemplation, by due conſideration, by carefully examining it, leſt any thing contrary to it ſhould be aſſociated and mixed with it on the one hand, or on the other, leſt it ſhould be too defective and inadequate, or too weak in its influence upon our minds.

Whence then impoſition or falſe religion.

If it is aſked, how then it comes that ſuch depraved notions of the Deity, ſo deſtructive of morality, and therefore ſo oppoſite to a moral ſenſe, have always prevailed in the world? To this I anſwer, 1. That nothing is more plain from hiſtory, than that even amidſt

ret humano, id non ſine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur. Itaque tum illud, quod erat à deo natum, nomine ipſius dei nuncupabant.——Tum autem res ipſa, in qua vis ineſt major aliqua, ſic appellatur, ut ea ipſa vis nominetur deus.——Alia quoque ex ratione, & quidem phyſica, magna fluxit multitudo deorum: qui induti ſpecie humana fabulas poetis ſuppeditaverunt.——Videtiſne igitur, ut à phyſicis rebus, bene, atque utiliter inventis, tracta ratio ſit ad commentitios, & fictos deos? quæ res genuit falſas opiniones, erroreſque turbulentos, & ſuperſtitiones pæne anileis.——Hæc & dicuntur, & creduntur ſtultiſſime, & plena ſunt futilitatis, ſummæque levitatis.——Sed tamen, his fabulis ſpretis, ac repudiatis, deus

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amidst the prevalence of superstition and idolatry, all the thinking part of mankind have ever had very just notions of the Deity and religion. What one of the personages in *Cicero*'s Dialogues about the gods says, was ever the opinion of all philosophers, a few only excepted, who studied and laboured hard to contrive some other uncommon system: *Namely*, That the doctrine of many gods, unless it be understood allegorically, is glaring nonsense. 2. It seems plain from history, that superstition crept in gradually by means of various artifices; and not improbably, it took its chief rise from, or was principally promoted by tyranny, as it is said in *the book of wisdom*. It seems to be its cruel invention in order to enslave men more effectually, or to make them more easy dupes to its ambitious aims. It is an art invented or promoted by tyrants and their flattering accomplices who share the prey with them, to instil into the minds of those they would enthral and hold in compleat subjection to their lawless will, a notion of divine right communicated to them from above, to bear absolute sway on earth till they take their places among the gods destined for them. Hence the deification of tyrants and heroes in which idolatry at first consisted, and from whence it most probably took its origin.

It took its rise with tyranny, or was promoted by it.

The workman from the work distinct was known,
And simple reason *never sought but* one:

E'er

deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei — Cultus autem deorum est optimus, idemque castissimus, atque sanctissimus, plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta & mente, & voce veneremur. *De natura deorum*, Lib. II.——Superstitio fusa per gentes, oppressit omnium fere animos, atque hominum imbecillitatem occupavit.——Nec vero (id enim diligentur intelligi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur.——Esse præstantem aliquam, æternamque naturam, & eam suspiciendam, admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cælestium cogit confiteri. Quamobrem ut religio propaganda

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E'er wit *oblique had* broke *that ſteady light*,
Man, *like his Maker*, ſaw, *that* all was right,
To virtue in the paths of pleaſure trod,
And own'd a Father *when he own'd a* GOD.
Love all the faith, *and all th'* allegiance *then*;
For nature knew no right divine *in* men,
No ill could fear in GOD; *and underſtood*
A ſovereign being, *but a* ſovereign good.
True faith, *true policy*, *united ran*,
That was but love *of* GOD, *and this of* man.
Who firſt taught ſouls enſlav'd, *and realms undone*,
Th'enormous faith of many made for one?
That proud exception to all nature's laws,
T'invert the world, *and counterwork its cauſe?*
Force firſt made conqueſt, *and that conqueſt*, law;
Till ſuperſtition *taught the tyrant awe*,
Then ſhar'd the tyranny, *then lent it aid*,
And gods of conqu'rors, *ſlaves of ſubjects made*:
She, *midſt the lightning's blaze and thunder's ſound*,
When rock'd the mountains, *and when groan'd the ground*,
She taught the weak to bend, *the proud to pray*
To pow'r unſeen, *and mightier far than they*:
She, *from the rending earth*, *and burſting ſkies*,
Saw Gods *deſcend*, *and* Fiends *infernal riſe*;
Here fix'd the dreadful, *there the bleſt abodes*;
Fear *made her devils*, *and weak* hope *her gods*:
Gods partial, *changeful*, *paſſionate*, *unjuſt*,
Whoſe attributes were rage, *revenge*, *or luſt*,
Such as the ſouls of cowards *might* conceive,
And form'd like tyrants, *tyrants would* believe.

Zeal

ganda etiam eſt, quæ eſt juncta cum cognitione naturæ: ſic ſuperſtitionis ſtirpes omnes ejiciendæ. *De divinat.* Lib. II.——Sed ſic, Scipio, ut avus hic tuus, ut ego, qui te genui, juſtitiam cole, & pietatem: quæ, cum ſit magna in parentibus, & propinquis; tum in patria maxima eſt: ea vita, via eſt in cælum, & in hunc cœtum eorum, qui jam vixerunt, & corpore laxati illum incolunt locum.——*Somn. Scipionis.* Etenim cognitio contemplatioque manca naturæ, quodam modo, atque incho-

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Zeal then, not charity, became the guide,
And hell was built on ſpite, *and heav'n on* pride.
Then ſacred ſeem'd th' æthereal vault no more;
Altars grew marble then, and reek'd with gore:
Then firſt the flamen *taſted living food,*
Next his grim idol ſmear'd with human blood;
With heav'n's own thunders ſhook the world below,
And play'd the God an engine on his foe.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 3.

But no argument can be brought from thence againſt a moral ſenſe in our nature.

Now, If it is aſked how men, notwithſtanding their moral ſenſe, came to ſuffer themſelves to be ſo groſly impoſed upon to their diſadvantage? May I not reply, 1. That ſuch an impoſition being not more repugnant to a moral ſenſe and a benevolent principle, than it is to ſelf-love, or a deſire of private good and happineſs; no argument can be brought from its taking place againſt a moral ſenſe, that does not equally militate againſt the reality of ſelf-love in our nature; the being and power of which principle was never on that or any other account called into doubt. 2. It appears from hiſtory, that ſuch hath always been the care of providence to ſave, guard againſt, or deliver men from ſuch pernicious errors, ſo contrary at once to private intereſt and to moral ſenſe, as far as could be done conſiſtently with making knowledge progreſſive and dependent on ourſelves: That in all ages of the world, there have appeared true philoſophers of generous public ſpirit, who taught true virtue and religion, and

ata ſit, ſi nulla actio rerum conſequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Pertinet igitur ad ſocietatem generis humani. Ergo hæc cognitioni anteponenda eſt: atque id optimus quiſque re ipſa oſtendit, & judicat. ——— Itaque niſi ea virtus, quæ conſtat ex hominibus tuendis, id eſt, ex ſocietate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, ſolivaga cognitio, & jejuna videatur. Itemque magnitudo animi, remota communitate, conjunctioneque humana, feritas ſit quædam inmanitas.

and boldly oppoſed corruption, ſuperſtition, and all enſlaving doctrines about government; ſuch were *Pythagoras*, *Thales*, *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Confucius*, *Zoroaſter*, and others: and ſuch muſt *Moſes*, the *Jewiſh prophets*, and JESUS CHRIST be allowed at leaſt to have been. But leaving thoſe with other objections to another place, I ſhall only add now, that to aſk why nature has not prevented all error, all falſhood, all impoſition, all falſe opinions and prejudices, all credulity, all wrong aſſociations of ideas and bad habits; is in reality to aſk, why nature has not done more than can poſſibly be done for making us capable of attaining to true knowledge, juſt ideas and opinions, rational concluſions, improved powers and good habits. For it has been already proved, that we are furniſhed and qualified for the purſuit of and attainment to knowledge, and for arriving at moral perfection, with all the proviſion that theſe ends require in our ſituation: or with regard to ſuch beings as mankind are and muſt be, to render the ſcale of life full and coherent.

Religious contemplation is a very pleaſant exerciſe.

I ſhall therefore proceed to obſerve on the head of religion, 1. That every exerciſe of contemplation, admiration, and love towards an all-perfect creator and governor of the world, is in its nature exceeding pleaſant and delightful. All beauty is naturally agreeable to our mind, but chiefly moral beauty. And therefore the contemplation of an all-perfect mind, compleatly wiſe and good, as well as omnipotent and infinitely removed from all imperfection, muſt

manitas. *De Offic.* Lib. I.—Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum eſſe natos; actionem autem genera plura.—— maximæ autem ſunt, primum, ut mihi quidem videtur, conſideratio, cognitiove rerum cœleſtium, quas a natura occultatas, & latenteis, indagare ratio poteſt: deinde rerumpub. adminiſtratio, aut adminiſtrandi, ſciendique prudens, temperata, fortis & juſta ratio, reliquæque virtutes, & actiones virtutibus congruentes, quæ uno verbo complexi omnia, honeſta dicimus: ad quorum etiam cognitionem,

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must greatly raise, transport and exhilerate the mind. This is the necessary consequence of a moral sense.

And highly improving to virtue.

2. Such contemplation must be highly assisting to and improving of the virtuous temper. It must strengthen our love of virtue; and redouble our emulation to improve and excel in it. It is indeed nothing but the love of virtue in its highest degree. And how doubly satisfying must the conscience of sincere endeavours to advance in virtue be, when one reflects that it is the way, the only way to be like our Creator, and to recommend ourselves to his favour here or hereafter: That it is imitating him, and acting in concert with him.

But good affections may become too strong or vehement.

3. But as every self-affection may be too strong as well as too weak, so may every generous affection be.

This is what *Horace* means when he says,

"*Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,*
Ultra quam satis est, virtutem si petat ipsam."

The best affections may not only be too weak to gain their ends; but by misguidance, or too great indulgence, they may become too strong and vehement. The love of mankind may thus become romantic. And, in like manner, religious contemplation and admiration, tho', on the one hand, it may be too little exercised in order to our happiness, and

How what religious admiration is apt to degenerate.

nitionem, & usum jam corroborati, *natura ipsa præeunte* deducimur. Omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, &c. *De finibus*, Lib. 5. Sed præsto est domina omnium & regina ratio, quæ connexa per se, & progressa longius fit perfecta virtus. Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum est viro. Quonam modo? inquies. Velut dominus servo, velut imperator militi. Quæ sunt ista arma? contentio, confirmatio, sermo intimus cum ipse secum.

and the improvement of our temper; yet, on the other hand, it may become too ardent; and thus it may degenerate into such excessive delight in raptorious contemplation, as may render averse to action, the great end of knowledge and of religion. And when one abandons the world to give himself up to religious contemplation, mankind being naturally made for social exercise and communication with one another in many acts of benevolence and friendship, the right ballance of the mind will be lost: action not being duly mixed with contemplation, the imagination will become visionary and romantic. And hence it is, that such persons are apt to imagine an extraordinary commerce and peculiar intimacy with the supreme Being; and to fancy all the thoughts or visions, which present themselves in consequence of their devotional contemplation and admiration, to be special dictates from heaven to their minds. It is true, good and just sentiments which are thus excited in the mind, as they are in that respect peculiarly the effects of religious acts, they may, in that sense, be said more especially to be from GOD; but they are not from him in any other way, than as they are the natural fruits of such contemplation and devotion according to the natural frame of our mind: and one cannot be too cautious in guarding against the perswasion of any special communication with the Deity, which pride is so apt, if it is once suffered to enter into the mind, or in the least indulged, to nourish to great extravagance; because in proportion as any other guide is set up in the mind besides reason and moral conscience, in proportion will those our natural guides be abandoned and forsaken by us in favour of that imagined superior one: and thus the

If any other guide is set up in our mind superior to natural reason, and not to be tried by it, our whole frame is unhinged.

secum. ——— Observantur species honestæ animo. It is reason, good sense, or philosophy, that must preside, in order to preserve the human mind sound, governable, and unfantastical. O vitæ dux, virtutis indagatrix. *Cic. tusc. quæst.* Lib. V.

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whole coherence of the human moral texture will be greatly endangered.

But perhaps there is not so much reason to caution against excesses, into which pious and devout affection may be misguided, as to recommend strongly the pleasure and profitableness to virtue, of devotion rightly governed. And then certainly it is so when we take frequent pleasure in contemplating the divine perfections; and such contemplation produces, on the one hand, chearful submission to the divine pleasure with respect to all things independent of us, or absolutely external to us, and out of our power, from the perswasion that the divine providence does all for the best in the whole. And when, on the other hand, the contemplation and love of the Deity excite us to action, or to seek with delightful attention and care, opportunities of exerting our benevolence, and of doing all the good we can; from a perswasion that it is only active benevolence which can liken or approve us to that infinitely perfect Being, whose happiness consists in communicating his goodness as extensively as Omnipotence can.

The genuine effects of true well moderated devotion, are submission to providence, and activity in doing good.

Thus we see, we aremade for religion as well as for virtue; and that indeed in our nature, religion and virtue are one and the same thing: it is the same natural disposition of the mind, employed *contemplatively* in admiring and loving supreme virtue; and *actively* in imitating that model; or in endeavouring to become more and more conformable to it. And as this is the idea which reason gives us of religion and virtue, so it is the idea christianity gives of it. The sum of religion and virtue according to that doctrine, is to love GOD, and to love our neighbour; and according to that doctrine these two good dispositions are inseparable: They must go together. *He who thinketh he loveth God, and loveth not his neighbour, deceiveth himself, for God is love.*

Conclusion.

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A brief review of the human nature, and its powers and dispositions, and their laws.

HAVING thus considered the chief laws and principles, powers and properties in the human nature relative to our bodily or moral frame, to our sensitive part or our connexion with a material world, relative to knowledge, to virtue, to interest, and to society: I think we may conclude, that human nature is well constituted, and makes an excellent species which well deserves its place in the rising scale of life and perfection: a species of being which shews an Author of perfect wisdom and goodness.

Now that all the principal phenomena relating to human nature and mankind, are accountable by reducing them to good principles from which they must result, will appear by casting our eye upon the following *Table of effects*, for these seem to be the principal phenomena belonging to us as men; and they are all reducible to the laws that have been already found either to be necessary, or fitly chosen and established.

Phenomena belonging to the general law of power.

A table of the phenomena, good and bad belonging to human nature, or resulting from its contexture.

GOODS.	EVILS.
Having a sphere of power and activity. Liberty and dominion; and so being capable of praise, virtue and good desert: Having great knowledge and proportioned power in consequence of culture or care to improve ourselves.	Want of power through ignorance and neglect of culture, blindness, impotence, slavery, consciousness of acting ill; remorse, shame, a desart and uncultivated, or a corrupt and diseased mind.

1. *To the laws of* knowledge.

GOODS.	EVILS.
Science, prudence, philosophy, arts, good sense, good taste, a refined imagination, an extensive understanding; knowledge of the beauty, order and wisdom of nature, and skill in imitating it by various arts.	Ignorance, error, prejudices, narrow views, dull or slow imagination, corrupt fancy, false taste; caprice and fantastical pursuits.

2. *To the laws of the sensible world and our union with it.*

Sensitive pleasures of various sorts; contemplation of nature or natural knowledge, pleasures of imagination, social intercourse about moral ideas, sensitive appetites to be governed.	Sensitive pains, subjection to the laws of matter and motion, false imaginations and pains arising from them. Unruly excessive sensual appetites and passions; uneasy sensations annexed to moral or intellectual desires, as well as to sensitive ones.

3. *To the laws of association of ideas and habits.*

Habitual knowledge, memory and acquaintance with nature, perfection in science, in arts, in every faculty, good taste, invention, avancement toward moral perfection, inward liberty, self-command, free agency.	Wrong associations, fantastic imaginations, bad habits, unimproved faculties, inward slavery, indolence and impotence.

4. *To the laws of our moral sense, reason and moral conduct.*

Reason, a moral sense, beauty, harmony, and consistency of manners, conscious virtue, or a sense of merit, greatness of mind, fortitude, magnanimity.	Depraved taste, remorse and self-condemnation, irregular self-tormenting, self-disapproving affections, lowness of mind, pusillanimity.

5. *To*

5. To the laws of intereſt and happineſs, or of private and public good.

GOODS.	EVILS.
Generous affections, well governed private affections, ſocial ones, their pleaſant effects and happy conſequences, the purſuit of private and public good, or virtue and intereſt the ſame.	Ungenerous, unſocial ſelfiſh affections, diſorderly deſires, and their unhappy effects and influences; private and public ill, or vice and miſery the ſame.

6. To the laws of ſociety, our ſocial make and our mutual dependence.

Social union, mutual dependencies, derived happineſs by communication and participation; confederacy to promote virtue, and the true elegance, grandeur and happineſs of ſociety.	Diſunion, tumult, diſorder, tyrany, rebellion, barbarity, ſlavery, public lowneſs and miſery.

7. To the law of religion.

True ideas of GOD and providence, true religion, its pleaſures, reſignation to the Deity, imitation of the Deity, conſciouſneſs of conformity to him, and of his favour and approbation.	Falſe ideas of GOD and providence, ſuperſtition, idolatry, blind zeal, dread of the Deity, ſenſe of diſconformity to him, and fear of his diſpleaſure.

This is a ſhort view of the principal appearances in the human ſyſtem. Now all the appearances reducible to thoſe laws muſt be good, the laws being good. And that they are ſuch is evident; for if the preceeding account of our frame, and the laws relative to it be true, it plainly and neceſſarily follows, 1. "That, in conſequence of them, we are made for a very conſiderable degree of happineſs and perfection of the moral ſort chiefly." And, 2. "That there is no affection,

All theſe phenomena are reducible to the excellent general laws already conſidered, which fit and qualify man for a noble end or happineſs.

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affection, disposition, power or faculty in our nature which merely produces evil; or which, on the contrary, does not produce very many great goods and no evils, but what are the effects of such a general prevalence of these laws, as makes our constitution a good whole, or adapted to a noble end". But if these conclusions be true, then are no effects in the human system evils absolutely considered; that is, with respect to the whole frame and constitution of human nature. In order to have a just notion of the government of the world, and of its Author, we need only ask ourselves, towards which kind of phenomena, the good or the opposite bad ones, the natural tendency of our powers and dispositions is? whether it is for the sake of the bad ones, which arise from their misuse or misguidance, that we are endowed with these powers and dispositions which constitute our frame; or for the sake of the goodones towards which these powers and dispositions naturally operate? Let us judge here as we do in analogous cases with regard to moral agents. Is one thought to have bestowed money, power, or any gift upon one which may be employed to good purposes, that they may be misapplied and abused to bad ones, unless we are previously certain of the malignity and wicked disposition and intention of the giver: but ought we not to form like judgments in like cases? But which is more, if we reflect that together with all our powers and dispositions, the Author of nature hath given us a moral sense, to what other purpose can we suppose our powers to be given in this manner, or so conjoined, but for the best use or the best end; since our moral reason and sense cannot be implanted in us for any other purpose, but to point and prompt us to the best use of all our powers, appetites and affections? For this moral sense is as naturally fitted for directing us right, and for no other end, as a helm is to guide and steer a ship.

Therefore there are no evil's absolutely considered arising from our frame. If we judge in this case, as we do in other like ones, we must conclude that all our powers are given us for a very useful and noble end.

Our moral sense cannot possibly be given us for any other reason but to guide us to the right use of all our

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How do we judge of any machine natural or artificial? Do we not say, it is fitted for that end to which it is propereſt to ſerve; or that to be applied to its moſt uſeful purpoſe, is its perfect and moſt natural ſtate? Thus we judge of plants, trees, ſhips, watches, and all ſorts of ſtructures, animate or inanimate. Why then ſhould we pronounce or judge (z) otherwiſe concerning man and the human ſyſtem? or can we do ſo without departing from all the received rules of judging of any thing; all the rules of judging either uſed in philoſophy or common life? Ought we not therefore to reaſon in this manner with regard to every law of our nature? as for inſtance, with regard to the law of knowledge; that muſt be owned to be a good law which is neceſſary to our being capable of ſcience, prudence, philoſophy, arts natural and moral, power, virtue and merit; tho' in conſequence of the ſame power we cannot but be capable of contracting prejudices, forming narrow views, and making falſe judgments; or tho' in conſequence of the very laws and eſtabliſhments that render knowledge progreſſive and dependent on ourſelves, and by which we have a certain ſphere of activity, power and dominion, errors, prejudices, wrong aſſociations, falſe judgments, and therefore bad choice, and unreaſonable purſuits cannot be otherwiſe avoidable by us, than by the right exerciſe of our underſtanding and reaſon to which we are prompted and directed in the only way we can be ſo conſiſtently with our own exerciſing and employing them; that is, by our delight in order, general laws, and the contemplation of public good. Or to give another inſtance, 2. With regard to the law of ſociety. That muſt be a good law with regard to the human ſyſtem, which binds and unites us together, by making our greateſt happineſs depend upon our uniting

Our whole frame is good. For all effects reducible to the law of knowledge,

and all effects reducible to the law of ſociety; or to any other of the laws of our nature above mentioned,

(z) This is the ancient way of reaſoning about man analogous to our way of reaſoning about all other conſtitutions natural or artificial. Inſtances of it have been already quoted from *Cicero* and others; and another ſhall be added immediately.

together

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together in a proper manner to promote that end; tho' in conſequence of that very law our greateſt happineſs cannot otherwiſe be acquired or attained than by right confederacy and union; and therefore many miſeries muſt ariſe from diſunion, and from uniting in an unfit or improper manner, ---and ſo on. --- For, in like manner, muſt we reaſon with reſpect to all the other laws of our nature that have been mentioned, and their phenomena or effects, which it is needleſs again to repeat. Now if this way of reaſoning be good, then is nature ſufficiently vindicated by the account that hath been given of the laws of our nature; for if it be good, then every effect concerning which we can reaſon in the manner as above, is ſufficiently explained and accounted for morally as well as phyſically; ſince it is thus reduced to an eſtabliſhment or general law and principle in nature, neceſſary to many excellent purpoſes, for which were not our nature fitted, it would not be ſo perfect as it is.

muſt be ſufficiently accounted for, if explication of phenomena hath any meaning at all.

But that the reaſoning is good, is evident, 1. Since it is that very way of reaſoning we admit in every other caſe to be good, and without admitting which natural philoſophy cannot advance one ſtep: for what does, or can natural philoſophy do, but reduce natural appearances to general laws, and ſhew the goodneſs of theſe laws. 2. But which is more, It muſt be true, in general, that no whole can be a good whole in any other ſenſe but this, that its parts, and all the references of its parts, with all the laws according to which theſe operate or are operated upon, are adjuſted to a very good end: Such a whole is a good whole in any proper or conceiveable ſenſe of a good whole. And therefore our ſtructure is ſuch.

For all the preceeding reaſonings about the fitneſs of laws go on in the ſame way that is admitted to be good in every other caſe.

In natural philoſophy in particular.

This account therefore of nature is ſtrictly philoſophical, or philoſophy and the explication of nature hath no meaning. We muſt admit it, or by parity of reaſon be obliged to give up with natural philoſophy, and ſay it does not ſufficiently explain or account

The preceeding account of human nature is therefore ſtrictly philoſophical

account for appearances by reducing them to good general laws; but that ſomething elſe muſt be done. Now what that *ſomething more* means no philoſopher has yet declared.

A recapitulation of it to prove this.

The caſe with regard to our conſtitution is briefly this. 'Tis impoſſible to make beings capable of attaining to any qualifications or improvements, and of being happy by ſo doing, otherwiſe than by providing them with the powers, faculties, affections, materials, and occaſions of attaining to them. And therefore, this being done, a being is duly fitted, qualified or furniſhed for a certain degree of perfection, and is in its kind of a perfect make, well deſerving its place in nature, which, without ſuch a kind, could not be full, coherent and riſe in due degree. To demand more to moral perfection than the neceſſary proviſion and furniture for ſuch perfection, is to demand in order to ſufficient proviſion and furniture, ſome thing more than ſufficient proviſion and furniture. It is to demand that moral attainments may be attainments without being attained, acquiſitions without being acquired (*a*). Wherefore our frame and make is ſufficiently vindicated, when it appears that we are, as has been ſhewn, excellently provided by nature for very great acquiſitions in knowledge, power, virtue and merit, and by that means in happineſs and perfection; if we ſet ourſelves to make a right uſe of our natural abilities, as

(*a*) Animi autem, & ejus animi partis, quæ princeps eſt, quæque mens nominatur, plures ſunt virtutes, ſed duo prima genera. unum earum, quæ ingenerantur ſuapte natura, appellanturque non voluntariæ: alterum earum, quæ in voluntate: poſitæ, magis proprio nomine appellari ſolent: quarum eſt excellens in animorum laude præſtantia. prioris generis eſt docilitas memoriæ: quæ ferè omnia appellantur uno ingenii nomine: eaſque virtutes qui habent, ingenioſi vocantur. alterum autem genus eſt magnarum, verarumque virtutum: quas appellamus voluntarias, ut prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, juſtitiam, & reliquas ejuſdem generis. *Cicero de finibus*, Lib. 5. No. 13.

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we are directed and excited to do by our natural inſtincts, affections or determinations. Natural endowments, properly ſpeaking, are not virtues or moral perfections; they are but the foundation, the capacity of and furniture for moral improvements, acquiſitions and virtues; the pre-requiſites to moral perfection and happineſs. But who dares ſay to himſelf, that he has it not in his power to attain to a very high degree of perfection? What man may attain to, we know from many examples in hiſtory and in preſent times; and who can look upon ſuch characters, and not feel that man may arrive at a truly noble degree of dignity and worth? They caſt us at a diſtance indeed, and upbraid us; but why? but becauſe we feel that it is in our power, if we would but earneſtly ſet about it, or if we are not ſadly wanting to ourſelves, even to do more than they?

That muſt be the natural end of a being (*b*), to the purſuit of which his natural powers are fitted, and the

(*b*) Eſt enim actio quædam corporis, quæ motus, & ſtatus naturæ congruentis tenet: in quibus ſi peccetur diſtortione, & depravatione quadam———contra naturam ſunt.———Itaque è contrario moderati, æquabileſque habitus, affectiones, uſuſque corporis, apta eſſe ad naturam videntur. Jam vero animus non eſſe ſolum, ſed etiam cujuſdem modi debet eſſe, ut & omneis parteis habeat incolumeis, & de virtutibus nulla deſit. Atqui in ſenſibus eſt ſua cujuſque virtus, ut ne quid impediat, quominus ſuo ſenſus quiſque munere fungatur in iis rebus, celeriter, expediteque percipiendis quæ ſubjectæ ſunt ſenſibus. Animi autem, &c. *Cicero*, Lib. 5. No. 12. Now it is in this ancient, and only true way of arguing we have proceeded, and therefore we may conclude with him, That man is truly ſuch as he paints him out to be. *De legibus*, Lib. 2. at the end. Nam qui ſe ipſe norit, primum aliquid ſentiet ſe habere divinum, ingeniumque in ſe ſuum, ſicut ſimulacrum aliquod, dedicatum putabit; tantoque munere deorum ſemper dignum aliquid & faciet, & ſentiet: &, cum ſe ipſe perſpexerit: totumque tentarit; intelliget, quemadmodum a natura ſubornatus in vitam venerit, quantaque inſtrumenta habeat ad obtinendam, adipiſcendamque ſapientiam: quoniam principio rerum omnium quaſi adumbratas intelligentias animo, ac mente conceperit: quibus illuſtratus, ſapientia duce, bonum virum, & ob eam ipſam cauſam cernat ſe beatum fore. Nam

the purſuit of which is his ſoundeſt, his pleaſanteſt ſtate. But ſo are we made with regard to moral perfection; the purſuit of it therefore is our natural, our healthful, our ſound or happy, as well as perfect ſtate. So that if the preceeding account of man be true, we may juſtly conclude, "That tho' the Author of nature, who hath filled his creation with all poſſible degrees of beauty, perfection and happineſs, hath made a ſpecies of beings lower than angels; yet man, who is this ſpecies, is crowned by him with *glory and honour*, and inveſted with a very large and noble ſphere of power and dominion." If the preceeding account of man be true, we are made for progreſs in virtue. And as any machine muſt be made for what it is made, tho' it cannot laſt forever, or whether it laſt but one day or a thouſand years; ſo man muſt be made for what he is made, whether he is to laſt but threeſcore years, or forever. But having now found for what end man is made while he exiſts, let us enquire what reaſon can determine

Concluſion concerning our nature. *N. B.* See in the notes a true picture of our nature, dignity, happineſs, and end, drawn by *Cicero*, and inferred from the ſame principles we have laid down in this eſſay. It remains therefore to be enquired how long man is likely to exiſt; or whether he is not deſigned for immortality.

Nam cum animus, cognitis, perceptiſque virtutibus, a corporis obſequio, indulgentiaque diſceſſerit, voluptatemque, ſicut labem aliquam decoris oppreſſerit, omnemque mortis, doloriſque timorem effugerit, ſocietatemque caritatis coierit cum ſuis omneiſque natura conjunctos, ſuos duxerit, cultumque deorum, & puram religionem ſuſceperit, & exacuerit illam, ut oculorum, ſic ingenii aciem, ad bona diligenda, & rejicienda contraria: quæ virtus ex providendo eſt appellata prudentia: quid eo dici, aut excogitari poterit beatius? Idemque cum cœlum, terras, maria, rerumque omnium naturam perſpexerit, eaque unde generata, quo recurrant, quando quo modo obitura, quid in iis mortale, & caducum, quid divinum, æternumque ſit, viderit ipſumque ea moderantem, & regentem pæne prehenderit, ſeſeque non unis circumdatum mœnibus, populares alicujus definiti loci, ſed civem totius mundi, quaſi unius urbis, agnoverit: in hac ille magnificentia rerum, atque in hoc conſpectu, & cognitione naturæ, dii immortales, quam ipſe ſe noſcet! Atque hæc omnia, quaſi fæpimento aliquo, vallabit diſſerendi ratione, veri & falſi judicio, ſcientia, & arte quadam intelligendi, quid quamque rem ſequatur, & quid ſit cuique contrarium. Cumque ſe ad civilem ſocietatem natum ſenſerit, non ſolum illa ſubtili diſputatione ſibi utendum

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mine with any probability concerning his duration; or whether there is not good ground to believe that he is made immortal, and consequently for eternal progress, in proportion to his care to improve his moral faculties. Which is the point proposed to be proved by this enquiry.

But before we proceed, it is proper to oppose to the preceeding account of man, such a state of mankind as it is reasonable to suppose must have been the product of a malignant Creator, who had no sense of, nor regard for virtue, or the good and perfection of moral beings.

But before we proceed to that, in order, by a kind of contrast, to give further light to the preceeding reasonings concerning man, let us endeavour to imagine to ourselves an idea of what the workmanship of a malicious creator must have been, in consequence of his malign disposition; for certainly we shall find that human nature must have been the very reverse of what it now is, had it been formed by a malicious Creator, or with vicious and ungenerous intention. "Would we allow room, (says an excellent author) to our invention to conceive what sort of mechanism, what constitution of senses or affections a malicious, powerful being must have formed, we should soon see how few evidences there are for any such apprehensions of the Author of this world. Our mechanism, as far as ever we have yet dis-

tendum putabit, sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione, qua regat populos, qua stabiliat leges, qua castiget improbos, qua tueatur bonos, qua laudet claros viros: qua præcepta salutis, & laudes apte ad persuadendum edat suis civibus: qua hortari ad decus, revocare a flagitio, consulari possit afflictos: fataque, & consulta fortium, & sapientum, cum *improborum ignominia*, sempiternis monumentis prodire. Quæ cum tot res, tantæque sint, quæ inesse in homine perspiciantur ab iis, qui seipsi velint nosse, earum parens est, educatrixque sapientia. This is a true picture of human nature, and of our duties. And truly had we not been made by an infinitely wise and good being, man must have been quite the reverse; such an animal, as *Ulysses*'s men were metamorphosed into by *Circes* in *Homer*, the sum of which fiction amounts briefly to this in *Horace*'s words.

Sirenum voces, & Circes pocula nosti:
Quæ si cum sociis stultus cupidusque bibisset;
Sub dominâ meretrice fuisset turpis & excors,
Vixisset canis immundus, vel amica luto sus.
Epist. lib. I. Epist. 2.

covered,

covered, is wholly contrived for good, no cruel device, no art or contrivance to produce evil, no ſuch mark or ſcope ſeems even to be aimed at: But how eaſy had it been to have even contrived ſome neceſſary engines of miſery without any advantage, ſome member of no uſe, but to be matter of torment: Senſes incapable of bearing ſurrounding objects without pain, eyes pierced with the light, a pallat offended with the fruits of the earth; a ſkin as tender as the coats of the eye, and yet ſome more furious pain forcing us to bear theſe torments: Human ſociety might have been made as the company of enemies, and yet a perpetual more violent fear might have forced us to bear it. Malice, rancour, diſtruſt might have been our natural temper: our honour and ſelf-approbation might have depended upon injuries, and the torments of others have been made our delight, which yet we could not have enjoyed through perpetual fear. Many ſuch contrivances we may eaſily conceive, whereby an evil mind could have gratified his malice by our miſery; but how unlike are they all to the ſtructure and deſign of the mechaniſm of this world, to the mechaniſm and ſtructure of our minds in particular? ‖

If we purſue this thought a little further, we ſhall immediately perceive, that a malignant Author would have made our frame and conſtitution quite the reverſe of what it is. All our ſenſes would have been made ſo many avenues to pain alone, and inevitably ſuch. Every increaſe of our underſtanding would have been tormentful: and we would have been made dependent one upon another, not for our good, but merely for our ſuffering and torture. Every pain would have been much keener and intenſer, and the effects of laws which would have produced very little if any good. Laws would not have been made general for the greater good, but in order to bring about greater miſery in the

‖ See Mr. *Hutcheſon on the paſſions*, whoſe words theſe are.

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ſum of things, and no pleaſure would have been intended but for a decoyer and ſeducer into pain.

In fine, let us run over in our minds all the laws of our frame which have been mentioned, and we ſhall plainly ſee that had we been contrived by a malicious Author for evil, not one of them would have taken place, but on the contrary their oppoſites: knowledge would have been equally neceſſary and painful; equally difficult and tormenting, and yet indiſpenſably neceſſary; we would not have been allured to it by the pleaſure of truth, nor fitted for it by a ſenſe of order and a complacency in analogies and general laws. And it would have been impoſſible for us ever to have attained to facility, readineſs and perfection in arts, ſciences, or practices by frequent acts; but repeated exerciſes would have been loſt labour, and our toil would always have been to begin again. Inſtead of a moral ſenſe, we would have had an immoral one; or we would have approved good affections, and yet have ſuffered by them, and not virtue but vice would have been private intereſt, that ſo men might not be otherwiſe the ſame kind, than as they were impelled and fitted by their paſſions and powers more particularly to work one another's miſery. No form of ſociety would have tended to produce perfection and happineſs; or no other combinations and confederacies would have been poſſible, but thoſe that reſult in diſorder, ruin and miſery. All nature would have filled us with horror and dread; we would not only have hated one another, but have hated ourſelves and our being; and yet we ſhould not have been able to put an end to it.

Our frame and conſtitution is therefore an infringible argument of the wiſdom, benevolence, and excellent moral diſpoſition of the Author of our nature, and of the generous adminiſtration that prevails over all his works. We are indeed the image of an all-perfect Creator; ſince tho' there be no reaſon to think that we hold the higheſt rank in the ſcale

cale of created intelligence, yet we are endowed with very noble powers, and are placed in an excellent ituation for their improvement to a very high pitch of perfection and happineſs. And thus, "are crowned with glory and honour, tho' we be lower than the angels." CHAP. IX.

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IT now remains to enquire what may be fairly and juſtly concluded from human nature, and the preſent conſtitution of things concerning death or the diſſolution of our bodily frame? In order to determine which queſtion, we need only ſtate the phenomenon in a true light. And thus it ſtands. "We are by nature excellently equipped and furniſhed for attaining to a very conſiderable degree of moral perfection, or of knowledge and virtue by the due culture of our natural endowments; and are placed in a very proper ſituation for that effect, even by having relation to, and communion with the ſenſible world by means of our bodies: but our bodies are made liable to diſſolution: they are not made to endure for ever; but muſt wear out, and may be deſtroyed while they are yet ſound and vigorous, by different kinds of violence, in conſequence of their ſtructure and ſubjection to the laws of matter and motion." This is the truth of the caſe. What judgment then is it reaſonable to form of this phenomenon, or of this ſtate and tendency of things with regard to mankind?

Let us now enquire what judgment ought to be formed concerning death.

The phenomenon fairly ſtated.

Futurity (*c*) is wiſely hid from us; it is not fit that infants ſhould know whether they are to live to

Futurity is wiſely hid from us.

(*c*) See *Cicero de divinatione*, Lib. 2. No. 9. Atque ego ne utilem quidem arbitror eſſe nobis futurarum rerum ſcientiam. Quæ enim vita fuiſſet Priamo, ſi ab adoleſcentia ſciſſet, quos eventus ſenectutis eſſet habiturus? &c.

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Prudens futuri temporis exitum,
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus.

Or as our own Poet has it,

Heav'n from all creatures hides the book of fate,
All but the page prescrib'd, their present state,
From brutes what men, from men what spirits know,
Or who could suffer being here below?
Oh! blindness to the future! kindly giv'n,
That each may fill the circle mark'd by heav'n.
Essay on man, Epist. 1.

We know, or may know enough of the settled order and succession of things for the regulation of our conduct, that is, for the common exigencies of natural life, and for avoiding the bad consequences of folly and vice, and reaping the good fruits of prudence and virtue; and that, it is evident, is all the foresight which is convenient, or can be pleasant to us, and therefore our duty and business is as the Poet expresses it.

——— *Quod adest memento*
Componere æquus.

Now for the same wise reasons that future events in this present life are hid from us, the particular events which are to happen to us after death; that is, the various scenes or changes of being we may be intended to pass through after leaving this state, are likewise beyond our forecast. But tho' our future state cannot be fully foreseen by us, because such knowledge would neither be agreeable nor convenient for us; yet

yet from the preſent ſtate, we may infer very probably that death is not a total diſſolution of our moral powers and their acquirements, but that theſe do ſurvive our bodies. Becauſe, 1. The diſſolution of our bodies is no more than putting an end to our communication with the ſenſible world, or to one kind of ideas we now receive from without, and the order in which they are conveyed into our minds; and therefore, there can be no reaſon to infer from hence the total diſſolution of all powers. 2. Becauſe this ſtate is but our entrance on life, and having all the appearances of a proper firſt ſtate of enjoyment, or rather of trial and diſcipline, for rational beings; it is natural to conclude, that it is but our firſt ſtate of probation, and not the whole of our exiſtence. 3. Becauſe the ideas of wiſdom and good order, which are natural to the human mind, or to which we are led by the conſideration of the preſent ſtate of things wherever we caſt our eyes; and in the perſwaſion of the prevalence of which throughout the univerſal ſyſtem, we muſt be the more confirmed, the more we examine nature, or the fuller view we are able to take of it: All theſe conſiderations give us good ground to hope, that beings endowed with ſuch powers as men are, which may ſurvive one method of enjoyment and exerciſe, were not made to be wilfully deſtroyed; or are not ſo totally ſubjected to the laws of matter and motion, that they cannot ſubſiſt any longer than theſe laws take place. We may indeed fairly put the iſſue of the queſtion about our future exiſtence upon this footing. "Whether it be more probable, that is, more analogous and conſiſtent with the preceeding account of our make to imagine that we are made with moral powers, merely for the entertainments and exerciſes which we are capable of receiving from a ſenſible world by our bodies for the ſhort while they only can laſt; or that it is but our firſt ſtate of trial, and to be ſucceeded by another ſuch exiſtence as good order and wiſdom

Yet we have reaſon to infer that death is not a diſſolution of our moral powers.

It is not analogous to our make to ſuppoſe that it is.

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in the whole requires?" For ſurely, if in what we have ſeen, by enquiring ſtrictly into our conſtitution, nothing but good order and perfect contrivance and harmony appear, there can be no reaſon to apprehend that diſorder, far leſs, that cruel deſtruction, or wilful annihilation, ever can happen under ſuch a wiſe and benevolent adminiſtration, as the preſent frame of things ſtrongly and clearly beſpeaks.

It is proper to conſider this matter more fully.

But in order to ſet an affair, of ſuch conſequence to the quiet and ſatisfaction of every thinking perſon, in a true light, I would offer the following obſervations, which are but ſo many corollaries evidently reſulting from the account that hath been given of human nature, and of the general laws to which all the effects and appearances belonging to it are reducible.

Our preſent connexion with a ſenſible world by means of our bodies, is arbitrary, not neceſſary.

I. We have a thinking part that receives our ſenſible ideas from without, or upon which they are impreſſed, according to certain laws. It is not, as ancient philoſophers (*b*) have ſaid, the eyes, or the ears

(*d*) The chief arguments from which the ancients inferred the immortality of the ſoul ſhall be taken notice of, becauſe ſome have ſaid, no good arguments are to be found among them, to render it ſo much as probable. The firſt was, univerſal conſent: Sed ut Deos eſſe natura opinamur, qualeſque ſint, ratione cognoſcimus: ſic permanere animos arbitramur conſenſu nationum omnium: qua in ſede maneant, qualeſque ſint, ratione diſcendum eſt. Cujus ignoratio finxit inferos, &c. Enim autem in re conſenſio omnium gentium, lex naturæ putanda eſt. *Tuſc. Quæſt.* Lib. I. No. 16.

2. The ſecond was, that our connexion with a ſenſible world, by means of our bodily organization, is not neceſſary, but arbitrary; and that our thinking part being totally or eſſentially diſtinct from our body, may ſurvive it, and cannot otherwiſe periſh with it, than by the will of our Creator that it ſhall. "Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quæ videmus. Neque enim eſt ullus ſenſus in corpore, ſed, ut non ſolum phyſici docent, verum etiam medici, qui iſta aperta, & patefacta viderunt, viæ quaſi quædam ſunt ad oculos, ad aureis, ad nareis à ſede animi

ears, or any of our outward ſenſes (properly ſpeaking) which perceive: theſe are only certain methods CHAP. IX.

animi perforatæ. *Itaque ſæpe, aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris & oculis, & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus:* ut facile intelligi poſſit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas parteis, quæ quaſi feneſtræ ſunt animi: quibus tamen ſentire nihil queat mens, niſi id agat, & adſit. Quid, quod eadem mente res diſſimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, ſaporem, calorem, odorem, ſonum? quæ numquam quinque nuntiis animus cognoſceret, niſi ad eum omnia referrentur, & is omnium judex ſolus eſſet.——Hæc reputent iſti, qui negant, animum ſine corpore ſe intelligere poſſe. Videbunt quem in ipſo corpore intelligant. Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obſcurior, qualis animus in corpore ſit, tanquam alienæ domui, quam qualis, cum exierit, & in liberum cœlum, quaſi domum ſuam venerit. ——Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri poteſt: nihil enim eſt in animis mixtum, atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum, atque fictum eſſe videatur——His enim in naturis nihil ineſt, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod & præterita teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti poſſit præſentia: quæ ſola divina ſunt. Nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire poſſint, niſi a Deo. Singularis eſt igitur quædam natura atque vis animi ſejuncta ab his uſitatis, notiſque naturis. Ita quidquid eſt illud, quod ſentit, quod ſapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleſte & divinum eſt, ob eamque rem æternum ſit neceſſe eſt. Nec verò deus ipſe, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi poteſt, niſi mens ſoluta quædam, & libera, ſegregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia ſentiens & movens, ipſaque prædita motu ſempiterno.

3. We can ſeparate our minds from our bodies when we will, in a certain ſenſe. Tota enim philoſophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis eſt. Nam quid aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, id eſt, a corpore, cum a re familiari, quæ eſt miniſtra, & famula corporis, cum a rep. cum a negotio omni ſevocamus animum? quid, inquam, tum agimus, niſi animum ad ſeipſum advocamus, ſecum eſſe cogimus, maximeque a corpore abducimus? ſecernere autem a corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud eſt, quam emori diſcere.

4. Their principal arguments were taken from the dignity, the excellent moral powers of our minds, many deſcriptions of which have been quoted from them. See what is ſaid of them *Tuſc. quæſt.* Lib. I. No. 25, & deinceps. With which arguments were joined, our natural ſenſe and deſire of immortality, our care about futurity, love of glory, and natural pleaſure in expanding the mind in the contemplation of eternity. *Cicero, ibidem,* and in the *Somnio Scipionis.*

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or orders, according to which, certain ſenſations are produced in us. Our thinking part therefore, which is properly ourſelf, is abſolutely diſtinct from all theſe ſenſations which it receives from without. And what follows from thence, but that there can be no natural or neceſſary connexion between the ſubſiſtence of our thinking part, and its having its preſent ſenſations from without. But if this be true, then may it not only ſurvive the prevalence of the order in which our preſent ſenſations are conveyed to us; but it cannot otherwiſe periſh, when that order ceaſes to take place, than in conſequence of a poſitive appointment of nature that our minds ſhould not ſurvive ſuch an order. I need not dwell long upon this head, ſince it is owned by all philoſophers that our preſent communication with a ſenſible world, according to the laws of which ſenſible ideas are produced in our minds, is but an arbitrary connexion. For if this be true, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that our minds might have exiſted without any ſuch communication, and may ſubſiſt when it no longer takes place. Nay, it muſt follow, that as the preſent connexion between our thinking part and a ſenſible world, by means of our bodily organization, is but an arbitrary connexion; ſo if we are totally deſtroyed when our communication with a ſenſible world by means of our bodies is at an end, that muſt likewiſe be the effect of as poſitive and arbitrary an inſtitution, as our preſent connexion with a ſenſible world is. But what reaſon is there to fear ſuch a deſtroying will or humour in nature?

We may therefore ſurvive ſuch a connexion.

Our periſhing totally with it, muſt be the effect of an arbitrary appointment that it ſhall be ſo.

There is no reaſon to apprehend ſuch an annihilating or deſtroying humour in nature.

II. The deſtruction of material beings cannot properly be called deſtruction, ſince exiſtence is loſt upon matter, conſidered by itſelf as an unperceiving ſubſtance; and the end of its creation can be nothing elſe but its being perceived by ſome thinking beings. When matter therefore is ſaid to be deſtroyed, all that can be ſaid to be done is, that perceiving beings

ings have loſt a certain claſs or order of perceptions, conveyed unto them from without, according to certain laws, which now no longer take place. The rules of analogous reaſoning ſurely do not permit us to infer from the moſt evident ſymptoms of the deſtruction of unperceiving ſubſtances, the total deſtruction of perceiving beings, ſince theſe latter are the only ones to whom exiſtence can really be any benefit or bleſſing? But which is more, when we narrowly examine what we call the deſtruction of matter, we evidently perceive that it is not properly deſtruction, but change of form. And certainly, if there really be no deſtruction at all, even of what is not benefited by exiſtence, there can be no ground to apprehend the deſtruction of any being that is. The true ſtate of the caſe, with regard to matter, as far as we can obſerve its changes, is,

The deſtruction of matter is not properly deſtruction.

Wherefore the deſtruction of a perceiving being cannot be inferred from the deſtruction of matter.

Look round our world: behold the chain of love
Combining all below, and all above.
See, plaſtic nature working to this end,
The ſingle atoms each to other tend,
Attract, attracted to, the next in place,
Form'd and impell'd, its neighbour to embrace.
See matter next, with various life endu'd,
Preſs to one centre ſtill, the gen'ral good.
See dying vegetables life ſuſtain,
See life diſſolving vegetate again:
All forms that periſh other forms ſupply,
By turns they catch the vital breath, and die.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 3.

Now if we ought and muſt reaſon from analogy, when we ſee no examples in nature of deſtruction, but merely of change, it is only change, and not deſtruction that can be inferred. It is only from a deſtroying humour prevailing viſibly in nature, that the deſtruction of perceiving beings can be inferred. And therefore if we do not find plain ſymptoms of a

But there is no ground to think any particle of matter is deſtroyed: what we call ſo, is really but change of form.

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A Fortiori there is no reason to think any perceiving being is destroyed.

a destroying temper in nature; or of delight, not in frugality and preservation, but in waste, and wilful annihilation, we can have no reason to suspect nature to be a destroyer of moral beings and powers? But whence can we have any ground to entertain such a cruel and gloomy idea of its course and tendency; since it is plain, even unconscious matter, in its seeming dissolution, is not destroyed, but only changed?

All that can be inferred from death is, that a particular order in which certain sensations are now conveyed into our minds, then ceases.

III. In reality, all that can be said to be done, when our bodies are dissolved by death is, that a certain method by which our minds are now affected with sensations and passions, ceases to take place. But can the total destruction of moral powers and beings be inferred from the ceasing of one certain method of being affected, or of receiving sensations from without? According to such a way of arguing, no one sense can be lost; but by parity of reason it might be said, the being who hath lost it can no longer exist. For it would be in vain to say, the present question is not about the dissolution of one organ, but of all our organs; for all of them are as distinct from us, that is, from our thinking part, as any one of them; nay, if any one of them be distinct from it, every one of them must be distinct from it, and consequently all of them together must be different from it. Further, experience tells us, that when all the senses cease to convey sensations from without, imagination, memory and reason can operate, and afford sufficient entertainment and employment to our mind. This happens frequently, not only in sleep, when all the organs of sense are fast locked up; but likewise in serious study, when the mind is intent on the search of truth and knowledge, or conversing with itself about its own actions and duties. How therefore can the destruction of all our moral powers, or of our thinking part, be justly inferred, merely from our ceasing to have

Whence a destruction of all thinking powers cannot be deduced.

have communication by our outward organs with a material world? Does any philoſopher doubt that certain beings have or may have ideas from without, to which we are utter ſtrangers? Or will any philoſopher ſay, it is impoſſible even for us to have ideas conveyed to us from without, which we have never yet perceived, and in a quite different way and order from that in which our preſent ideas of ſenſe are conveyed to us? How then can the total ceſſation of one way of conveying ideas into the mind from without, prove the total ceſſation of memory, imagination, reaſon, and other moral powers, and the abſolute annihilation of moral beings! Every preſumption which is not founded upon likeneſs or parity, is allowed in all caſes to have no foundation; but what likeneſs or parity is there, between death, whatever view we take of it, and our total annihilation? Is there any likeneſs or parity between the deſtruction of unperceived things not benefited by exiſtence, and perceiving beings, who alone can be ſaid properly to exiſt, becauſe they alone can properly be ſaid to enjoy? Or is there any likeneſs, any parity between the conſtant preſervation of inanimate ſubſtances, in ſuch a manner that not one particle of matter is loſt, but only changes its form, and the total, abſolute deſtruction of perceiving beings? Is there any likeneſs or parity between the ceſſation of one manner of being affected with ſenſations, and the total ceſſation of all conveyance of ideas into minds from without? Or finally, is there any likeneſs or parity between the total ceſſation of all conveyance of ſenſible ideas from without, and the total deſtruction of all higher and nobler powers of the intellectual and moral kind?

There is no likeneſs between death, and total deſtruction of our being; whatever view we take of it.

IV. That

The objections of *Pliny* and *Lucretius* against immortality, absurdly suppose that matter can think.

IV. That rant of *Pliny* the elder (*e*), and of *Lucretius* before him, in which they affect to croud a great many absurdities together, as resulting from or included in the supposition of our existence after death, does itself terminate in a very glaring contradiction to all sense and reason: for it proceeds upon the supposition of a necessary, physical connexion between the existence of the present material world to us, and the existence of our thinking part. Our bodies and our minds do indeed grow up together, as it is very fit mates should; and when the one suffers in any degree, the other sympathizes with a most tender fellow-feeling, insomuch that when

(*e*) *Pliny* in his *Natural history*, and *Lucretius*, Lib. III.

Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore & una
Crescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem, &c.

To which it is sufficient to oppose one excellent passage of *Cicero*, which is so just an account of human nature, and of what may be inferred from it concerning futurity, that I cannot chuse but add it to what hath been already quoted, to shew how just notions they had of religion and virtue, of mankind, and the Author of nature. Quid multa? sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantæ scientiæ, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam, quæ res eas contineat, esse mortalem: —— Et, cum simplex animi natura sit, neque haberet in se quidquam admistum dispar sui, atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi: quod si non possit, non posse interire. *Cicero de senectute*, No. 21. These arguments do certainly amount to a very great degree of probability, and must have had a very persuasive influence on minds so well disposed, as to look upon those who taught the mortality of our souls to be *Minuti Philosophi*, because they had pleasure in promoting a doctrine so opposite to the natural greatness of the human mind, and tending to cramp it most miserably; and who were so inclinable to entertain the other chearful and quickening belief, that they could say with *Cicero*, (ibidem) Quod si in hoc erro, *animos hominum immortaleis esse credam*, lubenter erro: nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo. Sin mortuus (ut quidam minuti philosophi censent) nihil sentiam: non vereor, ne hunc errorem meum mortui philosophi irrideant.

the

the body is heavily oppreſſed and diſordered, the mind is bowed down, and cannot raiſe itſelf to its higheſt exerciſes. But all this only proves that in this preſent ſtate, our minds and bodies are united together in the cloſeſt and moſt intimate manner: nay, properly ſpeaking, it only proves, that in this preſent ſtate our minds are variouſly affected by the various operations of the laws of matter and motion, according to a certain fixed order. For it is our mind, or thinking part, which perceives, or which is touched and affected: matter or body cannot perceive or feel. Body, or union with body and matter, can, therefore, only mean a certain order or method, according to which the mind is affected. And therefore to ſay, that mind muſt ceaſe to exiſt when body ceaſes, is indeed to ſay, that mind muſt neceſſarily ceaſe to exiſt, when one way of its being affected no longer takes place: or it is to ſay, that mind itſelf is not diſtinct from ſome of its perceptions, and the order in which theſe are conveyed to it; both which aſſertions are equally abſurd.

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They only prove a preſent dependence of our body and mind, according to certain laws of nature.

To ſay with the above-mentioned authors, "What probability is there, that we begin to live when we periſh; that we become *gods*, or at leaſt *demi-gods*, in compariſon of our preſent ſtate, when we ceaſe to be; or that we are deſtroyed in order to exiſt in a more perfect manner?" All this is manifeſtly begging the queſtion, and taking it as granted that our minds diſſolve with our bodies, and conſequently, that our thinking part is nothing diſtinct from its ſenſible perceptions. But who is not conſcious that the principle in him which receives ideas from without, is totally diſtinct from theſe paſſive impreſſions? Or can any philoſopher aſſert ſo glaring an abſurdity, as to ſay, paſſive, unperceiving matter can any otherwiſe affect a thinking being, than by means of laws appointing a connexion between its operations; or, more properly ſpeaking, operations produced upon it, and certain ſenſations or paſſions

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passions in minds. But all the idle stuff about matter's acting has been too long ago exploded by philosophers to be now refuted.

This is a very good first state for such a progressive being as man.

V. Let us therefore proceed to such conclusions, as a complete view of our present frame and state suggests, with regard to our surviving the dissolution of our bodies, or the present arbitrary union, by means of our bodies, with a sensible world. Now from what has been proved to be really our constitution, it is plain that we set out with very good furniture for making considerable progress in knowledge and virtue: our very senses are chiefly given us in order to be instruments and means of virtuous exercises in this present state: what therefore is the natural language resulting from such a frame, but that we are made for continual progress in moral perfection, in proportion to our culture, and our situation for culture, in whatever state or circumstances we may be placed? For because death happens, nothing more can be said on that account, than, "That there is a way at present by which our thinking part is affected, according to certain laws, which ceases upon the dissolution of our organical frame by death."

A first state cannot last always, but must give way to another.

It cannot be said, merely on that account, that a Being fitted for moral progress, cannot make progress after such a way of being affected from without no more takes place. The more natural conclusion is, that such a way of being affected ceasing, Beings fitted for progress shall be placed in new circumstances of progress and improvement. A progressive being cannot be made to continue always in the same state; and therefore a being so made has no reason to imagine its first state shall be its only state; or to conclude any thing else, when its first state ceases, than that, as a first state ought not to be, nor cannot indeed in the nature of things be the only state of progressive beings; so accordingly, it now goes to another, proper to succeed to its first.

This

This is certainly the concluſion death leads us to, if we take a juſt view of our moral make; moral powers being evidently made for progreſs, and therefore not for one ſtate: otherwiſe we muſt ſay, that moral powers, which in themſelves look to be deſigned and fit for perpetual cultivation and improvement, muſt neceſſarily ceaſe to be, becauſe, though they muſt have a firſt ſtate, and are not made always to continue in one ſtate, but for progreſſion, yet this ſtate ceaſes to be; which is in effect to ſay, that becauſe our firſt ſtate ceaſes, we are not likely to have another, though it muſt ceaſe, becauſe it is but a firſt. In other words, it is to argue thus; we muſt have a firſt ſtate, being progreſſive beings, which ſtate can only be a firſt ſtate; yet if it ceaſes, we muſt ceaſe to be. Than which nothing can be more abſurd.

It is therefore reaſonable to think that this ſtate only ceaſes, as the firſt ſtate of a progreſſive being ought to do.

It is true, our preſent ſtate is diſſolved with concomitant pains; but what follows from thence? but that it is diſſolved in conſequence of certain laws of matter and motion, which muſt, till they have no longer any influence upon us, variouſly affect us with pains and pleaſures: it only follows from hence, that the diſſolution comes about analogouſly to, or conſiſtently with the general laws, according to which we are affected with pain or pleaſure from without. Theſe pains are no more a proof of the diſſolution of the mind, than any other pains proceeding from the ſame laws, which the mind ſurvives. And our moral fabric plainly beſpeaks only a temporary connexion with matter, as a proper firſt ſtate, for their formation, exerciſe and improvement. For even during this connexion, our ſenſible appetites and gratifications are, according to our fabric, made to ſubmit to our moral powers, in ſuch a manner that unleſs they are directed and governed by them, they afford no true happineſs and enjoyment to us; but rather contrariwiſe bring pain and miſery

That our death is attended with pain, only proves that the laws of union with body continue to operate till the union is quite diſſolved.

CHAP. IX. misery upon us. To illustrate this reasoning more fully, let us consider,

There is a plain reason why there should be such a being as man, or a being with such moral powers united with body.

VI. There is an evident reason why, in the scale of existence, there should be such a being as man, that is, a moral being connected for a while with a material world; since were there no such being in the world, there would be a great void in nature: such a kind of being is absolutely necessary in the gradation of life and perfection, which makes the riches, the plenitude of nature; because without such a being, nature would not be full and coherent. But there is no reason, on the other hand, why a being made for progress, should always continue in the same state: nay, it is repugnant to the very nature of a progressive being, or a being made for progress toward perfection proportionably to the culture of its powers, that such a being should always continue in that situation which is its beginning or first state. This present condition of mankind, which is requisite in its place to the fullness and consistence of nature, affords us in our first beginning excellent materials and means of improvement in knowledge and virtue, considered as a beginning. And therefore the question is, why it ought not to be considered merely as a beginning? If there is an end to it, as there plainly is by death, what does that prove, but that a beginning or first state of progressive powers does not always last; or that, as it ought not to last, so neither does it? An end to a first state can prove no more, but that it is a first state; its further look must be inferred from the nature of the powers themselves, which make this first state; and therefore it having been found that our powers, sensitive and moral, as they are conjoined in our frame, make an excellent first state, for our formation and improvement in moral perfection; which state is by no means the only state our thinking part, with all its moral powers, can subsist in; it is reasonable

But there is no reason to think such an union should always continue, or be the only state in which our moral powers are placed.

sonable to conclude, since this, considered only as a first state, is a very good and proper one, that it is only such. In that view, all is orderly and consonant to the general course and analogy of nature, so far as we can pry into it; and the opposite notion is quite repugnant to the order, beauty and wise administration every where discernible in nature. And therefore this must be the true view of our present state, "That it is indeed our first, which must cease, but not the whole of our existence." CHAP. IX.

VII. But in the next place, as we see a plain reason why the present condition of mankind should take place in nature, which is so fit a state for us to be formed in, or rather to form ourselves in, to a very high degree of perfection, since without such a being as man, nature would not be full and coherent; so we may see a very plain reason, why this state does not always continue: not only a moral reason, why, being a beginning state, it should not continue; but a physical reason why it cannot last always. The existence, that is, the perception of a sensible world, is necessary to the fullness and riches of nature, and the perfection of its works. But this beautiful and useful sensible world, with which we have now communication by means of our bodily organization, must wear out, it cannot last for ever: such is the nature and constitution of matter, or such is the essential law of nature, with regard to all matter that falls within our sense or observation, that it, like artificial machines, is wasted by attrition; all the springs in it decay, become weak, and unable to perform their functions, and at last are quite worn out: nay, this happens to artificial machines, because they are material ones. Such then is the nature of bodies; such is the nature of matter in general. Wherefore the present constitution of our mundan system cannot hold out for ever, its powers will fail, it will at last be no longer

And it is evident that union with body and a material world cannot always last.

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This is a plain consequence of the properties of body or matter.

longer able to produce its ends. Or, which is the same thing to us, to all intents and purposes, since the sensible world to us, is the sensible world we are affected by, perceive, and have commerce with; our bodies, by which we have communication with a material world, as they naturally grow up to perfection, so they as naturally decline and dwindle away: nor can we have bodies that must not so waste and consume, composed of any matter we know; or endued with the properties our bodies must necessarily be, to have correspondence with the matter we are acquainted with; since all the matter we know is evidently alterable in its form and texture, by the same laws which render it of any use to us. This all philosophers are agreed in, and therefore we need not insist longer upon it.

It is owned by all philosophers.

But what follows from this, when we compare our moral powers with this system of matter with which we are now united, which thus perishes; whereas they are of an unperishing nature, and capable of eternal improvement, without any specific alteration of their present make: what follows from thence, but that we are but for a time, and in our beginning state, united with what, though it cannot last for ever, yet while it lasts; or, which is the same thing to us, while our correspondence with it lasts, affords to our moral powers in their first beginnings, very proper objects to exert themselves about; very proper means and occasions for their improvement. This, certainly, is what alone can be rationally inferred from the complex view of our frame, especially if we add to this,

Hence it is reasonable to conclude, that our moral powers, naturally capable of lasting for ever without wearing out, are only united for a time with bodies, in order to the fulness of nature, and because it is a very proper first state for our powers to be formed and improved in.

VIII. That in consequence of the frame of our earth, and the nature of our present united state, all mankind cannot live together on earth; but as it now happens, one generation must make room for another; because the earth would soon be overpeopled, if it were not inhabited as it is, by successions.

ons. I need not tell thoſe who have the ſmalleſt nĉture of natural philoſophy, that in order to make ır earth more capacious, or a proper habitation ɔr a much greater number of inhabitants of various inds than it now is, that its magnitude muſt be in- ·eaſed, and conſequently the whole conſtitution of ır mundan ſyſtem, if not of all things that exiſt, ıuſt be changed: for if the proportions of the ıagnitudes of the bodies which compoſe it be al- ·red, their diſtances, orbits, attractions, and in ne word, all the laws relative to them, muſt be ıanged: and therefore to demand ſuch an altera- on with regard to our earth, is in reality to deſire, ıere were no ſuch ſyſtem in nature as our mun- an one, but that its ſpace were entirely void, or lled with another ſyſtem of a different texture: hich will be allowed to be a demand that is phyſi- ılly abſurd; ſince, as far as we can carry our re- ·arches, or as analogy can lead us to form any no- on of things, nature is full and coherent as it is, ıd cannot be ſo if any change were made. But nce it is ſo that mankind muſt occupy the earth by ıcceſſive generations, and that the earth which is fit and proper part of our mundan ſyſtem; which ı its ſpace is the propereſt ſyſtem with regard to the hole of nature: what follows from this, according ɔ the rules of analogical reaſoning, but that though ne generation of men gives place to another, and ıuſt do ſo, and things are likely to continue ſo, hile the earth continues to be a fit habitation for hem, which it is likely to be while the laws of our nundan ſyſtem are able to hold it together in tole- ·able order; yet our mundan ſyſtem, and conſe- quently our earth, and all ſucceſſions of its inhabi- ants, muſt have an end at laſt, and ſhall be ſuc- ·eeded by another ſyſtem, formed perhaps out of he ruins of this, which ſhall be in its place and or- ·er of ſucceſſion, as beautifully, regularly, and be- ıeficially conſtituted, as this preſent one is. This is indeed,

Men muſt live upon earth by ſucceſſive generations.

Our earth could not be rendered more capacious, without altering our whole mundan ſyſtem, and in all likelihood the whole univerſe.

When our mundan ſyſtem is able to hold out no longer, there is reaſon from analogy to think it ſhall be ſucceeded by another, proper to ſucceed to it, perhaps riſing out of its ruins.

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indeed, what preſent order, and the analogy of things naturally lead us to conceive: for why ſhould we apprehend nature to be exhauſted by the preſent production? What reaſon have we to believe its fecundity ſo limited and ſcanty? Or if this be not its only birth, why ſhould we imagine that its future ones ſhall be leſs regular, ſhapely, and ſound? But theſe things I only mention, to ſhew how analogy leads us to think of nature in general, or with regard to its general order of production, that we may the better feel the force of the preſumptions which ariſe from analogy, with regard to ourſelves.

But if ſo, we have yet better reaſon to think this is but our firſt ſtate, which ſhall be ſucceeded by one very proper to follow it.

For if we have reaſon to think ſo of nature in general, as hath been ſuggeſted, why ought we not to think of nature with regard to ourſelves in like manner? What reaſon have we to fear that the parent who produced us, hath provided ſo liberally for us, and ſet us ſo well at preſent, cannot provide another habitation for us, when this fails, as well fitted to us as a ſecond ſtate, as this is as a firſt ſtate? Hath nature, which hath produced our moral powers, and ſuch variety of entertainment and employment for them, no further power, no further fertility? Is it quite drained, is it quite unable to ſupport us longer, or to make further proviſion for us?

If mankind ceaſe to be at death, there will neceſſarily be a void, a chaſm in nature.

IX. Before we proceed to other arguments to corroborate all that hath been ſaid, let us add, that the ſame principle ſo eaſily admitted by all philoſophers, with regard to our preſent ſtate, "That without it nature could not have been full and coherent," extends a great deal further than ſome are apt to imagine. It affords an excellent argument for our future exiſtence. For if mankind ceaſe to be at death, or when their bodies are diſſolved, there muſt neceſſarily, upon that event, be a chaſm or blank in nature; ſince it is only a tranſition by many from this to another ſtate, ſuited to him as coming from the preſent one, which can continue the chain

being without any interruption or breach. It is, upon ſuppoſition of our periſhing totally by death, broken and diſcontinued. This opinion concerning the plenitude of nature, and a riſing ſcale of exiſtence through all poſſible gradations of being, to the higheſt, is not only an ancient one, but it is that the contemplation of nature naturally, if not neceſſarily directs us to: for where do we perceive any void? how nicely, how ſubtly, or by what imperceptible ſteps do beings riſe to man, the only order of moral agents within our obſervation in our preſent ſtate? And if we do not perceive a chaſm in the deſcending gradation of nature, from us to meer vegetative life, why ſhould we dream of any blank in the aſcending gradation above us, to which by our imagination (ſo vaſt is its expanding power) we can ſet no bounds. This however is certain, that if the maxim be well founded, and there be no reaſon to think that there ever can be any void in nature; it muſt likewiſe be true, that no perceiving being ſhall ever ceaſe to exiſt, but ſhall continue to be, and to paſs through the gradations ſuited to its kind, and conſequently to the riches and fullneſs which makes the perfection of nature. Or whatever may be ſaid of merely ſenſitive beings of the lower order (to whom, however, why ſhould we begrudge immorality, as if the value of ours would be leſſened by its being common to all perceiving beings) at leaſt, it muſt be true that moral agents cannot ceaſe to be, but muſt continue for ever, and muſt paſs thro' the ſeveral gradations naturally ſuited to them, in proportion to their culture and care to improve. This muſt be true, becauſe indeed, not only upon the ceaſing of any ſpecies, but upon the ceaſing of any individual of moral agents to exiſt, there neceſſarily would be a chaſm, an interruption in the chain of nature; a want, a deficiency, inſtead of fullneſs. For a moral being, inſtead of making the progreſs it is naturally fitted for, would thus ſtop ſhort, and

That nature is full and coherent, we have reaſon to conclude from experience and analogy.

Yet that maxim muſt be falſe, if man is not made for eternal progreſs, and ceaſes to be at death.

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so leave nature void of that particular progreſſion it and it alone, can make or fill up. The progre man, as ſuch, is fitted to make in a ſucceedin ſtate to this, is no leſs neceſſary to the complet fullneſs and perfection of nature, than that whic he is fitted for in this preſent ſtate; for it is only being ſo conſtituted, that is, it is only man, wh can make that progreſs; and all poſſible progreſſe in moral perfection are requiſite to make nature ful and coherent. That idea involves in it the exiſtenc of all capacities of moral perfection which can exiſt and conſequently of all poſſible progreſſes, or all th progreſſes which may be made by moral powers o all ſorts, in proportion to the culture, implied i the very notion of moral perfection, of each ac cording to its kind, and in its particular manner

But we have no ground to doubt of the fullneſs of nature.

If therefore the riches and perfection of nature con ſiſts in ſuch fullneſs, and ſuch fullneſs really be th end purſued by nature, man is not to periſh, but t make for ever progreſs, in proportion to the pain he takes to improve himſelf. But, indeed, as we cannot form any other notion of fullneſs and perfection in nature, but this which hath been deſcribed, ſo the further we advance in the knowledge of nature, the more inſtances we find of this fullneſs, riches, and coherence; and conſequently, the more muſt we be confirmed in this opinion of nature, than which nothing can be more delightful. Our mind ſeems to be formed to conceive it, take hold of it, and rejoice in it with unſpeakable triumph. Whence elſe could it afford us the ſatisfaction and tranſport it does; how elſe could it ſo wonderfully dilate, expand, and quicken our mind, were we not made to be ſo affected by it? And if it is naturally ſo pleaſing, ſo exhilarating to the mind, muſt it not be true? can it be a deluſion? Were not nature really as great as this conception, ſo natural to the human mind, repreſents it to be, whence could we have that idea? How could we be ſo great-mind-

This idea is natural to the mind; it greatly delights in it.

ed

:d as to form it; how could nature lead us to it as :he moſt natural ſentiment?

It is needleſs, however, to tell philoſophers that :his notion concerning the fullneſs of nature, cannot :without manifeſt abſurdity, be extended to ſignify, "That nature hath always been full;" ſince created beings muſt begin to be; and that only hath no beginning which is uncreated, and exiſts by neceſſity of nature from all eternity: nor to ſignify, "that nature hath at all times been full, with all kinds of perfection and happineſs, or capacities of them:" ſince moral powers, the chief of all powers, are in their nature progreſſive; and progreſs, in the very idea of it, ſuppoſes a time preceeding every acquired degree of perfection, in which that did not, nor could not exiſt; or, in other words, ſuppoſes intermediate ſteps by which the progreſs is made. The fullneſs of nature, therefore, can only mean a continued, unbroken progreſs towards fullneſs; if which take place, man muſt be immortal. For otherwiſe a certain, poſſible progreſs would not take place; and ſo nature would not be a perfectly full, and coherent progreſs, which we have ſo good reaſon from the analogy of nature to think it is intended to be.

But by fullneſs of nature can only be meant a full progreſs.

Which cannot be the caſe, if man is not immortal.

Hitherto I have only ſpoken of *nature*; becauſe reaſonings from analogy require no more, but that we argue from the obſervable ſtate and courſe of things. And according to this way of reaſoning, we ſee that from nature, conſidered as a whole, as one frame or conſtitution of things, there is no ground to imagine that the better or nobler parts in it, moral powers, do not, as well as all its other parts, naturally tend towards their higheſt and nobleſt end; or that they ſhall only laſt for a while, and then be deſtroyed: there is no appearance of any ſuch imperfection, any ſuch diſorder and waſte, any ſuch deſtroying humour and tendency in nature. In this way of reaſoning, we have abſtracted

Hitherto we have only enquired what ought to be inferred from the courſe of nature by analogy.

But this courſe of nature proves the Author of nature to be perfectly well diſpoſed.

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from all consideration of the temper and disposition of the universal mind; and have considered nature itself just as we would consider and argue from any machine, by itself, with respect to its ultimate tendency. But since there can be no established course of things without a mind; and such a settled, wise course of things as we have found human nature and the laws relative to it to be, plainly proves the efficiency and superintendency of a powerful, wise and benevolent mind; let us now see how the conclusion will turn out upon changing the phrase: and if instead of arguing from the stated order and course of things, we reason from the nature of the Author, of which that affords a plain and irresistible proof. "Perfect, good and wise contrivance, is the good contrivance of some mind equal to it; it is therefore the contrivance and effect of a very powerful, wise, and good mind." Let us therefore no longer leave the governing mind out of the question; and let us now ask ourselves what it is reasonable to think concerning death, since,

Let us therefore consider how the argument will stand when instead of nature, or the course of things, we say the good and wise Author of nature.

1. Our frame and contexture shews in every respect an excellent moral disposition in our Maker, provided we are not destroyed by death, but are really intended, as our moral powers evidently seem to be, for eternal progress in moral perfection, proportionable to our care to improve in it; or since, could we but conclude that to be the case, there would be no ground at all to doubt of the perfect goodness of our Author, our present state being, upon that hypothesis, a most excellent first state of trial and formation for our moral powers, and consequently a full proof of an infinitely wise and generous superintendency.

Since, 2dly, We not only can exist after our union with a material world by means of our bodies ceases, there being no necessary, but only a voluntary or arbitrary connexion between our moral powers and bodies; or a sensible world, and the diffe-

diſſolution of our bodies is but the neceſſary effect of the very ſame laws which render a ſenſible world, which cannot always laſt, while it laſts, ſo fit an occaſion and ſubject for the improvement of our moral powers in this their firſt ſtate. CHAP. IX.

Since, 3dly, The very nature of a progreſs ſuppoſes a change of ſtate, the ceſſation of a firſt, and a tranſition to another: ſince, I ſay, all thoſe principles are true, let us aſk ourſelves, whether it is not reaſonable to look upon this as our proper firſt ſtate, which ſhall be ſucceeded by another, as fit to follow it as this is to be our firſt ſtate? Let us aſk ourſelves, whether this is not a reaſonable concluſion from theſe principles; or what elſe can be ſuppoſed, that is ſo conſonant to the nature of things, and to that temper and diſpoſition of the Maker and Governor of the world which it indicates? For the argument in its weakeſt form muſt ſtand thus, "All nature looks well with reſpect to virtue, provided death does not annihilate our moral powers, and this be but our firſt ſtate of trial and formation; all but this one doubtful phænomenon beſpeaks an excellent Maker and Governor." Now if this be the caſe, why does this ſingle fact alarm us, or appear frightful to us, ſince our communion with this ſenſible world is but an arbitrary connexion; this ſenſible world cannot laſt always, but our moral powers may ſurvive its deſtruction, and we cannot paſs into another ſtate without leaving this, which we only do in the manner neceſſary, in conſequence of the very laws which render our preſent ſtate, while it laſts, ſo fit a ſubject and means for the improvement of our powers. This, I ſay, is the only probable concluſion we can draw concerning death, from the conſideration of our preſent frame, if our preſent connexion with a ſenſible world be only an arbitrary connexion. But the ſtrength of conviction this argument carries along with it, in this ſhape, will encreaſe upon us, the more we reaſon the matter with ourſelves, from the account that has been given of

How the argument muſt then ſtand in its weakeſt form.

our

CHAP. IX. our conſtitution, and of the order of things in this our preſent ſituation, relative to our moral powers.

It gathers ſtrength from ſeveral conſiderations.

For, 1. If in the preſent ſtate of mankind, even thoſe laws of matter and motion, in conſequence of which death happens, are ſo well adjuſted to our happineſs, or our progreſs in moral perfection, what reaſon have we to apprehend ſuch bad management and intention toward man, as his total deſtruction by death plainly imports? It is only confuſion and diſorder which forebodes greater confuſion and diſorder: it is only evil diſpoſitions and intentions plainly diſplayed and evidenced, which can reaſonably create fear: preſent order prognoſticates future order; evidences of goodneſs and kind intention ought to create truſt and confidence: ſeeing therefore man is made for a very noble end here; and ſince all the laws and powers relative to his ſituation are excellently fitted to that end, what ground can we have to conceive ſo ill of the diſpoſition of our Author, as to think he had no other deſign with regard to us, than to equip and furniſh us for everlaſting progreſs, merely to have the pleaſure of diſappointing us, by demoliſhing our powers almoſt as ſoon as he gave us being; or as we had arrived by the courſe of things, to a tolerable conception of what our powers may attain to by due culture, if they are not wilfully deſtroyed. We can draw no juſt concluſion concerning the diſſolution of our bodies at death, in conſequence of the laws of the material creation, without taking into our conſideration the other parts of our preſent make, and the ends to which they are adapted; for that would be to reaſon from a very partial view of the object. And therefore the only queſtion with regard to man is, whether there is any ground to think, from the conſideration of his many moral faculties, that theſe are made to be deſtroyed with our bodily frame; or whether there is not, on the contrary, better reaſon to think that this ſtate is his firſt probationary

It is only from confuſion and diſorder that confuſion and diſorder can be reaſonably inferred.

Our preſent ſtate is an excellent firſt ſtate, conſidered as ſuch, and therefore it forebodes a good, orderly future ſtate, to ſucceed it.

one,

one, or one very fit for him in the beginning of his existence, in order to his being schooled, tried and improved to a very considerable degree of perfection, but not his only one, or the whole of his existence. Now the result of all that has been said of our frame and constitution, and of the laws relative to our present condition prove, that it is an excellent first state, a very proper school for our moral improvement; a state in which we may by proper culture, in consequence of the occasions, materials and means it affords us, arrive at a very considerable degree of perfection as a first state. And why therefore should we think, that when our bodily organization is destroyed, and consequently all the present material objects of gratification or exercise are taken from us, our minds capable of higher pleasures and enjoyments, are also quite destroyed together with what they have only an arbitrary connexion with: a connexion which ought to cease with its end and use; a connexion which cannot in the nature of things always last; and which must of necessity cease if we are progressive beings, as we as plainly appear to be, as any machine appears to be fitted for its end: for a state cannot succeed to another, unless that other give way to it. Would not this indeed be to conclude, that to beings made for progress, and therefore to change states, what may be only a change of state, and what must happen upon the change of our present state according to its very good laws, is not a change, but destruction of being? Is it not, in short, to say, that what is well conducted as a first part, is for that reason not to be looked upon as a well conducted first part, but as a bad whole? CHAP. IX.

II. We cannot suppose death to be a transition to another state, but the same pains and other circumstances which now attend it, must likewise accompany it on that supposition: since they are the necessary effects of our bodily constitution, and the laws

It is no objection against this reasoning, that death comes upon men at all ages.

laws of matter and motion. But it is moſt conſonant to the nature of our moral powers, and to the proviſion made for their improvement here, to ſuppoſe it not a diſſolution of our whole frame, but merely of our bodily part, and a tranſition into another ſtate; and therefore the preſumption muſt be that it is ſuch. Some may imagine that there would not be ſo much ground for doubting about our future exiſtence, if all mankind lived till their conſtitutions were quite worn out in old age, and none were deſtroyed violently. But what tho' ſome die in infancy, others in their prime? What tho' death comes upon men at all ages; ſince it always happens in conſequence of laws of matter and motion neceſſary to many excellent purpoſes in our preſent ſtate; and nature may have adjuſted the ſtate into which men paſs from this, at whatever period of life, or with whatever temperature of mind, ſo as that a future life ſhall make with this a very regular, conſiſtent and well adjuſted whole; a compleat *drama*, as ſome of the ancients have not improperly expreſſed it. The only queſtion is, Whether there is not good reaſon to think ſo from the preſent ſtate of things, and no juſt reaſon to fear the contrary? Whether our being does not begin in ſuch a manner as foreboades an orderly and proper progreſs inſtead of ſudden deſtruction? Upon ſuppoſition that this is not the whole of our being, but that there is a future ſtate; or, (to ſpeak more agreeably to what our moral being preſages) upon ſuppoſition that we are immortal, it is eaſy on that hypotheſis to conceive how mankind's entering upon a future ſtate, at various ages, may contribute to the happineſs, variety and general good of a future ſtate. But death, however it happens, is the effect of the ſteady operation of the laws of the material ſyſtem, which are found to be every way well adjuſted to it; and it is not inconvenient, but rather neceſſary to the general well-being of mankind in this ſtate. For which reaſons, unleſs it could be proved that this phenomenon

For as this is the neceſſary effect of good laws, ſo it may be requiſite to general good in a future ſtate.

non cannot possibly contribute otherwise than to disorder in a future state, it cannot be any ground for calling the good government of the world into question, or of fears with regard to futurity.

III. In fine, if it be true, as I think it hath been sufficiently proved, that man is made in this state (whether it be his only one or not) for progress in virtue; for governing his sensible appetites by reason and a moral sense, and for the generous pursuit of public good; and that all the parts of his frame concur to fit him for that end, push him to pursue it, or afford him means of pursuing it; and consequently of exerting great virtues: if this be true, then there can be no more reason to apprehend that the Author of such a frame and constitution of things, only designed man to make progress in it for a short time, and after that to cease by being destroyed, than there is reason to imagine that he would have made us for moral perfection, and for happiness by so doing, if he had no pleasure in moral creatures and their virtuous improvements and happiness. And sure no other reason could have induced our Author to indue us with reason and a moral sense, but satisfaction in the improvement and happiness of moral beings. But such a motive could never have determined him to set such narrow bounds to our moral improvements, by allowing such a short duration to our existence, as is the case on supposition that we perish with our bodies. Why should we conceive so of our Author; since hardly is there any one among us that would do so, or any thing like it, had we any power analogous to his? For can there be among men goodness surpassing that of the universal parent; benevolence excelling his, who made us capable of forming the idea of benevolence, and delighting in it. We may here apply what the Poet says on another occasion, and ask,

To imagine that we are destroyed at death, is to think worse of the Author of nature than we can of any rational creature.

Heus age, responde, minimum est quod scire laboro,
De Jove quid sentis? est ne, ut præponere cures

Hunc

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Hunc cuinam? cuinam? vis ſtaio? an ſcilicet hæres?
Quis potior judex, pueriſve quis aptior orbis?
Perſ. Sat. 2.

The greater good of the whole cannot make it neceſſary.

IV. It is true, every part of a whole muſt be ſubmitted to the greater good of that whole. But what reaſon can we have to imagine, that the greater good of the whole creation to which we belong as a part, can require our deſtruction after we have exiſted for ſome ſhort time; ſince we may exiſt, when our relation to this material world no longer ſubſiſts? Hardly will any one ſay, that there may not be room for us, after the deſtruction of our bodies, in immenſe ſpace. And certainly the greater good of intelligent beings, in the ſum of things, cannot require the annihilation of any particular ſpecies capable of moral or intellectual happineſs and perfection. The fewer ſpecies there are in nature capable of moral happineſs, the ſmaller quantity of capacity for happineſs, and conſequently of happineſs itſelf, there muſt be in nature: that is, the leſs perfect muſt nature be: but if the greater good of the whole cannot make it neceſſary that there ſhould be leſs good in the whole than may be, it can never make it neceſſary that mankind, capable of exiſting in another ſtate, ſhould be anihilated. Can the good of intelligent beings demand, that man ſhould be made for acquiring virtue, to improve in many excellent qualifications, and that only that he might ceaſe to be when he is conſiderably improved? And yet this is the fate of all men, who have given due pains to add virtue to virtue, and to advance in wiſdom and goodneſs, if men periſh with their bodies. What can the greateſt good of intelligent beings, or of beings in general, mean, but the greateſt aggregate or ſum of happy beings? And can the greateſt ſum of happy beings require that there ſhould be a quantity of happineſs wanting which may exiſt? To aſſert this, is really the ſame abſurdity as to ſay, that four is not a greater number than two. 'Tis in vain to ſay, that if nature had intended the greateſt aggregate

'Tis in vain to ſay, that we who know but a ſmall part cannot judge of the whole.

gate of good which could exiſt, there would be no degree of pain or miſery in nature: For with reſpect to phyſical evils or pains, they are the effects of good laws whoſe uniform operation is abſolutely good. And with regard to the greateſt aggregate of moral good or happineſs which could exiſt, all that can be done conſiſtently with the very nature and kind of it, was to produce the greateſt aggregate that could be of the capacity of it; ſince moral happineſs muſt, according to its very notion, be a moral progreſs, a moral acquiſition, or the reſult of the right uſe moral beings make of their moral powers.

For we are able clearly to determine ſeveral truths;

V. It is likewiſe to no purpoſe to ſay, we who know but a part, cannot reaſon about what the greateſt good of the whole may or may not require: For tho' it be very true, that we know but a ſmall part of the immenſe ſyſtem of nature, and that our faculties are very narrow, compared with that vaſt object; yet our knowledge muſt certainly extend as far as we have clear and diſtinct ideas, and are able to perceive clearly their agreements and diſagreements. And we may form the ideas of a whole, and of univerſal order and good from the conſideration of any part of nature: every part, as for inſtance, every vegetable, or every animal, being itſelf a particular whole, tho' a part of a larger ſyſtem: or we may form theſe ideas from the conſideration of any machine of human invention: and ſo ſoon as we attend to theſe ideas of whole and univerſal good, we clearly perceive, 1. That all the intereſts of intelligent beings require that nature ſhould operate according to general fixed laws; and there cannot be beauty, regularity and perfection in a whole, without the obſervance of general laws in the diſpoſition, oeconomy and operations of the whole. The very notion of a whole, includes in it an aptitude of parts to a principal end, a fixed deſign, and regular fixed means operating towards that deſign in the ſimpleſt and ſteddieſt way. In like manner may we

as, that the world muſt be governed by general laws.

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we conclude concerning a whole of intelligent beings: 2. That no effects of the general laws neceſſary to their good are evil with regard to the whole, ſince all the inconveniencies of the uniformity of ſuch laws are fully compenſated by the particular advantages which reſult from them, together with the general advantages redounding from the univerſality and uninterrupted operation of laws. 3. In like manner may we conclude, that ſomething muſt be wanting to the perfection of a whole of intelligent beings, if any additional quantity of happineſs could take place in it. 4. In like manner may we conclude, that a whole, conſiſting of a variety of moral beings, the happineſs of whom is made dependent on themſelves, or to be acquired by themſelves, is a more perfect whole, than one conſiſting merely of perceiving beings incapable of reflexion, willing, chuſing, approving, diſapproving affections and actions; or, in a word, who have no dominion, power or ſphere of activity. All theſe, and many other ſuch general concluſions may be as certainly laid down as any concluſions whatſoever in any ſcience: they are plain corrolaries from the very idea or definition of a whole, and of general perfection and good. Good muſt mean the good of ſome perceiving being; and if one perceiving being may be of a higher order than another, (as very different orders, claſſes and ranks may be conceived) then is moral perfection, or the capacity of attaining to moral perfection, higher than merely perceptive power, that is, meer capacity of receiving ſenſations. And if ſo, the greater quantity of happineſs producible, muſt mean no more, than the greateſt quantity of capacity for moral happineſs.

That no effects of general good laws are evil.

That a whole cannot be perfect, if any greater quantity of happineſs could take place in it.

That the good of a moral ſyſtem ought to be preferred to the good of an inanimate ſyſtem.

VI. Nay, tho' we are not able to comprehend the whole of nature, there are yet more particular inferences which we may deduce with as great certainty as theſe general ones concerning the perfection and good

good of a whole, with reference to our exiſtence after the diſſolution of our bodies. 1. It is only the due care of moral beings that can make a perfect whole; for they are the chief beings in rank and dignity; or their happineſs is the object of the greateſt importance, the greater good. And therefore it is not conſiſtent with good order, not only to ſuppoſe the laws of matter not ſubſervient to them, ſince matter itſelf is incapable of happineſs or enjoyment; but it is likewiſe ſo, to ſuppoſe the greater quantity of moral happineſs to be leſſened to make room for, or give place to a quantity of merely perceptive enjoyment. 2. The happineſs of moral beings, their moral inſtruction, or their encouragement to the improvement of their moral powers, cannot require that any moral being, who in their firſt ſtate have made good improvements, or have laid themſelves out with all ſincerity and conſtancy to make progreſs towards moral perfection, ſhould ſo ſoon as they have done ſo be deſtroyed. 3. Far leſs can any of theſe ends require, that they ſhould be moved into another ſtate, in which improvement ſhall be under very great diſcouragements and diſadvantages, and where moral beings who have made conſiderable improvements ſhall have leſs occaſions and means of improving in moral qualifications, than in their beginning ſtate. Theſe ends cannot require, that virtue ſhould be neceſſarily puſhed backwards, forced into decline, or deprived of all opportunities of advancing. Nothing can be more repugnant to the idea of a good governor, and of the purſuit of general good, and of a perfect whole, than ſuch adminiſtration. 4. Far leſs ſtill can theſe ends require, that beings furniſhed, prompted and encouraged, as we are in this ſtate by our make and frame to make progreſs in virtue, ſhould, after having taken due pains to attain to a certain degree of it, be baniſhed into a ſtate abſolutely contrived for the ſuffering and miſery of ſuch moral beings. 5. Not only

The greater happineſs of moral beings cannot require the deſtruction of moral powers.

Or diſcouragement of virtue in a future ſtate.

Far leſs the abſolute miſery of virtue.

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ly are such propositions diametrically opposite to the notion of a good and perfect whole, and of a wise and perfect governor; but from the very idea of a perfect whole of moral beings, it necessarily follows, that beings who have suffered in their first state by their steady adherence to virtue in spite of all opposition through the vices of others, must have reparation made to them; that is, be placed in such happy circumstances for the exercise and improvement of their virtue, as shall make their reflexion upon their past struggles and sufferings for virtue's sake exceedingly delightful to them, and greatly contribute to stir them up to redoubled zeal to make higher improvements suitable to so generous a recompense from the governor of the world, by placing them in happier circumstances of improvement. In general, we may conclude, that if the greatest good and perfection of moral beings be intended and pursued, the happy connexions which now take place, in consequence of which virtue is the highest enjoyment or moral perfection, is the greatest happiness, shall not be changed for the worse, or to the disadvantage of moral perfection; nor those which tend to make every degree of vice it own punishment, give place to others, which shall absolutely invite and encourage to vice, and discourage virtuous exercises and improvements. We cannot indeed imagine, that moral beings cease to be agents, or are laid even by way of punishment under a fatal, physical necessity of being irreclaimable; that they can be made utterly incapable of reflexion and reformation, or be tied to vice by any other fetters, besides those arising from habit, which hold the wicked so fast intangled. But then there is no reason to think, that their bad contracted habits will not adhere closly to them, and greatly torment them, all the means and objects of their gratification being removed: much less that there will be such a change in a future state in favour of vice, that it shall not so much as suffer in any way analogous

The general good must make it necessary that tried and improved virtue be promoted.

It cannot require that the present connexions of things should be changed in favour of vice.

nalogous to what it ſuffers here, by being its own tormenter and puniſher: but that it ſhall immediately become happier than it now is or can be; whilſt the hatred of it is quite inextinguiſhable in our minds.

In one word, if we are made for virtue, and ſo to be happy by attaining to it here to as high a degree of perfection as is conſiſtent with a firſt ſtate; then to apprehend any ſucceeding ſtate, in which all the preſent conſtitutions in favour of virtue, and the diſcouragements of vice ſhall be reverſed, is contrary to analogy, to probability, and, in one word, to all our methods of reaſoning about beings and things. It is to conclude from wiſe and good adminiſtration, that very bad government ſhall ſucceed: it is to infer malice from goodneſs: it is to deduce grounds of diſtruſt and fear from the plaineſt ſymptoms of ſincere kindneſs and good-will.

All theſe reaſonings about futurity muſt hold good, if in the preſent ſtate, things are ſo far conſtituted in favour of virtue and moral perfection, that there is reaſon to conclude our Maker and Governor ſincerely loves and delights in our moral improvements. Were there not indeed manifeſt tokens in the preſent oeconomy and government of our Author with relation to us, and to all beings within our obſervation, of due regard to virtue; ſuitable care of its education, improvement and happineſs, then truly might we with reaſon dread a ſucceſſion of worſe government, and fear this were but the prelude to complete miſery: but if from what hath been ſaid of human nature, it plainly appears, that while due care is taken of inferior beings in our ſyſtem, ſuitable proviſion is alſo made for us who are capable of very high moral attainments; that is, for our improvement in many noble moral gratifications, in ſo much that all the laws of the material ſyſtem, to which we are ſubjected by our union with a ſenſible world, are admirably conducive to our moral improvement and moral happineſs; then may we juſtly not only hope

CHAP. IX. well concerning futurity, but reſt ſatisfied that ſuch an excellent firſt ſtate of mankind ſhall be ſucceeded not by a worſe, but by a better with reſpect to virtue and moral perfection; that is, one ſuited to tried and proved beings. To apprehend the contrary, would be to fear where there is the beſt foundation for comfortable expectation. It would be to think worſe of the Author of nature than we can think of any man, who has any degree of goodneſs, any ſparks of wiſdom, or any benevolence in his conſtitution. For can he be called good among men, nay, or any thing elſe than the crueleſt of tyrants, who would exerce his power in the manner ſuch ſuppoſitions make the Author of nature, and of all the goodneſs men are capable of, to act with regard to his moral creatures?

The only objections againſt the preceeding train of argument I can foreſee, which deſerve our attention, are theſe two following ones.

Objection 1. I. It may be ſaid, that almoſt all the knowledge we can acquire here, is ſuch knowledge of the material world, and of our preſent connexions with it, as can only qualify us for living in this ſtate, or in one very ſimilar and analogous to it: It can be of no uſe to us in one quite new, or abſolutely different from this preſent condition of mankind. How can our preſent ſtate be conſidered as a ſchool to form and fit us for another ſucceeding one, unleſs we can attain here to ſuch knowledge of our future life as may prepare us for it? For without ſuch inſtruction, whatever other knowledge we may acquire, we muſt be as great novices at our entrance on a future ſtate, and as much to begin to learn then how to act or behave ourſelves, as we are when we enter upon this preſent ſtage. How can that be called a ſchool for a ſtate, in which we cannot poſſibly acquire any notion of its conſtitution and laws, or be any way made acquainted with it, but to which we muſt needs go as

as much at a loſs about every connexion and law in it, as if we had had no ſchooling at all? But what can we know here of our future condition? All we can learn here hath only relation to this ſtate, and is hardly ſufficient for our direction in it. CHAP. IX.

This objection appears at firſt ſight not unplauſible. But it will ſoon evaniſh when we conſider,

I. That thoſe powers which, at our entrance upon life, are and muſt neceſſarily be but in *embrio*, rude and ſhapeleſs as it were, or quite unformed, may be made very vigorous and perfect here by proper exerciſe and culture; ſo as to become fit to be employed about any objects of knowledge of whatever kind, or however different from thoſe which make the preſent materials of our ſtudy and ſpeculation. Inſomuch that this ſtate may as properly be ſaid to be a ſchool for forming and perfectionating our rational powers, in order to their being prepared and fitted for exerciſe about higher objects in a ſucceeding ſtate; as the firſt part of our education here is called a ſchool for life, or to prepare us for the affairs of the world and manhood, which are objects far above our reach, till our underſtanding by proper gradual exerciſe and employment is conſiderably ripened, or enlarged and ſtrengthened, which is the proper buſineſs of liberal education. Anſwer.

II. But not only is it true, that our underſtanding may be ſharpened, invigorated and improved in this ſtate by ſuitable culture, ſo as to be rendered fit for progreſs in knowledge in an after-life, which rational powers cannot be but in a gradual progreſſive manner, in conſequence of due exerciſe and culture: But which is more, the knowledge and virtue; or, in one word, the moral perfection of whatever ſort we acquire here, can never be loſt labour, or be uſeleſs to us, however foreign to the pre-

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ſent ſtate of mankind any other we go into may be. For, 1. Imagination and memory may retain the idea of the preſent world, and all the knowledge we have acquired of it, ſo as to be able to compare the new one with it; as a perſon, who happens to loſe his ſight after he had attained to a very conſiderable acquaintance with the viſible world, may always retain that knowledge, of which there are many examples. 2. No ſtate into which moral beings can be ſuppoſed to paſs, can be abſolutely, or in all reſpects ſo diſanalogous to that from which they go into it, but the knowledge of their own powers, or of the fabrick and conſtitution of their mind; and all the knowledge of moral powers which analogy can lead us to, muſt be in ſeveral regards of very important uſe to them. Every ſtate of moral beings muſt be in many reſpects analogous to every other ſtate of moral beings; becauſe moral beings, however different they may be from one another, muſt in ſeveral reſpects bear an analogy or likeneſs one to another. And as that muſt be true in general of all moral beings; ſo muſt it likewiſe be true, that every new progreſſive ſtate of the ſame moral beings muſt bear a very particular analogy or likeneſs to the ſtate immediately preceeding it: Therefore, as much knowledge of the common properties, relations and laws relative to all moral beings, and all moral endowments; and as thorough a knowledge of ourſelves in particular; that is, as extenſive a moral knowledge as we can attain to in this ſtate, muſt be of very great conſequence to us upon our entrance into any new one, however different it may be from the preſent. 3. Tho', in progreſs of time, all memory of our preſent ſtate ſhould be entirely loſt or quite effaced; yet beings who have made progreſs in knowledge, and underſtand what enquiry into the nature of things means, and how ſuch reſearches ought to be carried on and purſued, muſt be ſo far paſt ſchooling, that they ſhall no more need to learn

or

or be instructed in that art, which however is not only the first and most essential, but the most difficult part of knowledge; without which indeed no progress can be made, and which being acquired, progress is very easy and rather pleasure than toil. This done, the science of advancing in knowledge is mastered, the nature of truth and knowledge is understood; and that being over, the mind is so far very well fitted and prepared for any state, and can never again be such an infant or novice in any state of moral powers, as it must necessarily be at its first existence, before any notion of knowledge, or of the methods and arts of acquiring it is formed; and while its powers are quite weak and uncultivated as moral powers must needs be till they are unfolded and perfected by use and culture. All this will be yet clearer if we reflect, 4. How much is over when beings have learned to reduce appearances to general laws, and to look out for harmonies, analogies and agreements of effects; and are, by practice in induction, become masters of that only way of reasoning by which real knowledge can be attained. For they are thus prepared for unravelling any appearances, and for tracing them to their sources and causes, or general laws; and so are fit for studying any system in order to get the knowledge of its constitution and laws. Into whatever state one may pass, it must certainly be a very high and advantageous preparation for it, to be able to know how to go to work to get real knowledge and to avoid error; to have distinct ideas of general order, beauty and good, and of government by universal laws. Now so far may all advance in this state, who will give due diligence to improve their understanding and reason in the search of nature. 5. Besides, it is evident, that into whatever state one enters, the knowledge of number and proportion must always be of use, since these are properties or relations which must belong to all objects, and to all states. 6. And as for the

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knowledge of moral duties resulting from moral relations, that science, which of all others is the most becoming moral beings, and ought to be their chief study, it must be of perpetual and unchangeable use. The present virtues and vices must remain essentially the same in every state. Benevolence in all its branches must endure for ever. And what else are all the virtues but acts of generous affection? New relations will produce new obligations and duties; but the nature of moral obligation being well understood, new relations can no sooner present themselves to a mind so well qualified, but the duties resulting from them must immediately be discovered and perceived. 7. And, in the last place, as for the dominion over ourselves, and the inward liberty and power, and all the good habits which may be formed and acquired here by the assiduous study and practice of virtue, to attain to which is our principal business in this our first state, these being once acquired or established, that important work is over; that part of education or schooling, so essential to the happiness of moral beings in whatever state they may be placed, is past; and being accomplished, it must produce its natural good fruits and effects. The happiness resulting from a well-formed mind, and highly improved virtue, cannot take place till virtue is brought by due culture to great maturity and perfection. That is as impossible as it is for any plant to come to its maturity otherwise than by gradual progress, and to yield its fruit before it is grown up to its fruitful state; but when the good seeds of virtue are ripened, then must its happy harvest naturally succeed; then must virtue have its full effect: we must sow before we reap; but as we sow, so shall we reap; such really the constitution of things with regard to us evidently appears to be. So that, in every proper sense, this present state may be called our school, or our state of education for a future state, however new that state may be to us at our first arrival into it: our state of formation,

mation, discipline and culture, whether with regard to our understanding or our will; whether with regard to science or temper; knowledge or virtue; our rational faculties, or our appetites, affections and passions. But all that hath been said will be still more evident when we have considered the other objection, to which I therefore proceed.

Another objection.

II. It is said, why is not virtue compleatly happy here, and vice, on the other hand, compleatly miserable? Or since it is not so, what reason have we to imagine a succeeding state shall not be of the same mixed kind, in which the vicious may have a great share of pleasure, and the virtuous a large share of uneasiness and suffering, and in which goods and evils shall be as promiscuously dispensed as they are here? If we reason from analogy, let us reason analogously, and not conclude a better state from this confused, promiscuous distribution of things, in which virtuous and vicious persons (to say no more) are not distinguished from one another by any remarkable dispensation of favours to the former, and punishments to the latter. For here do not all things happen alike or indifferently to all men? that is, are not external advantages and disadvantages administered either by no rule at all, or at least, in a way which virtue has but little reason to think particularly in her favour and interest?

Answer.

Now in answer to this objection, which hath been often urged in various forms, let it be observed that, were not the present condition of mankind a very proper first state for forming and training up moral powers to great perfection, there would, indeed, be no reason at all to think well of the Author of nature, or to hope well concerning futurity. But, on the contrary, if it really appears to be a very proper first state for the education of our moral powers to a very high degree of perfection, then there must be

CHAP. IX. be very good ground to entertain a good opinion of our Creator, and to expect such a state to succeed to this, as is proper to succeed to a state of education and discipline. The whole stress of our argument lies upon that.

Now that this present state is a very proper one for the education, exercise and culture of our moral powers, is manifest: For,

1. We have moral powers capable of improvement to great perfection; and this state affords us excellent means, occasions, subjects and materials for their exercise and culture, in order to their very high improvement. And all the laws relative to the growth and improvement, or the degeneracy and corruption of our moral powers are very suitable to the nature of moral powers, and their progressive formation and course, in general; and to our rank and situation, in particular: insomuch that all the goods and evils which happen to us in this life, may very properly be considered as fit means and occasions of improvement in virtue: not the evils only, but likewise the goods; for as adversity is necessary to form, exercise and improve certain virtues, so is prosperity, to exercise, form and improve other virtues: and in a state of trial, formation and culture, various means of exercise, trial and culture are absolutely necessary. Objectors against providence are apt to represent distresses and afflictions only as trials; but those who take a right view of moral powers, and of the natural progress of virtue to perfection, will consider prosperous circumstances in the same light, with regard to beings, whose first end is to be formed to virtue; that is, by means of trial. Nay, those who have thoroughly studied human nature, have not scrupled to pronounce ease and plenty to be a severer searcher, explorer, and prover of the human mind (*f*), than

(*f*) So *Sallust*. Secundæ res animum sapientis fatigant. So *Tacitus*, Hist. lib 1. Fortunam adhuc tantam adversam tulisti: secundæ res acrioribus stimulis animum explorant. Quia miseriæ tolerantur, felicitate corrumpimur, &c.

the

ıe more ordinary and tolerable vexations of human fe. 2. And yet all the evils complained of in huıan life, which do not flow from the vices of manind, and which ought therefore to be conſidered ; its natural and proper bad conſequences, it being ıf the nature of vice to do hurt or miſchief: all ıther evils, I ſay, do either proceed from the conſtant ıperation of the general laws of the material world, vhich by their ſteady, unvaried operation, produce in excellent ſyſtem, without the exiſtence of which, while it can exiſt, nature would be incomplete and incoherent ; an excellent ſyſtem with reſpect to our moral powers, and their exerciſes and improvements, as well as with reſpect to the ſenſitive enjoyments it affords us. Or, 3. They are the effects of another moſt excellent general law ; even that univerſal law of our nature, in conſequence of which all moral and natural goods are our own acquiſitions; namely, that our induſtry and application ſhall gain its end, (*g*) and that nothing internal or external ſhall be procured by us, but in proportion to our diligence to acquire it. For the goods of life which are ſaid to be ſo unequally diſtributed, fall no otherwiſe in great abundance to any vicious perſon, than in conſequence of that univerſal law, ſo eſſential to moral beings, and their powers, by which it is, that whatever we ſet ourſelves to acquire is acquired. They fall to one's ſhare in the ſame way that the philoſopher hath his beloved pleaſure ariſing from large and extenſive knowledge ; and that the virtuous man acquires the treaſure upon which his ſoul is ſolely bent, even a well regulated mind, and conſciouſneſs of merit in the eyes of every wiſe and good being. Good habits, (and all the virtues are ſuch) are formed and eſtabliſhed by our own induſtry to attain them. And if bad habits are acquired by thoſe who ſet themſelves to form them, it is becauſe it is fit that general law ſhould take

(*g*) The law explained in the beginning of the firſt chapter.

place

CHAP. IX. place with reſpect to the fruits of our induſtry and application, *that as we ſow, ſo ſhall we reap.* Now it is in no other way that external goods fall to the ſhare of any one. It is only becauſe he ſets his heart upon them, beſtows all his thought, time and care about them, and leaves no ſtone unturned to procure them: and it is a proper general law, that our goods or evils ſhould chiefly be of our own procurance, or of our own making, and that application ſhould not be ſucceſsleſs. 4. But when external goods are acquired in great redundance, they cannot give the true happineſs of the rational mind. That can only proceed from improved virtue; and virtue, in order to be formed and improved, muſt likewiſe be earneſtly contended for and ſought after; or due pains muſt be taken to advance and raiſe it to perfection. How happily is all this, (which follows ſo clearly from the account that hath been given of our nature and frame in this Eſſay) expreſſed by our incomparable Poet.

" *Whatever is, is right.*"——*This world, 'tis true,*
Was made for Cæſar,—*but for* Titus *too:*
And which more bleſt? who chain'd his country, ſay,
Or he, whoſe virtue ſigh'd to loſe a day?
" *But ſometimes virtue ſtarves while vice is fed.*
What then? is the reward of virtue, bread?
That, vice may merit; 'tis the price of toil:
The knave deſerves it when he tills the ſoil,
The knave deſerves it when he tempts the main,
When folly fights for Kings, or dives for gain.
The good man may be weak, be indolent,
Nor is his claim to plenty, but content.

What nothing earthly gives, or can deſtroy,
The ſoul's calm ſun-ſhine, and the heart-felt joy,
Is virtue's prize.——

O Fool! to think, God hates the worthy mind,
The lover, and the love, of human kind,

Whoſe

Whoſe life is healthful, and whoſe conſcience clear; CHAP. IX.
Becauſe he wants a thouſand pounds a year!
Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 4.

Here is, in a few words, (in a ſhort, clear, but moſt extenſive reaſoning) a full ſolution, to all who are able to purſue it in their thoughts throughout all its conſequences, of all the objections brought againſt the preſent diſtribution of goods and evils; a *full vindication of the ways of God to man.* 5. But let it alſo be conſidered, that as education muſt precede perfection, and virtue cannot be formed but by degrees, and in proportion to culture; ſo the fruits of improved virtue ariſing from its proper exerciſes, cannot take place till virtue is brought to its maturity. That is as impoſſible as it is in nature for harveſt to precede ſeed-time and due huſbandry. Virtue cannot yield the fruits and advantages of complete virtue, nor be fit for the exerciſes and employments from which its happineſs muſt ariſe, till it is ſuch. The good habits, whence the felicity is to ariſe, muſt firſt be formed or acquired before the happineſs which can only reſult from their proper exerciſes can take place. The foundation muſt be laid before the ſuperſtructure can be raiſed. But proper exerciſes to form, ſchool, diſcipline, try and improve moral powers, having the ſuitable degrees of enjoyment attending them as ſuch, as properly or naturally prognoſticate a harveſt of virtue, a moral ripeneſs and its fruits, as ſuch, to ſucceed to this ſtate of moral culture, as ſeed-time and induſtry promiſe a harveſt in the natural world. 6. And finally, as no ſtate can be blamed in which the after-reaping is proportionable to, and of a kind with the ſowing, or in which it is the general law of nature with reſpect to moral beings, that their future perfection and happineſs ſhall be in proportion to the foundation they lay by their moral improvements: ſo, on the other hand, no happineſs, but on the contrary, miſery

CHAP. IX. fery alone can be looked for from the total corruption of the mind by vice, from confirmed evil habits and paſſions, eſpecially after the external means of ſenſual gratification fail, or are quite removed from them; which is the caſe, ſo ſoon as our minds are diveſted of our bodies, and ſeparated from a material world. If there be any eſſential or eſtabliſhed differences between virtue and vice, or the improvement and abuſe, the perfection and corruption of moral powers; the final effects of theſe muſt be as different or contrary, as the roots from which they proceed, are. But theſe two oppoſites cannot have their full effect till a certain time of culture, formation and probation is paſt; becauſe a moral building muſt advance gradually, as well as a material one; or becauſe a moral harveſt requires as neceſſarily a progreſs towards it, as a natural one. We muſt either deny, that the proper adequate happineſs of a moral being muſt be the reſult of his perfection, or of the high exerciſes for which greatly improved moral powers are qualified, which is abſurdly to diſtinguiſh the proper happineſs of a rational being from its proper perfection: Or, if we aſk, why virtue is not compleatly happy while it is but in a ſtate of formation; we really abſurdly aſk, why education muſt precede perfection. But if complete rational happineſs muſt be the natural effect of highly improved virtue ſuitably placed and employed, what can be expected from a degenerated corrupted mind in a ſtate far removed from all material objects, but the natural effects of diſorderly paſſions, depraved habits, and the conſciouſneſs of deformity and guilt: a harveſt of corruption and proportionable miſery?

Thus therefore, in whatever light we conſider our preſent ſtate, there is good reaſon to think it our firſt ſtate only, and a very proper one as our firſt ſtate: our moral ſeed-time to which our after-harveſt ſhall be proportioned. For this is evidently the law of nature with regard to us, That as we ſow, ſo we

e ſhall reap. The moral improvements, from which lone the happineſs truly ſuited and proportioned to ur moral frame can ſpring, muſt be acquired by ue culture and exerciſe. They cannot have their omplete and perfect effect till they are arrived to per-ection: But a proper ſtate for their education to erfection, plainly betokens a ſucceeding ſtate, in hich effects ſhall be congruous and proportionate o the culture paſſed through, and its fruits. CHAP. IX.

Let us only add to all this, that the hope or pre-entiment of future exiſtence is natural to man: and whence elſe can this proceed, but from the care of our Maker, who will not diſappoint any inſtinct, deſire, or hope he hath implanted in his creatures? It is Heaven that points out *an hereafter, and dictates eternity to mankind*; 'tis Heaven hath inſpired us with this pleaſing hope, *this longing after immortality*, which is ſo noble a ſpur and excitement to virtuous labours and deeds. And ſearch all nature throughout, and ſhew one inſtance, if you can, where it works in vain; or merely to diſappoint even bodily inſtincts, much leſs well governed rational affections and deſires.

What future bliſs, he gives not thee to know,
But gives that hope *to be thy bleſſing now.*
Hope *ſprings eternal in the human breaſt;*
Man never is, *but always* to be *bleſt;*
The ſoul uneaſy, and confin'd at home,
Reſts, and expatiates, in a life to come.

Eſſay on man, Ep. 1.

And again,

For him alone, hope *leads from gole to gole,*
And opens ſtill, and opens, on his ſoul,
'Till lengthen'd on to faith, *and unconfin'd,*
It pours the bliſs that fills up all the mind.
He ſees, why nature plants in man alone
Hope of known bliſs, and faith in bliſs unknown?
(Nature, whoſe dictates to no other kind
Are giv'n in vain, but what they ſeek they find)

Wiſe

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Wiſe is her preſent : ſhe connects in this
His greateſt virtue *with his greateſt* bliſs.
At once his own bright proſpect to be bleſt,
And ſtrongeſt motive to aſſiſt the reſt.

Eſſay on man, Ep. 4.

Concluſion. Man therefore is made for eternal progreſs in moral perfection proportionally to his care and diligence to improve in it. And with reſpect to death, we have reaſon to ſay with an excellent Ancient, " *Eo itaque ſimus animo, ut horribilem illum diem aliis, nobis fauſtum putemus: Non enim temere, nec fortuito ſati & creati ſumus; ſed profecto fuit quædam vis quæ generi conſulerit humano : nec id gigneret, aut aleret, quod cum exanclaviſſet omneis labores, tum incideret in mortis malum ſempiternum—portum potius paratum nobis & perfugium putemus.*

The End of the FIRST PART.

THE

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART II.

BEING

A further vindication of HUMAN NATURE; in which the chief objections made againſt it are examined, and proved to be abſurd.

Quod ſi mundi partes naturâ adminiſtrantur, neceſſe eſt mundum ipſum naturâ adminiſtrari: cujus quidem adminiſtratio nihil habet in ſe, quod reprehendi poſſit. Ex iis enim naturis, quæ erant, quod effici potuit, optimum, effectum eſt. Doceat ergo aliquis potuiſſe melius, ſed nemo unquam docebit, & ſi quis corrigere aliquid volet, aut deterius faciet, aut id quod fieri non potuit deſiderabit.

Cicero de natura Deorum, Lib. II.

Reſpecting man, whatever wrong we call,
May, muſt be right, as relative to all.

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. I.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART II.

INTRODUCTION.

INTROD.

IN the former part of this enquiry, we have proved from the direct conſideration of our frame and conſtitution, that it is good; or that we are made for an excellent end. But becauſe this ſubject is of the laſt importance, it is well worth while to conſider the objections which are made againſt human nature, and the preſent ſtate of mankind.

How it is propoſed to anſwer objections.

Now before I examine particular objections, it is proper to premiſe in general,

Objections which end either in demanding an impoſſibility, or a chagonet the worſe are abſurd.

I. That objections which neceſſarily terminate in demanding impoſſibilities, are abſurd. And ſuch are

INTROD. are all thoſe which imply in them as direct a contradiction, as if it were demanded that man ſhould be, and not be, at the ſame time.

II. Such objections are likewiſe abſurd which demand any alteration to the worſe; or a change from which greater inconveniencies would neceſſarily follow than thoſe complained of. For a more inconvenient law would certainly be a worſe one.

It is neceſſary to premiſe theſe two plain truths in an Eſſay, wherein it is propoſed to ſhew, that the objections brought againſt our preſent ſtate, do, if not at firſt ſight, yet when cloſely purſued to their ultimate meaning and tendency, terminate either in demanding an impoſſibility, or a change to the worſe. But they are alſo premiſed, becauſe a great many imperfections and evils in the world, are reſolved by ſome ancient philoſophers into what they call *inhability or obliquity of the ſubject, and neceſſity of nature*. By which I am apt to think, they meant imperfections and evils which are, in the nature of things, abſolutely unavoidable upon the ſuppoſition of the exiſtence of certain ſubjects, as being abſolutely inſeparable from them And, without all doubt, the objections which terminate in demanding ſome law or property in a material being; for inſtance, which it cannot in the nature of things admit of, are abſurd for that very reaſon, if there is a moral fitneſs, that there ſhould be a material creation. (*a*) I give this example, becauſe thoſe philoſophers had recourſe to the inhability or obliquity of the ſubject, and the neceſſity of nature chiefly in accounting for apparent evils of the phyſical kind; that is, apparent evils reſulting from the properties of matter, and the laws of corporeal motion. But we may juſtly call inhability of the ſubject and neceſſity of nature, all natural or eſſential incapacity in any ſubject, moral or material of any demanded per-

What the ancients meant by the inhability or obliquity of a ſubject.

(*a*) *Plutarch* de procreatione animæ.

fection.

fection. For certainly all such appearances are sufficiently vindicated, which are shewn to be the necessary result of the essential qualities of a subject, natural or moral; or all such objections are sufficiently refuted, which are shewn to demand something incompatible with the essential properties of a subject, provided it can be proved to be morally fit and good that such a subject should exist. INTROD.

Thus all objections against the material creation, which necessarily terminate in demanding that matter should be active and not passive, are certainly absurd. If it be morally fit that matter should exist: since matter is essentially, or as matter, passive and inert. In like manner, all objections against a moral creature, which necessarily terminate in demanding impeccability in such creature; or a physical impossibility of its forming any wrong judgment, or chusing unreasonably, must be absurd, if it be morally fit and good that such a moral creature should exist; since impeccability or absolute impossibility of erring is incompatible with the moral powers and properties which constitute a moral creature. All such demands terminate in an absurdity, because they require what the subject cannot admit of; what is contrary to its nature, that is, what is really impossible and contradictory.

In what sense inhability of the subject supposes no limitation of the divine power.

Now inhability of a subject, or necessity of nature, as we have explained it, supposes no limitation creating power, unless the impossibility of working contradictions; as for instance, of making a thing to be and not to be at the same time, or of making the same subject possess at the same time repugnant and incompatible qualities, be a limitation of creating power, which cannot be asserted. Nor does inhability, or necessity of nature, as we have explained it, presuppose the necessary existence of any subject previous to and independent of the mind that created the world; it only supposes, that subjects of a certain nature, if they be created, must be created with

INTROD. that particular nature, or with the properties which belong to it; and that properties which are abſolutely in their eſſence repugnant to co-exiſtence in the ſame ſubject, cannot be made to co-exiſt in the ſame ſubject. And that is, not to ſuppoſe creating power limited by any thing, or ſubjected to any thing, ſince the impoſſibility of making contradictions to be true is no limitation of power.

Objections that terminate in demanding a change to the worſe, are abſurd.

II. The other propoſed method of ſolving objections made againſt human nature, and the preſent ſtate of mankind, by ſhewing, that they terminate in demanding a change to the worſe; or that would be attended with more or greater diſadvantages than thoſe complained of, does not involve in it any limitation of creating power; ſince power cannot be ſaid to be limited or confined, becauſe it is directed by wiſdom and goodneſs; and is only employed to produce that from which greater good, in the ſum of things, muſt neceſſarily enſue. Nay, if we rightly conſider the matter, it will be found, that this laſt way co-incides with the former; and that ſuch demands, as well as the former, terminate in requiring a natural impoſſibility. For, ſo certainly do all demands terminate, "which require the general advantages of a general law without the general prevalence of that law;" "or the goods of one law by means of another law;" "that an end ſhould be produced without means proper and appoſite to its production;" "or that ſuch and ſuch a law ſhould be general, and yet ſeveral neceſſary effects of its general operation be hindered from taking place." To require a change of any law on account of the inconveniencies which attend it, if theſe be compenſated by the good effects of that law, is an abſurd demand; ſince all the intereſts of intelligent beings require, that the laws by which they are regulated, or which are fixed for their regulation of themſelves, ſhould be general and prevail uniformly: and to require

quire that a being ſhould be progreſſive, without the conſequences which neceſſarily redound from progreſſiveneſs, is plainly an abſurd demand. But all this will become clearer, when we conſider particular objections. And whatever ancient philoſophers meant by the inhability of the ſubject, and neceſſity of nature, we ſhall ſee that the greater part of the objections againſt man, do neceſſarily terminate in ſome contradictory, or very unreaſonable requeſt, and that in this ſenſe, "*Si quis corrigere volet, aut deterius faciet, aut id quod fieri non potuit deſiderabit.*"

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LET us firſt conſider the effect of complaining that man is ſo perfect as he is; or that he has the powers and affections he is really endowed with; and, ſecondly, the effect of complaining that he is not more perfect than he is.

Some objections againſt man, are really objections againſt his perfection.

I. All objections which tend to cut off and retrench any perfections which man is endowed with by nature; any of his ſenſes, appetites, affections, or capacities of pleaſure, his reaſon, activity, moral agency, power and liberty, or any other property, are objections againſt his perfection; they are complaints againſt the Author of our nature for making him ſo perfect as he is. For which of them is not exceeding uſeful; the ſource of very noble enjoyments; the foundation of many excellencies and virtues? Our diſcerning, diſtinguiſhing, judging and reaſoning powers, are evidently the foundation of our being capable of rational exerciſes and enjoyments: and as for our appetites and affections, they are either of private or public uſe, or both. We

For all our powers, diſpoſitions and affections are capacities of happineſs and perfection.

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may call the private ones modes of ſelf-love, for they are all moved by a proſpect of real or apparent good to ourſelves. But can a perceptive being exiſt without a principle of ſelf-preſervation; or without the love and deſire of pleaſure; or can the love and deſire of pleaſure in a ſenſible being be leſs extenſive than its ideas of good and pleaſure? The public ones we may call modes of benevolence or ſocial love; for they are all moved by the ſpecious ſhew of public good: and is it not fit that rational creatures ſhould be endowed with ſuch affections as unite and bind them together, and without which there can be no merit, no ſociety, no happineſs by communication and participation; which would be the caſe, were we not endowed with a principle of benevolence, and the ſocial affections which ſpring from it?

All appetites and affections, of whatever kind, may be rendered weaker or ſtronger than they ought to be by habit; but ſuch active, beſtirring principles, as appetites and affections, are neceſſary in our conſtitution, to be the ſprings of motion, to prompt, to impel, or rather to drive us into action: not the private only, leſt we forget the public, and reaſon ſhould not be ſufficient, or have force enough to perſuade us before it is too late, to mind that intereſt, which, though in one ſenſe it be foreign to us, is in reality our moſt natural or beſt good. Nor yet the public only, leſt by being wholly taken up abroad, we ſhould entirely forget home affairs, and ſoon become incapable either to look abroad, or to take care at home to any advantage. It is, indeed, hard to ſay, whether the ſocial without the private, or the private without the ſocial, would be more pernicious to us. And not only is it neceſſary, if either the one or the other have any conſiderable degree of force in our frame, that the other ſhould likewiſe have conſiderable force, in order to preſerve a juſt ballance; but it is requiſite that both ſhould have a conſiderable degree of force, that they may be

be able to move us, and that we may have pleasure and satisfaction in our pursuits; for without affections and appetites there can be no enjoyment. Reason itself can only give us satisfaction by its exercises, whether in searching after knowledge, or in acting agreeably to the nature of things, in consequence of our having in our nature an appetite after knowledge, and a moral sense of the fitness of actions.

So are all the laws with regard to them. The law of habits in particular.

Now as for appetites and affections, their being diminished or strengthned in their force by habit; this is necessary, in order to our being really benefited by the exercises of our faculties; or to their being bettered and improved by our diligence to improve them. For what is any habit, but a faculty or affection brought to great force and vigour by repeated acts? without such a constitution, we could never attain to perfection in any science, art or virtue. And which way more honourable or advantageous to us could have been contrived for improving all our different powers and affections to their greatest perfection, and for keeping them in due order, than besides the natural controul which those of one kind are to those of another, to have given us a cool and sedate principle, to deliberate, advise and govern them: our reason, which also becomes stronger or weaker, in proportion as it is exercised; and soon becomes master as it ought to be, if it has but fair play allowed it, or if it is not violently opposed and born down. For reason, by frequently exercising our powers and affections aright, forms many good and perfect habits in us.

Let us examine all our senses, all our appetites and passions, and then let us say which of them we would not have to take place in our frame: not those which impel us to take care of ourselves, for why should the private system not be preserved? or can the public system be sufficiently taken care of by nature, unless each private part of the whole be furnished

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furniſhed with what is neceſſary to its preſervation? Not thoſe which lead us to partnerſhip and union; for how can individuals make a whole, without a common feeling, and cementing affections? Reaſon cannot be left out of our frame, and we continue rational; and if there were no affections and appetites in our frame, what improvements would we be capable of; what would reaſon have to govern; or what would ſpur us to action? All the proper exerciſes of any of our affections, whether private or public, are certainly pleaſant; and if the improper ones are either miſchievous to ourſelves or others, or equally ſo to both, how can we have the pleaſures in the one way, without the pains in the other; otherwiſe than by the right government of them; the conſciouſneſs of which is itſelf the greateſt pleaſure we are capable of? Did the paſſions move within us neceſſarily, juſt as it is proper and convenient for ourſelves and our kind that they ſhould, without the interpoſitions of our reaſon as a governor, or independently of our own choice and direction, then would we be good animals, but we could not be called virtuous or moral beings: that higher rank and character ſuppoſes in its very idea, reaſon to govern affections and appetites agreeably to a natural ſenſe of right and wrong, of fit and unfit: without them therefore we would be deprived of all the enjoyments and advantages which now belong to us, as beings of a higher order than merely ſenſible, paſſive creatures; capable of ruling our appetites and paſſions to good purpoſes, if we but ſet ourſelves in earneſt to do ſo: that is, we would be leſs perfect than we are.

The objections againſt man's imperfection are no leſs abſurd.

But hardly will any one object againſt our Author for providing us with ſo large a capacity for pleaſures of various ſorts, or for making us ſo perfect as we are. And yet, on the other hand,

II. All

II. All objections which are made againſt our conſtitution, becauſe we have not greater and higher natural capacities, or a larger ſtock of faculties, are abſurd; becauſe ſuch objections cannot ſtop, while man is leſs than the very higheſt order of created perfection. Theſe objections, if they have any meaning at all, muſt prove that no creature ought to exiſt, but that which is of the moſt perfect nature a finite and created being can be. In reality, to uſe the words of a very good author (*a*), "The "demands made when man is objected againſt be- "cauſe he is not a complication of all perfections, "are as abſurd, as to demand why a fly is not made "a ſwallow, every ſwallow an eagle, and every ea- "gle an angel; becauſe an angel is better than any "of the other creatures named. There muſt, ſays "he, be a gradual deſcenſion and aſcenſion of the "divine fecundity in the creation of the world, to "make it a full demonſtration of the fullneſs of his "power and bounty." The ancients anſwered theſe objections in like manner, by telling us, that the riches and perfection of nature conſiſts in its being filled with different kinds of being and perfection, from the loweſt to the higheſt. Such objections, in truth, ultimately come to this, Why man at all? or rather, why any creature, which is not as perfect as a creature can be? And ſure it is ſufficient to oppoſe to ſuch like queſtions, the following more generous ones: Why ſhould there be any diſcontinuity or void in nature, *which unleſs it be full cannot be coherent?* Why ſhould any ſyſtem be wanting which the firſt cauſe can produce, the natural tendency of which, according to its conſtitution, is to greater good in the ſum of things? Why not all poſſible kinds, orders and ranks of beings? Why not as rich a manifeſtation of the Creator's power and goodneſs, as

They terminate in demanding an impoſſibility.

They know no ſtop.

(*a*) *Henry More's Divine Dialogues,*

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the moſt immenſe variety of being, perfection and good, can ſhew forth? If angels, why not arch-angels? And why not, likewiſe, in the deſcending ſcale of life, man; ſince he hath made him but *a little lower than the angels, and hath crowned him with glory and honour, and given him a very large dominion* natural and moral.

Objections then, which demand that man ſhould be more perfect than he is, are abſurd, becauſe they can never ſtop; and they are really objections againſt the general perfection of nature. This is their abſurd language,

Why is not man an angel, earth a heav'n?
Who aſk and reaſon thus, will ſcarce conceive
GOD gives enough, while he has more to give:
Immenſe the pow'r, immenſe were the demand;
Say, at what part of nature will they ſtand?

Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 4.

There is plainly a phyſical abſurdity in them.

But there is likewiſe a phyſical contradiction in theſe demands or objections. For with regard to the moral, as well as the natural world, it is neceſſarily true, that every ſpecies of being muſt have its determinate nature and conſtitution, with which certain other qualities are abſolutely incompatible. With reſpect to corporeal beings it is manifeſt, that flying, ſwiming, walking upright, and all other ſuch various qualities, require a particular organization to be maintained and preſerved in a particular way, with which other ſtructures are as inconſiſtent as being ſtreight is with being crooked. Nor will it be leſs evident if we think a little upon the matter, that every moral being muſt have ſome certain determinate conſtitution, with which the qualities of any other mental fabric is as inconſiſtent, as one bodily organization adapted to one chief purpoſe, is with that adjuſted to another: a moral being can no more have two different mental ſtructures, than one and the

the ſame material being can have two different bodily ſtructures. It is equally abſurd in the moral and in the natural world, that one and the ſame being ſhould be two different beings. It is therefore a contradiction to demand, why any being is not a complication of all perfections: it is to aſk, why a being has not at the ſame time all various ſtructures and conſtitutions: it is to aſk, why it is made for an end that requires a certain fabric adjuſted to it, and why at the ſame time it is not made for another end, that requires another diſtinct fabric adjuſted to it.

Hence we may ſee what muſt be the only queſtion with reſpect to our make.

Now from this it plainly follows, that the only intelligible queſtion, with regard to any conſtitution or fabric, muſt be, to what end is it adapted, and whether that end be worth while; could it be better adjuſted to its end, or ought the end to which it is adjuſted, to have place in nature? So that all the objections made againſt man muſt vaniſh, if it appears that he is made for a very noble end. For (though there are, no doubt, higher orders of beings in nature than man) yet if he be ſo made, he well deſerves his place in a gradation which could not exiſt without him; but, did he not exiſt, would neceſſarily be interrupted and incoherent. But to be ſatisfied that man is made for a very noble end, let us only conſider what our own hearts tell us, upon ſerious reflection, our end is. For if to be made to make progreſs in moral perfection to the degree we are capable of arriving, by due diligence to improve ourſelves, be not a noble and worthy end, what can be ſuch? Is it not worth while to attain to that perfection we know men can arrive at by due diligence, whether we look within, and enquire what we are made for; or whether we recal to mind certain ſublime characters in hiſtory which caſt us at a diſtance, and reproach us, becauſe we are able, if we ſet about it, even to do more than they have done. Man hath, indeed, noble, honourable and glorious powers,

capable

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capable of being improved, even in this their firſt ſtate, to a wonderful height of excellency and merit, if we are not wanting to ourſelves, whatever our circumſtances or ſituation may be. And that theſe powers are immortal, and ſhall afterwards be placed in circumſtances well ſuited to the uſe that has been made of them here, muſt be certain, if there be any thing immortal in the creation; if all things are not made merely to be ſoon annihilated; if the Author of nature does not take more pleaſure in pulling down and deſtroying, than in building up and communicating happineſs; if capacity for enjoyment of the nobleſt kind, is not made merely to be diſappointed; if it is not made merely to be able to conceive what the Author of nature will not be ſo generous as to give; or, in fine, if the Author of nature is but as good as man is by his own natural diſpoſition, which he owes to him (*b*). Man hath,

(*b*) See what *Plutarch* ſays of the dignity of man, and the extent of his power and dominion, in his excellent treatiſe *de fortuna*. Finge viro aliquem noſtrum ſic dicere: fortuna præſtat ut videamus, non viſus & oculi, quos luciferos Plato dicit. Fortuna audimus non facultate ictum aeris apprehendente qui per aures ad cerebrum fertur. Quis non vereatur hoc modo ſenſibus detrahere? Atqui viſum auditum, guſtatum olfactum, reliquas item corporis facultates atque partes natura nobis dedit, ut earum miniſterio prudentia uteretur. mens enim videt, mens audit, reliqua cæca ſunt & ſurda. Et ſicut ſole ſublato quod ad reliqua ſidera attinet, perpetuam haberemus noctem ut Heraclitus dixit: ita præſtare reliqui ſenſus non poſſent abſque mens eſſet & ratio, ut reliquis animalibus anteiret homo. Nunc quod potiores ſumus iiſque imperamus, non caſu aut fortuitu fit, ſed Prometheus, id eſt, rationis uſus hoc efficit.

Fœtus equorum, aſinorumque & boum genus
Munera rependens, quæ noſtris laboribus
Subeant ——— *ut eſt apud Æſchylum.*

Alioqui ſui ortus natura & conditione pleraque bruta ſunt quam nos memore. Alia enim cornibus armantur, dentibus ſtimulis, &c. ——— Solus homo, ut ait Plato, nudus, incrinis, ſine calceis & tegmine eſt a natura relictus.

Unum

hath, by his reaſon, power to make every element, every piece of matter, every inferior creature, greatly ſubſervient to him; and if he is not wilfully deſtroyed by his Maker, through delight in deſtroying, which there is no reaſon to apprehend from any thing in nature, nothing but himſelf can ſtand in the way, as he is conſtituted, of his making eternal progreſs in perfection. And is not ſuch a being worthy of his place in nature? He is furniſhed by nature for moral improvements, in the only way he can be furniſhed for ſuch: he hath all the faculties neceſſary for advancement in knowledge and virtue (*e*); faculties, which, by uſe and exerciſe, ſoon become

Unum ſed hæc largita, emollit omnia.

Scilicet rationis uſum & induſtriam ac providentiam,

Vires exiguæ ſunt mortalium
Sed calliditate multiplici,
Belluas maris, & terreſtria,
Et ſub cælo volantia
Omnia homo domat.

Nihil agilius equo nihil velocius; ſed hominibus currunt. Perox eſt animal canis & iracundum: ſed homines cuſtodit——— Faciunt enim eo, ut diſcamus quo hominem attollat ratio, & quibus rebus eum ſuperiorem faciat, utque omnia in ſuam redigat poteſtatem. ——— Peritia autem, memoria, ſapientia & arte ſecundum Anaxagoram omnia quæ ipſa habent bruta in noſtros vertimus uſus: favos apum colligimus, lac mulgemus, &c.——— Enim vero in humanis rebus haud dubie cenſendum eſt etiam artificum opera & fabrorum qui metalla cudunt, qui domos ædificant, qui ſtatuas faciunt, &c. ——— Mirum itaque ſit, cum artes ut ſuum finem conſequantur nihil indigeant fortunæ opera, artem omnium maximam & perfectiſſimam quæ humanæ gloriæ & officii ſummum continet nullam eſſe, &c.

(*e*) Natura enim hoc corporis tabernaculum veluti inſtrumentum compoſuit ut & obediens ſit, & ad omnes vitæ rationes concinno quodam aptoque modo par eſſe poſſit. Animus quoque ad convenientes virtutes conformandus eſt atque inſtituendus: minimum ad temperantiam, veluti corpus ad ſanitatem: ad prudentiam vero veluti ad ſenſuum ſubtilitatem: ad fortitudinem veluti ad robur & vires: ad juſtitiam veluti corpus ad pulchritudinem.

Harum

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come ſtrong and vigorous; and he is ſurrounded not only with inexhauſtible ſubjects of the moſt entertaining enquiries, but with excellent means, materials and occaſions of exerciſing every great and noble virtue, having a very large extent of power and dominion in the material as well as the moral world. What therefore can be objected againſt him, if it be indeed no objection, as it certainly is not, to ſay he is not the top of the creation; that there are beings much higher than he; or that though he hath a noble nature, yet it is not the very nobleſt that can exiſt? Is it not ſufficient to take off all theſe objections, that we have good reaſon, from the analogy of nature, and the conſideration of the temper and character of the ſupreme being our Maker, which is ſo clearly imprinted upon the whole of nature, as far as we can pry into it by all our reſearches, to conclude, "That the higheſt pitch of perfection any among mortals have ever arrived at, howſoever great it be in compariſon of our ſtate at our firſt ſetting out in infancy, is however as nothing, when compared to the ſuperior perfection thoſe ſo improved and exalted men ſhall attain to, by their continued care to improve themſelves, in another ſtate; and, in fine, that at every period of their future exiſtence, the perfection arrived to will be the ſame nothing, ſo to ſpeak, in reſpect of that ſuperior excellence ſtill before them, and in their power to attain to."

Harum virtutum primordia quidem ſunt ex natura: media, vero & fines, in diligentia: in corpore videlicet gymnaſtices adjumento & medicinæ: in animo autem eruditionis & philoſophiæ beneficio. Hæ enim facultates nutriunt & roborant, &c. *Timæus Locrus de anima mundi.*

Hoc opus ſapientiæ mihi videtur ad quod natus & conſtitutus eſt homo, atque ad quod inſtrumenta & facultates Deo accipit. Homo in hoc natus & conſtitutus eſt, ut naturæ rationem in univerſo contempletur: & cum ipſe ſit ſapientiæ opus, ſpeculari prudentiam quæ in exiſtentibus reperiretur, &c. *Archytæ libro de ſapientia.*

This

This is what I have been endeavouring to prove to be the caſe, in the firſt part of this eſſay; and that no doubt may remain with relation to it, I ſhall go on to conſider, firſt of all, two of the moſt material objections made againſt the preſent ſtate of mankind; and then I ſhall conclude, by endeavouring to make every objector againſt the government of the world feel the abſurdity of all objections againſt it; or clearly perceive that whatever change he can poſſibly deſire or imagine, would make a very bad ſtate of things, could it poſſibly take place. CHAP. I. To this queſtion a ſufficient anſwer hath been given in the principles.

The two great objections made againſt the ſtate of mankind are, I. The prevalence of vice; and II. The unequal diſtribution of the goods of fortune, as they are called, or external goods.

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I Shall therefore, in the firſt place, lay a few obſervations together, in ſuch an order as ſeems to me to give full ſatisfaction, with regard to the prevalence of vice in the world. The chief objections confuted.

Firſt of all let it be obſerved, that (*f*) "Here "men are apt to let their imaginations run out up- "on all the robberies, pyracies, murders, perjuries, "frauds, maſſacres, aſſaſſinations, they have either "heard of, or read in hiſtory, thence concluding "all mankind to be very wicked: as if a court of "juſtice were a proper place to make an eſtimate "of the morals of mankind, or an hoſpital of the "healthfulneſs of a climate. But ought they not The objection taken from the prevalence of vice among mankind.

(*f*) See Mr. *Hutcheſon* on the *Paſſions*, whoſe words theſe are.

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" to consider, that the number of honest citizens " and farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of crimi- " nals in any state; and that the innocent or kind " actions of even criminals themselves, surpass their " crimes in numbers. That it is the rarity of crimes, " in comparison of innocent or good actions, which " engages our attention to them, and makes them " to be recorded in history, while honest, gene- " rous, domestic actions are over-looked, only be- " cause they are so common; as one great danger, " or one month's sickness, shall become a frequent- " ly repeated story, during a long life of health " and safety."

Not so much vice as is generally imagined.

Cicero (*g*) mentions a book written by a famous Peripatetic philosopher, *Dicæarchus*, to shew that more mischiefs are brought upon mankind by the hands of men themselves, than by earthquakes, deluges, pestilences, devastations of savage beasts, or any other such causes. But we ought, says *Cicero*, to set over-against these evils, the innumerable benefits which men receive from men. The vast advantages which redound from rightly constituted society, from arts and sciences, from philosophy, from oratory, from prudence and virtue.

Let not the vices of mankind be multiplied, or magnified; let us make a fair estimate of human life, and set over-against the shocking, the astonishing instances of barbarity and wickedness, that have been perpetrated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave actions with which history shines, but the prevailing innocency, good nature, industry, felicity and chearfulness, of the greater part of mankind at all times, and we shall not find reason to cry out, as objectors against providence do on this occasion, that all men are vastly corrupt and vicious, and that there is hardly any such thing as virtue in the world. Upon a fair computation, the fact does

(*g*) *De Offic.* Lib. I.

indeed

ndeed come out, that very great villanies have been very uncommon in all ages, and looked upon as nonſtrous; ſo general is the ſenſe and eſteem of virtue.

In conſequence of the excellent laws of our nature, ſome vices are unavoidable, becauſe narrow views and wrong aſſociations of ideas are unavoidable.

II. But, in the ſecond place, (*b*) It is eaſy to conceive, how falſe opinions, wrong notions of things, prejudices miſleading aſſociations of ideas, narrow views, and unreaſonable purſuits muſt ſpread, if they are once introduced among any part of mankind, in conſequence of theſe moſt uſeful principles and laws in our conſtitution; "our dependence upon one another;" "the docility and pliableneſs of our infant minds;" "our regard to our parents, teachers and ſuperiors;" "the influence of example, and our diſpoſition to imitate." In conſequence of theſe excellent diſpoſitions in our minds, 'tis impoſſible, but errors, falſe judgments, and correſpondently wrong actions muſt gain ground, if they ever begin or take place. No perſon in ſuch a ſtate as ours, can be ſingle in his falſe opinions, bad taſte, or hurtful purſuits. In the political as well as the natural body, when contagion enters, it muſt ſpread. On the other hand, in a ſtate of beings entering upon the world, with minds formed for gradual progreſs in knowledge and virtue, in ſciences, in arts, and every moral perfection; it is morally impoſſible, but ſome muſt form falſe opinions, and be influenced by narrow views. It is our imagination and judgment, or our opinion of things, that chiefly guides our conduct, and adds ſtrength to one ſort of affections by taking from the force of others: and therefore, if narrow views, falſe judgments, and wrong aſſociations of ideas take place: vicious purſuits muſt likewiſe take place. But how is it poſſible to conceive any ſtate of beings formed

And according to the excellent laws of our nature, vices when they begin, will ſpread.

(*b*) See the corolary to the Chapter, *on the aſſociation of ideas and habits*, Part 1.

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to make gradual progreſs in perfection, in propo tion to their diligence to improve themſelves therei abſolutely ſecured againſt acting upon any views th are not true; or abſolutely ſecured againſt raſhly cor ceiving any falſe opinions? This is certainly to d mand an impoſſibility with reſpect to any infant c firſt ſtate of progreſſive beings, in whatever ſituatio they may be placed. And if it be to demand an im poſſibility with regard to any infant ſtate of beings what muſt ſuch a demand be with reſpect to being capable of receiving pleaſures from external ob jects; and conſequently of ſollicitations from the ſenſes before their reaſon can grow up even by an degree of culture to very great maturity and ſtrength

Illuſtrations upon this argument.

Now it is to demand an impoſſibility with regard t any firſt ſtate of progreſſive beings. For it is in rea lity, either to demand a phyſical or a moral impo ſibility that ſuch beings ſhould ever err. But to de mand a phyſical impoſſibility, in this caſe, is cer tainly to demand, that their progreſs ſhould nowiſe depend upon themſelves, which is, in other words to demand that they ſhould not be progreſſive beings or beings to be formed to perfection in knowledge and virtue, by their own application to improve themſelves. And to demand a moral impoſſibility, that beings ſo made ſhould ever err, what is it but to demand, that it ſhould not belong to the nature of moral agents, to be able to aſſent to any opinions that are not true, or to be determined in their conduct by any views that are falſe. And both theſe demands are equally abſurd in any ſenſe that can be put upon them, but this alone: That ſuch ought to be the nature of things, that truth only can have the full and complete diſtinguiſhing evidence of truth, and right only can have the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics of right, which every one will readily own to be neceſſarily and immutably the caſe with regard to truth and right, whatever falſe judgments or wrong choices any one may precipitantly make.

Theſe

Theſe demands, if taken in any other ſenſe, require that moral beings ſhould be ſo formed, as that either ſomething elſe ſhould be neceſſary to perſwade and determine them, than the appearances of things to their minds, and what that ſhould be, is abſolutely inconceiveable: Or that their making true judgments and acting rightly, ſhould be in their own power ſome other way, than by their being furniſhed with the faculties, ſenſes and diſpoſitions neceſſary to make true judgments and right choices; and by its depending on themſelves to exert and employ theſe faculties and diſpoſitions as they ought, in order to diſtinguiſh truth and right from vice and falſhood; which is alſo quite inconceiveable. There is abſolutely no middle between theſe two ſtates; beings with a certain ſphere of activity, or a certain dependence of effects upon their own application of their own faculties to this or the other purpoſe; and beings who have no power, no ſphere of activity, or upon whoſe will there is no dependence of effects as to their exiſtence or non-exiſtence: Beings, whoſe right and wrong uſe of their faculties is in their own power, and beings who have no active powers, no dominion.

Further illuſtrations on this argument.

In order to ſet this in another light, let me but juſt aſk any one, whether it is poſſible to conceive beings made for progreſs in knowledge and virtue, all of whom do from the very beginning, and during the whole courſe of their lives, form juſt judgments in all caſes, where choice and determination is immediately neceſſary, without ever erring; without ever miſtaking their intereſt or duty? Or to keep cloſe to our ſtate, which is that now under conſideration; let me aſk, whether it is poſſible to conceive all men, even in their moſt infant and unimproved ſtate, ever acting under the influence of right views, and with due proportionate affections to the values of objects, without any one's ever miſtaking his true intereſt and the nature of things in any point; without any

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one's ever yielding rashly to any sollicitations of in viting pleasure; or without his having certain appe tites oftner called forth into action, by certain concur rences of circumstances, than any others, and thu made stronger in his constitution by frequent exer cise, than those which, tho' equally natural to him are not so frequently solicited by their proper objects. Whether, in one word, he can conceive all mei as they are now formed, ever so acting, and so in fluenced to act by circumstances, which must necessari ly excite certain affections to a certain degree, tha none, (for instance) shall conceive too high an opi nion of power over the rest; an inclination to hav it; or having it, not be disposed to exert it otherwis than to the greatest advantage of others in all re spects, without abusing, deceiving, or hurting an one in any degree. I believe every one will readil grant this to be inconceivable or morally impossible But if any one, upon granting it to be so, should urge why then man is made; or why is there such a stat at all. He does really ask either. 1. Why there i any affection, faculty or appetite in our constitution which in the nature of things is capable of being th source of bad. Which is to ask, why there is any affection, faculty or appetite in our nature at all Since there can be no faculty, no affection, or appetite even of the social or benevolent kind, which may no by misguidance become the source of evil. Or 2dly. Why any circumstances are allowed to take place, which may invite faculties, appetites or affec tions to operate in any way that is vicious or hurtful To which question, the only proper answer is to ask, what circumstances in life happen antecedent to, or independent of all wrong exercises of human powers, affections and appetites, which are not the consequences of some general law relative to our frame and state, which is of excellent use; nay, necessary to our perfection and happiness: and what circumstances in life happen consequently to mankind's own wrong exercises of their

No objection can be fetched from hence that does not terminate in an absurdity.

their powers, which are not likewiſe the fit and proper consequences of their being made for happineſs and perfection, proportionally to their right uſe of their powers and faculties: Or to aſk in general, what effect belonging to human nature may not be reduced to ſome general law, either of the natural world, or of the moral kind, which is itſelf of the greateſt utility, if not neceſſity to our happineſs and perfection. Now it hath been proved over and over again in this Eſſay, that every faculty, appetite, and affection in our nature, and every law relative to their exerciſes, is of admirable uſe. CHAP. II.

In fine, to infer from our being ſo made by nature, that our affections, appetites and faculties, which are of very great uſe, may be perverted and abuſed, or wrongfully employed; to infer from thence, that we have a very bad make and conſtitution; or that our make and conſtitution is very improperly ſituated and placed; is not only to argue againſt the utility of a thing from the perverſion of it, which is allowed in every other caſe to be an abſurd way of reaſoning; but it is to infer that we are badly made, becauſe we are made capable of turning a very large ſtock of powers, faculties, appetites and affections to very good account; in ſuch a way as we may have the merit of it, and the pleaſure ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of ſuch merit. For it is ſelf-evident, that were it not the order and conſtitution of nature with regard to us, that right uſe and bad uſe of our natural ſtock ſhould depend on ourſelves, we could make no acquiſition; we could not be capable either of praiſe or blame, good or ill deſert, becauſe nothing would be ours in any proper ſenſe of that word. Obſerving the connexions of things, in order to act wiſely or agreeably to them, could not be our employment, or the ſource of our happineſs, as it is at preſent: We would only be capable of receiving a ſucceſſion of meer ſenſations, external or

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internal, without any of the interpoſitions of our own reaſon or will, which being our own interpoſitions, give us a title to the character of moral active beings; and are the ſource, as ſuch, of all the nobleſt pleaſures we enjoy.

Two principles in human nature reign,
Self-love to urge; and reaſon to reſtrain;
Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call,
Each works its end, to move or govern all:
And to their proper operation ſtill
Aſcribe all good; to their improper, ill.
Self-love, the ſpring of motion, acts the ſoul;
Reaſon's comparing Ballance rules the whole;
Man, but for that, no action could attend,
And but for this, were active to no end.
Fix'd like a plant, on his peculiar ſpot,
To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot;
Or meteor-like, flame lawleſs through the void,
Deſtroying others, by himſelf deſtroy'd.

Eſſay on Man, Ep. 2.

We muſt admit this ſolution to be good; or ſay, that good taſte ought not to be an acquirable perfection.

We may illuſtrate all that hath been ſaid by this obvious ſimilitude. Does not every one reſt ſatisfied, that the right culture of his garden depends abſolutely on himſelf, tho' notwithſtanding a ſenſe of harmony, beauty, and of true imitation of nature be natural to all men, yet one muſt have improved that ſenſe very much, and have ſtudied gardening before he can be able to lay out fields with good taſte: and tho' it be morally impoſſible, ſome amongſt mankind ſhould not fall into a wrong taſte of imitating nature, or of beauty in laying out fields, or in other imitative arts, notwithſtanding the natural ſenſe of beauty common to all mankind, capable of being improved by all to a perfectly good taſte. Does any one think his gardens independent on him, becauſe his fields are not ſo made, that nothing can ſucceed, but what is done according to right taſte, and tends to make a good whole

whole; or becauſe negligence and wrong taſte have bad effects, and it is only good culture and good taſte, that can make a well-diſpoſed garden, ſuitably furniſhed with all that is uſeful and delicious, wholeſome and beautiful? Would any one have our taſte in this, or any other of the elegant arts, not to depend upon our own improvement of our natural faculties, or to be acquirable otherwiſe than it is by us? Does not every one take the acquiſition of ſuch a taſte to be ſufficiently in his power, as things are conſtituted; and is he not ſenſible of the abridgement, nay, total deſtruction of the pleaſures the elegant arts now give; that would neceſſarily enſue, if improvements in them were not made as they now are? CHAP. II.

But if this be owned, it muſt by parity of reaſon be acknowledged, that the right culture of all our other natural powers and diſpoſitions, and of the mind, in general, is ſufficiently in our power as we are now conſtituted; and that, in any other way, our improvement would not be our own acquiſition, nor by conſequence give us the pleaſures it now does, by being our own work and acquiſition. Let not men therefore contradict themſelves, and call that unreaſonable and unfit in one caſe, which they allow to be proper and very well ordered in another preciſely parallel or like caſe: but let it be remembered, that the way of the human mind's operation towards its improvement, ought to be uniform; that the way to one improvement ought to be analogous to the way of improvement in every other caſe: or that it is fit there ſhould be an univerſal fixed order with regard to the manner of attaining to perfection of whatever kind; that is, of whatever faculty, diſpoſition, taſte or affection in our nature, *viz.* that it ſhould be in proportion to our diligence and care to improve our knowledge and taſte. Which none will ſay.

III. All this will be yet plainer, if we conſider the vices of mankind in their true light, or trace them to Vices are but the corruptions or degeneracies of good and uſeful affections.

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to their real ſprings; for we univerſally find, "that "no man acts from pure malice; that the injurious "perſon only intends ſome intereſt of his own with- "out any ultimate deſire of our miſery; and that "he is more to be pitied for his own mean ſelfiſh "temper, for the want of true goodneſs, and its "attendant happineſs, than to be hated for his con- "duct, which is really more pernicious to himſelf "than to others. There is no reaſon to think, "there is any ſuch thing as pure diſintereſted ma- "lice in the moſt vicious of mankind." (*g*)

Some of ſelf-love which is abſolutely neceſſary.

And, in reality, if we trace vices to their ſources, we ſhall find, that they are all the corruptions or degeneracies of highly uſeful and noble affections. This point is exceedingly well handled by *Plato* in his *Gorgias*, but I ſhall only on this ſubject, excerpt two obſervations from two excellent modern writers upon it, which are ſufficient to ſhew us from what ſprings all vices proceed, or to what cauſes they ought to be aſcribed. Dr. *Henry More*, in his *Divine Dialogues*, ſpeaking of vices, ſays, "They are the ſpawn of ſelf-love, which, if we eye narrowly, we ſhall find to be very uſeful, nay, a very neceſſary mother in ſociety. Self-love is abſolutely neceſſary: nay, it is no more than the deſire of pleaſure and happineſs, without which a ſenſitive being cannot ſubſiſt: and if rightly conducted, it would lead us to the purſuit of virtue as our intereſt. Yet wrath, envy, pride, luſt, and the like evil paſſions, are but the branches and modifications of this fundamental neceſſary diſpoſition towards good and happineſs; for what is wrath, but ſelf-love edged and ſtrengthened for ſending off the aſſaults of evil? What is envy but ſelf-love grieved at the ſenſe of its own want, aggravated and made more ſenſible by the fullneſs of another's enjoyment? What is pride, but ſelf-love deſiring to be the beſt, or aſpiring for the beſt,

(*g*) See *Hutcheſon on the paſſions*, whoſe words I here uſe.

and

and partly triumphing and glorying that it is now become none of the leaſt? He quotes an excellent ſaying of *Socrates* to this purpoſe, that the wicked man really purſues, by a fatal miſtake, that which is worſt for himſelf; that he himſelf is the greateſt ſufferer; and that therefore, with the wiſe and good he can be no object of envy, but of pity and compaſſion."

This was the opinion of the beſt ancients.

Such indeed was the opinion of all the wiſer and better ancients (*h*) concerning vices. A philoſophy as much more tender and humane, as it is truer than

(*h*) See *Plutarch de virtute morali.*———Multo autem his utiliores ſunt affectuum fœtus, rationi præſto ubi ſunt, eique ad virtutum enitenti opem ferant. Sic moderata ira fortitudini adjumento eſt, odium in malos juſtitiæ, ac juſta indignatio adverſus nullo ſuo merito rebus ſecundis elatos, quando hi dementia ſimul atque petulantia inflammatis animis correctione opus habent. Jam ab amicitia naturalem ad diligendum propenſionem, ab humanitate miſericordiam, a vera benevolentia gaudere una atque dotere, ne ſi velis avellere ullo modo poſſis. Præterea ſi peccant qui una cum inſano amore omnem tollunt amorem: equidem non recte agunt, qui propter avaritiam omnes etiam alias damnent appetitiones. Sed perinde agunt ac ſi quis currendum, quod aliquando impingatur, aut jaciendum neget, quia nonnunquam a ſcopo aberretur; aut canendum quod inſcite canatur. — Adde quod ſi omnino evelli ex animis affectus poſſint multorum eorum ratio hebetior fierit atque ocioſior, ſicut gubernator vento ceſſante non admodum habet quod agat. Atque hæc ut apparet, obſervantis legumlatoris id in civitate ambitionem, æmulationemque excitant, &c.—Non enim tam recte cum Xenocrate dixeris, mathematicas diſciplinas eſſe anſas philoſophiæ: quam hoc, affectus iſtos verecundiam, cupiditatem, pœnitentiam, voluptatem, dolorem, anſas eſſe adoleſcentium: quas ſalutari atque concinna opportunitate ratio & lex apprehendentes, eos cum profectu in rectam perducant viam, ut non male profeſſus fuerit *Laco* ille pædagogus effecturum ſe, ut puer gauderet honeſtis, ac moleſte ferat turpia. quo liberalis inſtitutionis fine neque major poteſt ullus, neque pulchrior nuncupari.

Virtus eſt rationis prudentia, iræ fortitudo, cupidinis temperantia, & totius animi juſtitia.——— Vitium ex oppoſitis; rationis inſipientia, iræ pavor, cupidinis intemperantia, totius denique animi in juſtitia. Virtutis ex recta vivendi ratione, rectaque educatione; vitia ex contrariis. *Saluſti philoſophi de diis & mundo*, Cap. 10.

the

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the prevailing modern philoſophy, which delights in exhibiting man in the blackeſt colours. There certainly is implanted in our nature that deſire of power and dominion which *Hobbes* takes notice of: and from the degeneracies, corruptions and perverſions of this natural appetite, many woful evils do indeed ariſe. But *Hobbes*'s error conſiſts in his conſidering, that deſire of power and dominion as the only principle of our nature, and not taking along with it the other equally natural appetites with which it is united in our frame, and with which it is therefore intended to co-operate; and in the juſt ballance of which kept and maintained by the preſiding authority of reaſon, virtue or the health and perfection of the mind conſiſts. Now theſe other appetites and diſpoſitions are our love of knowledge, and our delight in truth, or our deſire of knowing the real connexions, relations and values of things: our love of ſociety and public good: and our moral ſenſe or our determination to approve or diſapprove affections, actions and characters, according as they are conducive to public good or public miſchief. My Lord *Shaftbury* refutes this gloomy pernicious doctrine of *Hobbes*, in the truly philoſophical, pleaſant and good natured way, of which we have ſeveral examples among the ancients when they are reaſoning againſt the ſame tenets. We find *Arrian* juſt arguing in the ſame way in his commentaries upon *Epictetus* againſt that opinion, as Lord *Shaftſbury* does againſt *Hobbes*. *Cicero* often treats the ſame opinion in the ſame pleaſant manner: and thoſe excellent authors do indeed ſet a noble example before us, that ought to be imitated in all diſputes and controverſies, even of the moſt important kind. For what can be of greater moment than the queſtion about the human make, whether it argues a good or a bad diſpoſition in its Author: and yet even upon this ſubject, they ſhun invectives and uſe kindly terms, preferring hard arguments to abuſive words.

They ſet us an excellent example of the beſt manner of confutation.

It

It was certainly, as Lord *Shaftſbury* obſerves, ‖ an extreme dread of anarchy and licentiouſneſs, that frightened *Hobbes*, into his ſyſtem of abſolute monarchy and paſſive obedience: the fright he took upon the ſight of the then governing powers, who unjuſtly aſſumed the authority of the people, gave him ſuch an abhorrence of all popular government, and of the very notion of liberty itſelf, that to extinguiſh it for ever, he recommends the very extinguiſhing of letters, and exhorts princes not to ſpare ſo much as one ancient *Greek* or *Roman* hiſtorian. His quarrel with religion was the ſame as with liberty; the ſame times gave him the ſame terror in this other kind: he had nothing before his eyes beſides the ravages of enthuſiaſm, and the artifices of thoſe who raiſed and conducted that ſpirit. Hence likewiſe his quarrel with human nature. But what ſhould we ſay to one of theſe anti-zealots, who in the zeal of ſuch a cool philoſophy, ſhould aſſure us faithfully, "that we were the moſt miſtaken men in the world to imagine there was any ſuch thing as natural faith or juſtice? For that it was only force and power that conſtituted right. That there was no ſuch thing in reality as virtue; no principle of order in things above or below; no ſecret charm or force of nature, by which every one was made to operate willingly or unwillingly towards public good, and puniſhed and tormented if he did otherwiſe. Is not this the very charm itſelf? Is not the gentleman at this inſtant under the power of it?—"Sir, the philoſophy you have condeſcended to reveal to us is the moſt extraordinary. We are beholden to you for your inſtruction. But, pray, whence is this zeal in our behalf? what are we to you? are you our father? or if you were, why this concern for us? is there then ſuch a thing as natural affection? if not, why all this pains? why all this danger on our account? why not keep this ſecret to yourſelf? or what advantage is it to you

‖ See his *Eſſay on the freedom of wit and humour*. This paſſage is quoted as an example of good natured refutation.

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to deliver us from the cheat? the more are taken in it, the better. 'Tis directly against your interest to undeceive us, and let us know that only private interest governs you, and that nothing nobler, or of a larger kind should govern us whom you converse with. Leave us to ourselves, and to that notable art, by which we are happily tamed and rendered thus mild and *sheepish*. 'Tis not fit we should know, that by nature we are all wolves. Is it possible, that any one who has really discovered himself such, should take pains to communicate such a discovery?"

But mere vices are the degeneracies of benevolent affections by misguidance.

II. But this leads me to another observation upon the springs and sources of human vices; the great disturbers of human life, and on account of which the human make is subject of complaint, or rather railery among some philosophers; and it is this, "a great many evils are not so properly the product of self-love wrong directed, and of our desire of power, which are, however they may be perverted in themselves, very suitable; nay, necessary affections or dispositions in our nature: but they are really the degeneracies of benevolence itself; for as the noble Author just now quoted, observes, "Does "not *Philanthropy*, ‖ or the love of mankind, by a "small misguidance of the affection become pernicious and destructive? A lover of mankind becomes a ravager: a hero and deliverer becomes an "oppressor and destroyer. But if we consider matters rightly, it is not strange, that war, which of "all things appears the most savage, should be the "passion of the most heroic spirits. For it is in war that "the knot of fellowship is closest drawn. 'Tis in war "that mutual succour is most given, mutual danger "run, and common affection most exerted and employed. The generous passion is no where so strongly "felt, or vigorously exerted, as in actual conspiracy or "war; in which the highest genius's are often known "the forwardest to employ themselves. For the most

‖ See *Charact.* T. 1. p. 115. whence this excellent observation is taken.

"generous

" generous ſpirits are the moſt combining. They
" delight moſt to move in concert, and feel, if I
" may ſo ſay, in the ſtrongeſt manner the force of
" the confederating charm.

The ſame Author furniſhes us with another example in caballing or cantonizing. " How the wit
" of man, ſaith he, ſhould ſo puzzle this cauſe
" as to make civil government and ſociety appear a
" kind of invention, and creature of art, I know
" not. For my own part, methinks this herding
" principle and aſſociating inclination, is ſeen ſo
" natural and ſtrong in moſt men, that one might
" readily affirm, 'twas even from the violence of
" this paſſion, that ſo much diſorder aroſe in the
" general ſociety of mankind.

" Univerſal good, or the intereſt of the world,
" in general, is a kind of remote philoſophical ob-
" ject. That greater community falls not eaſily un-
" der the eye. Nor is a national intereſt, or that of
" a whole people, or body politic, ſo readily appre-
" hended. In leſs parties, men may be intimately
" acquainted or converſant, and acquainted with
" one another. They can there better taſte ſociety,
" and enjoy the common good and intereſt of a
" more contracted public. They view the whole
" compaſs and extent of their community; and ſee,
" and know particularly whom they ſerve, and to
" what end they aſſociate and conſpire. All men
" have naturally their ſhare of this combining prin-
" ciple, and they who are of the ſprightlieſt and
" moſt active faculties, have ſo large a ſhare of it,
" that unleſs it be happily directed by right reaſon,
" it can never find exerciſe for itſelf in ſo remote a
" ſphere as that of the body politic at large. For
" here, perhaps, the thouſand part of thoſe whoſe
" intereſts are concerned, are ſcarce ſo much as
" known by ſight. No viſible band is formed; no
" ſtrict alliance; but the conjunction is made with
" different perſons, orders, and ranks of men; not
ſenſibly,

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" ſenſibly, but in idea; according to that genera
" view, or notion of a ſtate or common-wealth.
" Hence other diviſions amongſt men. Hence
" in the way of peace and civil government
" that love of party and ſubdiviſion by cabal
" For ſedition is a kind of cantonizing already be
" gun within a ſtate. To cantonize is natural, wher
" the ſociety grows vaſt and bulky: and powerfu
" ſtates have found other advantages in ſending co-
" lonies abroad, than merely that of having elbow-
" room at home, or extending their dominion into
" diſtant countries. Vaſt empires are in many re-
" ſpects unnatural, but particularly in this, that be
" they ever ſo well conſtituted, the affairs of many
" muſt, in ſuch governments, turn upon a very
" few; and the relation be leſs ſenſible, and in a
" manner loſt, between the magiſtrate and people,
" in a body ſo unwieldy in its limbs, and whoſe
" members lie ſo remote from one another, and
" diſtant from the head.

" 'Tis in ſuch bodies as theſe that great factions
" are apt to engender. The aſſociating ſpirits,
" for want of exerciſe, form new movements, and
" ſeek a narrower ſphere of activity, when they
" want action in a greater. Thus we have *wheels*
" *within wheels.* And in ſome national conſtitu-
" tions (notwithſtanding the abſurdity in politics)
" we have one empire within another. Nothing is
" ſo delightful as to incorporate. Diſtinctions of
" many kinds are invented; religious ſocieties are
" formed; orders are erected; and their intereſts
" eſpouſed and ſerved with the utmoſt zeal and
" paſſion. Founders and patrons of this ſort are
" never wanting. Wonders are performed in this
" wrong ſocial ſpirit by theſe members of ſepa-
" rate ſocieties. And the aſſociating genius of man
" is never better proved, than in theſe very ſocie-
" ties, which are formed in oppoſition to the gene-
" ral

" ral one of mankind, and to the real intereſt of CHAP. II.
" the ſtate.

" In ſhort, the very ſpirit of faction, for the " greateſt part, ſeems to be no other than the abuſe " and irregularity of that ſocial love and common " affection, which is natural to mankind. For the " oppoſite to ſociableneſs is ſelfiſhneſs. And of all " characters, the narrow, ſelfiſh one is the leaſt " forward in taking party. The men of this ſort " are, in this reſpect, true men of moderation. " They are ſecure of their temper, and poſſeſs " themſelves too well, to be in danger of entering " warmly in any cauſe, or engaging deeply with " any ſide or faction."

Thus we ſee that almoſt all the vices of mankind are nothing elſe but the degeneracies of good and uſeful affections; or good, uſeful affections influenced by narrow views. I do not ſay this to extenuate the guilt or deformity of vice, but to ſhew how we ought to judge of our make and conſtitution, notwithſtanding all the vices which have or do prevail in the world. For ſure that ought not to be imputed to the Author of nature, which is in reality a perverſion of the qualities he has endowed us with for excellent purpoſes. Properly ſpeaking, the original ſtock is his, and what alone he is accountable for; the uſe or abuſe of our affections is ours, if there be any being in the world who hath any thing that can be called its own; or if there can be, with regard to any being, any foundation for approving or blaming itſelf.

All this is delightfully illuſtrated by the excellent moral poet ſo often quoted, in ſeveral parts of his truly philoſophical, as well as poetical, eſſay on man.

Better for us, perhaps, it might appear,
Were there all harmony, all virtue here;
That never air or ocean felt the wind;
That never paſſion diſcompos'd the mind:

But all ſubſiſts by elemental ſtrife;
And paſſions are the elements of life.
The gen'ral order, ſince the whole began,
Is kept in nature, and is kept in man.
What would this man? Now upward would he ſoar
And little leſs than angel, would be more;
Now looking downwards, juſt as griev'd appears,
To want the ſtrength of bulls, the fur of bears.
Made for his uſe all creatures if he call,
Say what their uſe, had he the powers of all?
Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 1

And with regard to the paſſions implanted in ou
nature,

As fruits ungrateful to the planter's care,
On ſavage ſtocks inſerted, learn to bear;
The ſureſt virtues thus from paſſions ſhoot,
Wild nature's vigour working at the root.
What crops of wit and honeſty appear,
From ſpleen, from obſtinacy, hate, or fear!
See anger, zeal and fortitude ſupply;
Ev'n av'rice, prudence; ſloth, philoſophy;
Envy, to which th' ignoble mind's a ſlave,
Is emulation in the learn'd and brave:
Luſt, thro' ſome certain ſtrainers well refin'd,
Is gentle love, and charms all womankind:
Nor virtue, male or female, can we name,
But what will grow on pride, or grow on ſhame.
Thus nature gives us (let it check our pride)
The virtue neareſt to our vice ally'd;
Reaſon the byaſs turns to good from ill,
And Nero *reigns a* Titus, *if he will.*
The fiery ſoul abhorr'd in Cataline,
In Decius *charms, in* Curtius *is divine,*
The ſame ambition can deſtroy, or ſave,
And makes a patriot, as it makes a knave.
Eſſay on man, Epiſt. 2

Bu

IV. But to clear up this point yet further, let us reflect what we would have done by nature to ſet us right, and to prevent our abuſe of our powers and affections; or what we can conceive poſſible for nature to have done for that effect, which it hath not done. CHAP. II.

Nature could not poſſibly have done more for us than it has.

It appears from what has been ſaid of vices, that none of them take their riſe from affections or appetites in our nature, merely implanted for evil purpoſes, or to qualify us for vices. No vice takes it riſe from a paſſion or affection abſolutely hurtful, and not fitted for very good purpoſes. Even the love of power, as hurtful as it is by ſome effects of it, is in itſelf a moſt noble principle in our nature, as being the foundation of greatneſs of mind, and of many lofty and excellent virtues. Without it, the human mind would have been timorous, ſubmiſſive, low and groveling; it could never have riſen to great attempts, or have been capable of great ſentiments. Magnanimity, deſpight of danger, and public ſpirit, could not poſſibly have been virtues within our reach, without ſuch an original greatneſs of mind, as ſuppoſes the deſire of extending our abilities and our ſphere of activity. But if this is really the caſe, nature acted a kind part with regard to us, in implanting in us this principle; it certainly intended our good and perfection by it. Or would any man chuſe to have had mankind ſecured againſt the bad effects of wrong-turned ambition, at the expence of our being utterly deſtitute of a capacity of noble and worthy ambition, of high ideas, great ſentiments, and ſuitable actions?

The original forces of affections ſtand right.

How, therefore, can we conceive mankind to be ſecured by its Author againſt the vices which really ſpring from affections neceſſary to our good and perfection, influenced and directed by falſe and narrow views, till they are become very ſtrong and powerful; nay, are quite wrought into temper by repeated acts, in conſequence of the uſeful law of habits: how, I ſay, can we conceive mankind ſe-

CHAP. II. cured by our Author againſt ſuch vices, and thei hurtful effects, otherwiſe than by his originally we proportioning the forces of the affections implante by him in our nature, to one another, and to th general good of the whole ſyſtem; and by giving us reaſon, together with a ſenſe of order and juſ ſubordination, in the regulation of all our natura affections, to enable us to direct and guide them t their beſt ends. This is certainly the only conceiv able way, conſiſtent with our being reaſonable be ings, our having any moral ſphere of activity, o our being capable of approving ourſelves and ou conduct. For nothing can be more evident tha that it is the power of governing appetites, affection and actions by reaſon, and a ſenſe of right and wrong that makes the order of beings called rational crea tures; an order, confeſſed to be ſuperior in rank and dignity to ſuch as have no ſenſe of right and wrong, no power over their perceptions, motions and choices; or rather, no power of chuſing, pre fering and acting.

I. Now with reſpect to the original forces of our affections, it is well obſerved by an excellent author, whom we have often quoted, that to aſſert (‖), "Tha men have generally arrived to the perfection of their kind in this life, is contrary to experience. But on the other hand, to ſuppoſe no order at all in the conſtitution of our nature, or no prevalent evidences of good order, is yet more contrary to experience. We actually ſee ſuch degrees of good order, of ſocial affection, of virtue and honour, as make the generality of mankind continue in a tolerable, nay, an agreeable ſtate. However, in ſome tempers we ſee the ſelfiſh paſſions by habits grown too ſtrong, in others we may obſerve humanity, compaſſion and good nature ſometimes raiſed, by habits, to exceſs.

(‖) Mr. *Hutcheſon* on the paſſions.

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Illuſtration on this argument.

Were we to ſtrike a medium of the paſſions and affections, as they appear in the whole ſpecies of mankind, to conclude thence what has been the natural ballance, previouſly to any change made by cuſtom or habit, which we ſee caſts the ballance to either ſide, we ſhould, perhaps, find the medium of the public affections not very far from a ſufficient counter-ballance to the medium of the ſelfiſh; and conſequently the over-ballance on either ſide, in particular characters, is not to be looked upon as the original conſtitution, but as the accidental effect of cuſtom, habit, aſſociations of ideas, or other ſuch cauſes; ſo that an univerſal increaſing the ſtrength of either, might, in the whole, be of little advantage. The raiſing univerſally the public affections, the deſires of virtue and honour, would make the hero of *Cervantes*, pining with hunger and poverty, no rare character. The univerſal increaſing of ſelfiſhneſs, unleſs we had more accurate underſtandings to diſcern our niceſt intereſts, would fill the world with univerſal rapine and war. The conſequences of either univerſally abating or increaſing the deſires between the ſexes, the love of offſpring, or the ſeveral taſtes and fancies in other pleaſures, would perhaps be found more pernicious to the whole, than the preſent conſtitution. What ſeems moſt truly wanting in our nature, is greater knowledge, attention and conſideration; had we a greater perfection this way, and were evil habits, and fooliſh aſſociations of ideas prevented, our paſſions would appear in better order.

But while we feel in ourſelves ſo much public affection in the various relations of life, and obſerve the like in others; while we find every one deſiring indeed his own happineſs, but capable of diſcerning by a little attention, that not only his external conveniency, or worldly intereſt, but even the moſt immediate and lively ſenſations of delight, of which his nature is ſuſceptible, immediately flow from a

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public ſpirit, a generous, humane, compaſſionate temper, and a ſuitable deportment; while we obſerve ſo many thouſands enjoying a tolerable ſtate of eaſe and ſafety, for each one whoſe condition is made intolerable, even during our preſent corruption: how can any one look upon this world as under the direction of an evil nature, or even queſtion a perfectly good providence? How clearly does the order of our nature point out to us our true happineſs and perfection, and lead us to it, as naturally as the ſeveral powers of the earth, the ſun, and air, bring plants to their growth, and the perfection of their kinds? We, indeed, are directed to it by our underſtanding and affections, as it becomes rational and active natures; and they by mechanic laws. We may ſee that attention to the moſt univerſal intereſt of all ſenſitive natures, is the perfection of each individual of mankind. That they ſhould thus be, like well-tuned inſtruments, affected with any ſtroke or touch upon any one. Nay, how much of this do we actually ſee in the world? What generous ſympathy, compaſſion, and congratulation with each other? Does not even the flouriſhing ſtate of the inanimate parts of nature, fill us with joy? Is not thus our nature admoniſhed, exhorted, and commanded, to cultivate univerſal goodneſs and love, by a voice heard through all the earth, and words ſounding to the ends of the world? (*m*)

Now what is the reſult of all this excellent reaſoning from the experience of all mankind, but that there is ground to think, our affections ſtand originally in our nature very well proportioned to one another, and to the ultimate end of them all, the general good of the kind, and the private good of every individual, ſo far as the good of the kind

(*m*) This author makes another obſervation to the ſame purpoſe, page 177, which the reader may conſult.

admits

admits the private good of every individual to be consulted; or that all the variety, with respect to the human affections, there is any reason to imagine to be original, is well adjusted to the public good. These conclusions do certainly ensue from the experiences above narrated. And indeed, the most considerable inequalities that are observed in human life, with respect to the forces of the affections, of whatever kind, do plainly take their rise from what hath been proved to be of admirable use in our nature, *viz.* the way and manner in which habits are generated or produced. It is by habit only that any appetite or affection is strengthened, or wrought into temper. CHAP. II.

II. Now there being ground to think that the affections originally stand right, or in due proportion in our original nature, what more could nature have done for us, in order to their being preserved in a due ballance, for private and public good, than to have given us reason, and a sense of right and wrong, to govern them by?

And nature hath given us a guiding principle.

That we have such a power or faculty is indisputable; and how this faculty may gain strength, is no less evident to experience: even by exercise, as all our other faculties, powers and principles do. But to say, why hath not nature made reason stronger in us, or to grow up faster, is indeed to ask, why reason is a faculty improvable into strength and vigour by exercise. It is to ask, why it does not acquire force and authority, otherwise than by due culture. It is therefore to ask, why it is reason. It is known to be early in our power to bring reason to very great perfection, with regard to the management of our passions; for, as corrupt as man is, we have many instances of such perfection: this is in our power, in any sense that any thing can be said to be in our power, and if we do not cultivate reason, it does not arrive at due perfection, for this very good

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cauſe, "That nature deſigned and willed that the cultivation of our reaſon ſhould be a progreſſive work, dependent on ourſelves." I am obliged often to have recourſe to this principle, this law of our nature, becauſe it is univerſal, or runs through the whole of our compoſition (*n*).

All this is beautifully expreſſed by our excellent moral poet.

Moſt ſtrength the moving principle requires,
Active its taſk, it prompts, impels, inſpires;
Sedate and quiet the comparing lies,
Form'd but to check, delib'rate, and adviſe.
Self-love yet ſtronger, as its object's nigh;
Reaſon's at diſtance, and in proſpect lie;
That ſees immediate good by preſent ſenſe,
Reaſon the future, and the conſequence;
Thicker than arguments, temptations throng,
At beſt more watchful this, but that more ſtrong.
The action of the ſtronger to ſuſpend,
Reaſon ſtill uſe, to reaſon ſtill attend:
Attention, habit and experience gains,
Each ſtrengthens reaſon, and ſelf-love reſtrains.

Eſſay on man, Ep. 2.

I ſhall only now add one thing with reſpect to it, that has hitherto been but juſt ſuggeſted, namely, that men never heſitate in admitting it to be a good

(*n*) Animi conſtitutio ſic ſe habet, ut una ſit ejus pars ratio, altera iracundia, tertia cupiditas. Ratio cognitioni, ira robori, cupiditas appetitui præeſt. Cum igitur hæc tria una compago in unum redigantur, tum virtus in animo gignitur & concordia: cum per ſeditionem inter ſe dividuntur, vitium oritur atque diſcordia. Sunt autem virtuti hæc tria neceſſaria, ratio, facultas & conſilium. Jam ratione animæ præditæ virtus eſt prudentia, quoniam judicii & contemplationis particeps eſt habitus: iracundiæ autem fortitudo, quandoquidem reſiſtit, & gravia perfert hic habitus: cupiditatis vero temperantia, poſteaquam corporis voluptatum quædam eſt moderatio: totius denique animi juſtitia, &c. *Ex Theage Pythagorio, in libro de virtutibus.*

account

account of nature, with reſpect to any of our exter- CHAP. II.
nal powers, or their ſubjects, to ſhew that the right management of them depends upon ourſelves; for that we are free with regard to them, they never doubt. Thus no man thinks of blaming nature, becauſe one does not manage his eyes, or any other of his ſenſes or members, to the beſt advantage for his conveniency and pleaſure, in the way of merely animal life: that is readily ſaid to be one's own fault, when the perſon is at his own diſpoſal, and free from external violence of every ſort. Here every ſuch an one is immediately pronounced free: no perſon is at a loſs to underſtand what this freedom means: and none who underſtand what it means, do not think, that in theſe matters, nature has done well to put our intereſt or good in our own power, and to make them dependent upon our ſelves. Every one will ſay, that not to have made man ſo, would have been to have made him a mere ſenſitive brute; and that ſuch an one, though he ſhould never feel any pain, but be entertained with a conſtant flow or ſucceſſion of agreeable ſenſations, would, however, be but a mere animal, quite paſſive, and far inferior to a being capable of foreſeeing and acting, or of purſuing ends by his own choice. But if this be owned with reſpect to external objects, and our ſphere of activity in the natural world, how comes it not to be owned with regard to moral objects, and our ſphere of activity in the moral world? Such a freedom with regard to the latter, muſt be freedom with regard to them, as much as the freedom with regard to external objects juſt defined, is freedom with reſpect to them. And if freedom with regard to external objects be any excellence: freedom of the ſame kind, with regard to moral objects, muſt be at leaſt an equal excellence. Let metaphyſicians quibble and wrangle about freedom as long as they pleaſe, it is certain, that in the ſame ſenſe that we can be ſaid, and are unanimouſly ſaid to be free,

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free, with respect to eating, drinking, walking, sitting, or any such external acts; we are likewise free with respect to many internal or moral acts, such as thinking upon this or the other subject, indulging or crossing this or the other affection, *&c.* Nay, which is more, with regard to moral acts, we have really more freedom than with regard to any of our operations upon external or material objects. For who is not sensible, that the cultivation of his mind depends more upon himself than the cultivation (for instance) of his garden; for it is subject to fewer letts and impediments than the other: the cultivation of our mind depends only upon our setting ourselves in earnest to do it; whereas the cultivation of our garden depends upon many causes we cannot oppose or controul.

If our having natural power be no ground of objection, having moral can be none.

All that I aim at by this is, that if we are but allowed to be free with regard to the operations of our minds about our affections, in the same sense that we are said to be free with regard to any external actions, or operations upon material objects; it must follow, that nature is not to be blamed for our mismanagements in the one case, more than for our mismanagements in the other, which nobody thinks of doing.

Account for moral, as for nat'ral things:
Why charge we heav'n in these, in those acquit?
In both, to reason right, is to submit.

Essay on man, Epist. 1.

Indeed, to blame nature in either of these cases, is to say, nature has done wrong in giving us any sphere of activity at all, or in making us creatures capable of acting by foresight and choice. But objections against man are sufficiently answered, if they are shewn ultimately to terminate in demanding, "Why nature hath made any order of beings of that kind, or made any creatures with such a sphere

ſphere of dominion, as raiſes them above creatures who do not at all guide themſelves, or chuſe for themſelves, having no guiding principle in their conſtitution."

If it is ſaid, that ſeveral men's minds are like certain ſpots of ground, uncapable of cultivation to any good purpoſe. It might be anſwered firſt of all, that it is not certain that there is any ſuch ſpot of ground, which by a full knowledge of ſoils acquireable by man, if he gives due pains, and takes right methods to attain to ſuch knowledge, may not be managed to a very uſeful purpoſe: we muſt firſt be able to ſay, the ſcience of nature cannot be carried farther than it hath been, before we can affirm any ſoil is abſolutely uſeleſs. But however that be, it may be juſtly affirmed, that there is no ground to think there is any ſuch mind amongſt mankind, otherwiſe than in conſequence of ſome law of matter and motion neceſſary to the good of the natural world, our union with which, and conſequently our dependence upon the laws of which, makes ſo proper a ſtate of being in the fullneſs of nature, as has been already proved. I believe all naturaliſts will agree with me, that there is reaſon to think from experience, that the incapacities of ideots and changelings is ſuch a phenomenon as diſtortion in the members of the body, and owing in like manner to natural cauſes. And in the third place, however even that may be, it is certain, on the one hand, that ſuch examples are very rare; and, on the other, that great variety of talents, not only with reſpect to ſtrength and quickneſs, but even in ſpecies, is requiſite to the happineſs and perfection of mankind: though all talents, faculties and genius's are not alike uſeful, yet there is none we know of which is not uſeful, or capable of being employed to very good purpoſes. Nay, on the contrary, the care of mankind about their happineſs is certainly very deficient in this very article, in not taking due pains to manage education

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cation in a manner suited to explore, bring forth and improve every various talent and temper in mankind; all these being so many materials nature has liberally laid to our hands, as a rich stock for the improvement of society into goods. And to this we may add, that human life absolutely requires that many should be more fitted for bodily exercise, than for the employments of the understanding; more for the labours of the hands, than for those of the head. But it is sufficient to our purpose to observe, that the fact in universal experience with regard to mankind is, that it is difference with regard to improvement and culture of natural powers and affections, that makes the most remarkable differences (*o*) and inequalities amongst mankind; insomuch that it may be justly said, "that every man's attaining to a good

(*o*) This objection would quickly evanish, if we would but reflect, 1. How necessary variety of talents and characters among mankind is.

There's some peculiar, *in each leaf and grain;*
Some unmark'd fibre, or some varying vein:
Shall only man be taken in the gross?
Grant but as many sorts of mind, as moss.

And, 2. Whence this variety proceeds.

That each from other differs first confess;
Next, that he varies from himself no less:
Add nature's, custom's, reason's, passion's strife,
And all opinion's colours cast on life.
Yet more; the diff'rence is as great between
The optics seeing, as the objects seen.
All manners take a tincture from our own,
Or come discolour'd thro' our passions shewn,
Or fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies,
Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dies.

'Tis education forms the common mind
Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclin'd.

Nature well known, no miracles remain,
Comets are regular, and Clodio *plain.*
Mr. *Pope*, Ep. Eth. B. 2. Epist. to Lord *Cobham.*

temper

temper of mind, and to light ſufficient for his right conduct in the more ordinary circumſtances of human life, is in every man's power." CHAP. II.

Take nature's path, and mad opinions leave,
All ſtates can reach it, and all heads conceive;
Obvious her goods, in no extreme they dwell,
There needs but thinking right, and acting well,
And mourn our various portions as we pleaſe,
Equal is common ſenſe, *and* common eaſe.
Eſſay on man, Ep. 4.

Reaſon, as ſuch, muſt depend on culture.

'Tis true, very many who call themſelves *philoſophers*, have taken great pleaſure; a very odd unaccountable pride, in declaiming againſt human reaſon: ſome have even gone ſuch a length, as to ſay, that the brutes are happier without it than man is with it; or can be, conſidering how weak it is and feeble; how eaſily it is deceived by any falſe ſemblance of good, and how eaſily it yields to every corrupt affection or headſtrong appetite; or rather how tamely it is driven before them; for ſo they ſpeak who make this objection, and ſo may we ſay of many perſons. But to what does all this amount, if it be true, as we have endeavoured to prove from experience, 1. That all our affections ſtand rightly in our nature. 2. That it is fit habits ſhould be contracted by repeated acts. And, 3dly. That it is fit, reaſon ſhould depend as to its ſtrength upon our culture or care to exerciſe and improve it? What do all thoſe objections prove, if theſe propoſitions be true, but that ſome do not take care to improve their reaſon, and therefore their reaſon is weak; and that ſome have, by indulging their paſſions in a wrong way, inſtead of governing them by reaſon, very ſtrong hurtful paſſions. It does not prove, that the way in which nature deſigned we ſhould improve in knowledge or in virtue, is not a good way. In order to make their

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their objection militate againſt the Author of our make, they muſt either prove, "that to have ſenſations without the power of chuſing, or any ſphere of activity, is a nobler, a better ſtate, than to have the power of chuſing, a guiding principle, and a ſphere of activity:" Or they muſt prove, "that it is a very bad ſtate of things to make perfection of any kind only attainable by care to improve one's faculties, powers and affections." For tho' it will be readily granted to them, that philoſophers (that is, ſome who are commonly ſo called) are frequently greater ſlaves to paſſions than others; yet what can be inferred from hence, but that the government of the affections requires not only the knowledge of right and wrong, but conſtant and ſteady diſcipline. A man may not only have made very great advances in ſeveral parts of learning and ſcience, without having much conſidered the nature of the human mind, and the right conduct of human affections; but one may even have that latter ſort of knowledge in theory to great perfection, and yet be a ſlave to ſome bad appetite for want of ſetting himſelf to ſubdue it, and to diſenthral himſelf from its tyranny by proper means. We have had again and again occaſion to obſerve, that it is by repeated acts alone, that new habits are produced, or that old ones are deſtroyed: and we have not only many examples before our eyes, even among the illiterate part of mankind, to convince us what perfection may be attained to, by right diſcipline in the conduct of the paſſions; but we have each of us ſomething within us, which tells us on every occaſion, that it is in our power to conquer any bad habit, any impetuous unruly appetite, and to attain to the maſterſhip of all our affections and deſires; and that it is at once our intereſt, and our duty, to ſet ourſelves to obtain this inward liberty, this ſelf-command, this beſt and nobleſt of dominions.

V. But,

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V. But, in the fifth place, we might juſt as well argue from the vices which prevail among mankind, that there is no ſuch thing as ſelf-love in our make, as that there is not a principle of benevolence in our nature. For what vice is contrary to the well-being of our kind, or of ſociety, which is not likewiſe contrary to the private good of every individual? The three greateſt moral evils, in human life, are ignorance, ſuperſtition and tyranny. Now let us conſider each of theſe, 1. Ignorance. No doubt, a vaſt many bad effects ariſe from it; but what better proviſion could nature have made than it has done for our improvement in knowledge? Man, indeed, through the defect of natural knowledge is not half the lord of the univerſe he would be, were he at due pains to improve his knowledge: all the lordſhip he hath, all the advantages he enjoys, are owing to his knowledge of nature; but what vaſt fields of natural knowledge lie yet quite uncultivated! Men in their ſtudies and reſearches go too far beyond or above themſelves; not that the knowledge of any part of nature is not worthy of purſuit, but becauſe the intereſts of mankind chiefly require acquaintance with our earth, with ſoils, with climates, with air, with water, with fire, and other ſubjects, more immediately relating to us and our advantages, to the preſervation of our health, the abridgement of our labour, and other conveniencies. It chiefly concerns us to know theſe elements; and if they are not underſtood, ſo far as to be able to make them as ſubſervient to our purpoſes as they might be rendered; whence is it, but from what hath made all the progreſs we have been able to make in natural knowledge, ſo late and ſlow; to our not ſtudying nature itſelf? Now, benevolence indeed, if we would but liſten to it, calls upon us for the ſake of mankind to apply ourſelves to this ſtudy: it calls upon ſocieties to ſet about and encourage theſe enquiries: it calls upon magiſtrates and rulers of ſtates to take proper methods

We may as well pretend to infer, that there is no ſuch thing as ſelf-love in our nature from the vices that prevail among mankind, as to pretend to prove from them, that there is no benevolence in our nature.

This reaſoning applied to ignorance of the natural world.

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methods of having this ſcience cultivated and purſued; becauſe all the intereſts of mankind are deeply concerned in the advancement of ſuch knowledge. But does ſelf-love leſs ſtrongly excite to what is ſo evidently the intereſt of the whole, and of every private perſon. And why then ſhould the neglect of this ſtudy be imputed merely to the want of benevolence in our nature, ſince all our private intereſts are noleſs concerned in it, than public good? If we neglect what ſelf-preſervation or ſelf-intereſt prompts to, is it allowed to be an argument, that there is no ſelf-love in our nature, or that it is too weak? And if that be not allowed, how can the neglect of what benevolence urges to, be reckoned a proof that there is no benevolence, no ſocial principle, no virtue in our compoſition: or why ſhould the Author of our nature be accuſed for not having dealt well with us, in not giving us a ſtrong enough deſire of public good, merely becauſe public good is not ſufficiently attended to; more than be accuſed for not having planted in us a ſtrong enough principle of ſelf-preſervation, ſince true ſelf-intereſt is not ſufficiently attended to, which is never done. For if it be fair to make the one accuſation, it muſt be ſo to make the other. And if it be ſufficient to vindicate nature, in the one caſe, that we are well endowed with the powers and means of knowing our intereſt; it muſt be ſufficient, in the other caſe, to vindicate nature, that we are ſufficiently provided with the power and means of knowing the public intereſt. Indeed our being ſo provided is a ſufficient juſtification of nature in both caſes, becauſe the chief enjoyments any beings are capable of, are thoſe which ariſe from the gradual improvement of their own powers, by proper care to improve them: this, I ſay, is a ſufficient vindication of our nature, eſpecially if it be added to the account, "that private and public good, are in the nature of things, the ſame,

ſame, or, at leaſt, inſeparably connected, and therefore, that to be rightly ſelfiſh is true wiſdom."

In the moral world.

II. The ſame reaſoning may be applied to moral knowledge, becauſe it can only be acquired in the ſame way as natural; that is, by experience and obſervation, or by the ſtudy of moral objects, as the other by the ſtudy of material ones; and becauſe ſelf-love no leſs ſtrongly dictates to us the ſtudy than benevolence does; a thorough knowledge of ourſelves, and of our intereſts and pleaſures, being evidently the intereſt of every particular perſon, as much as it can be the intereſt of the public. But then with regard to moral knowledge, it is worth while to obſerve further, that tho' the acurate knowledge of the human mind be a part of ſcience which has never been much cultivated, yet the common duties and offices of human life have always, or at all times, and in all ages been ſufficiently underſtood. This plainly appears from the hiſtory of mankind; for in all ages of the world, and in all countries, there have been proverbs in every one's mouth, which ſufficiently expreſs the greater part, or, at leaſt, the more important parts of morality. (*p*) The ignorance and barbarity of certain nations and times have been ſtudiouſly magnified by ſome travelers and hiſtorians, to ſerve I know not what purpoſes: but from others we learn, that hoſpitality, juſtice, gratitude, candor, temperance, and all the

(*p*) That temperance is the beſt preſervative of health, and that honeſty is the beſt policy, are univerſal proverbs in all countries, and they ever were ſo; and are not theſe a complete ſyſtem of morals. For every one becomes ſoon enough acquainted with his conſtitution to know what diſorders or diſcompoſes him; and, in order to know, what honeſty requires in any particular inſtance, one needs only ſuppoſe himſelf in the caſe propoſed, and ask himſelf, what he would deſire or expect to be done to him in it. But which is more, in all countries there are prevailing fables known to the vulgar, that expreſs in a very ſtrong manner, all the more important duties and rules of life.

CHAP. II. virtues have been found very general, even in nations called the most barbarous. Insomuch that no country has ever wanted its proverbs, as has been just said, expressing very fitly the advantages of them, and the obligations to them: not even the countries the most corrupted and perverted by superstition and tyranny: the two other great evils complained of in human life; and which are indeed the two greatest obstacles to the progress of useful knowledge; the great sources and supports of all the ignorance that has prevailed, or still prevails among mankind.

This reasoning applied to tyranny.

III. Now with regard to them, we may observe, that though we want very much a history of superstition, faithfully collected, it seems evident that if tyranny be not the inventress and mother of superstition, yet at least, they have always gone hand in hand, kept pace, and acted as it were in concert. Tyranny, no doubt, says a noble author, has a natural tendency to corrupt mens notions of the Deity, and of religion and morals. "Morality and good government must go together: there is no real love of virtue without the knowledge of public good. And where absolute power is, there is no public. Accordingly, they who live under tyranny, and admire its power as sacred and divine, are debauched as much in their religion as in their morals. public good, according to their apprehension, is as little the measure or rule of government in the universe as in the state. They have scarce any notion of what is good and just, other than as mere will and power have determined. Omnipotence they think, would hardly be itself, were it not at liberty to dispence with the laws of equity, and change at pleasure the standard of moral rectitude."

"But, notwithstanding the prejudices and corruptions of this kind, 'tis plain, there is some thing still of a public principle, even where it is most perverted and depressed. The worst of ma-

"gistracies,

" giſtracies, the mere deſpotic kind, can ſhew ſuffi-
" cient inſtances of zeal and affection towards it.
" Where no other government is known, it ſeldom
" fails of having that allegiance and duty paid it,
" which is owing to a better form. The eaſtern
" countries, and many barbarous nations have been,
" and ſtill are, examples of this kind. The perſonal
" love they bear their prince, however ſevere to-
" wards them, may ſhew how natural an affection
" there is towards government and order among
" mankind. If men have really no public parent,
" no magiſtrate in common to cheriſh and protect
" them, they will ſtill imagine they have ſuch a
" one; and, like new-born creatures, who have ne-
" ver ſeen their dam, will fancy one for themſelves,
" and apply (as by nature prompted) to ſome like
" form, for favour and protection. In the room of
" a true foſter-father and chief, they will take after
" a falſe one; and, in the room of a legal govern-
" ment and juſt prince, they will obey even a ty-
" rant, and endure even a whole lineage and ſucceſ-
" ſion of ſuch."

All this is very true with regard to tyranny and its natural tendency; ſo that the greateſt corruptions among mankind, either in morals or in religion, may be aſcribed to it as their ſource and firſt cauſe: but ſurely, tyranny, and its diſmal effects, are not more repugnant to benevolence, than they are to ſelf-love and ſelf-intereſt. For at what would we think ſhould ſelf-preſervation make us ſpurn and rebel more zealouſly, than the cruel uſurpations of deſpotic will and lawleſs power? But if the riſe of ſuperſtition, or falſe religion, ſhould not be thought ſufficiently accountable, by ſuppoſing it the device of tyrants to carry on their ambitious ſchemes (*q*) of enſlaving mankind

To ſuperſtition which is found to go hand in hand with tyranny.

(*q*) A late author, (*Hiſt. du Ciel*) in my opinion, hath rendered it exceeding probable, that ſuperſtition or idolatry took its riſe from the miſinterpretation of the ſymbolical language in practice

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mankind more eaſily and ſucceſsfully; or whatever may have been the riſe of it, ſure any barbarous uſages which have been eſtabliſhed by it, are equally repugnant to the love of ourſelves, and to the love of one another. From all which, it follows, that nothing can be inferred from any vices which have ever reigned among mankind, but that men are capable of falling into ſad corruptions, if they do not uſe their natural powers rightly. To which it ought, on the other hand, to be oppoſed, that mankind are capable of great perfection and happineſs by the right uſe of their powers. And this being the caſe, it can never remain a queſtion, whether man is well formed by nature, with thoſe who think the greateſt of all happineſs and perfection is that which is attainable by a being itſelf, in proportion to its care to improve its natural ſtock of powers and

amongſt the *Ægyptians* more eſpecially, the firſt meaning of which, after the invention and common uſe of letters, was ſoon forgot. But, at the ſame time, he ſhews, that the worſhip of dead heroes was the earlieſt ſpecies of idolatrous worſhip; ancient ſymbols that were originally uſed, to ſignify the proper occupations of the different ſeaſons and months of the year, and to mark out the returns of feaſts, having been, after their proper uſe was forgot, firſt interpreted to ſignify the inventions or actions of deceaſed benefactors, heroes or kings. And nothing is more plain from hiſtory, than that ambitious men were at great pains to promote the cuſtom of *Apotheoſis*, in concert with those employed about ſacred things, who found their account in it by many conſiderations. In fine, we may judge how idolatry was introduced and kept up in ancient times, from the way in which falſe religion is now ſupported. Tyrants, and corrupt prieſts, mutually finding their intereſt in it, cordially league and unite to uphold it by all the arts they can deviſe: 'Tis the divine right of theſe two to enſlave the reſt of mankind, and to live luxuriantly upon their induſtry, or rather drudgery, that is the chief end of all the mixed policy of arbitrary power and ſuperſtition. But the ſucceſs of ſuch cruel policy, ſo evidently contrary to the well-being and happineſs of every individual in ſuch tyrannies, muſt firſt be allowed to be a good argument againſt our being naturally ſenſible to miſery and happineſs, before it can be brought as one to prove, that we have in our nature no ſocial feeling, no diſpoſition toward ſociety and union.

affectio

affections. To what hath been ſaid, we may juſt ſubjoin, that almoſt at all times, and in all ages and countries, even among the moſt barbarous, enthraled and ſuperſtitious, there have not been wanting ſome perſons who not only had arrived, by the due exerciſes of their faculties, to juſt notions of religion, morality, and mankind's true intereſts; but who likewiſe thro' public ſpirit, boldly bore teſtimony to the truth, and called upon mankind but to open their eyes, that they might ſee the happineſs and perfection for which nature hath kindly deſigned them. For this fact is ſufficiently atteſted by hiſtory.

Without a mixture of good and evil, there can be no place for prudence, &c.

VI. But I proceed to another conſideration, in order to ſhew the abſurdity of the complaints made againſt human nature, on account of the vices to which it is liable. We have often had occaſion to deſire it to be obſerved and remembred, that moral ends and effects muſt have their ſtated means and cauſes, as well as natural ones; otherwiſe there could be no ſuch thing as moral connexions, moral order, and moral knowledge: let thoſe therefore who object againſt the human make, and the preſent ſtate of things, on account of phyſical and moral evils which ſpring from certain cauſes, conſider well the ultimate reſult of their objections; whether by them they do not demand cauſes without their effects, or effects without their cauſes, both which are equally abſurd; both which are owned to be groſly abſurd with reſpect to natural cauſes and effects: and both which muſt, by parity of reaſon, be abſurd with regard to moral effects and cauſes. 'Tis certainly abſurd to wiſh to have the capacity of foreſeeing the conſequences of things in the natural world to any degree, and the power of procuring goods to ourſelves, of avoiding evils, or of turning evils into goods, in conſequence of that capacity; and, at the ſame time, to deſire that there were no bad conſequences, no evils to be guarded againſt, or turned

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into goods. Now the ſame muſt likewiſe hold true with reſpect to moral connexions, and our capacity of foreſeeing moral goods or evils, and our power in conſequence thereof, of ſhunning or warding off ſuch evils, or of turning them into goods. Nature, in both caſes, has deſigned to make procuring goods and avoiding evils dependent on ourſelves, in order to make the ſtudy of nature our employment, and our happineſs in a great meaſure our own work and acquiſition. And therefore, if on the one hand, we think ſuch conduct of nature neceſſary with regard to us, in order to our enjoying the pleaſures of knowing nature's laws and connexions, of foreſeeing conſequences, and of exerting ourſelves wiſely, as it certainly is, then let us not blame nature for having ſo conſtituted things, that knowledge and foreſeeing might be neceſſary; or that there might be place for ſuch a thing as acting wiſely, and chuſing well, ſince theſe could not take place, were there no evils to be avoided or converted into good by wiſdom and virtue. If, on the other hand, we do not like the conduct of nature, which lays a foundation for wiſdom and virtue, good and prudent action, foreſight and ſelf-approbation; let us ſpeak out plainly the ultimate meaning of our complaint againſt nature; and ſay, nature hath dealt unkindly by us in making our happineſs depend in any meaſure on ourſelves, and in making us capable of the pleaſures of knowledge, foreſight, ſelf-direction, and good management. (*r*)

Before

(*r*) See this ſubject finely treated in *Plutarch de fortuna*. Vitam regit fortuna, quidam dixit, non ſapientia. Quid ergo? neque juſtitia, neque equalitas, neque temperantia, neque modeſtia res humanas dirigunt? Sed a fortuna & propter fortunam factum eſt ut in ſua perſeveraret Ariſtides paupertate cumparare divitias ſibi poſſet? Et Scipio, &c. ——— jam conſilio dexteritate ſublata, par eſt neque conſiderationem ullam rerum relinqui;

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Hence we see the neceſſity of evils.

Before we object againſt a ſtate of rational creatures, becauſe evils do reſult from certain combinations of things, as goods do from others, according to fixed laws, aſcertainable by them, in order to be the rule of their choices, conduct, and purſuits; we ought to be ſure whether it is poſſible in the nature of things, that there can be rational creatures capable of the pleaſures reſulting from choice and wiſe purſuit, were there not evils reſulting from certain choices and purſuits, in conſequence of the connections

linqui; neque inveſtigationem utilitatis.——Quid enim invenire aut diſcere homines poſſent homines ſi fortuna omnia dirigantur?——Ita prudentia neque aurum eſt, neque argentum, neque gloria, neque valetudo, neque robur, neque pulchritudo. Quid ergo ea eſt? Id quod recte his omnibus uti poteſt, ac ſingula horum jucunda facit, laudibilia, utilia, cum ſine hac inutilia, ſterilia, damnoſaque ſint, & moleſtiam dedecus poſſidenti ea adferant. Præclare itaque Prometheus apud Heſiodum præcipit Epimetheo.

——*Ne munera magno*
Ab Jove miſſa unquam accipiat, ſed habere recuſet.

Nimirum de fortunæ bonis loquens: perinde ac ſi muſicæ ignarum canere fiſtula, aut recitare indoctum, aut equitare ignarum equi gubernandi vetant: ita eum hortans ne magiſtratum gerat cum imprudens ſit, neve ſit dives animo præditus illiberali. Non enim duntaxat res ſecundæ indigno oblatæ occaſionem ſtultis exhibent malorum conſiliorum, ut Demoſthenes dixit; ſed & proſperitas merito major imprudentibus calamitatum anſa & origo eſt.

The ſubſtance of all this account amounts briefly to this. If the moral and natural world are not governed by general laws, they are governed without order in a dilatory indeterminable manner, which is chance, or equivalent to it: and if, according to the general laws by which the world is governed, there are not evils to be avoided, as well as pleaſures to be purſued; there can be no ſuch thing as prudence and folly. Which is as plain, as that there can be no ſuch thing as an art of avoiding, where there is nothing to be avoided; or an art of procuring happineſs, where happineſs cannot be the object of ſearch and purſuit. This reaſoning goes further than it is neceſſary to my purpoſe to purſue it. It is difficult to handle the neceſſity of evil in ſuch a manner, as not to ſtumble ſuch as are not above being

CHAP. II. tions of things; or if not positive evils, at least what may be called evils, that is, pleasures very inferior to other pleasures: but that is so far from being possible, that we cannot possibly conceive how there can be any such thing as place for right or wrong choice, wisdom or virtue, but in such a state; nay, we clearly see there cannot be place for wisdom and virtue, good and bad conduct, but in such a state: for right and wrong choice, with respect to whatever mind, even with respect to the creating mind, necessarily suppose connexions productive of happiness, and connexions productive of evil, or at least of less good. There is therefore an absolute ne-

alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will find, that consistently with the unlimited power of the supreme cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system evils must have place. But because some will easily grant that with respect to physical evils. I would only suggest here to such, one thing that I have purposely avoided in this enquiry, which is, that whatever way moral good and evil be considered, or from whatever source they are derived, moral evil supposes physical evil to be the effect of certain actions in consequence of the laws of nature. The deduction of moral obligations from the essential difference of actions in respect of beauty or fitness (which must be the basis whatever other method is taken) necessarily supposes physical evils to be the consequence of certain methods of action. Suffer me, however, to propose one question to philosophers, the consequences of which, whatever way it may be determined, reaches very far. "Whether all constitutions or connexions of things can be indifferent to the first independent mind, the creator of all things; that is, equally agreeable to him, of whatever temper he may be supposed to be, good, or bad." Every one will easily perceive, that to say, if he is good, he must like what is best, is no answer at all; because if there be no goodness or badness, but what is of his appointment, whatever he appointed would have been good, if he had appointed it to be such. The same question may be put thus, in other terms, "was the first mind determined to chuse by any meliority in what he chose; or would any other frame of things have been equally good, if he had appointed that to be the frame of things. Wherever choice is made, there is better and worse independent of choice. Whether a mind be necessarily determined in his choices by motives or not; deliberation itself supposes something to be preferred.

cessity

ceſſity in the nature of things, that in order to the existence of agents capable of good and bad choice, there ſhould be, at leaſt, very high goods to be obtained by certain purſuits, in compariſon of others, to be obtained by other purſuits. And is not this coming very near to admitting an abſolute neceſſity of connexions from which evils reſult, in order to the very being of rational creatures, and their diſtinguiſhing excellence and happineſs. But if we are obliged to go ſo far, in admitting a neceſſity of evil in a comparative ſenſe, ought we not to be very cautious how we object againſt any evils which take place: or can we, indeed, reaſonably object againſt evils, unleſs we can clearly prove, that they are not at all neceſſary to the happineſs and perfection of rational creatures; for till we can prove that, (a neceſſity of comparative evil being once admitted) the preſumption will lie with reſpect to any particular evils, that they may be neceſſary to good, the greater good of rational beings: but as ſuch, they are goods, and not evils. CHAP. II.

Several virtues neceſſarily preſuppoſe not only phyſical but moral evils.

But, having but juſt ſuggeſted this general obſervation, I ſhall now go on to ſhew, from particular inſtances, that many of the evils complained of in human life, moral as well as natural, are, in the nature of things, neceſſary, abſolutely neceſſary to many goods, without which human life could have no diſtinguiſhing excellence, nor indeed any conſiderable happineſs; which inſtances will confirm, *a poſteriori*, our arguing, as we have juſt done, abſtractedly, from the nature of things, for the neceſſity of evil in general.

I. Not only is it true in general, as has been already obſerved, that there can be no rational creatures, capable of right and wrong choice, good and bad conduct, wiſdom and virtue, unleſs there be, with regard to them, connexions which are productive at leaſt of leſſer and greater pleaſures, to be the

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the objects and rule of their conduct and purſuits. But with reſpect to man, it is certain, that ſevera vices and imperfections (*f*), as well as phyſical pain and wants, are abſolutely neceſſary to the very being and exerciſe of certain virtues, which are the higheſt glory of human life, and afford men their beſt plea-ſures and enjoyments. Not only are darkneſs, doubts, ignorance, narrow views and falſe conceptions, as neceſſary, in the nature of things, to give a high reliſh to knowledge, truth (*t*), inſtruction, recovery from error, and the breaking in of light upon the mind, as hunger, thirſt, and other urgent appetites are to the exquiſiteneſs of the pleaſure ſenſible gra-

(*f*) The whole diſſertation of *Plutarch de capienda ex inimicis utilitate* is a proof of this. Vis inimico ut egre ſit facere, nol ei exprobare laſciviam, molitiem, intemperantiam, illiberalita-tem, ipſe fortis eſto, caſtus, verax, humanumque & æquum ii cum quibus tibi res eſt te præbe. Quod ſi ad maledicendum, &c. ——Si illiteratum, ſtudium diſcendi tuum laboremque in tende: ſi timidum, excita fortitudinem tuam, ſi laſcivum dele ex animo ſi quod reſtat deliteſcens libidinis veſtigium.—— Atque hoc modo licet in inimicitia manſuetudinem & malorum tolerantiam demonſtrare. Simplicitati & magnanimitati atque bonitati plus loci hic eſt, quam in amicitiis. Non enim tam pulchrum eſt, bene amico facere quam turpe non facere id, cum neceſſitas ejus requirit. Cæterum oblata occaſione ulciſcendi ini micum, eum miſſum facere æquanimitatis eſt. Qui vero & mi-ſeratur inimicum afflictum & opem infert indigenti, & filiis eju ac familiæ adverſo ipſorum tempore operam ſuam ſtudiumque defert; hunc qui non amat ob animi humanitatem neque probi tatem laudat, Huic pectus atrum eſt atque adamantinum. —— He concludes with a moſt generous remark. Qui vero non ex cæcatur odio inimici, ſed vitam ejus, mores, dicta, factaque u incorruptus ſpectator contemplatur, is pleraque eorum, quorun ſimilia æmulatione correptus eſt, intelliget ei diligentia, provi dentia, probiſque actionibus parta eſſe: eodemque contendens ſtudium honeſtatis, gloriæque ſuum augebit; vanitate & ſocordi affectuum amputatis, &c.

(*t*) So *Cicero*, in a fragment preſerved by *D. Aug.* Lib. IV cap. 2. *de Trinitate.*—— Nec enim fortitudinis indigeremus nullo pro poſito aut labore aut periculo: nec juſtitia cum eſſe nihil, quod appeteretur alieni: nec temperantia quæ regeret eas ſi nullæ eſſent libidines: nec prudentia quidem egeremus null delectu propoſito bonorum & malorum.

tification

tifications afford; insomuch that the one could not be without the other: but which is more, several moral diseases, imperfections and vices, make the materials and subjects of many excellent virtues, they make place for them, they call them forth into action, they give them occasion to exert themselves, prove their force, and display all their beauty. As without distresses, wants and afflictions of the natural kind, there could be no room for patience, fortitude, compassion and charity; so without moral evils to combat with, or to remedy, there could be no place for heroism, for generous instruction, for noble efforts to reform mankind from errors and vice, for struggling against corruption and tyranny; in one word, for any of the noble, public-spirited, generous virtues, which add such lustre and glory to human life; and often render it a scene not unworthy of higher orders of rational beings to contemplate (*u*). Here then is not only an excellent

(*u*) See *Seneca*. Quare bonis viris mala accidunt quum sit providentia. He perhaps goes too far, when he says, Nobis interdum voluptati est, si adolescens constantis animi irruentem feram venabulo excipit, si leonis incursum interritus pertulit, tantoque spectaculum est gratius, quanto id honestior fecit. Non sunt ista quæ possunt Deorum in se vultum convertere, sed puerilia & humanæ oblectantia levitatis. Ecce spectaculum dignum, ad quod respiciat intentus operi suo Deus. Ecce par Deo dignum, vir fortis cum mala fortuna compositus, utique si & provocavit. Non video inquit, quid habet in terris Jupiter pulcrius, si convertere animum velit, quam ut spectet Catonem?

He makes, however, very good reflections upon this subject. Vir bonus omnia adversa exercitationes putat. Quis autem, vir modo, & erectus ad honesta, non est laboris appetens justi & ad officia cum periculo promptus? Cui non industriæ otium pœna est? Athletas videmus quibus virium cura est cum fortissimis quibusquam confligere.——————Marcet sine adversario virtus. Tunc apparet quanta sit, quantum valeat polleatque cum quid possit, patientia offendit.——————Magnus es vir; sed unde scio, si tibi fortuna non dat facultatem exhibendi virtutis?——————Nemo sciet quid potueris; ne tu quidem ipse. Opus est enim ad notitiam sui experimento.——————Gaudent magni viri rebus adversis, non aliter quam fortes milites bellis.——————Ad quam rem non

CHAP. II. excellent uſe of theſe moral evils, which are however, as we have ſeen, nothing but the corruptions and perverſions of affections, which in themſelves are of the higheſt importance to our dignity and perfection: but here is plainly a neceſſity of imperfections and vices, to the very exiſtence of many virtues, or to their formation, trial, exertion, and glorious efforts. Imperfections and vices do indeed give force and heightening to good qualities and virtues, as the ſhades in a picture ſet off the brighter and more enlightened parts. It is not poſſible that there can be an agreeable variety of beauty in the moral world, without foils and contraſt, any more than in the natural; for whatever is raiſed, heightened, or made conſpicuous in nature, muſt be rendered ſuch by ſhade and contraſt; And let us but think how dull the hiſtory of mankind would be, or how low, untouching, inſipid and

non opus eſt aliqua rerum difficultate? Gubernatorem in tempeſtate, in acie militem intelligas.——Ipſis, Deus conſulit, quos eſſe quam honeſtiſſimos capit, quoties illis materiam præbet aliquid animoſe fortiterque faciendi. Calamitas virtutis occaſio eſt.——Hos itaque Deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoſcit, exercet:——Hanc itaque rationem dii ſequuntur in bonis viris, quam in diſcipulis ſuis præceptores: qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, in quibus certior ſpes eſt.—— Quid mirum, ſi dare generoſos ſpiritus Deus tentat? Nunquam virtutis molle documentum eſt,——Ignis aurum probat, miſeria fortes viros.——Hoc eſt propoſitum Deo, quod ſapienti viro, offendere hic quæ vulgus appetit, quæ reformidat, nec bona eſſe nec mala. Apparebunt autem bona eſſe, ſi illo non niſi bonis viris tribuerit, & mala eſſe ſi malis tantum irrogaverit.—— Omnia mala ab illis removet. Scelera & flagitia & cogitationes improbas & avida conſilia, & libidinem cæcam & alieno imminentem avaritiam. Iſt iquos pro fælicibus aſpicitis, ſi non qua occurrunt ſed qua latent, videritis, miſeri ſunt ſordidi, turpes, ad ſimilitudinem parietum ſuorum extrinſicus culti. Non eſt illa ſolida & ſincera fælicitas: Cruſta eſt, & quidem tenuis.——Cum aliquid incidit, quod diſturbet & detegat, tunc apparet quantum altæ ac veræ fæditatis alienus ſplendor abſconderit. Vobis dedi bona certa menſura: quanto magis verſaveritis, & undique aſpexeritis, meliora majoraque permiſi vobis, non egere fælicitate fælicitas veſtra eſt.

groveling

groveling a ſhow to ourſelves, human affairs would be, without the magnanimous conteſts, and heroic atchievements of virtue contending with vices. But this is not all the vices ſerve for, merely to illuſtrate virtues, and to diſplay their charms to advantage: for benevolence, magnanimity, gratitude, patriotiſm, public ſpirit, and all the other virtues, which are the great ornaments of mankind, could not take place, were there no wants among mankind to ſupply, or diſtreſſes to be relieved, no monſtrous paſſions to bear down and ſubdue, no ſavage enemies to combat and deſtroy, no great goods to bring to mankind, or no great evils to deliver them from. A *Hercules* could not have aſcended among the gods, and acquired everlaſting fame, had there been no cruel tyrants, that ravaged mankind like furious tygers, to conquer and extirpate. Nor could an *Orpheus* have done the moſt glorious work that can fall to the ſhare of mere mortal, by civilizing a people, and bringing in wholſome laws, philoſophy, arts, and good taſte among them, had he not found a nation that was yet living like the wild beaſts, and quite a ſtranger to all the high enjoyments of well poliſhed humanity. All this is as evident, as that ſupplying ſuppoſes wants, and delivering ſuppoſes diſtreſs. They, therefore, reaſon moſt abſurdly, who would have human life diſtinguiſhed by glorious virtues, and yet thoſe virtues not have ſubjects, materials and occaſions to exert and prove themſelves upon.

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II. But in the ſecond place, if objectors attend to human nature, to the nice ballance and dependence of human affections, and to the natural tendency and courſe of things, they will plainly ſee an abſurdity in many of their complaints againſt human nature, on account of the vices to which it is liable, unleſs they think that mankind ought not to form themſelves into ſocieties, and endeavour to make the bodies

Every ſtate of the body politic, as well as of the body natural, is incident to particular diſeaſes or vices.

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bodies into which they form themſelves, great, opulent and powerful, by encouraging manufactures, trade, and the polite arts. If they think that mankind ought not to do ſo, but would be happier in ſmall bodies, without any arts, but ſuch as are neceſſary to mere ſubſiſtence; or by foregoing all worldly power and grandeur for ſimplicity and quiet, or rather indolence. It is ſufficient to anſwer, that men may do ſo if they pleaſe: they are made for ſociety, and they may chuſe for themſelves, their end and form in contriving ſociety. Though they cannot attain to any end by any means, no more than a machine can be well formed for a certain end, without a fabric adjuſted to that end; yet they may chuſe their end, and the means to that end, if they will but content themſelves with that end, and expect no advantages from it, but what it is fitted in the nature of things to produce.

But, to expect the advantages and benefits which ariſe from large bodies, who ſet themſelves by proper means to make a great, an opulent and polite ſociety, from ſmall bodies that have no ſuch aim, and do not therefore take the ways and means to attain to it; or to expect to avoid the inconveniencies which naturally ariſe from this or the other manner of combination, or from the purſuit of this or the other end by its proper means, is as abſurd as to eat our cake and cry for it.

Of the vices to which the opulent ſtate is ſubject.

III. But having premiſed this general anſwer, in order to be convinced of the abſurdity of complaints againſt our make, on account of the many vices mankind are obnoxious to, when formed into great ſocieties, whoſe end is wealth, power and politeneſs; I would deſire the reader to attend to the following very evident maxims.

1. On the one hand, worldly wealth, power, greatneſs, when attained, neceſſarily give more occaſions to the affections to take a ſtrong turn and bent

ient towards the purſuit of external gratifications, than their contraries, indigence, weakneſs, and obſcurity do. Affections and appetites muſt neceſſarily be ſtrongly ſollicited by objects and means proper to gratify them, if theſe are continually preſent to the mind; and affections much ſollicited, much called upon, and frequently indulged, muſt grow ſtronger and ſtronger as they are ſo. Whence it follows, that according to the nature of things, inordinate appetites and affections towards external goods, muſt be very prevalent in opulent, powerful and great ſtates. It is unavoidable. CHAP. II.

2. On the other hand, worldly power, wealth and greatneſs, cannot be obtained by a ſtate, but by the purſuits of the individuals; for what elſe is a ſtate but an aſſemblage of many individuals; or its goods, but the ſum or aggregate of the goods obtained by the purſuits of the individuals? But it is impoſſible that external advantages can be obtained, if they are not very keenly purſued; or be keenly purſued, if they are not highly valued. And it is extremely difficult for individuals to value ſo highly as to purſue keenly, any external goods, and ſtill preſerve their affections from all the inordinacies and irregularities, to which keen and ſtrong affections towards external goods are liable, and which would prove the ruin of ſociety, if they were not reſtrained to a certain degree by right policy.

3. On the one hand, as riches and plenty cannot be obtained without induſtry; ſo without very great conſumption induſtry cannot be encouraged or maintained: but whatever contributes to conſumption, muſt, as ſuch, conduce to promote and encourage induſtry: and there will neceſſarily be moſt encouragement to induſtry, where there is moſt conſumption; but there will be moſt conſumption of external goods, where there is moſt ſenſual gratification, and conſequently there will be moſt encouragement to induſtry, where there is more affection

to

to ſenſual gratification, than where there is leſs The pains taken to procure goods will be in propor tion to the demand for them.

4. But on the other hand, as it is certain tha wealth and greatneſs cannot be procured by a ſtate unleſs they are ſought and purſued; ſo it is certain that opulence and plenty when procured, by afford ing for a time the means of ſenſual gratification, t a very great degree of voluptuouſneſs, tend to mak men averſe to the toils and hardſhips, to the labou and aſſiduity, by which alone continual conſumptio can be ſupplied and reinforced with freſh ſtores, i order to the continuance of opulence and plenty The temper and ſpirit neceſſary to acquire them i loſt by great indulgence in the enjoyment of them So that as a nation cannot be opulent, unleſs there be the conſumption by ſenſual gratifications, neceſſa ry to maintain the induſtry requiſite to procur them; ſo opulence and plenty cannot long ſubſiſt, unleſs, notwithſtanding the indulgences neceſſary t conſumption, the ſpirit of induſtry be kept up a midſt that indulgence and conſumption.

5. From theſe poſitions it follows, that the for mation and maintenance of a ſociety, which ſhal purſue and attain to wealth and grandeur, requires the niceſt adminiſtration, a very curious adjuſtment, many counterpoiſing regulations, and with all, the moſt watchful, delicate attention and interpoſition. (*x*) Such a ſociety muſt, in the nature of things, be a

(*x*) Ut in fidibus, ac tibiis, atque cantu ipſo, ac vocibus concentus eſt quidam tenendus ex diſtinctis ſonis, quem immutatum, ac diſcrepantem aures eruditæ ferre non poſſint, iſque concentus ex diſſimillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur & congruens: ſic ex ſummis & infimis, & mediis interjectis ordinibus, ut ſonis moderata ratione, auctus conſenſu diſſimillimorum concinit, & quæ harmonia a muſicis dicitur in cantu, ea eſt in civitate concordia arctiſſimum atque optimum omni in repub. vinculum incolumitatis; quæ ſine juſtitia nullo pacto eſſe poteſt. *Cicero de rep.* l. 2. *Ex Aug. de civit. dei.* l. 2. c. 21.

Statue

a compoſition of contrary qualities, from which harmony and general good are to be educed; which muſt require very ſkilful management, very accurately contrived laws, and a very dextrous adminiſtration. CHAP. II.

But, 6. That ſuch an adjuſtment and adminiſtration of ſociety is poſſible, our own conſtitution, to go no further, is a ſufficient proof; ſince were but a few things changed, it would neceſſarily produce the continuance of great opulence and power, great induſtry and noble arts, glorious virtues, and great general happineſs: it would produce conſumption neceſſary to the maintenance and encouragement of induſtry, without the decreaſe of the induſtrious ſpirit, which is, and muſt be the great ſecret, in order to the getting and preſerving of opulence and greatneſs. It would not be free from vices; but all vices being duly curbed and reſtrained, out of the vices that did prevail would be educed great goods by the virtues to which ſuch a conſtitution would naturally give due vigour and force.

IV. This reaſoning is certainly true, but if it is ſo, then it inevitably follows, that all objections againſt man, on account of the vices his nature is liable to in certain combinations of men and things are abſurd. For mankind muſt certainly be well made, "ſince

Men may chuſe their ſtate, but every ſtate hath its natural and neceſſary conſequences.

Statuo eſſe optimi conſtitutam rempublicam quæ ex tribus generibus illis regali, optimo, & populari confuſa modice, nec puniendo irritet animum immanem ac ferum, nec omnia præter mittendo, licentia cives deterrores reddat. *Cicero de repub.* l. 2.

Reſp. res eſt populi, cum bene ac juſte geritur, ſive ab uno rege, ſive a paucis optimatibus, ſive ab univerſo populo. Cum vero injuſtus eſt rex, quem tyrannum voco: aut injuſti optimates, quorum conſenſus factio eſt: aut injuſtus ipſi populus, cui nomen uſitatum nullum reperio, niſi ut etiam ipſum tyrannum appellem: non jam vitioſa, ſed omnino nulla reſp. eſt; quoniam non eſt res populi, cum tyrannus eam, factiove capeſſat: nec ipſe populus eſt, ſi ſit injuſtus, quoniam non eſt multitudo juris conſenſu, & utilitatis communione ſociata. *Cicero de rep. frag. Ex Aug.* l. 2. c. 21. *de civitat. dei.*

Debet enim conſtituta ſic eſſe civitas, ut æterna ſit. *Ibid.*

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we are made capable of purſuing various ends, and of forming ourſelves into different combinations for attaining various ends with foreſight and choice" ; "ſince bad conſtitutions of ſociety, or unnatural combinations, not proper to attain to any good end, muſt be miſerable and cannot long ſubſiſt, but muſt diſſolve like a diſeaſed body ;" "and ſince by means of good government, ſocieties may be extremely happy, not only notwithſtanding any exceſſes or degeneracies, to which the affections implanted in us, or that can be ingrafted upon us, are liable ; but in great meaſure, at leaſt, even in conſequence of the inordinate affections and concupiſcences which are neceſſary to the procuring worldly wealth and greatneſs, or which they naturally tend to engender ; theſe being counter-poiſed or counterworked by the virtues, a good conſtitution of ſociety as naturally tends to produce, as any well contrived machine works to its effect, while all its ſprings and wheels are in due order." This being the caſe, no objection can be made againſt our make and frame, which does not terminate in aſking, either why we are made to arrive at any conſiderable end by uniting our forces in the ſocial way, which is to object againſt our being ſocial creatures, and made for fellowſhip, communication and participation ; or, in aſking, why our forces muſt be rightly combined and exerted in order to gain a certain good end, which is indeed to aſk, why means are requiſite to an end ; or why an effect muſt be produced by its cauſes, than which there cannot be a greater abſurdity in phyſics or in morals ; or, laſtly, in aſking, why the goods of any combination of qualities in order to attain them, may not be effects of another calculated to attain other goods, which is likewiſe abſurd. For it is no leſs impoſſible, that the advantages of a ſimple ſtate of mankind without arts only aiming at quietneſs, and mere ſubſiſtence, can belong to a ſtate calculated to advance in opulence and greatneſs, by the

the arts and means requiſite to that end; than 'tis impoſſible, that fire ſhould have at the ſame time, the properties of fire and of water. Men are capable of both ſtates and conditions, but they cannot have the goods of both at the ſame time. Each hath its peculiar advantages and diſadvantages, which muſt go together. (*y*) CHAP. II.

As

(*y*) See an excellent paper on this ſubject, Vol. VI. No. 464. that is concluded with a very pretty alegory, which is wrought into a play by *Ariſtophanes*, the *Greek* Comedian. It ſeems originally deſigned as a ſatyr upon the rich, though in ſome parts of it, it is like the foregoing diſcourſe, a kind of compariſon between wealth and poverty.

Chremylus, who was an old and a good man, and withal exceeding poor, being deſirous to leave ſome riches to his ſon, conſults the Oracle of *Apollo* upon the ſubject: The Oracle bids him follow the firſt man he ſhould ſee upon his going out of the temple. The perſon he chanced to ſee, was to appearance, an old ſordid blind man, but upon his following him from place to place, he at laſt found by his own confeſſion, that he was *Plutus*, the God of riches, and that he was juſt come out of the houſe of a miſer. *Plutus* further told him, that when he was a boy, he uſed to declare, that as ſoon as he came to age, he would diſtribute wealth to none but virtuous and juſt men; upon which, *Jupiter*, conſidering the conſequences of ſuch a reſolution, took his ſight away from him, and left him to ſtrole about the world, in the blind condition wherein *Chremylus* beheld him. With much ado, *Chremylus* prevailed upon him to go to his houſe, where he met an old woman with a tatter'd raiment, who had been his gueſt for many years, and whoſe name was *Poverty*. The old woman refuſing to turn out ſo eaſily as he would have her, he threatened to baniſh her, not only out of his houſe, but out of all *Greece*, if ſhe made any more words upon the matter. *Poverty*, on this occaſion, pleads her cauſe very notably, and repreſents to her old landlord, that ſhould ſhe be driven out of the country, all their trades, arts and ſciences would be driven out with her; and that if every one was rich, they would never be ſupplied with theſe pompous ornaments and conveniencies of life, which made riches deſirable. She likewiſe reprefented to him the ſeveral advantages which ſhe beſtowed upon her votaries in regard to their health, their ſhape, and their activity, by preſerving them from gouts, dropſies, unwieldineſs and intemperance. But whatever ſhe had to ſay for herſelf, ſhe was at laſt forced to troop off. *Chremylus* immediately conſidered how he might reſtore *Plutus* to his ſight; and, in order to it,

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As the natural ſo the political body hath its infancy, childhood, manhood and decline; and in both equally each of theſe ſtages, as it hath its peculiar advantages and pleaſures, ſo it hath its peculiar diſeaſes. Nay, as every habit of the natural body is incident to certain particular diſorders; the corpulent to one ſort, for inſtance, and the meager to another; ſo every form of ſociety and government hath its peculiar evils as well as goods naturally growing out of it. The rich and opulent ſtate hath its evils. But the poor mean one hath likewiſe its no leſs pernicious or diſagreeable ones.

It belongs therefore to man to chuſe. He cannot alter the nature of things, but ought to direct his conduct according to them. And to deſire that his Creator ſhould have made him capable of chuſing for himſelf and conducting himſelf, and yet not have made variety of better and worſe for the exerciſe of his thought and choice; is it not to deſire matter of choice without any difference in things? Nay, to demand that all connexions of things ſhould be equally beautiful and

conveyed him to the temple of *Eſculapius*, who was famous for cures and miracles of this nature. By this means the deity recovered his ſight, and begun to make a right uſe of it, by enriching every one that was diſtinguiſhed for piety towards the god, and juſtice towards men; and at the ſame time, by taking away his gifts from the impious and undeſerving. This produces ſeveral merry incidents, till in the laſt, *Mercury* deſcends with great complaints from the gods, that ſince the good men were grown rich, they had received no ſacrifices, which is confirmed by a prieſt of *Jupiter*, who enters with a remonſtrance, that ſince this late innovation, he was reduced to a ſtarving condition, and could not live upon his office. *Chremylus*, who in the beginning of the play, was religious in his poverty, concludes it with a propoſal, which was reliſhed by all the good men who were now grown rich, as well as himſelf, that they ſhould carry *Plutus* in a ſolemn proceſſion to the temple, and inſtal him in the place of *Jupiter*. This allegory inſtructed the *Athenians* in two points: firſt, as it vindicated the conduct of providence in its ordinary diſtributions of wealth; and, in the next place, as it ſhewed the great tendency of riches to corrupt the morals of thoſe who poſſeſſed them.

good-

good, it is not only to take away from a rational creature all ſubjects of choice, but it is to demand, that all different things, and combinations of things ſhould have preciſely the ſame relations, qualities and effects: A phyſical abſurdity too groſs not to be perceived by the moſt ordinary underſtanding. Thus then it is viſible, that when we trace objections againſt the make and frame of man, and the connexions he ſtands in, to the bottom, they end in contradictory demands.

But the objections brought againſt mankind, on account of the vices they are liable to, being chiefly fetched from the vices which prevail in great and opulent ſtates: it is not improper, before I leave this head, to add two or three remarks upon them.

Several things are miſrepreſented; luxury, for inſtance, is declaimed againſt in a very vague ſenſe.

I. The complaints which are made againſt ſuch ſtates, in the general confuſed way of declaiming againſt luxury, have many of them no meaning at all, or a very abſurd one. For luxury is often taken by thoſe declaimers in ſuch a vague, indeterminate ſenſe, that, in reality, every thing which agrandizes a nation, may be ſaid to be luxury, and in ſuch a ſenſe, not only poetry, painting, ſtatuary, ſculpture, architecture, gardening, muſic, and all the fine arts, even philoſophy itſelf are voluptuous purſuits, and encouraging them is luxury; but trade alſo, and all its imports, are a nuſance, a plague.

Now to put an end to ſuch confuſed railery or morality, let it be called which you will, I would only aſk thoſe who have any underſtanding of human affairs, 1. Whether under a wiſe adminiſtration, a people may not only enjoy all the polite arts in great perfection, but even enjoy all the goods of other countries which their own product can purchaſe, without being impoveriſhed by it? If they would have no trade, then let us live upon the product of our ſpot: for ſure, if they would have

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trade encouraged, they would have foreign goods imported in exchange for our own product; and would they have them imported and not enjoyed? And as for the polite arts, what do they do, but employ the wealth of a nation to the beſt purpoſes in the beſt taſte, or with the greateſt elegance? What indeed is wealth without theſe, muſt it not be a nuſance? 2. I would aſk, whether under a wiſe adminiſtration, where military affairs are duly taken care of, or where a ſpirit of bravery and ſkill in military diſcipline are kept up by proper methods; a wealthy nation may not live in all the eaſe and plenty imaginable, and in many parts of it ſhew as much pomp and elegance, and delicacy of taſte, as human wit can invent, and at the ſame be formidable to their neighbours? Is there indeed no way of becoming brave and maſculine, without being poor, without abandoning trade and all polite arts, and giving ourſelves up entirely to martial exerciſes, and becoming a nation of mere ſoldiers? Here ſure there is a medium, which ſeveral nations have hit upon, otherwiſe there would never have been a nation at once, wealthy, polite and brave. It is indeed commonly ſaid, that the polite arts ſoften and enervate a people, but if that be abſolutely true, (z) is it not as certain, on the other

The fine arts do not effeminate.

But other arts muſt be united with them to make a brave as well as a polite people.

(z) See the different effects of arts deſcribed by *Plato*, together with the gymnaſtical exerciſes, which make a truly liberal education. *De Rep.* Lib. 3. Nonne animadvertis inquam, ut animum afficiant, qui gymnaſticam per omnem vitam exercent, muſicam non attingunt, vel qui contra faciunt? Qua de re, inquit loqueris? De feritate inquam & ruſtica quadam duritie, & contra molitie & mollitate & comitate. Novi equidem eos inquit, qui mera ſimplicique utuntur muſica plus æquo agreſtiores evadere. Qui contra muſica duntaxat molliores, quam quod ſit illis decorum. Atqui vis ipſa aggreſtis ad iracundiæ naturæ animoſitatem, granditatemque pertinet quæ in recta educatione inſtituitur, in fortitudinem abit: ſin autem præter id quod decet extenditur atque excreſcit, ferox, ut conſentaneum eſt, ac dura; ——Quid vero? Nonne philoſophica natura vim habet quandam miteu atque comem, quæ ſi nimium remiſſa fuerit, plus æquo

other hand, that without these arts, human life is very rude, savage, unpolished, and hardly one remove above that of the brutes which just breath, eat and drink? Were it indeed a dilemma, one part of which must be the case, who would hesitate which to chuse; whether to be as the fierce savage *Lacedemonians*, or as the intelligent polite *Athenians?* But there is far from being any dilemma in the case, for were not the *Athenians* as brave as they were polite? However, not to enter into historical discussions which would lead us too far from our point; who ever dreamed, that men could maintain a masculine, hardy, martial spirit, or have the courage and skill war requires, without any care taken upon them to nourish and keep up that spirit; and to exercise them for that effect in the arts and discipline of war? But why may not the qualities, resulting from the polite arts be united with those which result from war- CHAP. II.

æquo mollior redditur: sin præclare educata atque instituta, præclarum aliquod modestiæ & comitatis exemplum solet existere. ——Nonne igitur oportet illas inter se aptas consspirare atque consentire? Ejusque animus qui hoc temperamento aptatus est atque affectus temperans est atque fortis.——Quicunque igitur finit musicæ cantus perpetuo circumsonare animo suo, eamque per aures veluti per infundibulum, concentibus illis quos supra dulces, molles appellavimus perfundit.——Tandemque liquat & dissolvit animum, donec omnis illa animositas contabuerit penitus, eamque veluti nervos ex animo exciderit, segnemque bellatorem effecerit. —— Quod si quis gymnasticæs victui se totum tradat musicæ & philosophiæ studiis neglectis, primo quidem firmum corporis habitum consecutus, animos sumit, & granditate seipsum replet ipseque seipso fortior evadit. Quid vero? Quandoquidem nihil aliud agit, neque illi quicquam cum musis es commune, neque ullum discendi studium in ipsius animo inest quippe qui ne supremis labris quidem ullam disciplinam gustarit. — Neque ullam aliam musicæ partem, infirmitas quædam, & visus, & auditus hebitudo dominatur: quum ipsius sensus neque ex suscitentur, neque nutriantur, neque ullo modo expurgentur: Hispidus quidem & importunus homo, omnis eruditionis ac comitatis expers mihi videtur, &c. See *Aristot. Polit.* Lib. 8. 3, 4, 5, 6, *&c.* where the character of the *Lacedemonians* is shewn to be the natural effect of their education.

CHAP. II. like exercises; may not the two be conjoined; is it not the conjunction of the two seemingly opposite qualities, *viz.* the soft and the masculine, that we admire in the *Athenians?* Is it not this conjunction that makes the truly amiable hero? It was this made a *Scipio*. And it is this that will make a people, at the same time brave and polite, humane, social, generous, tender, and bold, formidable, inconquerable. To produce which great and lovely character, a rightly model'd education in a state, otherwise well constituted and governed, would be as infallibly effectual, as any means in the natural world are to produce and effectuate their end.

It is virtue alone that is the cement of society.

II. Another observation I would make is, that as it is virtue alone that can make any particular person truly happy; so it is virtue alone that can be called the basis and cement of society, or that makes it happy. For tho' vanity, prodigality, debauchery, and other vices, promote consumption, and consequently trade, yet they tend to destroy the spirit of industry: they would effectually dissipate and waste opulence and the means of worldly grandeur and power, were they not counterpoised by other vices on the opposite extreme, such as avarice, superstitious abstemiousness, and excessive contempt of all sensible gratification: no goods can arise from vices, without the aids of public wisdom and many virtues; and if not restrained within certain bounds, they would effectually ruin and destroy all society. Private vices are therefore really to society, what ordure and filth is to land; they are equally abominable and nauseous in themselves; and, like it, are only made useful by skilful, sagacious, and industrious management. They are the excrements of what is really useful, and can only be turned into use as natural ones are. Excrements of the one kind as well as the other, will abound most in opulent places where there is plentiful consumption; and in this also are they both alike, that they are in themselves of a poisonous, pestilential

It is virtue and political wisdom that educes good out of evil.

nature

nature, and tend to produce plagues, which would ſoon deſtroy mankind, or make them very miſerable: In great quantities they are pernicious to good ſoil, and choak the good ſeeds thrown into it, bringing forth nauſeous weeds in greater plenty than uſeful grains: without ſkilful tillage and huſbandry, and ſound wholeſome ſeed, they would never produce any good at all: and, in fine, as manure is chiefly neceſſary to poor, barren or exhauſted ſoil, ſo vanity, prodigality, debauchery, and other vices only can ſerve as a counterballance to ſuch vices of the oppoſite extreme, || as avarice or penuriouſneſs in all its branches and modifications, which, like poor ground, would but ſwallow up the ſeed thrown into it, and yield no crop. The ſimilitude holds exactly in all theſe inſtances. And if that be the caſe, then can vices, in no proper ſenſe, be ſaid to be beneficial to ſociety, though goods may be educed from them by virtue and political wiſdom; unleſs it can be ſaid, that a good crop is owing to excrements chiefly, and not to good ſeed and right huſbandry; which cannot be ſaid even with reſpect to ſoil that requires manure to change its barren nature, and render it fertile. But if it be really ſo with regard to vice and virtue, then there can be no doubt about the truth I am now endeavouring to eſtabliſh: for then our argument ſtands thus. "All the vices of men are but the corruptions, the degeneracies and perverſions of affections implanted in our nature for moſt excellent purpoſes, and without which, as they are grafted in us to be managed by our reaſon, we could not be capable of any ſhare of that dignity and perfection to which we now can by that means raiſe and advance ourſelves. But even theſe vices, by good management in the public, and the counter-working of many virtues exerting themſelves to that effect,

Excrements may be made uſeful, and ſo may vices.

|| Extremes in nature equal good produce,
Extremes in man concur to general uſe.
Eth. Ep. l. 2. Ep. 3.

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may be converted into benefits; insomuch, that societies, notwithstanding all the vices human nature is liable to in any circumstances, may be rendered very happy, very great and powerful, by good government and administration."

Now this defence of human nature must be admitted to be good, if what we have often said of the absurdity of objecting against the dependence of the happiness of society upon a right form of government be called to mind, *viz.* that it is objecting against our being made social creatures. But,

Supposing vices to be necessary, yet good being educed out of them, the wisdom of the moral world will stand on the same footing as the wisdom of the natural.

III. Let it be just added on this article, that supposing it to be granted that vices are necessary in the moral world, in the same sense that excrements are in the other; equally unavoidable, or if you will, mechanical effects; what will follow from this concession, but that, as such is the constitution of the material world, that the excrements which are unavoidably necessary or mechanically so, that would poison or corrupt the air, and produce diseases were they not carried off, may by skill be rendered useful in manuring the ground; so such is the constitution of the moral world, that the evils which are absolutely unavoidable in consequence of the human make, that are in themselves plagues and miseries, may be converted by skill and good management into goods. This, I say, is all that could be inferred upon granting that vices are necessary in the same sense that animal excrements are necessary; and therefore good order would still stand upon the same footing with respect to the moral world, as it does with respect to the material, where an objection taken from filth that can thus be turned into profit, would be justly stiled silly and ridiculous: there would still, even according to that way of reasoning, be the same difference between virtue and vice, as between excrements and good seed, and right husbandry.

But vices are in no proper sense mechanical effects.

But what hath been supposed cannot be granted: the

he ſimilitude between vice and excrement fails in this reſpect. The former is abſolutely a mechanical effect, whereas the other depends, as we feel by experience, upon ourſelves; it being in every man's power to govern his affections, and to prevent them from running into enormities and irregularities. In the one caſe, it only depends upon us to prevent the bad effects, or to turn into good; in the other, it depends upon us to prevent our affections from being extravagant, and to manage them well; and it likewiſe depends upon us, by joining in right ſociety, to turn the bad actions of the wicked and vicious into good uſes, or to reſtrain them within certain bounds. We have therefore in the laſt caſe a double power, or there is a double dependence on ourſelves. And for that reaſon, whatever neceſſity there may be for evils in order to goods, no evil can be ſaid to be neceſſary, in a ſenſe that implies any neceſſity upon any perſon not to act right, or not to govern his affections well. We are not more ſure that certain effects in nature, within and without our bodies, are abſolutely independent upon our will, than we are ſure, each of us for ourſelves, that the government of our affections and actions depends upon ourſelves: this is a difference between things that muſt remain, while our nature and the preſent conſtitution of things exiſts, that ſome things are not in our power, and that others are: it cannot be altered. And ſo plainly is that difference felt in moral things, that whatever objections may be made againſt providence, and the human make, all objectors find that they cannot chuſe but blame themſelves, and think they ſuffer juſtly, when they act amiſs. We may arraign nature as much as we pleaſe, in order to throw a ſhare of our own faults upon nature, providence, or ſomething external to us and independent of us, but when we have done all we can thus to extenuate our guilt in doing wrong, to ourſelves we are ſtill conſcious that the guilt lies at our own door.

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Objections taken from phyſical evils.

WE ſhall now conſider the objections taken from the phyſical evils which prevail in the world; the various diſtreſſes and calamities that vex human life, and what is called an unequal diſtribution of external goods, ſuch as riches, power, *&c.*

Now I think the following obſervations will ſufficiently evince the abſurdity or unreaſonableneſs of all ſuch complaints againſt providence in the government of mankind, and ſhew that there is no reaſon to object againſt the pains and troubles of human life, or the diſtribution of external goods; but on the contrary, good ground to approve the excellent laws, according to which all is brought about; or to conclude that all is brought about according to moſt uſeful general laws, none of which can be changed, but to the worſe. But let it be remembered, before we go further, that it is impoſſible to conſider the laws of the material world, and thoſe of the moral ſeparately. Man being indeed, as ſome philoſophers have well expreſſed it, *Nexus utriuſque mundi*; or it being a nice blending and interweaving of natural and moral connexions and their effects, that conſtitutes our preſent ſtate, or makes us what we really are. If this be kept in mind, the reader will eaſily ſee that repetitions upon this ſubject are unavoidable, ſince we muſt ever be having recourſe to the ſame laws and principles in our nature, whatever the difficulty, queſtion or objection about man may be. This being premiſed, to prevent cavilling at repetitions, which, however, I ſhall endeavour to avoid as much as the nature of the ſubject admits; I would obſerve, that in order to treat diſtinctly and clearly

clearly of the miseries and vexations complained of in human life, it is necessary to separate or distinguish three sorts of them. CHAP. III.

I. Such as totally arise from the laws of matter and motion; or in other words, the laws of the sensible world, such as earthquakes, storms, *&c.* These evils classed.

II. Such as arise from social connexions. Of which kind are all sufferings on account of disorders in the society we belong to; or such as arise partly from our social connexions, and partly from the laws of matter and motion; of which sort are, for instance, diseases and misfortunes descending from parents to their children. And,

III. Such as spring partly from our own follies and vices, and partly from the laws of the corporeal world. Of this kind are diseases brought upon ourselves by intemperance, *&c.*

I shall therefore treat of these three classes of evils separately, yet not so as to confine myself so strictly to any of them, as not at the same time to take notice under each of them, of certain evils, which though they do not strictly belong to that class, yet may be accounted for from the same principles as those which are properly of it.

I. With respect to evils of all sorts in general, or to those which flow from the steady and uniform operation of the general laws of the sensible world, in particular, let not a principle already mentioned be forgot, namely, connexions producive of evils are necessary, in order to our having matter of foresight and choice: for if all connexions produced equal goods, we would have no occasion for studying nature, no use for foresight, no matter of deliberation and choice. It would be all one to us what happened, we

Unless there is a mixture of good and evil, there can be no prudence or folly; there cannot be good and bad choice.

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we might fold our arms, and let things take their course. If it is fit there ſhould be creatures whoſe goods and enjoyments are to be in any meaſure of their own procurance, it is abſolutely neceſſary, with regard to ſuch beings, that there ſhould be ſome things to be avoided, as well as ſome things to be deſired and ſought after; matter of bad as well as of good choice; actions which tend to bring pain, as well as methods of acting which tend to bring pleaſure and happineſs. In fine, unleſs it can be doubted whether it is worth while to be endowed with the power of ſtudying nature's laws and connexions, and to have happineſs dependent in any degree on one's ſelf; it cannot be doubted, but it muſt be fit that choices and actions ſhould have different conſequences, ſome producing good, and others evil; and to deſire that there ſhould be any ſuch beings exiſting as we are, capable of chuſing and acting, and whoſe happineſs is dependent in a great meaſure on our choices and purſuits, where there is nothing evil to be avoided, is really to demand a ſtate, in which there ſhall be beings capable of chuſing, without any matter or ſubject of choice in that ſtate.

Phyſical evils are abſolutely neceſſary, if beings have particular textures, and are ſubject to general aſcertainable laws.

2. With regard to phyſical evils, or ſuch as flow from the laws of the ſenſible world in particular, to object againſt our ſtate becauſe there are ſuch evils in it, involves this abſurdity in it: it is to demand our bodies were ſo made, that every object, whatever its texture is (for every particular object muſt have its own particular one) might be congruous to their ſtructure or organization. Now let objectors explain, if they can, how any body can affect another agreeably, without being proportioned and adjuſted to it, without tallying with it, ſo to ſpeak; for their objections ſuppoſe that to be poſſible. It is certain that phyſical goods ought to be produced according ſome general law, or in ſome fixed, unvarying order: and this is found by experience to be the general

al law with regard to us (and to all animals that fall within our obſervation) that whatever external objects tend, by any application, any effluvia, or in whatſoever way, to hurt our bodily contexture, alarms us by a ſenſe of pain (*a*); and the ſenſe of pleaſure is produced by influences of external objects which ſuit our organization, or no wiſe tend to deſtroy or hurt it. Now to aſk why we ſhould have any ſenſe of pain, when external objects are really prejudicial to us, or tend to deſtroy our bodies, is to aſk, why nature gives us warning what to avoid? And to aſk, why any external objects are hurtful to our bodies, is either to aſk why we have a particular organization, or why there is any variety of external objects? Nay, it is to demand, that even the ſame external object, applied to the ſame bodily organization, at whatever diſtance, with whatever force, or in one word, in whatever manner, ſhould always be congruous to it, and never tend to hurt it in any degree. The objection really reſults in demanding, that ſenſible pleaſures ſhould not be produced in us by external objects which have a certain aptitude to our organization, which aptitude may be found out by ſtudying our ſtructure, and the various textures of bodies; for if there be ſuch a thing as aptitude or congruity, there muſt be likewiſe ſuch a thing as inaptitude and incongruity: it really reſults in demanding that ſenſible pleaſures ſhould be produced in us in no order or method, by no intermediate ſteps, progreſs or means: for if they are produced in ſome order or method ſteadily, each receſs from or contrariety to that order, muſt unavoidably produce an effect different from or contrary to what is produced by the order tending to give pleaſure. One order cannot be another order. One

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(*a*) Quicunque igitur motus ſunt qui naturam excedunt, dolorem pariunt: quicunque vero ad ipſam reſtituuntur voluptates nominantur, &c. *Timæus locus de anima mundi.*

train

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train of cauſes and effects cannot be a different one. Every thing muſt have its determinate nature and properties; and every determinate nature or compoſition of properties, muſt, as ſuch, have its determinate influences, conſequences and effects, with regard to every other determinate nature or compoſition of properties. All this is ſelf-evident; or what can knowledge and ſtudy of nature mean?

We muſt think we have quite exhauſted natural knowledge, before we can ſay that ſeveral evils are abſolutely unavoidable by prudence and art.

3. But in the third place. With regard to phyſical evils let it be obſerved, that as general laws producing goods and evils, are neceſſary to the exiſtence of beings capable of activity and prudence, and of happineſs acquired in that way; ſo we cannot poſſibly determine, that all phyſical evils we complain of are quite inevitable by prudence and art, till we are ſure that we have quite exhauſted the ſcience of nature, and have gone as far by the ſtudy of it, as our knowledge can extend, with regard to avoiding evils, or turning them into goods. The further we advance and improve in the knowledge of nature, the more we are able to ſubdue earth, ſea, and every element; or to make them ſubſervient to our advantage. And though there are, no doubt, many hurtful effects of the laws of the ſenſible world, which are abſolutely unavoidable or unalterable by us, yet it is no leſs ſure, that the ſtudy of nature is far from its being at its *ne plus ultra*, and that it may be yet carried much farther than it is, in order to abridge human labour, to ſurmount the barrenneſs of ſoil, to provide remedies and antidotes againſt diſeaſes occaſioned by a bad conſtitution of air, peſtilential exhalations, and other phyſical cauſes; to make navigation and commerce leſs dangerous; and in a word, to produce many goods we are not yet able to produce, and to prevent, or at leaſt to alleviate, many evils in human life we cry out againſt. But as far as evils are owing to our ignorance, or the narrowneſs of our knowledge, through our neglect of ſtudying nature in a right manner; ſo far we can have

have no juſt reaſon of complaint, unleſs it be ſuch, CHAP. III.
that our happineſs is made to depend upon our own prudence and activity; that is, unleſs it be a juſt cauſe of complaint that we are rational beings.

4. But what is of principal conſideration in this queſtion is, "That natural philoſophers have been able to ſhew, that almoſt all the phyſical evils complained of in human life, flow from the general laws, by which we have and enjoy, and can only have and enjoy, all the pleaſures and advantages a ſenſible world affords us in our preſent ſtate, which cannot be changed but to the worſe." Dr. *Henry Moore*, in his *Divine Dialogues*, inſiſts much upon the neceſſity of general laws; and in anſwer to the objections taken from the falling of rain in the highways, *&c.* ſays, the comical conceit of *Ariſtophanes*, in explaining rain by *Jupiter*'s piſſing through a ſieve, is not ſo ridiculous, as conſidering the deſcending of rain like the watering of a garden with a watering pot by ſubaltern free agents. The objections taken from earthquakes, ſtorms at ſea, irruptions of fire in vulcano's, peſtilences, and other ſuch phenomena, terminate in a like abſurdity: they demand that the ſenſible world ſhould be governed by thoſe general laws, to which we owe all the pleaſures and benefits ariſing from our preſent commerce with a ſenſible world, without any of their hurtful effects. That is, they terminate in demanding general laws, without all their effects. When we murmur at the evils which happen by the qualities of air, fire, water, and other bodies, in conſequence of gravitation, elaſticity, electricity, and other phyſical powers, we certainly do not attend either to the innumerable good and uſeful effects of theſe qualities or powers, and their laws; or to the fitneſs in the whole, that qualities or powers, and their laws, ſhould be general, that is, operate uniformly and invariably. If we reflect upon this, we would not raſhly conclude, to uſe the words of ſome author

But [illegible] good general laws.

CHAP. III. on this subject, for instance, "That the wind ought not to blow unfavourably on any worthy design of moral agents: but think better, and say more wisely, that the good laws of nature must prevail, tho' a ship-full of heroes, patriots, worthies, should perish by their invariable uniformity."

Illustration. If we consider the beautiful order of the sensible world, and the vast extent of those few simple laws which uphold it, we can by no means think it strange, says an excellent author, "If either by an outward shock, or some internal wound, particular animals, and sometimes man himself, are deformed in their first conception, and the seminal parts are injured and obstructed in their accurate labours. It is, however, then alone that monstrous shapes are produced. And nature, even in that case, works still as before, not perversly or erroneously, but is over-powered by some superior law, and by another nature's justly conquering force. Nor need we wonder, if the soul or temper partakes of this occasional deformity, and suffers and sympathises with its close partner. Why should we be surprized either at the feebleness and weakness of senses, or the depravity of minds inclosed in such feeble and dependent bodies; or such pervertible organs, subject, by virtue of a just and equal subordination, to other natures and other powers, while all must submit and yield to nature in general, or the Universal System." But every one may find full satisfaction with regard to the laws of a sensible world, in several excellent treatises on this subject; in Dr. *John Clarke*'s discourses at *Boyle*'s lecture (in particular) upon the origine of evil; and therefore referring my readers, on this head, to such writers, I shall just add, that from the late improvements in natural philosophy it plainly appears, as an admirable philosopher excellently expresses it, "That as for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the

the actions of finite, imperfect ſpirits: this, in the ſtate we are in at preſent, is indiſputably neceſſary to our well-being. But our proſpects are too narrow: we take, for inſtance, the idea of ſome one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas if we enlarge our view, ſo as to comprehend the various ends, connexions and dependencies of things, on what occaſions, and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleaſure, the nature of human freedom, and the deſign for which we were put into the world, we ſhall be forced to acknowledge, that thoſe particular things, which, conſidered in themſelves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when conſidered as linked with the whole ſyſtem of beings. CHAP. III.

We juſt as wiſely might of heav'n complain,
That righteous Abel *was deſtroy'd by* Cain,
As that the virtuous ſon is ill at eaſe,
When his lewd father gave the dire diſeaſe.
Think we like ſome weak prince th' Eternal Cauſe,
Prone for his fav'rites to reverſe his laws?
Shall burning Ætna, *if a ſage requires,*
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires!
On air or ſea new motions be impreſt,
O blameleſs Bethel! *to relieve thy breaſt?*
When the looſe mountain trembles from on high,
Shall gravitation ceaſe, if you go by?
Or ſome old temple nodding to its fall,
For Chartres' *head reſerve the hanging wall?*

Eſſay on Man, Ep. 4.

Let thoſe who object againſt evils as abſolute evils, well conſider the concatenation of things natural and moral, and how things muſt hang together in nature.

5. But before I leave this head, in order to lead the reader to attend to the wonderful concatenation of cauſes and effects throughout nature, throughout all, in particular, that regards mankind; and to obſerve how neceſſary the preſent mixture of evils and goods is to our well-being, and how impoſſible it is to conceive any change but to the worſe; I cannot

CHAP. III. chooſe but ſuggeſt another obſervation to him, almoſt in the words of an author, who does not ſeem to have deſigned to defend providence, and yet has made ſeveral obſervations, which, when purſued to their real reſult, do effectually prove its wiſdom and goodneſs; which obſervations, were this the prope place for it, I could eaſily ſhew to have no dependence upon certain principles with which he ſets out, and of which he ſeems exceſſively fond. "The neceſſities, the vices and imperfections of man, together with the various inclemencies of the air, and other elements, contain in them the ſeeds of all arts, induſtry and labour: it is the extremities of heat and cold, the inconſtancy and badneſs of ſeaſons, the violence and uncertainty of winds, the vaſt power and treachery of water, and the ſtubbornneſs and ſterility of the earth, that rack our invention, how we ſhall either avoid the miſchiefs they may produce, or correct the malignity of them, and turn their ſeveral forces to our own advantage a thouſand different ways; whilſt we are employed in ſupplying the infinite variety of our wants, which will ever be multiplied as our knowledge is enlarged, and our deſires encreaſe. No man needs to guard himſelf againſt bleſſings, but calamities require hands to avert them. Hunger, thirſt and nakedneſs, are the firſt tyrants that force us to ſtir; afterwards our pride, ſloth, ſenſuality and ficklenefs, are the great patrons that promote all arts and ſciences, trades, handicrafts and callings; whilſt the great taſk-maſters, neceſſity, avarice, envy and ambition, each in the claſs that belongs to him, keep the members of the ſociety to their labour, and make them all ſubmit, moſt of them chearfully, to the drudgery of their ſtation, kings and princes not excepted.

Illuſtration. The greater the variety of trade and manufactures, the more operoſe they are, and the more they are divided in many branches, the greater numbers may be contained in a ſociety, without being in one another's

ther's way, and the more eaſily they may be rendered a rich, potent and flouriſhing people. Few virtues employ any hands, and therefore they may render a ſmall nation good, but they can never make a great one. To be ſtrong and laborious, patient in difficulties, and aſſiduous in all buſineſſes, are commendable qualities; but as they do their own work, ſo they are their own reward, and neither art or induſtry have ever paid their compliments to them: whereas the excellency of human thought and contrivance has been, and is yet, no where more conſpicuous, than in the variety of tools and inſtruments of workmen and artificers, and the multiplicity of engines, that were all invented, either to aſſiſt the weakneſs of man, to correct his many imperfections, to gratify his lazineſs, or to obviate his impatience. CHAP. III.

It is in morality as it is in nature: there is nothing ſo perfectly good in creatures, that it cannot be hurtful to any one of the ſociety, nor any thing ſo entirely evil, but it may prove beneficial to ſome part or other of the creation. So that things are only good and evil in reference to ſomething elſe, and according to the light and poſition they are placed in.

And thus, ſaith he, what we call evil in this world, moral as well as natural, is the grand principle that makes us ſociable creatures, the ſolid baſis, the life and ſupport of all trades and employments; without exception, there we muſt look for the true origine of all arts and ſciences; and the moment evil ceaſes, the ſociety muſt be ſpoiled, if not totally diſſolved.

This author brings a very proper inſtance to illuſtrate this, from the advantages and different benefits that accrue to a nation on account of ſhipping and navigation, compared with the manifold miſchiefs and variety of evils, moral as well as natural, that befal nations on the ſcore of ſea-faring, and

CHAP. III. their commerce with ſtrangers, and that are the very foundation of trade and commerce; which the reader may conſult at his leiſure (‖).

Illuſtration. There are ſeveral other reaſonings and examples in this author, which might very well be applied to our preſent purpoſe, to ſhew what is the reſult upon the whole, of the mixture of pains, that is ſo greatly murmured at in human life, and how abſurd ſuch murmuring is, when we take a large view of the connexions and dependencies of things. But as for the main end that author had in view, which was to prove, "that there is nothing ſocial in our nature, and that it is direful neceſſity only that makes us ſociable creatures; and that all the ſo much exalted moral virtues, are nothing elſe but the offspring of political flattery, begot upon pride;" I need not ſtay here to refute them, ſince in the former part of this eſſay, we have fully proved the very contrary to be true, or that we are ſocial by nature, and have a principle of benevolence very deeply inlaid into our nature, and likewiſe a moral ſenſe of the beauty and deformity of affections, actions and characters. *Cicero* hath long ago, in ſeveral parts of his philoſophical works, charmingly proved the abſurdity and falſhood of ſuch corrupt doctrines concerning human nature, and the riſe of ſociety, towards the end, in particular, of his firſt book of *Offices*, where he borrows a very apt ſimilitude from the bees. My lord *Shaftsbury* hath ſhewn us what we ought to think of this kind of philoſophers, and how we ought to deal with them, in the paſſage above quoted. And a little after he more particularly examines this philoſophy, tracing it through all its ſubtle refinements; a piece of excellent reaſoning, that well deſerves our cloſeſt attention. "You have heard it (my friend) as a common ſaying, that *Intereſt governs the world.* But I believe, whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find that paſſion, humour, caprice, zeal, faction, and a thouſand

(‖) *Fable of the bees.*

ſand other ſprings, which are counter to ſelf-intereſt, have as conſiderable a part in the movements of this machine. There are more wheels and counterpoiſes in this engine than are eaſily imagined. It is of too complex a kind to fall under one ſimple view, or be explained thus briefly in a word or two. The ſtudiers of this mechaniſm muſt have a very partial eye, to overlook all other motions beſides thoſe of the loweſt and narroweſt compaſs. It is hard, that in the plan or deſcription of this clock-work, no wheel or ballance ſhould be allowed on the ſide of the better and more enlarged affections; that nothing ſhould be underſtood to be done in kindneſs or generoſity, nothing in pure good-nature or friendſhip, or through any ſocial or natural affection of any kind: when perhaps the main ſprings of this machine will be found to be, either theſe very natural affections themſelves, or a compound kind derived from them, and retaining more than one half of their nature.

These reaſonings have no neceſſary connexion with the principles of the author from whom they are taken.

But here (my friend) you muſt not expect that I ſhould draw you a formal ſcheme of the paſſions, or pretend to ſhew you their genealogy and relation, how they are interwoven with one another, or interfere with our happineſs or intereſt. It would be out of the genius and compaſs of ſuch a letter as this, to frame a juſt plan or model, by which you might, with an accurate view, obſerve what proportion the friendly and natural affections ſeem to bear in this order of architecture.

How ſuch principles ought to be refuted.

Modern projectors, I know, would willingly rid their hands of theſe natural materials, and would fain build after a more uniform way. They would new frame the human heart; and have a mighty fancy to reduce all its motions, ballances and weights to that one principle and foundation, of a cool and deliberate ſelfiſhneſs. Men, it ſeems, are unwilling to think they can be ſo outwitted and impoſed on by nature, as to be made to ſerve her purpoſes, rather

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than their own. They are ashamed to be drawn thus out of themselves, and forced from what they esteem their true interest.

There has been, in all times, a sort of narrow-minded philosophers, who have thought to set this difference to rights, by conquering nature in themselves. A primitive father and founder among these, saw well this power of nature, and understood it so far, that he earnestly exhorted his followers, neither to beget children, nor serve their country. There was no dealing with nature, it seems, while these aluring objects stand in the way. Relations, friends, countrymen, laws, politic constitutions, the beauty of order and government, and the true interest of society, and mankind, were objects which he well saw would naturally raise a stronger affection, than any which was grounded upon the bottom of mere self. His advice, therefore, not to marry, nor engage at all in the public, was wise and suitable to his design. There was no way to be truly a disciple of this philosophy, but to leave family, friends, country, and society to cleave to it.—And, in good earnest, who would not, if it were happiness to do so? — The philosopher, however, was kind in telling us his thought. 'Tis was a token of his fatherly love of mankind.

Tu pater & rerum inventor! tu patria nobis
Suppeditas præcepta! ——

But the revivers of this philosopy in later days, appear to be of a lower genius. They seem to have understood less of this force of nature, and thought to alter the thing, by shifting a name. They would so explain all the social passions and natural affections, as to denominate them of the selfish kind. Thus, civility, hospitality, humanity towards strangers, or people in distress, is only a more deliberate selfishness. An honest heart is only a more cunning one;

one; and honesty and good nature, a more deliberate, or better regulated self-love. The love of kindred, children, and posterity, is purely love of self, and of one's immediate blood; as if, by this reckoning all mankind were not included; all being of one blood, and joined by intermarriages and alliances, as they have been transplanted in collonies, and mixed one with another. And thus, love of one's country, and love of mankind, must also be self-love. Magnanimity and courage, no doubt, are modifications of this universal self-love! For courage, (says our modern philosopher) is constant anger. And all men (says a witty poet) would be cowards if they durst.

That the poet and the philosopher both were cowards, may be yielded perhaps without dispute. They may have spoken the best of their knowledge. But for true courage, it has so little to do with anger, that there lies always the strongest suspicion against it, where this passion is highest. The true courage is the cool and calm. The bravest of men have the least of a brutal bullying insolence; and in the very time of danger, are found the most serene, pleasant and free. Rage, we know, can make a coward forget himself and fight: but what is done in fury or anger, can never be placed to the account of courage. Were it otherwise, womankind might claim to be the stoutest sex: for their hatred and anger have ever been allowed the strongest and most lasting.

Other authors there have been of a yet inferior kind: a sort of distributers and petty retailers of this wit; who have run changes and divisions, without end, upon this article of self-love. You have the very same thought spun out a hundred ways, and drawn into motto's and devices to set forth this riddle; "that act as generously or disinterestedly as you please, self still is at the bottom, and nothing else." Now if these gentlemen, who delight so much

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much in the play of words, but are cautious how they grapple closly with definitions, would tell us only what self-love was, and determine happiness and good, there would be an end of this enigmatical wit. For in this we should all agree, that happiness was to be pursued, and, in fact, was always sought after: but whether found in following nature, and giving way to common affection; or, in suppressing it, and turning every passion towards private advantage, a narrow self-end, or the preservation of mere life; this would be the matter in debate between us. The question would not be, "who lov'd himself, or who not;" but, "who lov'd and serv'd himself the righteſt, and after the trueſt manner."

'Tis the height of wisdom, no doubt, to be rightly selfish. And to value life, as far as life is good, belongs as much to courage as to discretion. But a wretched life is no wise man's wish. To be without honesty, is, in effect, to be without natural affection, or sociableness of any kind. And a life without natural affection, friendship, or sociableness, would be found to be a wretched one, were it to be try'd. 'Tis as these feelings and affections are intrinsically valuable, and worthy, that self-interest is to be rated and esteemed. A man is by nothing so much himself, as by his temper, and the character of his passions and affections. If he loses what is manly and worthy in these, he is as much lost to himself, as when he loses his memory and understanding. The least step into villany or baseness changes the character and value of a life. He who would preserve life at any rate, must abuse himself more than any one else can abuse him. And if life be not a dear thing indeed, he who has refused to live a villain, and has preferred death to a base action, has been a gainer by the bargain (‖)".

(‖) *Characteriſticks*, T. 1.

II. But

Such evils as result from social dependence are goods.

II. But I proceed to consider a second class of evils in human life objected against; those which arise from our social connexions, or partly from them, and partly from the laws of the sensible world. Now upon this head I need not insist long, since evils, as far as they are resolvable into the connexions of things, which make the sensible world, or the laws of matter and motion, have been already considered. And as for our suffering in consequence of our social relations and dependencies; as by the misfortunes of others, their want of health, infirmity, death, or their external losses by bad weather, storms, shipwrecks, and other physical causes, it is plainly the result of our reciprocal union and connexion; that is, of our being made for society, and by consequence mutually dependent: Can a finger ake or be hurt, and the whole body to which it belongs not suffer? If therefore it is not unfit that we should be one kind, made for participation and communication, it cannot be unfit that we should be linked and cemented together, by the strongest ties, by mutual wants and indigencies; or that we should make one body. For to demand society, social pleasures, social happiness, without that close and intimate dependence which makes us one body, is indeed to desire society without society. And it being as impossible, that a certain number of men should be congregated together in a certain form politic, called *a state or constitution*, without certain effects resulting from it; as that any number of bodies should be mixed, without producing certain effects; nature is justly deemed very kind to us, since it prompts, directs, and points us, by our generous affections, and our inward sense and love of public order and good, to associate ourselves in the way and manner, by which alone, in the nature of things, general good, beauty and happiness can be attained. For this is all that could be done consistently with the dependence of

our

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our happineſs on ourſelves, to put us into the road to true happineſs.

III. In the third place therefore, it remains to conſider thoſe evils which flow from follies and vices of whatever kind; whether the laws of matter and motion have any ſhare in the effect, as they plainly have in the diſeaſes brought upon us by exceſſes in eating, drinking, and other external indulgencies; or whether our ſocial connexions have any ſhare in the effect, as they likewiſe muſt have in many caſes; ſince 'tis impoſſible, for example, man can have the advantages of good reputation and conduct in ſociety, without having, at leaſt, the ſemblance of the qualities that deſerve it; and ſince, whatever ſets or in a bad ſituation with regard to the favour and love of mankind, muſt impair our happineſs: Or whether, in the laſt place, they are wholly mental, and ſpring from the natural ballance and dependence of our affections, in conſequence of the anatomy, ſo to ſpeak, of the mind; as many plainly are: for what are the diſeaſes of the mind, the worſt of all diſeaſes, ſuch as choler, envy, peeviſhneſs, madneſs, *&c.* but diſorders naturally introduced into the mind, in conſequence of its fabric, by exceſſive paſſions, and wrong aſſociations of ideas. Now with regard to all theſe evils, I would obſerve, that it muſt be highly unreaſonable to complain of them, unleſs it be abſolutely unfit that vice ſhould be its own puniſhment, or bring its own chaſtiſement, either along with it, or after it in any degree; or unleſs it be unfit, that there ſhould be ſuch a thing as prudence and imprudence, wiſdom and folly, right and wrong conduct. For what can theſe mean, if different paſſions and actions have not different conſequences?

Vices puniſh themſelves according to the natural courſe of things.

(*b*) On

(*b*) On the one hand, it is abſurd to object againſt providence, or the government of the world, becauſe ſome goods fall to the ſhare of the vicious. For perſons guilty of many vices, may yet have ſeveral excellent qualities, and do ſeveral prudent, nay good actions. Very few, if any are totally vicious, or quite deprived of every good quality. And good actions and qualities will be good actions and qualities with whatever vices they are mixed. But is it a bad conſtitution of things in which acts of prudence, induſtry and virtue have their good effects? Nay, on the contrary, is it not a moſt excellent general law, that prudence and induſtry ſhould be in the

Goods fall to the ſhare of the vicious according to the excellent general laws of induſtry.

(*b*) There is an excellent treatiſe of *Plutarch*, *De his qui ſero a numine puniuntur*, well worth our attention, in which he gives ſeveral anſwers to this important queſtion, Why the wicked are not immediately and viſibly puniſhed in this life, but often ſuffered to flouriſh. Firſt, he quotes *Plato*, Plato in nobis viſum a natura fuiſſe accenſum dicit, ut ſpectandis admirandiſque cœleſtium corporum motibus anima noſtra amplecti condocefacta decorum & ordinem odium conciperet incompoſitorum & vagorum motuum, temeritatemque & caſui fidentem levitatem fugeret tanquam omnis vitii & erroris originem. Non eſt enim major alius fructus quem ex Deo capere poſſit homo, quam quod imitatione pulchrorum & bonorum quæ divinæ naturæ inſunt, virtute potiatur. Propterea Deus malis interpoſita mora ac tarde pœnas infligit, non quod vereatur, ne accelerando ſupplicio erret aut committat cujus pœnetentia aliquando ducatur. Sed ut in vindicandis aliorum peccatis ſævitiam & vehementiam nobis hoc exemplo ſuo eximat. ——— Caute in hoc genere verſari & manſuetudinem graviumque læſionum tolerantiam pro divina habere virtutis parte, quam Deus nobis demonſtrat, puniendo, paucos emendantem, tarde puniendo multos juvantem atque corrigentem, &c. The other reaſons he adds ſeem very nearly to coincide with what our Saviour ſays in anſwer to this queſtion, *Wilt thou then that we go and gather up the tares? But he ſaid, Nay; leſt while you gather up the tares, you root up alſo the wheat with them.* And with what St. *Peter* ſays, *Be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thouſand years, and a thouſand years as one day. The Lord is not ſlack concerning his promiſe, as ſome men count ſlackneſs, but is long-ſuffering to usward, not willing that any ſhould periſh, but that all ſhould come to repentance. Account therefore that the long-ſuffering of our Lord is ſalvation.*

main

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main ſucceſsful and obtain their ends? Is it unreaſonable or unjuſt, that internal goods ſhould be procured by certain means? And what are the means, by which they are attained to, according to the connexions of things in the government of the world? Is it not induſtry employed to get them, that purchaſes them? And can there be a better rule with regard to acquiſitions of all ſorts, than that they ſhould be made by induſtry, diligence and labour to make them? Thus the philoſopher attains to the knowledge which is his delight. Thus the virtuous man attains to the virtuous qualities his ſoul is ſolely or chiefly bent upon. And in no other way do any goods fall to the ſhare of any perſon than by ſetting himſelf to attain to them.

Vice always produces miſery.

On the other hand, it would certainly be a great abſurdity to object againſt providence, that according to the connexions and order of things, vice is in a great meaſure its own puniſher by the evils it brings upon the wicked. And yet if we look cautiouſly into things, we ſhall find, that the far greater part of the evils and miſeries complained of in human life, are the effects and conſequences of vicious paſſions, and their purſuits. Whence elſe is it that honeſty is ſo univerſally pronounced the beſt policy; and diſhoneſty, folly? The plain meaning of this maxim is, that according to the natural tendency and courſe of things, there is no ſolid ſecurity for the beſt goods and enjoyments of life, but by virtuous conduct; and that a vicious one is the moſt unwiſe, becauſe the moſt unſafe, dangerous courſe, all things conſidered, even with regard to this life only. This maxim is readily aſſented to by all upon the ſlighteſt review of human affairs, or when the more viſible and obvious effects of good and bad conduct only are attended to. But the more accurate obſervers of things have found reaſon to carry the maxim ſtill further, and to aſſert, "*omnis homo ſuæ fortunæ artifex eſt.*" Or, as it is otherwiſe expreſſed, "*ſui cuique mores fingunt*

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Hiſtory and poetry prove this.

gunt fortunam. i. e. Every man's happineſs or misery is chiefly owing to himſelf; inſomuch, that what vulgarly called good or bad luck, is really and truly at bottom good or bad management. Many, very many of the evils of human life, which to ſuperficial obſervers appear accidental, are indeed originally owing to wrong judgments or exceſſive paſſions. If we attend to faithful hiſtory, or to what *Ariſtotle* (*c*) calls a better inſtructor than hiſtory, to wit, that is, probable poetry, in which human life and the natural conſequences of paſſions and actions are juſtly repreſented: if we attend to theſe teachers, we ſhall quickly perceive, that many more of the miſeries of mankind are owing to miſconduct, to ſome wrong ſtep, to ſome immorality, than we are generally aware of; or, at leaſt, than the objectors againſt providence ſeem to have ſufficiently attended to. Every good dramatic piece is a proof of this. The reaſon why the tragic plots, which according to *Ariſtotle* are the beſt (*d*), move our fear and pity without raiſing any diſſatisfaction, or repining in our minds at providence, is becauſe they exemplify to us the fatal conſequences into which one little error, any too vehement paſſion, any the ſmalleſt immoral indulgence, may plunge thoſe who are poſſeſſed of many excellent, highly eſtimable, truly amiable qualities. But how could this be done; or how could we be moved by ſuch repreſentations, were they not natural? And in what ſenſe can they be called natural, unleſs the whole progreſs of the repreſentation be according to nature; that is, unleſs the effects repreſented be according to the ſtructure of the human mind, and the regular eſtabliſhed courſe and influence of things (*e*)? "Tragedy hath indeed chiefly for its object the diſtreſſes of the great

(*c*) Ariſtotle *art. poeticæ*, cap. 9. (*d*) Ibid. cap. 13.
(*e*) See this obſervation illuſtrated by Mr. *Hutcheſon, in his conduct of the paſſions.*

the

CHAP. III. the high genius of this poetry, consists in the lively representation of the disorders and miseries of the great, to the end that the people and those of a lower condition may be taught the better to content themselves with privacy, enjoy their safer state, and prize the equality of their guardian laws" (*f*). But how does it, or can it conduce to that excellent end, but by shewing in what greater miseries than lower life can ever be plagued with, the great are often involved by the vices to which their high circumstances only expose, as they can only so severely punish. No such representation could move, unless it were natural. And it cannot be natural, unless nature, that is, the constitution of things with regard to virtue and vice, be such as the imitation represents. In fine, we must give up all pretensions to beauty, truth and nature in moral poetry, that is in fiction or imitation of moral life, unless it be true, in fact, that the least vicious excess, or the smallest immoral indulgence, may and commonly does involve in a long train of miseries.

In reality, poetical probability, beauty, justice, truth or nature, if they are not words without a meaning, suppose the account that hath been given of human nature in this essay to be true.

They suppose, 1. That there is a social principle, and a sense of beauty in actions and characters deeply interwoven with our frame, and improveable to a very high pitch of perfection. For how else could we be moved by the struggles between virtue and passion, which make the sublime and the pathetic too of sentiments in such compositions? Or how could we possibly not only admire but love virtue even in distress; be charmed with its firmness and beauty, and prefer its sufferings to the most triumphant circumstances of the villain? 2. They suppose such a nice ballance and dependence of our affections,

(*f*) *Characteristics*, T. 1. advice to an author.

that

that every vicious paſſion produces great diſorder, horrible tumult and riot in the mind, and ſadly endangers its health, peace and ſoundneſs. 3. They ſuppoſe, that the ſmalleſt immoral indulgence often, nay, almoſt always involves in the moſt perplexing difficulties, the moſt awful miſeries. There, in particular, do we ſee the truth of what the ſatyriſt obſerves. CHAP. III.

——————————— *Nam quis*
Peccandi finem poſuit ſibi? Quando recepit
Ejectum ſemel attrita de fronte ruborem?
Quiſnam hominum eſt, quem tu contentum videris uno
Flagitio? Dabit in laqueum veſtigia noſter
Perfidus ——— Juv. Sat. 13.

If theſe principles are not true, poetry can have no foundation in nature, it cannot be true imitation and pleaſe as ſuch; it cannot be natural: Truth, conſiſtency, beauty, a natural plot, and right and wrong conduct in ſuch compoſitions and repreſentations are words without a meaning. But, on the other hand, if the premiſes concerning the imitative arts are true, as they muſt be, if there is truth in poetry, or indeed in any other imitative art; how excellently is human nature conſtituted, and what reaſonable objection can be brought againſt it? For which of thoſe principles of human nature, which have been mentioned as the foundation of poetical truth, and as the ſource of all the pleaſures moral imitations afford or can afford us, is not a moſt uſeful and noble one: an unexceptionable proof that we are indeed the workmanſhip of an infinitely wiſe Being, who is, as he was called by the ancients, *perfect reaſon, perfect virtue?*

But to proceed, in the objections againſt providence, on account of the diſtribution of external goods and evils; are not theſe goods and evils exceedingly magnified? It is certainly fair to reduce

In objections external goods and evils are much magnified.

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them to their true values and meaſures before we pronounce any judgment concerning them. Now what are thoſe goods which are ſaid to be ſo unequally divided? Or what are their oppoſite evils which are ſo loudly complained of? The goods may be all reduced to one, wealth, for it includes them all in it, that is, it is the means of procuring all that voluptuouſneſs deſires, or rather, luſts after; and the oppoſite to that is poverty, or mediocrity of circumſtances; a fortune that can afford little or nothing toward the gratification of ſenſual appetites. But what is wealth, if, in reality, there be more greatneſs and ſublimity of mind in deſpiſing it than poſſeſſing it? And if thoſe are indeed the moſt amiable and glorious characters among mankind, who prefer virtue, not only in poverty, but under violent perſecution, to flouriſhing redundant vice; and who look upon the conſumption of wealth in mere gratification to ſelfiſh ſenſual concupiſcence as ſinking and degrading the man; as acting a beaſtly, a vile, abominable part? And yet what elſe is it, but ſuch a virtuous contempt of merely ſenſual enjoyments, that makes the ſublime of ſentiments and actions in life, in hiſtory, or poetry?

If we attend to the objections made againſt providence, or the doubts which crowd into our minds in melancholly hours, we ſhall find that we are apt to make ſeveral miſtakes: the goods of ſenſe are over-rated, and the pains magnified; for what are all theſe goods in compariſon with thoſe, which our reaſon, and a refined imagination, our moral ſenſe, and ſuch other powers, far ſuperior to our external ſenſes, afford us? And what are all the evils and pains in the world, compared with the agonies of a guilty mind? Beſides, we are ready to apprehend every perſon to be miſerable in thoſe circumſtances which we imagine would make ourſelves miſerable; and yet we may eaſily find, that the lower rank of mankind, whoſe only revenue is their bodily labour, enjoy

enjoy as much chearfulneſs, contentment, health, quietneſs, in their own way, as another in the higheſt ſtation of life. Both their minds and their bodies are ſoon fitted to their ſtate. The farmer and labourer, when they enjoy the bare neceſſaries of life, are eaſy. They have often more correct imaginations, thro' neceſſity and experience, than others can acquire by philoſophy. This thought is indeed a poor excuſe for a baſe, ſelfiſh oppreſſor, who, imagining poverty a great miſery, bears hard upon thoſe in a low ſtation of life, and deprives them of their natural conveniencies, or even of bare neceſſaries. But this conſideration may ſupport a compaſſionate heart too deeply touched with apprehended miſeries, of which the ſufferers themſelves are inſenſible.

The pains of the external ſenſes are pretty pungent; but how far ſhort, in compariſon of the long tracts of health, eaſe and pleaſure? How rare is the inſtance of a life, with one tenth ſpent in violent pain? How few want abſolute neceſſaries; nay, have not ſomething to ſpend in gaiety and ornament? The pleaſures of beauty are expoſed to all, in ſome meaſure. Thoſe kinds of beauty which require property to the full enjoyment of them, are not ardently deſired by many; the good of every kind in the univerſe is plainly ſuperior to the evil. How few would accept of annihilation, rather than continuance in life, in the middle ſtate of age, health and fortune? Or what ſeparated ſpirit, who had conſidered human life, would not, rather than periſh, take the hazard of it again, by returning into a body in the ſtate of infancy.

——————Who would loſe
For fear of pain, this intellectual being?

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External goods depend in general on industry, which is a good institution of nature.

Again (*g*), Let us consider that external goods must (as it hath been observed) fall to the share of those who set themselves to procure them; they are the purchase of industry and labour. They may be got by fraud or violence. But they are naturally the product of virtuous labour and diligence to get them. They may fall by succession or gift into the mouths of the indolent and lazy, but some one must have taken pains to procure them. And is it then any wonder, or any just cause of complaint, that things are so constituted that wealth shall be purchased by industry, or riches fall to the share of any one who leaves no stone unturned to attain them? Do not all goods, of whatever kind, thus depend upon our setting ourselves to purchase them; the goods of the mind as well as external ones? But, which is more, when external goods fall to one's share, can they alone make him happy? Who is it that truly enjoys them, but the good, the generous man, whose supreme delight is in making others happy? Truly, (*h*) the happiness of man does not consist in the abundance of the things he possesses. Else, whence is discontent and uneasiness more frequent among those placed in the most favourable circumstances of outward enjoyment, than others in more disadvantageous ones? And if many want and are distressed, are there not many likewise, who, being able to relieve them, deprive themselves of the highest joy riches and power can afford, to wipe tears from mournful eyes, and to bid misery be no more?

They cannot make happy alone, or without virtue.

(*g*) Most of these observations are given in Mr *Hutcheson*'s words, in his excellent treatise *on the conduct of the passions*.

(*h*) See *Plutarch*'s excellent treatise *De virtute & vitio*, where he reasons at great length to prove that the greatest abundance of worldly wealth, or the happiest circumstances of outward enjoyment, are absolutely insufficient, without virtue, to produce peace and contentment of mind, or to make happy; and on the other hand, that virtue is an unspeakable support in adversity.

Further;

Further; the pleaſures of wealth or power are proportioned to the qualifications of the deſires or ſenſes, which the agent intends to gratify by them; now the pleaſures of the internal ſenſes, or of the imagination, are allowed by all who have any tolerable taſte of them, as a much ſuperior happineſs to thoſe of the external ſenſes, though they were enjoyed to the full; ſo that wealth or power give greater happineſs to the virtuous man, than to thoſe who conſult only luxury or external ſplendor. If theſe deſires are become habitual or enthuſiaſtic, without regard to any other end than poſſeſſion; they are an endleſs ſource of vexation, without any real enjoyment: a perpetual craving, without nouriſhment or digeſtion: and they may ſurmount all other affections, by aids borrowed from other affections themſelves. The ſenſible deſires are violent, in proportion to the ſenſes from which the aſſociated ideas are borrowed; only it is to be obſerved, that however the deſires may be violent, yet the obtaining the object deſired gives little ſatisfaction, the poſſeſſion diſcovers the vanity and deceit, and the fancy is turned towards different objects, in a perpetual ſucceſſion of conſtant purſuits (*i*).

When we have obtained any ſhare of wealth or power, let us examine their true uſe, and what is the beſt enjoyment of them.

——————Quid aſper
Utile nummus habet? patriæ cariſque propinquis
Quantum elargiri decet?——

Perſius.

What moral pleaſures, what delights of humanity, what gratitude from perſons obliged, what ho-

(*i*) *Quod petiit, ſpernit; repetit quod nuper omiſit:*
Æſtuat, & vitæ diſconvenit ordine toto:
Diruit, ædificat, mutat, quadrata rotundis.
Hor. Epiſt. Lib. 1. Epiſt. 1.

CHAP. III. nours may a wife man of a generous temper purchaſe with them? How fooliſh is the conduct of heaping up wealth for poſterity, when ſmaller degrees might make them equally happy; when the great proſpects of this kind are the ſtrongeſt temptations to them to indulge ſloth, luxury, debauchery, inſolence, pride, and contempt of their fellow creatures; and to baniſh ſome noble diſpoſitions, humility, compaſſion, induſtry, hardneſs of temper and courage, the offspring of the ſober dame poverty? How often does the example, and almoſt the direct inſtruction of parents, lead poſterity to the baſeſt views of life! How powerfully might the example of a wiſe and generous father, at once teach his offspring the true value of wealth or power, and prevent their neglect of them, or fooliſh throwing them away, and yet inſpire them with a generous temper, capable of the juſt uſe of them. Education in order to make wiſe and happy, ought to fix early upon the mind thoſe two important truths, 1. That it is not indeed riches which can make happy, but that he only who can be happy without them, can have true happineſs from them. 2. But yet it is fit that induſtry ſhould gain its end: vicious induſtry its end, as well as virtuous induſtry its end. Theſe two truths well underſtood, and deeply rooted in the mind by right inſtruction and education, could not fail to produce a quiet, eaſy, contented mind, and induſtry wiſely placed.

All this reaſoning is excellently ſet forth by the incomparable poet often quoted.

> " *Whatever* is, *is* right." *This world, 'tis true,*
> *Was made for* Cæſar—*but for* Titus *too:*
> *And which more bleſt? who chain'd his country, ſay*
> *Or he whoſe virtue ſigh'd to loſe a day?*
> " *But ſometimes virtue ſtarves while vice is fed.*"
> *What then? is the reward of virtue, bread?*

Tha

That vice may merit; 'tis the price of toil:
The knave deserves it when he tills the soil,
The knave deserves it when he tempts the main,
Where folly fights, for tyrants, or for gain.
The good man may be weak, be indolent,
Nor is his claim to plenty, but content.——
What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy,
The soul's calm sun-shine, and the heart-felt joy,
Is virtue's prize: a better would you fix?
Then give humility a coach and six,
Justice a conqu'ror's sword, or truth a gown,
Or public spirit its great cure, a crown:
Rewards, that either would to virtue bring
No joy, or be destructive of the thing.
How oft by these at sixty are undone
The virtues of a saint at twenty one!——
—'Tis phrase absurd to call a villain great:
Who wickedly is wise, or madly brave,
Is but the more a villain, more a knave.
Who noble ends by noble means obtains,
Or failing, smiles in exile or in chains,
Like good Aurelius *let him reign, or bleed,*
Like Socrates, *that man is great indeed.*

Essay on man, Epist. 4.

But having sufficiently insisted in the former part of this essay upon the happiness which virtue alone can give; I shall just subjoin two or three more reflexions upon the present distribution of goods and evils.

I. As many of the goods of life are by our social constitution dependent upon the right government of society; so, on the one hand, many of the evils complained of arise from a disorderly or ill-administred state; and, on the other hand, many of the sufferings and punishments due to vice are likewise left to be the effects of rightly governed society.

The punishment of vice is wisely left in some measure to society.

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ty. All these things are too evident to need much illustration. The progress of knowledge, and all the elegant pleasures, which the due encouragement of ingenious arts are able to afford to mankind, plainly depend upon the care of society, to promote and encourage the arts and sciences. And therefore, if society is deprived of many enjoyments of these sorts, so superior to merely sensual gratification, 'tis owing entirely to the wrong government of society, the narrow views and bad pursuits of its administrators. And just so, on the other hand, if all manner of vice is not duly restrained, curbed, and chastised, and consequently vice is more prosperous and triumphant than it ought to be; to what is that owing, but to society's not taking suitable measures to promote general happiness? But the fitness or moral necessity of such dependence of general happiness upon the right government of society, a good politic constitution, and the impartial execution of good laws, has been again and again handled in this discourse.

Unless we suppose a mixture of goods and evils dependent on other causes than virtue; or if we suppose external motives to virtue according to the course of things; there could be no true or pure virtue in the world.

II. Let us consider a little what would be the consequence, if the encouragement of virtue, and the discouragement of vice, were not in some degree left to society, to mankind themselves; but if such were the constitution of things, that vice was always discovered and pointed out by some extraordinary calamity inflicted upon it in this life; and virtue, on the other hand, was sure of having its merit distinguished by some remarkable external favour. 'Tis evident, that the present constitution of things, by which the procurance of external goods is the effect of skill and industry to attain them, is absolutely inconsistent with such a state and connexion of things, and could not take place with it. But besides, in such a constitution of things, virtue would not be left to be chosen for its own sake, that is for the enjoyments which virtuous exercises, together

ther with the ſenſe of having acted rightly, afford: There would then be another motive to virtue, ariſing from a poſitive external reward, the very being of which would neceſſarily leſſen the merit and the excellence of virtue, by removing the trial of it, which the preſent ſtate gives occaſion to.

For then only indeed is a perſon truly virtuous, when his ſenſe of the dignity and excellence of virtuous conduct, is able to make him adhere to virtue, whatever other pleaſures he may forego, or whatever pains he may ſuffer by ſuch adherence. I do not ſay, that there is no virtue, but where this virtuous fortitude (*k*) is quite inſurmountable: few attain to it in ſuch a degree. But one is only virtuous in proportion as he hath this noble ſtrength of mind. And invitation to this pure love of virtue does not require a poſitive connexion between it and any external badges of the divine favour: it can, on the contrary, only take place, in a ſtate where there is no external bribe to virtue, or nothing to excite to it, beſides the pleaſures of the rational and moral kind accompanying it, and the conſciouſneſs of its excellence. The fortitude in which the perfection of virtue conſiſts, cannot be formed but in a ſtate where there is a mixture of goods and evils to try and prove it, to give it occaſions, ſubjects and means of exerting itſelf. And therefore, at leaſt, till that fortitude be formed and attained to, its fit that rational beings ſhould be placed in a ſtate fit for forming and improving it. But, which is more, how

(*k*) So all the ancients define the virtuous man. See *Plutarch*, *De virtutibus moralibus*. And, *De animi tranquillitate*.——So *Cicero* frequently. See particularly, *De legibus*, Lib. 1. Quod ſi pœna ſi metus ſupplicii non ipſa turpitudo, &c.——So even the poets.

Cautus enim metuit ſoveam lupus accipiterque
Suſpectos laqueos, & opertum milvius hamum.
Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.
Hor. Epiſt. Lib. 1. *Epiſt.* 16.

can

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can virtue be ſuppoſed to be rewarded, in conſeqence of a poſitive arbitrary inſtitution, by enjoyments diſtinct from the exerciſes of virtue, and its natural fruits in the mind, without ſuppoſing ſomething ſuperior to all thoſe enjoyments which are the natural effects of virtue itſelf? For virtue is the love of virtuous pleaſures: but a pleaſure given by way of reward for acting virtuouſly, muſt mean a pleaſure ſuperior to that which attends virtuous behaviour. Wherefore in any proper ſenſe of reward, virtue can only be ſaid to be its own reward: it can only be rewarded by higher attainments in virtue. I am afraid, thoſe who demand ſuch a connexion of things, as has been mentioned in favour of virtue, deſire ſuch a connexion in its favour, as ſhould at laſt reward the virtuous man for his virtuous conduct, by giving him the means of wallowing in ſenſual pleaſures. If this is not their meaning, let them explain themſelves, and name the poſitive reward they would have annexed to virtue in this life different from all that is rational and virtuous: and if they mean ſuch a reward: as, to deſire any reward to be given virtue before it be formed to very great perfection, if they are for allowing virtue at all to take place, and to be formed, is to deſire it too ſoon; ſo to deſire ſuch a reward after virtue is formed, is to deſire a reward to formed virtue, which would deſtroy it after it is formed. But if they do not mean ſuch a reward as would deſtroy virtuous affection, but a reward conſiſtent with it, and that not till it is arrived at very great perfection, let them ſay at what time, or at what period of virtue they would have it beſtowed; and, above all, let them name the reward they would have, that we may ſee whether it can be beſtowed in this life on virtue, without altering the ſtate of things in this life that is neceſſary to form and try virtue, and to bring it to perfection. If by their reward to virtue, they mean higher improvements in virtue, and better and more enlarged means of exerting its excellence,

lence, let them ſhew us, that this ſtate does not afford means of higher improvements, and of larger exertions of the virtuous diſpoſitions, than any, the moſt virtuous or perfect man, has made all the advantage of in his power; let them ſhew us, why a firſt ſtate of virtue, which ought to be a mixed one, ſhould not have its boundaries; or how it poſſibly cannot have its *ne plus ultra*. And let them ſhew us, that it is better and wiſer not to place virtue firſt in a forming ſtate, and afterwards in a ſtate ſuited to its improvements, than to do ſo. For all this they ought to prove, in order to make there objection againſt this ſtate of any force; for till they prove all this, it will remain exceeding probable, that this ſtate is very well adapted to form and improve virtue; ſince any other connexions in favour of virtue than now take place (as by poſitive rewards different from its natural and inſeparable fruits) would make this an improper ſtate for the education, trial and improvement of virtue; that is, for forming rational beings to the love of moral perfection or virtue for its own intrinſic excellence, and its own rational fruits. CHAP. III.

When all the ſufferings which virtue now and then meets with in the world, all its oppoſitions and perſecutions are laid together, what do they prove, but that in this ſtate, occaſions and means now and then ariſe of calling forth and exerciſing very great virtues? And how glorious! how eligible are ſuch circumſtances to true, high-improved virtue! Who would not rather be the diſtreſſed ſufferer than the proſperous perſecutor? What do all theſe ſufferings prove, but that a noble trial falls ſometimes to the ſhare of virtue; and that it is then it appears in all its fortitude, majeſty and beauty? And what is the reſult of this, but that this is a proper firſt ſtate for virtue, and that we are indeed made to be virtuous, ſince the caſe of ſuffering virtue is ſo eligible to every mind able to diſcern its beauty; The evils that happen to the virtuous, are occaſions and materials of great virtues.

CHAP. III. beauty; since the toils, the struggles, the hardships of virtue are so inviting to us, that while the greatness of virtue in suffering bravely for truth and goodness is present to any mind, none can chuse but prefer such a state to all the triumphs of prosperous, insolent vice? What is the natural language of all this, or what does such a constitution of things prognosticate, but care for ever to give virtue suitable occasions of exerting, and thereby rewarding itself; and that when this state of formation and trial comes to an end, virtue shall be placed in circumstances suited to its improvements, in which it shall be, more than it can be in its forming state, its own reward? In fine, whatever violence, opposition, cruelty or barbarity virtue may meet with in this state, what can be inferred from thence, but that this state is not the whole of our existence, but a part, our entry on being; and that the future state of virtue and vice shall clear up many difficulties, which cannot but appear dark and intricate, till the *drama* is further advanced. Very good arguments are drawn from the present state of things to prove a future state, which have been often repeated by divines and philosophers, and I shall not therefore now insist upon them. Two cautions, however, with regard to some such arguments are not unnecessary, since, in fact, many are led by them into mistakes. The first thing I would observe on this head is, that in the warmth of some reasonings on this subject, several good men are often led to represent the case of virtue here as very deplorable, and the administration of things as very disorderly; and thus to magnify the distresses and evils of human life, and to undervalue its blessings and advantages, in order to prove the necessity of reparation, or juster distribution in a future state. But surely future order cannot be inferred from utter present disorder and confusion. 2. In the warmth of such reasonings, several expressions are used, which are liable to be misconstructed

Some reflexions on the arguments for a future state from present inequality with respect to virtue and vice.

ſtructed into an opinion of future rewards, diſtinct from rational pleaſures, nay, contrary to the exerciſes of virtue, and of the ſenſual kind. But ſurely nothing can be more excellent, or more great than virtue; and what is inferior, not to ſay repugnant to it, cannot be its reward. CHAP. III.

I do not make theſe obſervations, which greatly merit our attention, with any view of derogating from any writer, far leſs with an intention to ſuggeſt that the reaſonings taken from the preſent flouriſhing of vice, and ſuffering of virtue, to prove a future ſtate, are not concluſive; but merely to prevent any one's being miſled by inaccuracies of language or rhetorical arguments, into opinions very contrary to truth, and to the ſenſe of thoſe writers themſelves who have laid the great ſtreſs of the evidence for a future ſtate upon what they have called an inequality with regard to virtue and vice in this life. When providence and the preſent ſtate of mankind are fairly repreſented, the argument for a future ſtate ſtands thus, and is unanſwerable. We are ſo conſtituted, that the exerciſes of virtue, and the conſcience of it, are our higheſt (*l*) enjoyment; and vice, whatever pleaſure it may afford of the ſenſual kind, always creates bitter remorſe, and almoſt always great bodily diſorder: but ſuch a conſtitution muſt be the workmanſhip of ſuch

The true ſtate of the caſe or argument.

(*l*) See a fine ſentence of *Cicero* to this purpoſe preſerved by *Lactantius*, Lib. 5. cap. 19. Vult plane virtus honorem: nec eſt virtutis ulla alia merces, quam tamen illa accipit facile, non exigit acerbe. Sed ſi aut ingrati univerſi, aut invidi multi, aut inimici potentes ſuis virtutem præmiis ſpoliant, næ illa ſe tamen multis ſolatiis oblectat, maximeque ſuo decore ſeipſam ſuſtentat. With regard to vice, there is another fragment of *Cicero* preſerved by the ſame author, *Lib.* 6. *cap.* 8. which is exceedingly beautiful. Eſt quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffuſa in omneis, conſtans, ſempiterna——Unuſque erit communis quaſi magiſter, et imperator omnium Deus, ille legis hujus inventor, diſceptator, lator: cui qui non parebit, ipſe ſe fugiet,

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such a perfectly virtuous and good Creator, as all the other parts of nature prove its Author to be, in proportion as we advance in the knowledge of it. And therefore we have just reason to think, that beings capable of improvements in virtue, are not made merely to exist in a state, which, though it be very fit for the trial and formation of virtue, yet cannot be thought to be contrived for any other purpose, but to be a first state of trial and formation. Were a state of trial and formation the only state in which moral beings exist, nature would be but a very imperfect, nay, a bad system: but as it cannot be such, if the Author of nature be infinitely good and perfect, which all the other parts of nature, as far as we can search into them, proclaim him to be; so there is no reason to apprehend it to be such, from any such appearances as are by no means symptoms of imperfect administration, but upon supposition that this is the only state of mankind: for to infer so, purely on that account, is to conclude that there is no future state, merely because the first state looks to be what a first state ought to be, namely, a state of trial and formation; which is absurd.

If we do not exceedingly depretiate virtuous enjoyments, and excessively magnify external gratifications, we must own some care about virtue here; a care proper to its state of education and discipline: but if we do, it is reasonable to expect future care and concern about it. If separately, from the consideration of certain goods which fall to the share of vice, and of certain evils which sometimes fall to the share of virtue here, we have very good reason

piet. ac naturam hominis aspernabitur, atque hoc ipso luet pœnas maximas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. See a charming description of virtue, and the happiness it brings along with it, in *Juvenal*'s Prayer, *Satyre* 18. See what he says of the punishment of vice by itself, *Satyre* 13. And there are many beautiful passages to the same purpose in *Plato*, particularly *De Republica*, Lib 1.

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to think well of nature, or that all beſpeaks a good Author and Governor; then, either there muſt be a future ſtate of mankind, to which this is a well adjuſted prelude; or it muſt be proved, that ſuch is the fate of virtue and vice here, that this ſtate hath not at all any appearance of being a proper firſt ſtate, but is ſo irregular, and contrary to good order, that whatever all other things may ſeem to prove, conſidered ſeparately, yet when this is taken into the account, all the other ſigns of wiſdom and goodneſs prove nothing, and the preſent ſtate of virtue and vice clearly evidences ſuch utter confuſion, irregularity, and hatred of virtue, that from it no future good can reaſonably be hoped for. Either this muſt be proved, or a future ſtate is certain. But who can think ſo harſhly of nature, if he but opens his eyes to the manifold inſtances of wiſdom, benevolence, and love of virtue, which every where appear throughout its adminiſtration? CHAP. III.

The preſent queſtion chiefly turns upon this ſingle point, Whether, ſince it is reaſonable to think that the firſt ſtate of rational beings ſhould be a ſtate of formation and diſcipline, there is not, all things conſidered, more reaſon to think that this our preſent ſtate is but a firſt ſtate of trial and formation, than to think it is our whole exiſtence? Now if it be true, that all the evils in this ſtate are not only proper to a firſt ſtate of trial and formation, but do ariſe from general laws, the ſteady operation of which is abſolutely fit, and which produce much greater goods than evils, goods of the higheſt and nobleſt kind: and if it be true, that the further we look into any parts of nature, and into the connexions and dependencies of things relative to man in particular, the more reaſon we find to think well of nature, and conſequently of its Author: if all this, I ſay, be true, as I think we have ſufficiently proved it to be, what then can be concluded, with any ſhew of reaſon, but that, as there ought to be a firſt ſtate of rational beings, ſo this

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this is our first state, and not the whole of our existence: and that, as the progress of things, or the scheme of government advances, so in proportion, shall all perplexing difficulties with regard to nature open to us, be cleared up and unravelled? If the *drama* be not compleated here, then we see but a part: and if we see but a part, it is no wonder if we are considerably in the dark. But do we not see enough of order, and goodness, and excellent conduct, to persuade us that we are only in the dark, because it is but a part that we can see? For must not virtue be formed before it can be perfect? And must it not be perfect, before it can reap the fruits of its perfection? Can the effect precede or take place without the cause; or the end prevent the means?

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A complex view of the objections made against human nature, and of the absurdities resulting from them, or in which they necessarily terminate.

BUT to go through more objections separately would but oblige me to repeat very often the same principles, from which the solutions given to those that have been mentioned are brought, the principles fully explained in the first part of this enquiry. I shall now, therefore, take as complete a view of the human state as I am able, and endeavour to shew, that no change can be demanded, which is not either impossible or unreasonable; that is to say, for the worse.

Let us, I say, take as full a view of our nature as we can, and impartially enquire, what it is in our constitution and frame we would have altered; or strictly examine the tendency and meaning of our objections and demands, whether they do not necessarily terminate, when they are closely pursued to their

these kind of affections to ballance one another; or their last result, in requiring something very absurd, or very inconvenient and disadvantageous. CHAP. IV.

Would he who is not pleased with our present make have no gradation of perfection in nature? Or would he have a gradation in nature from the lowest to the highest species of created perfection without man? Would he have nature as full of life, perfection and happiness as may be; and yet such a species as man wanting? Or would he have mankind to exist, and to make a proper species in the rising scale of existence, that fills nature and makes it coherent, and yet not be that very species necessary to such gradation and fullness? Why does not man deserve his place in being? Or in what respect is he wrong placed? Would he have earth without inhabitants, or would he have no earth in our mundan system? Or can we alter that mundan system in any respect, without altering it entirely, that is, without making quite another system, and consequently without allowing this one a place in nature? This no person, who has any tincture of natural philosophy, will propose.

Would the objector have man a merely passive being, without any power, dominion or sphere of activity allotted to him; only impelled by appetites and affections, succeeding to one another in their turns, independently of his own choice and direction, and driving him irresistibly to ends he cannot foresee, or foreseeing, cannot prevent or avoid? Would he have man to have been made only capable of certain passive gratifications, without any power of judging, willing, chusing, deliberating and ruling; without any thing committed to his charge and management; without any objects or subjects to regulate, work upon, and command? Would he have man to have been created incapable of acquiring and procuring goods to himself or others, incapable of reflecting upon himself, as one able to be useful or hurtful to his kind as he pleases; incapable of distin-

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guiſhing between good and evil, beneficial or hurtful, and of approving or diſapproving his conduct? Would he have man formed without a moral ſenſe, without the capacity of perceiving fitneſs and unfitneſs in affections, actions, and characters; and without the capacity of receiving pleaſure from the conſciouſneſs of having acted a fit and becoming part? Or can there be a ſenſe of right and wrong, fitneſs and unfitneſs, unleſs there be eſſential differences of things as to right and wrong, fit and unfit? Can objects co-exiſt, without having certain relations to one another? Or a mind deſigned for chuſing and acting, and to whom a certain ſphere of activity is aſſigned, ought it not to be capable of diſcerning the relations and differences of objects, moral ones in particular? Would we have been more perfect without any power, without any dominion? Or can there be power and dominion without ſubjects? Ought our power to extend only to natural objects and not to moral, or to moral and not to natural ones? Is it too large? Or is it too ſmall, becauſe we are not omnipotent? Hardly will it be ſaid it is too large. Yet to ſay, that there muſt be a gradation in nature, and no inferior as well as ſuperior ſpecies to us, is manifeſtly abſurd. But how are intelligent beings ſuperior to others, but in knowledge, power and dominion, or an intelligent ſphere of activity? Nor is it leſs abſurd to ſay, that any ſpecies can exiſt without having its determinate nature, capacity and extent of power. The only queſtion therefore is, whether our ſphere of activity has not an extent that conſtitutes a very noble ſpecies of being, worthy, as ſuch, of a place in the ſcale of exiſtence? Let us therefore examine a little its reach and extent. Is not progreſs in knowledge to infinity, or beyond any aſſignable bounds dependent upon ourſelves; that is, is it not in our power to be continually advancing in a field of ſcience, which is abſolutely exhauſtleſs? And does not our dominion in nature encreaſe

creaſe with our knowledge of nature; our dominion over material objects with the knowledge of the material creation, or of the laws and properties of bodies; and our dominion over moral objects with the knowledge of ourſelves, or of the nature and ballance of our affections, and of the qualities of the objects ſuited to them? What known property of bodies has not been made ſubſervient to ſome uſe by ſcience and arts? Practical arts, which are all imitations of nature, advance with real knowledge. And thus our dominion in nature is enlarged, and is continually enlargeable by ourſelves. And as for our affections and appetites, is it not in our own power to regulate them according to our reaſon and moral conſcience, or conformably to the natural agreements and diſagreements of things? For theſe two ways muſt mean the ſame thing. Now, would the objector have us capable of acquiring dominion, either natural or moral, previouſly to knowledge; or knowledge not to be dependent on, or acquirable by ourſelves; but have judgments to ſpring up in the mind, without our knowing whence they proceed, how they are formed, or why they are right, and may be relied upon; or, in one word, without our having the pleaſure of attaining to ſcience by our own diligence, by our own application to get it, by the voluntary right uſe of our faculties? Sure no objector againſt the imperfection of our make would have us more perfect, and yet not active. But can we otherwiſe be active, than by moving, exerting and employing our faculties by choice? Far leſs ſure would any objector have man ſo formed, that he could not arrive at perfection or improvement of any ſort by all his repeated labour; but that he ſhould always be obliged to begin anew, and never acquire any facility, readineſs or perfection in ſciences or actions, by all the repeated exerciſes of his powers. Would he have man incapable of attaining to the deliberative habit; or to the habit of thinking well

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Continued.

Would the objector against man, have him formed without private affections, without self-love and the other appetites necessary to self-preservation; or without those which regard others, and knit us to society, and merely with the few narrow contracted ones which terminate in ourselves? Would he have man capable of sensible and private pleasure, and likewise capable of social happiness, without both these kinds of affections to ballance one another? Or

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of which of these kinds of happiness would he have us incapable? Would he have the soundness of a mind indued with these kinds of affections not to depend upon the just ballance of them; or the ballance to be necessary to happiness, and yet not to depend upon our own regulation of our affections; or would he have the ballance impaired or incroached upon, and that diminution or encroachment not felt by sensation, but merely perceived by reflexion, without any uneasiness; whilst the effect of each rightly governed and ballanced affection is pleasant in itself, by way of sensation? Or would he have us perceive affections operate within us without any sensation of pleasure or pain? One or other of these he must demand; or our affections must continue to work as they do. But to demand the last, is to require that affections should not at all affect us, or be perceived by us. And to demand the other, is to require that an affection in its due proportion should be pleasant, and yet not be disagreeable when it is out of that due proportionate state; which is to require, that things should be proportionate and disproportionate at the same time in the same respect; congruous and incongruous to the same thing; tally and not tally with it? Would he have our frame of body or mind to be disordered, or threatened with hurt, and we have no warning of our danger; or would he have all things to have the same relation to, the same agreement with the same texture? Would he have every man so framed, as to have no relation to other men, no dependence upon the rest of his kind? Would he have men to constitute one kind, without a common stock, a common interest? Or would he have a common dependence, without reciprocal ties and affections? Would he have men so framed as to be related to one another, and mutually connected and dependent, and yet their common happiness not be dependent upon good union and joint endeavours

Continued.

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rightly directed and governed? Or would he have the common happineſs of mankind to be dependent, and yet the happineſs of individuals not to be dependent in any meaſure upon right union and duly confederated force? Would he have one kind of union as fit to promote the common happineſs as any other; diſunion as fit as union? Would he have ends gained without means, or all means to be equally fit for accompliſhing and effectuating any end whatſoever? Would he have mankind to conſtitute one kind, without being like to one another in the fabric and temperature of their minds, as well as in that of their bodies? Or would he have mankind conſtitute one ſpecies, whoſe greateſt good and perfection ſhould depend on ſocial, virtuous union, and yet there be no differences amongſt men in talents, diſpoſitions, genius's and abilities? Would he have all men preciſely the ſame in every reſpect; all of them placed in one point of time, place and ſight, altogether equal, as ſo many pieces of matter of the ſame magnitude, form, ſize and weight? Can there be a whole without parts? Can there be unity and harmony of deſign without variety, either in the natural or in the moral world? Or is it only in the natural world, that diverſity of parts and qualities can ſhew power and wiſdom, or that uniformity amidſt variety can produce beauty and good, and ſo evidence wiſe and good deſign? Would any objector have man begin to be, and not ſet out; to be a progreſſive creature, and not begin and proceed? Would he have man to attain to perfection gradually, and yet not to aim at it, advance towards it, and arrive at it by intermediate ſteps; attain to it without means, by any ſort of means, or by contrary means? Would he have man to be formed to attain to moral perfection, without moral powers, or without exerting theſe powers; that is, acquire otherwiſe than by acquiring: For is not moral perfection, a perfection and happineſs that is acquired by moral beings themſelves?

themſelves? In fine, let any objector take a juſt and full view of the natural aptitude and tendency of all all our faculties, as ſenſitive, as underſtanding, as moral, as ſocial beings, and ſay, whether all theſe are not fitted together to attain to an excellent end; a very conſiderable portion of ſenſitive and of rational, moral and ſocial happineſs. Let us but imagine mankind, with their common wants and indigencies, and their different talents and diſpoſitions, acting with regard to themſelves and others, as far as their mutual power and influence reaches, conformably to their reaſon and moral ſenſe, in all their purſuits, employments and exerciſes; and then let us ſay, whether mankind in ſuch a ſituation, would not ſhew a very beautiful variety of moral perfection and happineſs; or make a very orderly, beautiful and happy kind? Let us conſider, how orderly, beautiful and happy, any conſociation of mankind is in proportion as it approaches to ſuch a ſtate; and then let us ſay, where the blame is to be laid, if mankind be not a very happy, orderly and beautiful ſyſtem. The queſtion, as far as the end of our make deſigned by our Author is concerned, is, what we are capable of being in this ſtate, what we are ſufficiently framed and provided for; and conſequently what is the natural aptitude and tendency of all the inferior parts of our frame, conſidered as commited to the guidance and management of our reflecting powers, to be directed according to our moral ſenſe of right and wrong. This is the only fair way of judging or pronouncing ſentence concerning mankind, the end of our being, and the intention of our Author; becauſe this is the only fair way of judging of any whole, or of any author and contriver. Would it not be abſurd to ſay, a watch is not a good watch becauſe it is not a ſhip, or a fire-engine, or is only fitted for what it is fitted? And would it not be abſurd, in like manner, to ſay, a watch is not well contrived becauſe it can be broken and diſordered? But it is no leſs abſurd to ſay, mankind is not a

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CHAP. IV. good syſtem becauſe it is not another ſyſtem; or that mankind is not well conſtituted for its end, becauſe men may diſappoint that end: the very end for which we were made, being a certain degree of perfection and happineſs to be acquired by our proper care to attain to it. That only can be called natural to any intelligent being to which its nature regularly tends; and by deviating from which, proportionable diſorder and unhappineſs are produced. Let us therefore conſider by what deviations it is, that diſorder and unhappineſs are produced among mankind; and then, ſay, if virtue, if moral perfection be not our natural end. But how cloſly we are puſhed and prompted by nature, to purſue that end, and not to deviate from it in any degree, will ſufficiently appear to every one, if he will but aſk his own heart, whether he is ever difficulted to find out his duty, and what it becomes him to do, if he but conſults his moral conſcience, looks within himſelf, and ſeriouſly enquires about it. Notwithſtanding all attempts to ſilence moral conſcience, and bear it down or impoſe upon it, it often, uncalled upon, bears teſtimony for truth; for right, and againſt wrong, even in the moſt corrupted mind, to its great diſquietment. And this moral conſcience is never conſulted or called upon, but it immediately gives ſentence againſt vice and folly, and clearly points out truth, fitneſs and goodneſs. Let the moſt abandoned, hardened, callous debauchee, retire but a moment within his own breaſt, and tell himſelf, if he dare, that it does not.

Continued.

This light *and* darkneſs *in our chaos join'd,*
What ſhall divide? The God within the mind.
Tho' each, by turns the other's bounds invade,
As in ſome well wrought picture, light and ſhade,
And oft ſo mix'd the difference is too nice,
Where ends the virtue, *or begins the* vice.
Fools! Who from hence into the notion fall,
That vice *or* virtue *there is none at all.*

If

If white and black, blend, ſoften, and unite,
A thouſand ways, is there no black and white?
Aſk your own heart, and nothing is ſo plain;
'Tis to miſtake *them coſts the* time *and pain.*
Eſſay on man, Ep. 4.

Can our duty, our dignity, our happineſs be more clearly or more ſtrongly pointed out to us? Or can we indeed make any wrong ſtep without blaming ourſelves, without being conſcious it is our own fault? And is not virtue our ſupreme happineſs? Where elſe can we find it? And is not this happineſs within our power, within every one's reach? Is not virtue moſt glorious, moſt lovely, when it is moſt ſeverely tried; and is not trial neceſſary to its formation, neceſſary to its education, and to diſplaying all its charms, beauty and force? Can there be trial and formation, without means, occaſions and ſubjects? Or is it not fit, nay, neceſſary to the being of virtue, that it be ſchooled, proved and ſeverely ſearched? Ought not rational beings to be placed in ſuch a ſtate? And does not ſuch a one naturally forebode another more perfect ſtate of formed and improved virtue to ſucceed it? Muſt immortal moral powers neceſſarily periſh when the firſt means and objects of their exerciſes ceaſe? Or is there ought in nature that gives ground to apprehend, that this firſt ſtate of our exiſtence is our only one? Are we formed to acquire virtue, and yet hardly have time with all our diligence to make great advances in it till we are utterly deſtroyed? Or is it a good reaſon to think no other ſtate ſucceeds to this, becauſe this hath all the appearances and ſymptoms of ſuch a ſtate of trial and formation, as our firſt ſtate ought to be? Is it a good reaſon to think, that it is the whole of our being, becauſe ſome things appear as dark to us, as they muſt neceſſarily do, if this be but a part of our being? Whence could we have ideas of virtue, a ſenſe of its beauty, a ſtrong attachment to it, if

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if our Author had no ideas of it, no perception of its beauty, no attachment to it? Or what is there in nature we underſtand, that does not clearly evidence the goodneſs, the perfect goodneſs of its Author? But if he be good, what have the virtuous to fear, here or hereafter? All things muſt work together for the good of the virtuous, for their good is the chief object worthy the Author of nature's care and concern; he can love or approve them only. But that all things may work to their good, to this ſtate of trial, another ſtate muſt ſucceed, ſo fitted to beings, who have paſſed through their firſt ſtate of trial, as will beſt conduce to the general happineſs of all moral beings; to the happineſs of the virtuous, or of ſuch as are at due pains to improve in the moral perfection their nature is capable of. That there is order, and wiſdom, and goodneſs prevailing in nature, all nature cries aloud: And if there be, the Author of nature muſt love and purſue the general order, happineſs and perfection of his ſyſtem. But if he does ſo, what hath his own image to dread? And ſurely well improved reaſon and virtue is ſuch. If we are not to ſubſiſt hereafter, it muſt be becauſe there can be no proviſion, no entertainment for us after our commerce with this ſenſible world is at an end; or becauſe, tho' there can be, yet the Author of nature is not diſpoſed to make any other proviſion for thoſe excellent powers with which he hath furniſhed and adorned us. But what reaſon have we to imagine ſo cruelly of him who hath ſo well provided for us here? If we have none other but the mixture of pains and evils with goods in this ſtate, we have none at all; for the goods are by far ſuperior to the evils; the evils all flow from principles and laws neceſſary to the higheſt goods and enjoyments; and a mixture of evils is abſolutely neceſſary to the forming, ſchooling, proving, and perfectionating reaſon and virtue.

Can

Can the full fruits of virtue take place till virtue is become perfect? Can the happineſs which reſults from a greatly improved mind, from ripened and well formed powers and good habits, exiſt before powers are duly formed and improved, and good habits are contracted and eſtabliſhed? Can an effect precede or prevent its cauſe? Can harveſt be before ſpring? Or muſt there not be a moral ſpring before a moral harveſt, as well as a natural ſpring before a natural harveſt? Whatever may be ſaid of the order in which natural effects are produced, it is certain, that moral powers cannot come to their full maturity, or conſequently bring forth their fruits, and have their full effect, till they are duly cultivated and improved. To ſuppoſe it, is a downright contradiction. CHAP. IV.

What elſe then can any one, who impartially conſiders things, conclude, but with *Socrates*, "*Nec enim cuiquam bono mali quidquam evenire poteſt, nec vivo, nec mortuo, nec unqnam ejus res a diis immortalibus negliguntur.*"? Continued.

In all the reaſoning hitherto, I think I have not ſuppoſed the Being of a GOD, and a divine providence proved from any arguments *a priori*: but if I have, let ſuch ſuppoſitions be entirely laid aſide, as they ought to be in an attempt to prove divine providence *a poſteriori*, or from the ſtate and condition of things; and let every one aſk himſelf, what it is moſt natural to conclude concerning man from the account that has been given of the human nature; what it is moſt reaſonable to conclude concerning a being ſo furniſhed for progreſs in knowledge as man is, ſo fitted for ſociety and happineſs in the way of participation and communion; a being with ſuch an extent of dominion and power in the natural and in the moral world, and ſo capable of delighting in order, wiſdom, truth of deſign, and general good: whether it is more likely that he is the workmanſhip of a wiſe and good Creator,

and

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and under a perfectly wise and good providence and administration, than otherwise; and whether, in fine, it is more natural to imagine, that this present state of mankind is our whole existence, or that it is but our first state of formation and trial; since all appearances are very accountable upon that supposition. For the question comes to this, "Whether all the parts of our complex frame, and all the laws relative to it, are really so good as we have shewn; that is, whether they do not really produce exceeding great goods, and no evils for the sake of evil?" And to that question the first part of this essay is designed to be an answer.

CONCLUSION.

THE excellent poet we have so often quoted, hath clearly shewn, in one of his *Ethic Epistles* (*m*), how difficult it is to judge of the motives by which men are influenced to act, from the actions; because the same actions may proceed from contrary motives, and the same motives may influence contrary actions: and therefore to form characters, we can only take the strongest actions of a man's life, and try to make them agree, in which there must be great uncertainty, from nature itself, and from policy.

But whatever difficulty or uncertainty there may be, in judging of the springs of particular actions, human nature and its Author are sufficiently vindicated, when it appears, that all the powers of man, and all the springs which move him, are given him for excellent purposes: and that all the variety of

(*m*) *Ethic Epistles*, Book II. Epist. 1. to Lord *Cobham*.

characters

characters among men muſt be reſolved into certain mixtures or blendings of appetites and affections, which are all of them of the greateſt uſe in our frame, and which all operate, or are operated upon, mix and combine, grow and improve, or contrariwiſe degenerate and corrupt, according to moſt excellent general laws. We have not attempted in this eſſay to draw or paint particular characters, or to account for any particular characters, by analyſing them into the original ingredients of which they are compounded; becauſe it was enough to our purpoſe, to point out the conſtituent parts, by the various combinations of which, all different, nay oppoſite characters are compoſed; and to ſhew, that not only all theſe are very uſeful particles in our conſtitution, but that they cannot mingle and blend, be ſtrengthened or diminiſhed, improve or degenerate, otherwiſe than according to certain rules or laws, which are very fitly eſtabliſhed. But let any one take any character in *Homer*, *Virgil*, *Horace*, *Terence*, in any epic poem, in any tragedy or comedy, in hiſtory, or in natural, that is, probable fiction, and try whether all the ingredients in it are not reſolvable into thoſe powers and affections belonging to human nature, treated of in this enquiry; and the particular mixture forming that character into the operations of the general laws, by which all the various modifications of human powers and affections are brought about, which have likewiſe been here explained and vindicated. CONCLUS.

In other words, the deſign of this enquiry being *to vindicate the ways of God to man*, by accounting for moral as for natural things, we cannot help thinking it is accompliſhed, if we have proved that all the inſtincts, appetites, affections and powers given to man, are ſo placed, that they have proper materials, occaſions, means and objects for their exerciſe and gratification; and that all the laws relative to their growth and improvement, or degeneracy and

CONCLUS. and corruption, to their ſtrengthening or diminution, their intermingling or jarring; and conſequently all the laws relative to our pain or enjoyments, to happineſs or miſery, to virtue or vice, are excellent general laws, none of which can be changed but for the worſe. For thence it follows, that *Order is kept in man* as well as *in nature:* or, that in both, the univerſal intereſt is ſteadily purſued by general laws, beyond all exception, good. Now this, we think, is done; becauſe, though all the particular appetites and paſſions, or rather all their particular workings, are not particularly ſpecified and defined, yet the capital ſources whence all the diverſity in human life proceeds, are pointed out, and the final cauſes of theſe powers and affections are diſcovered to be exceeding good or beneficial.

On life's vaſt ocean diverſly we ſail,
Reaſon the card, but paſſion is the gale:
Nor GOD alone in the ſtill calm we find;
He mounts the ſtorm, and walks upon the wind.
Paſſions, like elements, though born to fight,
Yet mix'd and ſoftned, in his work unite:
Theſe, 'tis enough to temper and employ,
But what compoſes man can man deſtroy?
Suffice that reaſon keep to nature's road,
Subject, compound them, follow her and GOD.
Love, hope, and joy, fair pleaſure's ſmiling train,
Hate, fear, and grief, the family of pain,
Theſe mix'd with art, and to due bounds confin'd,
Make, and maintain, the ballance of the mind:
The lights and ſhades, whoſe well-accorded ſtrife
Gives all the ſtrength and colour of our life.
Eſſay on man, Ep. 2.

Every virtue (as an excellent author hath obſerved (*n*), hath ſome vice nearly allied to it, or

(*n*) *Cicero de Inven. Rhet.* Lib. II. No 55. *Ed. Schrivelii.*

ſpringing

ſpringing, as it were, from the ſame root: for every vice is ſome uſeful affection miſguided or miſplaced. But there is no miſguidance, abuſe or corruption in the human mind, whatever its evil effects and conſequences may be, which does not happen according to ſome law of our nature, which, did it not take place, we could have no dignity, no excellence, no freedom, no power, no virtue, no moral happineſs. Man, therefore, is well conſtituted and well placed here at preſent. And ſhall not the work advance as it begins? If order prevail now, ſhall it not prevail for ever? Univerſal good is now purſued, and will therefore for ever be purſued. To conclude otherwiſe, is indeed to forſake all reaſon; for it is wilfully to reaſon contrary to all appearances of things, or to the whole analogy of nature. CONCLUS.

As in the material world, while one hath no notion of reducing effects to general laws, he cannot but be loſt, bewildered and amazed, amidſt a chaos of ſeemingly odd and whimſical, independent effects: ſo muſt it likewiſe happen with reſpect to the moral world. For regularity and order can never be apprehended, but in proportion as effects are reduced to general laws; or when they are conſidered as the effects of ſuch. When one objects againſt eclipſes, meteors, comets, earthquakes, vulcano's, and a thouſand other phenomena, which indeed appear very uncouth, while conſidered by themſelves ſingly, as arbitrary effects, produced without any rule; or while one merely reflects on the miſchiefs they produce; what does the philoſopher, what ought he to do, or what indeed can he do, to remove ſuch objections againſt nature, but ſhew, if he can, the general laws whence theſe ſeemingly evil effects proceed, and the fitneſs of theſe general laws: or, if he cannot do that, ſhew that we can trace nature, in ſo many inſtances, to operation, by excellent general laws, that there is good ground to think

CONCLUS. think nature works univerſally by good general laws, and never by partial arbitrary wills. And in the ſame manner, when one objects againſt particular appearances in the moral world, the philoſopher certainly gives a ſatisfying anſwer, when he ſhews, that we can trace the far greater part of the appearances in the moral world to powers, and general laws of powers, wiſely and fitly choſen and eſtabliſhed, in order to promote the general good of the human ſyſtem. It will not be eaſy to name any effects which may not be reduced to one or other of the general laws here defended. But if ſome appearances ſhould be inexplicable, that is, if the general laws from which ſome particular phenomena ariſe, ſhould not be aſcertainable; yet ſeeing in very many, or rather almoſt all inſtances, general laws can be aſſigned which are unexceptionably good, it is highly reaſonably to conclude, that nature works throughout all by good general laws; and conſequently, that even the appearances which cannot be explained, becauſe their general laws are not known, muſt be the effects of good general laws. For to conclude otherwiſe, is to argue in downright oppoſition to analogy, or to all rules of judging concerning any ſyſtem or whole.

In other words, whatever diſorder and confuſion there may appear to be in the material world, whilſt one ſtops at particular effects, or conſiders them as ſingle, unconnected incidents; yet all muſt appear very orderly, when one repreſents to himſelf the neceſſity of its being governed by general laws, and accordingly is able to repreſent to himſelf all its effects, as proceeding from ſuch general laws, as gravity, centrifugal force, attraction, elaſticity, electricity, *&c.* For in proportion as he comes thus to ſee effects, ſeemingly evil, whilſt they are conſidered as the effects of particular wills, to be in reality good, as being the effects of operation by good general laws, he muſt in proportion begin to think well

well of nature, and perſuade himſelf that all effects in it are owing to good general laws, and muſt therefore be all, for that very reaſon, good effects. But if this way of reaſoning, with reſpect to the material world, be juſt: it muſt likewiſe be good reaſoning with regard to the moral world, to conclude in like manner concerning it, that all its effects proceed from good general laws, provided in many inſtances we can trace its effects to good general laws. And accordingly, let any one, inſtead of ſuffering his mind to wander through the various appearances in the moral world, from phenomena to phenomena, as ſingle, detached, unconnected parts, repreſent to himſelf the powers and affections belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to the different operations, influences and effects of theſe powers, as one whole; and then, let him ſay, whether it is not a ſyſtem formed to produce a quantity of good, that well deſerves its place in nature. It is to help one to take ſuch a review of the moral world, that the general laws of our nature have been pointed out in this enquiry. For that being done, it only remains to every one to remove himſelf, as it were, at a diſtance from it, and to conſider it as a whole, governed by theſe general laws, in like manner as we may and ought to do, in order to have a juſt idea of our material ſyſtem; to conſtruct it to himſelf in his imagination, and thus making a whole of it, conſider the general laws by which it is governed. It requires but a very ſmall degree of reflexion to find out that there is no other way of judging concerning either. And whoever carefully attends to what hath been ſaid of the general laws relating to our powers, and their operations, muſt ſoon ſee, 1. That all the laws of matter and motion, or of the material world, are either neceſſary, or very proper to afford ſuitable materials, means, occaſions and objects, to the exerciſe, employment and gratification of our powers

CONCLUS

CONCLUS. and affections; and consequently, that no circumstances happen in consequence of the general operation and prevalence of these laws, which are evils, absolutely considered. And, 2. That as our powers and affections themselves are necessary to our happiness and dignity, so all the laws relative to their various operations, and all their changes, modifications, influences and consequences, are likewise necessary to our dignity, happiness and perfection. But what else is there to be accounted for, with regard to mankind, but the affections and powers belonging to our composition, and their operations in various circumstances; and the variety of circumstances which excite or bring them forth into action, according to fixed laws in certain manners.

Whatever powers creatures have, they must be powers which operate, or are operated upon, according to certain fixed methods. But if the powers be good, and all the laws according to which they work, or are worked upon, be good, the system composed by these powers, and laws of powers, must be a good system. If therefore the laws relative to our external circumstances, that is, the laws of the sensible world; and the laws relative to our moral faculties, to our advancement in knowledge, in power and liberty, to association of ideas and habits, to virtue, to private and social happiness, that is, all the laws relative to our moral perfection; if all these laws be good, be well adjusted to one another, and none of them can be altered without sinking and degrading the rank and condition of man, or without diminishing his capacity of happiness and perfection, then is the human system a good system. Or it must be said, that the human system, though contrived and formed very fitly to produce a very good whole, ought not to take place in nature, because other powers placed in other circumstances, would make, not indeed the human system, but a comparatively better system. To which I know

know no anſwer can be given, but this one, That there is a very good reaſon why there ſhould exiſt in nature every kind of ſyſtem which makes a good whole; for thus alone can *nature be full and coherent*; thus alone can infinite benevolence exert itſelf, and be happy, by communicating happineſs in the ampleſt or the moſt unbounded manner. CONCLUS.

If a ſyſtem be the contrivance and production of a perfect mind, it muſt be a perfect work. There can be no evil in it. We may clearly ſee, on that ſuppoſition, how it comes about in ſuch a ſyſtem, that thoſe who know but a part, are not able to account for every phenomenon; or why ſome things may appear to ſuch, imperfections, nay, diſorderly and evil effects. For that muſt needs be the caſe, with regard to thoſe who have only a partial view of a ſyſtem. But in ſuch a whole there can be no real evil, or abſolute imperfection; that is, there can be nothing that is not neceſſary to the general order, perfection and good of the whole ſyſtem. Wherefore, if the Author of the ſyſtem of which we are a part, be perfectly good, that ſyſtem muſt be perfectly good. But ſince we can ſee but a part, it is not ſtrange that ſome things ſhould appear to us imperfect or unaccountable. Nay, it is impoſſible in ſuch a ſituation that ſome things ſhould not appear to us to be ſuch. What then ought thoſe who are perſuaded of the being of a God, and of a perfect over-ruling providence, by arguments brought *à priori* to prove it; what ought they to conclude, but that if we had a larger view of our ſyſtem, we ſhould ſee more order and perfection in it, than we can poſſibly perceive in a limited view of it. The goods we perceive in it, we may be ſure, were intended by the Author of nature; and the cauſes, means, or laws which produce them, may likewiſe produce other greater goods, which we cannot diſcern, till we have a more full and comprehenſive knowledge of the ſyſtem. But the ſeeming evils for

CONCLUS. which we cannot account, becauſe we do not comprehend enough of the ſyſtem to be able to account for them, cannot be real evils, but muſt be, with reſpect to the whole, good, if the Author be perfect in wiſdom, goodneſs and power. For what is produced by ſuch a mind, muſt be good in the whole. This is the concluſion which neceſſarily follows from the arguments brought *à priori* for a divine all-perfect providence. Now how compleat, how full, muſt our conviction of this truth be, when we find by enquiring into our ſyſtem, that the farther we are able to carry or extend our reſearches into it, the more marks and evidences we diſcover of wiſdom and good order prevailing throughout all in man as well as in nature, agreeably to what the arguments fetched *à priori* prove, muſt needs be the caſe.

The arguments *à priori* have been ſet in ſo many various lights by excellent writers, Dr. *Samuel Clarke* and Mr. *Woolaſton* particularly, that I need not now inſiſt upon them, in an eſſay merely intended to reaſon *à poſteriori*. Let me, however, juſt obſerve, that theſe arguments are far from being ſo intricate as ſome are pleaſed to repreſent them. They, on the contrary, muſt be very obvious to every one, who but underſtands what power and effect of power, contrivance and production, whole and part mean. For thoſe ideas to which the conſideration of any animate or inanimate being, or indeed any artificial machine, naturally leads us, being diſtinctly conceived, all the reaſoning *à priori* (as it is called) to eſtabliſh the being of a God, and the reality of an all-perfect providence, turns upon the few following ſelf-evident principles.

1. That whatever is contrived is contrived by ſome contriver; and whatever is produced is produced by ſome producer, poſſeſſed of power ſufficient to produce it.

2. That

2. That all power, not only of contriving, but of producing, all power belonging to mind; or nothing being active but mind by its will, it is a mind only that can contrive and produce (*o*). CONCLUS. Observations on the arguments *à priori*.

3. That nothing can be an original ultimate source of derived power, but a mind whose power is not derived.

4. A mind which produces by power not derived, produces by power eternal and uncreated, between the exertion of which and its effects, there is an essential, necessary, independent, immutable connection; a connexion not established by the will of any other being, but which cannot but take place.

5. One system is one effect, but one effect can have but one cause or producer; it cannot be totally produced by two causes.

6. There must be some likeness, proportion or parity, between the manner in which a being exists, and its essence, or all its qualities and attributes. And consequently, a being which exists in an independent and unlimited manner, must be in every respect independent and unlimited: or, in other words, a being which exists in the most perfect manner, must be in every respect essentially and absolutely remote from all imperfection, that is, perfect.

To corroborate this last proposition, involving in it an absolute necessity for the essential moral perfection of an independent mind, it is justly added,

1. That there can be no malice but where interests are opposite. But a first universal mind can have no interest opposite to that of its own workmanship, and therefore can have no malice. "If there (*p*) be a General Mind, it can have no parti-

(*o*) See this important truth fully and clearly explained by Mr. *Locke*, in his chapter on power. *Essay on human understanding*.

(*p*) This reasoning often occurs in the *Meditations of Marcus Antoninus Philosophus*. See it explained, *Characteristicks*, T. 1. *Essay on enthusiasm*.

CONCLUS. ticular intereſt; but the general good, or the good of the whole, and its own private happineſs, muſt of neceſſity be the ſame. It can intend nothing beſide, nor aim at any thing beyond, nor be provoked to any thing contrary; ſo that we have only to conſider, whether there be really ſuch a thing as a mind which has relation (*q*) to the whole or not. For if unhappily there be no mind, we may comfort ourſelves, however, that nature has no malice. But if there really be a mind, we may reſt ſatisfied, that it is the beſt-natured, the beſt-diſpoſed, the moſt benevolent one in the world."

II. It may be added, that there cannot be a diſpoſition in creatures more perfect than the diſpoſition of their Maker. If therefore, there is ſuch a thing in our nature as delight in univerſal good, there muſt be ſuch a diſpoſition belonging to our Maker: He muſt have it in its moſt perfect degree, unalloyed and incorruptible.

Now all theſe propoſitions being very evident, we have thus a very clear evidence before we enter into a particular examination of effects, that the one eternal mind, the Author of the ſyſtem of which we are a part, muſt be perfect in wiſdom and goodneſs, as well as in power. And by the preceeding enquiry into the human make and ſituation, man is found to be ſuch a being, that the further we are able to carry our reſearches into his frame and ſtate, the more reaſon have we to be ſatisfied with reſpect to the wiſdom and good intention of his Maker. Thus therefore we have arguments, *à priori* and *à poſteriori*, exactly tallying together to confirm beyond all exception that moſt comfortable truth, "That there is an infinitely perfect GOD, who

(*q*) That there muſt be a mind which has relation to the whole, is evident, becauſe a whole muſt be contrived and produced.

made and rules his whole creation, of which we are a part, in the most perfect manner, whom it is therefore our duty to love, adore and imitate". But as this is the doctrine of reason, so it is the doctrine of the christian religion, confirmed to us by another kind of truly philosophical evidence. For JESUS CHRIST gave a proper and full proof by his works, of a far more comprehensive knowledge of the universe in all its parts, that is, of GOD's providence and government of the world, natural and moral, than we can attain to; and at the the same time, full evidence of his integrity and good intention. But such information or testimony hath all the qualities necessary to create trust, or render it credible. The truth of the testimony of JESUS CHRIST concerning a divine providence, immortality and a future state, (which yet does not encroach upon reason, but leaves sufficient room for all philosophical researches into nature, and leaves the proper evidence of every other kind of reasoning entire) depends upon a no less simple self-evident maxim than this, " That samples of knowledge are samples of knowledge, and samples of integrity are samples of integrity; that these two evidence an honest and well qualified informer, and that a well qualified honest informer ought to be credited and relied upon" (*r*). CONCLUS.

Reason therefore, and revelation concur to assure us, that we are made by, and are under the direction of an infinitely perfect Author, who loveth virtue, and who will make it happy: that man is framed by him to make immortal progress in virtue, in proportion to his diligence to improve in it.

And that virtue or moral perfection, when it is brought by proper exercise and culture to due maturity and vigour, shall then be rendered complete-

(*r*) See this fully handled in my *philosophical enquiry concerning the connexions between the doctrines and works of Jesus Christ.*

CONCLUS. ly happy by those higher employments for which it cannot before that be qualified: the capacity for great moral happiness must first be formed or acquired before that happiness can be enjoyed: but when the capacity is acquired, then shall the happiness for which it is fitted, be attained.

It is usual in treatises of this nature and length to conclude with a brief recapitulution of the whole. But the contents shall be digested into a regular summary to serve that purpose; and because of the momentuousness of the subject, I rather chuse to finish this *vindication of human nature, or of the ways of God to man*, by giving in a few propositions such an united view of the human state, as will immediately be perceived by every intelligent reader to make a very coherent and comfortable system, and to carry (not to say any more of it) a much greater degree of probability along with it, than the contrary to it, and that by itself, or independently of any other considerations.

Another view of the human state.

I. As a material world can only be good or bad, that is, useful or hurtful with respect to beings made capable of perceiving it, and of being affected by it; or is really to all intents and purposes, nothing, while it is considered as absolutely unperceived: so it is obvious to every one, who can think at all, that the material world, with which mankind and other perceptive beings are so closly and intimately united in this present state of things wherein we exist, must be considered as making one whole; or a system, all the parts of which have a mutual connexion and dependence. This connexion and dependence is very manifest whereso'ever we cast our eyes. And the parts which have this coherence may very properly be divided in general, into moral and natural parts, that is, perceptive beings, and their powers, capacities and affections, and material objects perceived by perceptive beings, and variously affecting them.

II. Now

II. Now where parts have mutual reſpects, and are ſo connected, as evidently to make one ſyſtem, if general laws are found by induction to prevail in many inſtances in that ſyſtem, the preſumption muſt be, that general laws prevail throughout all the parts of it, or throughout the whole ſyſtem. If they are found to prevail in many inſtances in the material part, that is, in the effects of the material part upon perceptive beings; it is preſumable, not only that they prevail univerſally with regard to the material part, but univerſally with regard to all the parts of the ſame ſyſtem. But the preſumption that all is governed by general laws, muſt be yet ſtronger, if general laws are found in any conſiderable number of inſtances to prevail alſo in the moral part, that is, with reſpect to other effects diſtinct from thoſe of the material kind, ſuch as the improvements of underſtanding, reaſon, temper, *&c.* and the pleaſures and pains ariſing from theſe and the like ſources. CONCLUS.

III. By parity of reaſon, if the general laws, to which effects are reducible, as far as we are able to go in tracing or deducing them, be good, the preſumption muſt be that all is governed by good general laws. If we may not reaſon in this manner concerning effects, there is an end to all enquiries into effects: there is, there can be no ſuch thing as knowledge.

In reality, unleſs effects proceed from general laws, and may be traced to them, we cannot poſſibly underſtand them, or form any rules of conduct to ourſelves from them: there is no order; and ſcience is a vain abſurd attempt. But, on the other hand, if we find general laws prevailing and aſcertainable in any inſtances, then we have encouragement to go on in our enquiries: and if in going on, we find good general laws prevailing as far as we go, then may we moſt reaſonably preſume, that we may advance

CONCLUS. vance further by due diligence in finding out good general laws; and that in proportion as we advance in this knowledge, the more goodneſs and wiſdom we ſhall find in the conſtitution and government of things.

IV. And accordingly, philoſophers have found by their enquiries into the material part, as far as they have been able to carry their reſearches, order, beauty, and general good, ariſing from the general laws by which it is governed; or according to which appearances in it are produced. They have not only been able to aſcertain ſeveral general laws, by operating conformably to which, or in imitation of which many very uſeful arts have been invented to the great advantage of human life: but they have found the general good of perceptive beings to be purſued and effected, and therefore intended by the operation of theſe general laws; the good of mankind more particularly. Since the knowledge of the material world hath been brought to ſuch great perfection by Sir *Iſaac Newton*, many excellent treatiſes (*f*) have been written to prove, that the material part is governed by excellent general laws, or general laws admirably adjuſted to produce the greateſt general conveniency or advantage with reſpect to the perceptive beings, which inhabiting it are capable of receiving pleaſures from it. The reſult of his and all other reſearches into the material ſyſtem, (commonly called *nature*) carried on in the ſame way of induction from experiments, and of reſolution (*t*) of appearances into laws deduced from experience, is, that the Author of nature does nothing in vain, but works by the feweſt, that is, the ſimpleſt means, ſteadily and uniformly, or always

(*f*) Many of the diſcourſes at Mr. *Boyle*'s lecture are of this kind. Thoſe of Dr. *John Clark* in particular.

(*t*) *Analyſis* and by *Atheſis*.

analogouſly

analogouſly for the general good and perfection of the whole. CONCLUS.

V. Now this being the reſult of all proper methods of enquiry into nature, we have not only great encouragement to go on in our reſearches into the material part, but we have likewiſe great encouragement to go on as Sir *Iſaac Newton* (*u*) propoſes, and to enquire in the ſame manner into the moral part, or the appearances which properly relate to our moral powers, that is, to improvements, as beings capable of reflexion, reaſoning, acting, and of uniting in ſociety for the advancement of our common happineſs and perfection. That we have reaſon, and the power of acting and chuſing, and certain moral affections belonging to our nature, cannot be called into queſtion: Nor can it be doubted, that powers and affections of whatever ſort, ſenſitive or moral, muſt have their various degrees of perfection and imperfection; and that a power is intended to be advanced to the higheſt degree of perfection to which it can be. But, in order to the advancement of any power to its perfection, there muſt be certain means and methods of advancing it to its perfection: and if there be certain means and methods, by which a power may be advanced to its perfection, there muſt neceſſarily, on the other hand, be certain means and methods, by which a power cannot but degenerate and corrupt, or become depraved: for the means and methods contrary to the perfecting means will be ſuch. Our buſineſs therefore is to enquire into theſe fixed means, or general laws relative to our powers and affections, according to which they may be raiſed to their perfection, and into their contraries producing oppoſite effects, in order to know them, and ſee whether, as in the material part, ſo likewiſe in the moral part, all the laws, as far as we can trace them, be not contributive to the

(*u*) In his *optics* towards the end.

general

CONCLUS. general good, or such as cannot be changed in any respect without the greatest inconveniencies or disadvantages.

VI. But if we give any attention to our make and situation, we shall plainly find, that by the powers and affections bestowed upon us, and the laws relative to their exercises in our situation, we are fitted to attain to a very considerable degree of moral perfection and happiness, consisting in, or arising from the dominion of reason over our sensitive appetites, or their just subordination to a well-improved sense of order, fitness, right and public good implanted in us, to be duly improved in order to be our guide and ruler. By a little attention to our constitution and circumstances, we shall find, that being endued with a principle of reason, and capable of forming the ideas of general order and good, and of delighting in the contemplation of it, our union with a material world, by means of our bodies, affords us matter of most agreeable contemplation and study; and that being endued with a social principle, and a sense of public good, and of moral order and decency, that the highest satisfaction we are capable of is, that which results from our being able to moderate and govern the sensitive appetites and faculties, by which we are made susceptible of pleasures from material objects, as a just view of public good, and a right sense of moral order and decency requires; while at the same time, such are the laws relative to our sensitive pleasures and pains, or the laws according to which material objects affect us, that, in general, not sensitive pleasure, but sensitive pain is the proportional effect of departure from the dictates of reason with respect to the government of our sensitive appetites. Either there is no such thing as perfection and imperfection with respect to any power or quality; but these words have absolutely no meaning: or the regular and constant presidence of our reason over our sensitive appetites and faculties,

and

and over all our choices, actions and purſuits, is the perfect ſtate of thoſe powers, ſenſitive and rational, which conſtitute us what we really are. And as indeed, it is a contradiction to ſuppoſe in any caſe the happy ſtate of a being not to be of a kind with, to reſult from, and be proportioned to the perfect ſtate of that being: ſo, in our caſe, our ſelf-enjoyment, greateſt peace, pleaſure and happineſs, refult from and are proportioned to that which hath been ſaid to be our preſent ſtate, and muſt be ſuch in any proper ſenſe of perfection: or in the ſame ſenſe, that we ſay the perfection of any conſtitution of whatever ſort is ſuch or ſuch. CONCLUS.

VII. Now ſince intelligent purſuit ſuppoſes knowledge guiding the purſuit, and knowledge cannot but be progreſſive; and what is not acquired by the application of a being with choice, to acquire it cannot be its own acquiſition, or give it any pleaſure as ſuch, it is plain the perfect ſtate of our powers and affections, in order to give us the pleaſure of ſelf-approbation and a ſenſe of merit, muſt be gradually formed and acquired by ourſelves, or by the intelligent and diligent purſuit of ſuch a ſtate, according to the methods by which it may be attained to, in conſequence of the laws of our nature and circumſtances. Which method will immediately be found, upon a little reflection, to be no other than exerciſing our reaſon, not only to know the boundaries of pain and pleaſure, their moments or quantities, the effects of different exerciſes and gratifications, with regard to the happineſs of our kind, and the rules of truth, fitneſs and decorum, with reſpect to all our exertions of our affections, and all our actions; but likewiſe to regulate our affections, choices, actions and purſuits, agreeably to the dictates of this knowledge. For as habits of any kind can only be acquired by repeated acts, ſo this habit of governing all our affections and conduct

CONCLUS. conduct by reaſon, and agreeably to the juſt views of things, acquired by its due application to have right information, can only be attained by repeated acts of reaſon, in order to get knowledge, and to eſtabliſh itſelf into full power and command. Knowledge to direct to what is right and fit can only be attained by taking due pains to know. And the habitual authoritative power of reaſon, by which it becomes our ſteady ruler, can only be acquired by its aſſiduity to exert and keep its command. And conſiſtently with this method of attaining to our perfect moral ſtate, it is the univerſal law of our nature with reſpect to all acquirements, internal and external, that they ſhall be purchaſed by application to purchaſe them, according to certain methods eaſily diſcoverable by us. Were there not certain methods of our attaining to external goods eſtabliſhed by nature, they could not be purchaſed by us. And in like manner, were there not certain methods of our acquiring internal qualities or goods eſtabliſhed by nature, they could not be acquired by us. Now as the methods of attaining to external advantages by application and diligence agreeably to them, are eaſily diſcoverable by all who will but look a little about them, and reflect upon the connexions in nature which every day preſent themſelves to all: ſo the methods of attaining to the internal dominion of reaſon, our moſt perfect ſtate and chief good, are very obvious, ſince it only requires our having made this reflexion, that it is our perfect ſtate and chief good, and our ſetting ourſelves, in conſequence thereof, aſſiduouſly and ſteadily, to exert our reaſon as our guiding principle.

VIII. But this being the caſe with regard to all acquiſitions, external or internal, it is evident, that men are upon the equalleſt footing they poſſibly can be, not only with reſpect to external advantages, but, which is principal, with reſpect to their attainment

ment of their chief good. For thus acquisitions of both kinds are as dependent upon every one's intelligent and assiduous application and pursuit, as may or can be consistently with certain differences among mankind, which are absolutely necessary. For different circumstances with respect to situation for taking in views of the connexions of nature, and with respect to situation for receiving social assistances in our pursuits, must make differences with regard to situation for making acquisitions by our application or industry. But all men cannot be placed in the same circumstances; nor can community and society take place, or all men be mutually useful, and at the same time mutually dependent, without various powers, or (which will amount to the same thing, with different original talents) without our being placed in various situations, which produce divers turns of mind, different extent of powers, and various use and application of powers. Such differences which are the result of our make as social individuals, or are the effects of the laws of nature, properly so called, that is, of the laws of the material world, are the only limitations upon the general law, with respect to our acquisitions by our industry: so that it may be said, that according to the general law of acquisitions, all men are upon as equal a footing as possible, with respect to external advantages, it being the general law with respect to the acquirement of them, that they are to be the purchase of industry to attain to them. And as for moral happiness and perfection, every man is upon as equal a footing as may be, it being according to the general law and establishment of moral things, in every man's power to have that supreme satisfaction, which arises from the sense of due pains to keep and maintain, or rather improve, his reason, in its capacity and authority, to guide and rule his conduct. CONCLUS.

IX. And

CONCLUS. IX. And what is the effect of all the differences among mankind, proceeding from the ſources which have been juſt mentioned; but that hence ariſe means, occaſions and ſubjects, for the education, trial, exertion and improvement of many excellent moral excellencies. There is no ground to think that the powers and affections in all men do not ſtand originally ſo rightly proportioned to one another in force, that by due culture a great degree of moral perfection may be acquired by every one. The moſt remarkable moral differences among mankind do ariſe from negligence and culture, from right uſe and abuſe of powers and affections; for by diligence to cultivate do powers and affections only gain ſtrength and vigour, and arrive to perfection. But the exerciſes neceſſary to perfect faculties and affections, and eſtabliſh good habits, cannot take place without certain proper objects or materials. And ſuch really is the reſult of all the differences among mankind, whenceſoever they ariſe, that they afford ſuitable means, opportunities and objects for the exerciſes neceſſary to bring forth ſeveral virtues into action, and thereby to work them into perfect habits. All the virtues may be reduced to benevolence; they are nothing elſe but ſo many different exertions of ſocial love or benignity on different occaſions, or in different circumſtances. And without many differences among mankind, variety of benevolent affections and actions could not have place, they could not have ſubjects: there could not be that variety of circumſtances which is requiſite to their various exertion, to their trial and formation, their diſcipline and culture, and a due diverſity of their beautiful pleaſant employments.

X. Now if this be the ſtate of mankind, all the evils complained of in human life, muſt either be owing to the ſteady operation of the laws of the material

terial world, which laws are sufficiently justified and vindicated by natural philosophers: or to our suffering sensitive pain, in consequence of our not governing our sensitive appetites, and their pursuits and gratifications by the rules of right reason, which is an excellent law in the moral world; or to our not bestowing proper culture upon our powers and faculties, to bring them to their proper perfection; and yet that right and wrong use, improvement and neglect, pains to perfect, and labour to deprave, should have the different effects in the moral world they have, is likewise an excellent general law: or lastly, they must arise from differences among mankind, all the sources of which are necessary to the general good, and which differences are in themselves a very proper means of forming and improving virtuous habits. So that upon the whole we may justly conclude, that mankind are endued with powers capable of being advanced to great perfection; and are at present very well placed, in order to the schooling, the education and discipline of these powers. It is therefore a very orderly and well constituted state of existence, which well deserves its place in nature. CONCLUS.

XI. But if it be a proper state for education, to a very great degree of moral perfection, in which happiness, inward happiness, advances proportionably with moral perfection: is it not highly reasonable to conclude, that it is really intended for a state of moral education? It is plainly our first setting out; and if it be a proper state to set out in, or to begin the pursuit of moral perfection and happiness, what reason can there be to conclude that it is not such only; or that it is the whole of our existence? From a proper state for the formation and improvement of moral powers to great perfection, what ought we to expect or look for, but proper care afterwards to place well-improved powers in circumstances suited

CONCLUS. to them, or in which they ſhall have proper enjoyments by proper exerciſes. To make compleatly happy, two things muſt concur, powers or capacity, and objects ſuited one to another. Powers or capacity cannot make happy, without ſuitable objects; nor can objects bring happineſs, where the powers or capacity is wanting. Capacity muſt be formed, before objects only ſuited to capacity, formed to a certain pitch of perfection, can be means of happineſs. But if ſuitable care to form a capacity for great moral perfection be taken here, by furniſhing us with the proper materials or ſubjects of exerciſe, in order to its improvement; and if the gradual advances in improvement by proper exerciſes reward themſelves, or are a very great degree of happineſs, what can we induce ourſelves to think ſhall be the ſtate of highly improved capacity of moral happineſs, when the ſtate of formation and trial is at an end, but ſuch an one as ſhall afford it full happineſs, by exerciſes adequate to it? Virtue and vice cannot be idle unmeaning words, unleſs uſe and abuſe, corruption and improvement, perfection and degeneracy of powers, be inſignificant terms. But if they are not, highly improved virtues or moral powers, brought by due culture to their perfection, and corrupted minds, or depraved faculties and powers, muſt have very oppoſite effects. Nothing but tormentful appetites, and a direful conſcience of guilt and deformity, can be the reſult of a vitiated mind, in a ſtate far removed from all the means of ſenſual gratification, and where the employments and entertainments neceſſarily require moral powers greatly improved, a prevailing love of moral exerciſes and enjoyments, and full dominion and maſterſhip over ſenſual appetites. But how can we imagine that man, who by his frame and make cannot, even in the moſt luxuriant circumſtances of outward enjoyment, attain to any ſolid contentment or ſatisfaction of mind, but in proportion

tion as he is conſcious to himſelf of his giving due diligence to improve all his rational faculties to their proper perfection, and to maintain his reaſon in full power over all his deſires, appetites and paſſions; how can we imagine that man, who is ſo made, when this ſtate, which is only fit for educating and cultivating moral powers to a certain degree of perfection, and which cannot poſſibly always laſt, does ceaſe, ſhall not paſs into another ſtate, in which care ſhall be taken of virtue, proportioned to the improvements it hath made! This ſtate being really wiſely and benignly conſtituted and governed, we may juſtly promiſe ourſelves, that order ſhall prevail for ever; and that, as it is really the effect of perfectly wiſe and kind contrivance and adminiſtration, ſo whatever we can clearly conceive to be neceſſary to equally good adminiſtration in an after ſtate, ſhall certainly take place there. And therefore we may reaſonably conclude, that though here many die before they have had time and opportunity of attaining to any very great degree of moral perfection, yet ſince that happens in conſequence of laws very well adapted to general good in the preſent ſtate, it can be no ground of objection againſt providence; becauſe, if a good diſpoſition is but beginning to exert itſelf, moral powers may be placed, upon their removal from this ſtate, in circumſtances very advantageous for their ſpeedy improvement. And though all have not here the ſame advantages for moral improvements, yet ſince the differences whence that inequality proceeds, ariſe from excellent cauſes, and are themſelves exceeding uſeful, this can be no juſt ground of objection againſt providence, becauſe minds duly improved by proper culture, in proportion to the circumſtances they are placed in for improvement, may be placed after death in a very happy ſituation for quick and great improvement: and thus, as it were, compenſation may be made to them. In one word, if this be an CONCLUS.

CONCLUS. orderly firſt ſtate, in which the general good is ſteadily intended and purſued by its Author, we have all the reaſon in the world to reſt ſatisfied, that a future ſtate ſhall likewiſe be a very orderly one, in which the happineſs of every well-diſpoſed mind ſhall likewiſe be purſued, as far as is conſiſtent with the univerſal good of rational beings. And we may be as ſure as we can be of any thing, "That if the univerſal good of rational beings be intended and purſued, this is the law of the government of the univerſe with regard to mankind, and all rational beings, that their happineſs ſhall advance with their moral perfection, which can only advance in proportion to the care of moral agents to improve their moral powers.

I think it is impoſſible to take an impartial view of mankind, and not clearly ſee that this is the real ſtate of the caſe, with regard to us; or to imagine, that we are not here in a very proper ſtation for arriving to a very great capacity of moral happineſs, by attaining to a great degree of moral perfection.

And ſure nothing can be more delightful than this opinion of mankind; or more gloomy, horrible and diſpiriting than the contrary notion. One's mind muſt indeed be in a very corrupt ſtate, before he can poſſibly take pleaſure in perſuading himſelf that man is not made to aim at and attain to moral happineſs hereafter, by duly improving his moral powers here; if to take pleaſure in it be at all poſſible, as I, indeed, can hardly conceive how it can be. The mind of man is ſo made, that the idea of attainment to great happineſs hereafter, by the ſuitable culture of his mind here, is no ſooner preſented to it, than it gladly takes hold of it, and indulges itſelf with truly laudable complacency in the great and cheering hope; nay, it triumphs and exults in it, and thereby feels itſelf riſe to the nobleſt ambition, and ſwell with the moſt elating expectation. And if it be ſo, then indeed is man made for virtue, and he is indeed

deed the workmanſhip of an infinitely perfect being; for is not a mind, animated with ſuch virtuous deſires, reſolutions and hopes, truly the image of a Creator, who is complete moral perfection, complete reaſon and virtue? Whence elſe could ſuch capacity proceed? How could man, were not his Creator infinitely perfect, have been capable of ſuch a great idea, and ſo divine an ambition? CONCLUS.

Would a perſon really have a ſtrong, a truly great ſoul, this is the belief which alone can produce it. He who hath this perſuaſion duly rooted and eſtabliſhed in his mind, by frequent meditation upon it, muſt indeed riſe in his affections above all ſenſual enjoyments, and look down with contempt upon every pleaſure that is repugnant to integrity and virtue: nay, he will be able to ſurmount, with ſedate fortitude, the crueleſt ſufferings by which virtue ever was or can be proved, and come forth from them doubly brightened and perfected.

Surely no one who duly conſiders the moment of this doctrine I have been endeavouring to eſtabliſh; or with what noble comfort, with what fulneſs of joy, with what great and elevating hopes, it is pregnant, will wonder that I have laboured to the utmoſt of my abilities to ſet it in various lights; and that I can hardly part with it, but am at the end of every different view I am capable of giving of it, fond to begin again, and to try to ſet it yet in ſome other light, that may better ſuit ſome one or other's underſtanding.

For it is of the greateſt importance to every thinking perſon's ſolid happineſs to be firmly perſuaded of it. Without being convinced of it, what can one who thinks enjoy! Or how can he be eaſy? For if it be not true, how gloomy, how frightful is the ſtate of things! Diſcontent, horror, deſpair, muſt needs be the never ceaſing tormentors of every one who thinks mankind are not under the kind care of an all-perfect mind. But the doctrine of a good providence over-ruling all, and of a future

CONCLUS. state of immortal happineſs to the virtuous, is as true as it is comfortable. For even the very ſmall part of the vaſt ſcheme of providence we here ſee, tho' it be but a ſmall, a very ſmall part, is full of the riches of the wiſdom and goodneſs of its Author, in imitation of which lies, according to our make, our only true happineſs; for the happineſs of a man conſiſteth not in the abundance of the things which he poſſeſſeth, but in the practice of virtue, and the hopes of attaining to complete happineſs, by attaining to perfect virtue: and our happineſs being ſo placed, as to be found there alone, that is itſelf a full proof, that he who made us, and placed us here, is perfectly happy only in conſequence of his abſolute moral perfection.

XII. Thoſe who ſearch into the works of GOD, have indeed reaſon to ſay with an ancient, "He hath garniſhed the excellent works of his wiſdom, and he is from everlaſting to everlaſting: unto him may nothing be added, neither can he be diminiſhed; and he hath no need of any counſellor. O how deſirable are all his works! and that a man may ſee even to a ſpark. One thing eſtabliſheth the good of another; and he hath made nothing imperfect; and who ſhall be filled with beholding his glory? By his word all things conſiſt, and all his viſible works praiſe him. But there are yet hid greater things than theſe be, for we have ſeen but a few of his works". The ſame writer after a long diſcourſe upon the works of GOD, and the wonderful conduct of providence towards all his creatures, towards man in particular, breaks forth into this moſt animated addreſs to all good men.

"Hearken unto me, ye holy children, and bud forth as a roſe growing by the brook of the field: and give ye a ſweet ſavour as frankincenſe, and flouriſh as a lily; ſend forth a ſmell, and ſing a ſong of praiſe, bleſs the LORD in all his works. Magnify his name, and ſhew forth his praiſe with the

the ſongs of your lips, and with harps, and in prai- CONCLUS.
ſing him you ſhall ſay after this manner: All the works of the LORD are exceeding good, and whatſoever he commandeth ſhall be accompliſhed in due ſeaſon. And none may ſay, What is this? Wherefore is that? For at time convenient ſhall they be ſought out.—He ſeeth from everlaſting to laſting; and there is nothing wonderful before him. A man need not to ſay, What is this? Wherefore is that? For he hath made all things for their uſes. —— For the good are good things created from the beginning: ſo evil things for ſinners. The principal things for the whole uſe of man's life, are water, fire, iron, and ſalt, flour of wheat, hony, milk, and the blood of the grape, and oil, and clothing. All theſe things are for good to the godly: ſo to the ſinners they are turned into evil.—All the works of the LORD are good, and he will give every thing in due ſeaſon. So that a man cannot ſay, this is worſe than that; for in time they ſhall all be well approved. And therefore praiſe ye the LORD with the whole heart and mouth, and bleſs the name of the LORD".

I have in the marginal notes quoted many paſſages from ancient authors, to prove the antiquity and univerſality of the belief of an univerſal good providence, and of the immortality of mankind, and of all rational beings. And I need not tell any who are acquainted with the ſacred writings, how clearly theſe truths are there aſſerted. But I cannot chuſe but take notice of what is ſaid of a future ſtate, in a book of the ſame claſs with that from which I have juſt now tranſcribed ſo beautiful a part.

"Righteouſneſs, ſaith that writer, is immortal."

He repreſents the reaſoning of the ungodly with themſelves in this manner. "Our life is ſhort and tedious, and in the death of a man there is no remedy: neither was there any man known to have returned from the grave. For we are born at all adventure;

CONCLUS. and we shall be hereafter as though we had never been: for the breath in our nostrils is as smoke, and a little spark in the moving of our heart; which being extinguished, our body shall be turned into ashes, and our spirit shall vanish as the soft air, and our name shall be forgotten in time, and no man shall have our works in remembrance, and our life shall pass away as the trace of a cloud, and shall be dispersed as a mist that is driven away with the beams of the sun, and overcome with the heat thereof. — Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures like as in youth. Let us fill ourselves with costly wine and ointments, — let none of us go without his part of voluptuousness; let us leave tokens of our joyfulness in every place; for this is our portion, and our lot is this.

Let us oppress the poor righteous man, let us not spare the widow, nor reverence the ancient gray hairs of the aged. Let our strength be the law of justice; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth. Therefore let us lie in wait for the righteous, because he is not for our turn, and he is clean contrary to our doings; he upbraideth us with our offending the law, and objecteth to our infamy the transgressings of our education. He professeth to have the knowledge of GOD; and he calleth himself the child of the LORD. He was made to reprove our thoughts. He is grievous unto us even to behold; for his life is not like other men's, his ways are of another fashion. We are esteemed of him as counterfeits; he abstaineth from our ways as from filthiness; he pronounceth the end of the just to be blessed, and maketh his boast that GOD is his Father. Let us see if his words be true, and let us prove what shall happen in the end of him. For if the just man be the son of GOD, he will help him, and deliver him from the hand of his enemies."

After

After this truly natural picture of a vicious mind and its language, he adds, "Such things they did imagine; for their own wickedneſs hath blinded them. As for the myſteries of GOD they know them not: neither hoped they for the wages of righteouſneſs; nor diſcerned a reward for blameleſs ſouls. But GOD created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his own eternity.—The ſouls of the righteous are in the hand of GOD, and there ſhall no torment touch them. In the ſight of the unwiſe they ſeemed to die: and their departure is taken for miſery, and their going from us to be utter deſtruction: but they are in peace. For tho' they be puniſhed in the ſight of men, yet is their hope full of immortality. And having been a little chaſtiſed, they ſhall be greatly rewarded; for GOD proved them, and found them worthy for himſelf; as gold in the furnace hath he tried them, and in the time of their viſitation they ſhall ſhine. They ſhall judge the nations, and have dominion over the people, and their LORD ſhall reign for ever; but the ungodly ſhall be puniſhed according to their own imaginations. For whoſo deſpiſeth wiſdom and nurture, he is miſerable, and their hope is vain, their labours unfruitful, and their works unprofitable. But glorious is the fruit of good labours, and the root of wiſdom ſhall never fall away. The unrighteous tho' they live long yet ſhall they be nothing regarded; and their laſt age ſhall be without honour. Or if they die quickly, they have no hope, neither comfort in the day of trial. And when they caſt up the accounts of their ſins, they ſhall come with fear, and their own iniquities ſhall convince them to their face. Then ſhall the righteous man ſtand in great boldneſs before the face of him who afflicted him, and made no account of his labours. For the righteous live for evermore, their reward alſo is with the LORD, and the care of them is with the moſt High". CONCLUS.

I have

CONCLUS. I have quoted this beautiful paſſage, as a further proof to ſhew how ancient, the comfortable belief of a future ſtate is. And with regard to the doctrine of the chriſtian ſcriptures concerning a future immortal ſtate, I ſhall only beg leave to obſerve, 1. That no poſitive account can in the nature of things be given of the order, conſtitution, and laws of a future ſtate, but ſo far as it is analogous or like to our preſent one; and therefore being a new ſtate, very different from this, which can only be like to it in a few general reſpects, a poſitive account of it can only be given in theſe few general reſpects; and the many more things in which it is different from it, can only be declared to us negatively, or by negative propoſitions, ſignifying that it differs from, or is not like to our preſent ſtate, in ſuch and ſuch reſpects. Wherefore to object againſt chriſtianity, that the account given of a future ſtate, conſiſts chiefly of negative propoſitions, is to object againſt it for not giving an account of a future ſtate, that cannot poſſibly be given to us, unleſs our intelligence could reach further than our ideas, or our ideas extend beyond experience, and analogy to our experience. I need not tell philoſophers, that a great part of what is called *ſcience* is but negative knowledge. It is ſufficient to the preſent purpoſe to remark, that the few poſitive and many more negative declarations relative to a future ſtate in the goſpels and epiſtles, if they were carefully collected together under their proper heads, would be found to amount to ſuch a diſcovery of the nature of a future ſtate, as well deſerves the moſt ſerious attention of all who have juſt notions of GOD, and of the dignity of human nature. 2. I would obſerve, that according to the ſcripture doctrine concerning the happineſs of a future ſtate, it ariſes from moral perfection ſuitably exerciſed and employed. It is deſcribed to be the natural and proper effect, fruit or harveſt (in conſequence of the laws of GOD's moral

Obſervations on the account given of a future ſtate in the chriſtian religion.

moral providence and government) of highly improved virtues, good habits, or a well formed and pure mind, and its ſuitable exerciſes about objects adequate to its capacity and diſpoſition; it is ſaid to be the conſequence of having ſown to the ſpirit, that is, of having laid a foundation by the improvement of our moral powers and affections for ſpiritual employments, and the happineſs reſulting from them; as the miſery of the vicious is, on the other hand, repreſented to be the natural effect, harveſt and fruit of a vitiated and depraved mind, or of degenerated corrupted powers and bad habits, or of having ſown to the fleſh and corruption. A great part of the happineſs of a future ſtate is ſaid to ariſe from more perfect knowledge; that is, from larger, juſter, and more clear and comprehenſive views of the divine wiſdom and goodneſs in the government of rational beings, than we can now attain to in our preſent ſituation, or till the great ſcheme of providence is advanced to that period; and from thoſe devout and pious affections, which ſuch knowledge muſt excite towards the all-perfect Creator and Governor of the univerſe. Yet the whole of the felicity of that ſtate is not repreſented as conſiſting in contemplation and pious adoration; but it is deſcribed as an active ſtate, a ſtate of ſervice to GOD, and of mutual ſervice to one another: for it is repreſented to be a city, a ſtate of high and noble activity; a ſtate of active benevolence; a ſtate of rule, truſt, power and dominion. And indeed the happineſs of the ſuperior orders of beings to man mentioned in the ſacred writings, is likewiſe ſet forth there, as chiefly reſulting from their being miniſtering ſpirits, employed in carrying on ſome noble, generous ends, in the adminiſtration of GOD, for the univerſal good of all rational beings. But it is not my preſent buſineſs to enquire more particularly into the chriſtian doctrine concerning a future ſtate. I have only mentioned theſe few things,

CONCLUS.

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CONCLUS. in order to shew the consistency between what is said of it in revelation, and what reason naturally leads to conceive concerning it. In the scripture, it is expressly affirmed, that this is the unchangeable law of GOD in his government of all rational beings, of mankind in particular, that "as they sow so shall they reap." And this we find, by enquiring into the constitution of man, and into the nature and means of all the acquisitions he is found capable of making, to be the rule. It is the rule here, and will be the rule for ever; and that rule being observed in the administration of moral beings, it must be right, just, good, reasonable administration: the ways of GOD towards man are perfect.

The chief thing aimed at in this essay, is to prove from the consideration of our affections, and powers, and of the laws relative to them, natural and moral, which constitute our present state, that man is made by an infinitely wise and good being for immortal progress in moral perfection and happiness. But in the marginal notes several remarkable passages of ancient authors are quoted, or referred to, not to make an ostentation of reading; but to shew, that the way in which human nature is considered in this enquiry, and the inferences deduced from it are very ancient; because some late writers have contended, that among the ancients, no good reasonings are to be found about divine providence, the end of man's creation, and a future state; and to shew the contrary is not merely to do justice to ancient philosophers; it is doing justice to truth and to human nature. For had even the most thinking and enquiring part of mankind, for many ages, never been able to form a just idea of the end or perfection for which man is made; of his relation to a supreme Author and Governor of infinite excellence; and of our duties and interests resulting from our moral powers, and their relations, connexions, and tendency or aptitude, mankind must certainly

certainly have been all that time in a moſt forlorn, dark and miſerable ſituation; as incapable of attaining to their true end, as if they had been created for no ſuch end. We are exceedingly indebted, on many important accounts, to divine revelation in all its different periods and diſpenſations, which will be found by every careful, impartial obſerver, to make a very beautiful, progreſſive part in the ſyſtem of providence; or one continued connexion and ſeries, one uniform deſign and analogy carried on for many ages, to its completion in the appearance of JESUS CHRIST in the world, very conſiſtent with all the laws of the moral world. But ſurely, to aſſert that without revelation, men have no law, rule or guide; or which is to all intents and purpoſes the ſame thing, are unable to diſcover any law, rule or guide, to direct them in the purſuit of their proper end, perfection and happineſs, is to affirm, that men, without a revelation, are incapable of attaining to that knowledge, which alone can enable them to judge rightly of a revelation when it is given to them. CONCLUS.

As well may a houſe ſtand in the air without a foundation, as revelation be ſuppoſed not to be built upon ſome certain principles of reaſon or natural religion, clearly diſcernible by their own intrinſic light and evidence. But becauſe it will be ſaid, that this queſtion is ſimply about fact, that is, whether previouſly to revelation, or without its aſſiſtance, enquirers into nature had been able to reaſon well concerning the being of GOD, a future ſtate and human duties: I have therefore taken care, as I have gone on in this enquiry concerning man, to point out ſeveral paſſages from ancient authors, where the nature of man, of divine providence, and of human perfection and happineſs, are not only well defined, but acurately deduced from ſolid principles in a truly or ſtrictly philoſophical manner.

It

CONCLUS. It is a very considerable satisfaction to a well-disposed mind, to imagine that good sense hath always been very universal in the world. Nay, in truth, it is hardly possible to vindicate moral providence, or the ways of God to man (in the persuasion of the equity and goodness of which all the comfort of a thinking person is bound up) upon the contrary supposition. And, in fact, there have almost never been wanting some among mankind, who, in the main, had just notions of human dignity and perfection; and who, actuated by a due sense of it, laid themselves out with all diligence to instruct others in that important knowledge. It does not appear that there were more scepticks, who took pleasure in puzzling and perplexing clear truths, in ancient than in later times; or that such were then looked upon by the wiser part of mankind with less contempt, or rather pity, than they now are, on account of the illiberal cast of mind, from which alone a zealous propagation of doctrines tending to discourage virtue, and throw a most gloomy damp upon all truly noble and generous ambition, can proceed. And what though speculative men in former ages had recourse to various hypotheses; and in pursuing some particular one, which, as all false suppositions when they are pursued far must do, led them into odd subtilties to avoid glaring contradiction, reasoned sometimes very weakly and childishly; can it be inferred from thence, (as, I think, a late author does in express terms) that these philosophers never reasoned well, or were absolutely incapable of reasoning well, about the very first principles of natural religion and morality? I cannot help thinking, that it would be very bad logic to say, that the great design of revelation cannot even now be discovered, because many pursuing strange hypotheses, reason, even now, very wildly and incoherently about it: or that, even now, morality is not capable of being set in a clear light, because very different, not to say repugnant, methods

thods are even now taken, in order to explain it; and among many writers very uncouth ſuppoſitions are ſtill admitted and reaſoned from. It might eaſily be ſhewn, that there is no hypotheſis made uſe of by any ancient moraliſt, in order to account for providence, and the preſent ſtate of mankind, which hath not been adopted, nay, purſued very far, and had great ſtreſs laid upon it, by ſome very modern writer. But what would that prove? Surely, to bring it as an argument that, even now, morality is quite darkneſs and uncertainty, would juſtly be reckoned very childiſh and ſilly. And yet, if ſuch reaſoning be not true now, it can never be in any caſe, that is, with reſpect to any time, good reaſoning. If any thing be clear, this muſt be ſo: That good reaſonings are good reaſonings, though, not only at the time they were produced others reaſoned weakly and fooliſhly about the ſame things, but even the very ſame perſons did, on other occaſions, admit and puſh far ſome odd hypotheſes, and ſo reaſoned very wildly and fooliſhly about the ſame matters, concerning which they at other times expreſs very juſt ſentiments, with great clearneſs, propriety, elegance, and force of argument. So ſtrangely do ſome ſtill go to work in their defences of a cauſe, which ſtandeth indeed upon a very plain, as well as ſure foundation; that I could not chuſe but ſay thus much in behalf, not merely of ancient philoſophy, but of the clearneſs and certainty of rational morality, that is, morality eaſily deducible from obvious principles of reaſon and common ſenſe. Nay, I cannot but add, that, ſo fully and clearly are all the principles and doctrines of morality explained in the writings of ancient moraliſts, that there is no concluſion, and almoſt no reaſoning, in any of the beſt modern writers upon morality and natural religion, that is not to be found in ſome ancient philoſopher, if not in all of them. None who are acquainted with *Puffendorf* and *Grotius*, and their commen-

CONCLUS.

CONCLUS. commentators, and the other moſt eſteemed authors of this claſs, can call this aſſertion into doubt: for in theſe writers, moſt beautiful paſſages from ancient authors are on every occaſion quoted. What is principally aimed at in this eſſay, is to call upon philoſophers to take the ancient way of conſidering human nature, and the care of providence about man in moral affairs, which is the ſame late philoſophers have agreed to take in the inveſtigation of natural effects, and in accounting for them, as the only proper method of coming at the knowledge of nature. And all the beſt, or moſt uſeful obſervations in this treatiſe, concerning human nature, and the ways of GOD to man, are taken from ancient authors: it was by them, or by modern authors who have rendered juſtice to them, that I was led to theſe reflexions. All indeed I have any right to pretend to, is to have attempted to diſpoſe very ancient obſervations upon mankind and moral providence, into the order that natural philoſophers, after *Sir Iſaac Newton*, follow, in accounting for material phenomena, which in moral philoſophy was the ancient method. It is in the knowledge of the natural world that we ſurpaſs the ancients. And if it may be juſtly wondered at, that the ancients never thought of ſearching for general laws in the material ſyſtem, but imagined it almoſt impoſſible to attain to any certainty in phiſiology, though they plainly had very juſt notions of moral providence, or of the care of heaven about mankind; and accounted for moral effects, by reducing them to powers and their laws, or manners of operation, which they perceived to be excellent beyond all exception; may it not with equal reaſon be juſtly wondered, that modern philoſophers, who have found ſo remarkably the advantage of tracing material effects to powers and general laws of powers, ſhould not think of carrying on their enquiries into moral phenomena in the ſame manner? The reaſon why *Socrates* deſpiſed the phyſi-

phiſiology of his time, was becauſe it did not reduce effects to general laws, and ſhew the wiſdom, fitneſs or goodneſs of thoſe general laws, from which effects proceed. And thoſe who will take the trouble to look into his philoſophy, as it is delivered to us by his ſcholars, muſt ſoon ſee, that his way of reaſoning concerning human duties, conſiſted in pointing out the perfections to which our ſeveral moral powers are capable of being advanced, according to the laws of our nature; and that his way of vindicating moral providence, or the ways of heaven to man, was by reducing effects in the moral world to good powers, and excellent laws of theſe powers, conſtituting the human capacity of moral perfection and happineſs.

But after all that hath been ſaid of the perfection of moral philoſophy among the ancients, I think the following truths, with reſpect to its farther improvement, in order to carry on right education to the beſt advantage, very obviouſly follow, from the ſketch of its deſign and aim, and fundamental principles, which hath been delineated in this enquiry; and they may therefore be added to it, as ſo many Corolaries.

COROLARY I.

From the idea of moral philoſophy delineated in this enquiry, it plainly appears that phyſiology and moral philoſophy are (as the ancients have often obſerved) in the nature of things, quite inſeparable. The material world was certainly created for the ſake of the moral world; they make one ſtrictly connected ſyſtem. And indeed, the material world, conſidered apart from its effects upon perceptive beings, hath no exiſtence, or at leaſt, cannot be ſaid to merit exiſtence; it is neither good nor bad, beautiful nor deformed, uſeful nor hurtful; it cannot be

Cor. II. said to have any properties, but bare existence, which, by consequence, would, in that case, be thrown away upon it. Now hence it follows, that enquiries into the beauty, order and goodness of the material world, can only mean, enquiries into the effects, material laws and connexions have, by the appointment of the Author of nature, upon perceptive beings, and the good final ends answered by such effects. But in this sense, not only is natural philosophy a part of moral, but a very essential part of it, in order to form a just judgment of our Creator, and his disposition towards us; or, at least, to have a full and satisfactory idea of his wisdom and goodness.

Corolary II.

Not only is this true in general, but we are so united in our present state with the material world, that we may justly be said to be a kind of being constituted by a certain blending and intermingling, or mutual dependence of moral powers and laws of matter and motion. This we plainly feel to be our present state and rank. And therefore the knowledge of ourselves must be perfect or imperfect, in proportion to the justness and adequateness of the ideas we have of that mutual dependence, and of the parts so blended and connected: This must be true of what is called *moral knowledge* with respect to us, or the knowledge of human nature; because it is obviously true in general. "That to know any frame, constitution, or whole, of whatever sort, is to know its parts, and those mutual respects of its parts, which make it one whole adapted to a certain end or ends."

Corolary

COROLARY III.

It is therefore very much to be desired, that philosophers would carry on their researches into human nature, as a being composed by the mutual respects of moral and material parts. And while these researches are pursued, it would be of great use to youth, if the more important observations and reasonings from observations, which have hitherto been made concerning the human nature, and the material world with which it is united, so as to make one system, were ranged into such order, as would best serve at once to give them early right notions of man's great end, or of the chief perfection and happiness for which he is intended and made; and of the care of GOD, the Father of all rational beings, about mankind; and to put them into the right road of pursuing such important enquiries for the further advancement of true knowledge. Such a system of moral philosophy for the instruction of youth, would certainly be of the greatest use. The great happiness of every man, depends upon his being early convinced, by good and solid reasoning, of his being under the care of an infinitely wise and good providence, and made to pursue, by proper culture, the moral perfection of which his nature is capable, in order to complete happiness. Without such early instruction, all other science is comparatively vain and unprofitable. *The proper study of mankind is man.* And a system of this knowledge proper for youth is greatly needed. The necessary materials are not wanting: the work is well worth the labour of some genius adequate to it: and several noble steps have been made towards it; but a great deal remains to be done, to accomplish such a body of moral knowledge, as would fully answer the ends which have been mentioned.

Corolary IV.

It is very evident from what hath been found to be true concerning human nature; and indeed, it is obvious to every one who thinks at all, that mere inſtruction of the beſt kind is not ſufficient to effectuate the great end of education; but together with it, early and uninterrupted, right uſage or accuſtomance is abſolutely neceſſary. For the deliberative temper, or a fixed unalterable diſpoſition to act with judgment, and after due deliberation, can only be acquired or eſtabliſhed in the mind, like all other habits, by uſe, cuſtom, or often repeated acts. And yet until this temper or habitual power of acting deliberately and judiciouſly be formed, one acts precipitantly or blindly, and is not maſter of himſelf and his actions: he is really not a reaſonable agent. Education ought therefore to be contrived, and calculated to produce betimes this ſelf-command, this freedom and maſterſhip of the mind. But tho' it be abſolutely neceſſary, that by proper inſtruction, young minds ſhould early be richly repleniſhed with juſt opinions and judgments concerning all the pleaſures and pains in human life, or which may attend human actions; and concerning what is fit and unfit, true, juſt and good, or contrariwiſe in every various kind of conduct in all circumſtances: yet of how little uſe will theſe judgments laid up in the mind be, unleſs from the moment one is capable of imbibing any of them by any methods of inſtruction, he is likewiſe inured to have recourſe to them to direct him in his choices and determinations. It is only by the laſt method, that theoretic principles can become practical ones; and that the deliberative habit can be formed in the mind; which being formed, it would almoſt be impoſſible to err, ſo ſtrongly doth pure undebauched nature point out to every one

one in every caſe what is fit and becoming; or, at leaſt, what is baſe and unworthy. How defective education commonly is in this reſpect is but too evident. And how much of the viciouſneſs and miſery of mankind is owing to its being ſo, will appear by conſidering the ſame part of human nature in another light. COR. V.

COROLARY V.

For how is it, according to the preceeding analyſis of human nature, that we are guided in our actions; or how are our affections variouſly moved, ſtrengthened or diminiſhed? Is it not by our opinions of things, or by the aſſociations of ideas which prevail in our minds? And how do falſe ones become ſo ſtrong and fixed, that they can hardly be altered, but by allowing them to operate upon us very long without examination or controul? If our happineſs chiefly depends upon our opinions of things, and the aſſociations of ideas which excite our affections, it muſt be of the laſt importance to accuſtom youth by right education and diſcipline, often to examine their opinions of things, and call their aſſociations of ideas to a ſtrict account; to break them into pieces, or reſolve them into their conſtituent parts, and impartially to conſider how theſe parts come to be united together into one idea, opinion or judgment; upon what foundation, or for what reaſon, that is, whether juſtly or unjuſtly. For thus alone can one acquire, or having acquired, maintain the ruling power of reaſon over his opinions and aſſociations; or be ſure of not becoming a mere dupe and ſlave to any the moſt fooliſh unaccountable fancy. But that our happineſs, as far as it depends on ourſelves, chiefly depends upon our opinions of things, and the aſſociations of ideas which rule in our minds, is evident; for

COR. V. tho' we cannot alter natural qualities and connexions; tho' pleaſures and pains are fixed and immutable things, yet there are almoſt no pains human life is incident to, which we may not very conſiderably alleviate by diſſociating from the ideas of them, ſeveral opinions connected with them by aſſociation, contrary to reaſon and truth, which greatly aggravate them. Nor are there any pleaſures which truly deſerve to be purſued with very great affection, which may not, on the one hand, be very much diminiſhed in our opinion, by ſome falſe and unreaſonable aſſociation; or, on the other hand, very much heightened, by a true and juſt or well founded opinion of them, or by uniting with them, by frequent aſſociation, ſuch complete ideas of them, that is, of their influences, tendencies, conſequences and connexions, as properly belong to the account, in a fair and true eſtimation of their full value. Nothing can be more true, than that our affections are excited by and correſpondent to the complicated appearances of things to our minds. And it is certainly true, that a very large ſhare of the vexation and miſery, as well as folly and wickedneſs of mankind, is owing to want of a full and ſtrong view of the dignity and excellence of ſteady conſiſtent virtuous conduct; or of juſt and complete aſſociations of ideas with reſpect to right actions; and to the very falſe opinions of the pleaſures ariſing from certain mere vanities, in conſequence of falſe ideas of good connected or aſſociated with them. To lead youth therefore to right opinions, and to form and fix in their minds juſt and true aſſociations of ideas, is the great buſineſs of education; the principal part of which end is accompliſhed by inuring them often to examine their opinions and aſſociations of ideas; and, in general, to let no idea of happineſs or miſery enter, or, at leaſt, ſettle in their mind, till it hath been ſoundly examined; for, notwithſtanding the prevalency of falſe opinions in the world about happineſs,

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were the examining temper early eſtabliſhed by right practice, ſo powerful is nature and truth; ſo powerful is the language of genuine, uncorrupted nature, that juſt ideas of pleaſures and pains would as it were ſpontaneouſly preſent themſelves to the mind: The truth of this appears plainly, if we but reflect how unavoidably the true notions of virtue and vice haunt even the moſt vicious to their great diſquiet. In vain do they chaſe them away, fly from them, or endeavour to keep them out. COR. V.

Here the maxim holds true,

Naturam licet expellas, &c.

The many artifices men contrive to put ſome fair ſhew to themſelves upon their vices, are clear proofs, that the ſenſe of virtue and vice is natural and hardly eradicable: every vice is originally ſo hateful to every man, that he naturally thinks himſelf at firſt abſolutely incapable of ever yielding to it: it is by ſlow degrees, not without violent ſtruggling, and by means of many deceitful artifices to palliate things, or give them falſe colours, that any man ever becomes reconciled to vice in any degree: But if a perſon once ſuffers himſelf to liſten to the ſubtle language of falſe pleaſure, and to be deluded by its guileful devices into precipitant compliance, inſtead of calling upon his reaſon and moral conſcience, to exert their proper authority, who can tell where ſuch a one may ſtop! 'Tis for this reaſon, that all good moraliſts ſpeak ſo ſeriouſly of the *deceitfulneſs of ſin*, and warn us with ſo much warmth, to guard with the utmoſt watchfulneſs againſt yielding or indulging in any caſe, till we are ſure there is no deceit, but that all is ſtrictly agreeable to honour, virtue and integrity.

COR. V. "*Vice is a monſter of ſo frightful mein,*
As to be hated, needs but to be ſeen;
Yet ſeen too oft, familiar with her face,
We firſt endure, then pity, then embrace."
Eſſay on man, ep. 1.

It is in ſome ſuch way only, that men become villains. And therefore the only preſervative againſt gradual corruption of the heart, is ſtrict and uninterrupted care to maintain and uphold our reaſon in the habitual practice of governing all our paſſions, and of examining ſtrictly all the ſubtle pretexts with which they are ſo fertile.

COROLARY VI.

But more particularly with regard to inſtruction in the ſcience of man, it is evident from the preceeding introduction to moral philoſophy, that it may proceed two ways. Either by laying open to view the powers belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to theſe powers in our preſent ſituation, and by tracing effects to theſe powers and laws of powers, as their ſources, and ſhewing their good final cauſes. By *powers*, I would here be underſtood to mean, not only the active faculties belonging to man, more properly called *powers*; but, together with theſe, all the affections and appetites belonging to our nature. And in this ſenſe I have often uſed the word *powers* in this eſſay for brevity's ſake. Now, in ſuch an analyſis of man, human duties will naturally preſent themſelves to our view; for what elſe can the duties of man mean beſides the proper exerciſes of his ſeveral powers; the ſeveral perfections to which they are capable of being advanced by ſuitable exerciſes; and the appoſite means, according to our frame and ſituation, for attaining to the higheſt degree of excellency our powers are ſuſceptible

ceptible of. The end, the dignity, the perfection, and the happineſs of a being, muſt neceſſarily mean the ſame thing. And as it can only be inferred from the conſideration of the make and ſituation of a being; ſo theſe being known, it muſt obviouſly appear, or be very eaſily diſcoverable. COR. VII.

Or moral philoſophy may proceed to ſhew directly, that certain manners of acting, in certain circumſtances, are human duties. Now if it goes this way to work, it is manifeſt, not only that it ought to advance gradually from one claſs of duties to another, according to the ſimpleſt order, and to advance in demonſtrating the duties of each claſs from the ſimpleſt, to more and more complex caſes gradually; but it is likewiſe very evident, that in ſuch a demonſtration of duties, recourſe muſt every where be had to our real frame and conſtitution, and to our real ſituation, and the real connexions of things upon which we in any degree depend. It will therefore ultimately terminate in a true analyſis of human nature, from which the care of Heaven about mankind, and the proviſion made for their advancement to perfection and happineſs, will plainly appear.

COROLARY VII.

An ethical ſyſtem, in either of theſe methods, in the latter more particularly, would not only be exceedingly embelliſhed, but greatly enforced by pointing out the various devices of ingenious arts, in order to paint out, and recommend with force to the mind, moral truths, or all the diſcoveries of reaſon concerning human duties, the beauty and advantages of every virtue, and the deformity and evil conſequences of every vice; and the wiſe and good order obſerved by the Author of nature in all his works. For what, indeed, properly ſpeaking, are

COR. VII. are all the ingenious arts, or their productions, which are called works of taſte and genius, (poetry more eſpecially in all its branches) but ſo many languages by which truths may be conveyed into the mind, ſo as to reach our affections, and move them at once uſefully and agreeably?

But which is more, in ſuch ethical ſyſtems, the principal powers of the mind, and their operations, cannot be fully explained, without having recourſe to the imitative arts, becauſe there is a very remarkable claſs of effects produced on our minds by theſe arts, in conſequence of certain powers belonging to our nature. Their influences upon the mind, the ſources of theſe influences; and the rules which muſt be obſerved in compoſitions of various ſorts, in each agreeably to its particular kind and end, in order to its perfection, muſt be laid open; or a very conſiderable part of our frame would be neglected and left out of the account. And accordingly, in ancient treatiſes upon morals, theſe arts and their delightful effects, are frequently taken notice of and illuſtrated. And in many ancient authors, the uſe that might be made of them in education, and the fitneſs of inſtructing youth early in their principal aim and true excellence, are often inculcated with great earneſtneſs. (*a*)

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(*a*) See *Plutarch de audiendis poetis.* ——Non ergo fugienda ſunt poemata philoſophaturis: ſed adhibenda poematibus philoſophica conſideratio, adſuefcendumque ut in eo quod delectat utilitatem quæras & eam amplectaris. ——Enim vero ſicut in picturis color plus afficit quam lineæ, propter ſimilitudinem corporis & fallendi aptitudinem: ita in poematibus mendacium probabilitate temperatum magis percellit & gratius eſt apparatu carminis & dictionis fabula & figmento carentis. —— Magis quoque adhuc cautum eum reddemus, ſi ſimulatque eum ad poemata applicamus, ipſam poeticam ei deſcribamus; artem nimirum eſſe imitatricem, pingendique arti quaſi ex altera parte reſpondentem. Neque id modo auditum habeat omnium ſermoni tritum, quo loquentis picturæ nomine poeſis, pictura tacentis poeſis afficitur. Sed præterea quoque eum doceamus quod pictam

COROLARY VIII.

Early inſtruction in the true beauty and perfection of poetry, and its ſiſter-arts, is not only neceſſary to render liberal education complete, becauſe a right taſte of them adds greatly to human happineſs, and becauſe that is the only proper method of preventing the bad effects, which theſe arts, being miſapplied, have upon the morals of youth: But beſides, right inſtruction in the foundation and rules of theſe arts, and the proper ends they ought to purſue, and cannot arrive to their beauty and perfection without purſuing, muſt really terminate in a very full examination or analyſis of human nature. For whence elſe can the effects of theſe arts be deduced, but from nature? This is acknowledged, as of-

tam lacertam aut ſimiam, aut Therſitæ faciem videntis delectamur, miramurque non pulchritudinis ſed ſimilitudinis cauſa. Suapte enim natura fieri id quod turpe eſt pulchrum non poteſt: imitatio, ſive pulchræ, ſive turpis rei ſimilitudinem exprimat laudatur: eademque rurſus, ſi pulchram turpis corporis imaginem effingat, decorum non ſervaverit. Pingunt etiam quidam actiones abſurdas ——— in his adoleſcens eſt maxime aſſuefaciendus ut diſcat rem quæ imitatione expreſſa eſt, non laudari: ſed artem quæ id quod propoſitum erat, recte repreſentaverit. Quando igitur poetica ars —— idcirco eum admonebimus, indignum eſſe, ſi honeſtatis pulchrique ſtudioſus, & non hoc, ſed doctrinæ capiendæ cauſa poemata legens obiter negligenterque percipiat quæ ad fortitudinem, temperantiam aut juſtitiam declamantur in iis———qualia ſunt, videre hominem prudentiſſimum in mortis periculo cum tota multitudine communi conſtitutum, non mortis ſed turpitudinis metu duci, animo adoleſcentis ad virtutis ſtudium motum afferet. ——— *After many virtuous leſſons from the poets, he adds*, Nonne hæc demonſtrationem habent eorum quæ de devitiis & externis bonis tradunt philoſophi, ea ſine virtute nihil poſſeſſoribus prodeſſe? ——— *He concludes*, Itaque cum propter hæc, tum prædictorum cauſa omnium, adoleſcenti in lectione poetarum bona opus eſt gubernatione; ne ſiniſtra ſuſpicione occupatus, ſed præcedente potius inſtitutione formatus, placidus ita familiariſque & amicus a poeſi ad philoſophiam deducatur.

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Cor. IX. ten as the conduct of a good poem or of a good picture is pronounced to be just and beautiful, because it is natural. And, in fact, the pieces left us by the ancients upon poetry and rhetoric, and several justly esteemed discourses of the same kind by moderns, are indeed truly moral treatises, and afford very great insight into human nature. But having sufficiently considered this matter in my treatise on *ancient painting*, I shall go on to another remark, which may be inferred from this introduction to *moral philosophy*.

Corolary IX.

In explaining moral duties, in the various circumstances of human life, in those which more frequently occur in particular, the necessity of bringing examples from history, or probable fictions, in which actions and characters are naturally represented, from the former more especially, will be readily acknowledged by all who have duly attended to the power and efficacy of example upon the human mind, or our natural strong disposition toward imitation. Examples of the virtues and vices, beautifully expressed or pointed out by being opposed to one another, do, like contrast in a picture, wonderfully strengthen, heighten and set off a moral lesson: it is thus the beauty of virtue, and the deformity of vice appear in the most conspicuous shining light. And as examples take a firmer hold of the imagination and memory than bare precepts (*b*);

(*b*) *Hence these and such like sayings so frequent among the ancients,*

Nihil recte docetur sine exemplo. *Columella.*

Facilius quid imitandum vitandumve sit docemur exemplis. Longum iter est per præcepta, breve & efficax per exemplo. *Seneca.*

so

ſo inſtances of good and praiſe-worthy conduct laid up in the memory, are ready at hand, not only to point out duty to us in a ſtronger and clearer language, than a general rule, without particular exemplifications of it, can poſſibly do; but likewiſe to work immediately upon our imitative diſpoſition, exciting a truly noble and laudable emulation in us. For the ſame reaſons, it would be a very uſeful exerciſe for youth, to employ them in frequently giving their judgment of particular actions recorded in hiſtory, with reaſons to ſupport their opinion: and alſo to accuſtom them to determine what virtue requires to be done in certain given caſes, which ought always to be ſuch as have, or may occur in real life; and at firſt ought to be ſuch as more frequently occur in, and are moſt ſuited to their own age and its common incidents, much in the manner *Xenophon* deſcribes in his account of the education of *Cyrus*. COR. X.

COROLARY X.

As moral inſtruction ought to be carried on very gradually, by proceeding from ſimpler to more and more complex caſes; ſo certainly, in the education of thoſe of the higher ranks in life more eſpecially, it ought to advance to the moſt complex and difficult of ſciences, politicks. I do not merely mean, that part of it which treats of the general duties of magiſtrates, and the duties and rights of ſubjects; nor even that which treats of the duties of ſeparate independent ſtates, one to another; but that ſtill more complex part, which enquires into the nature and effects of different conſtitutions and forms of government, and compares them together. It is not more abſurd to aſſert, that different mixtures and combinations of ſenſible qualities have not each its peculiar effects, in conſequence of the properties of bodies, and the laws of matter and motion;

Cor. X. motion; than it is to assert, that different mixtures and combinations of moral qualities or causes, have not each its peculiar effects, in consequence of the nature of moral causes and their laws. Both assertions do equally terminate in affirming, that what results from a certain combination of qualities or causes, happens by chance, and is not the natural effect of the combination of qualities and causes. And if that affirmation be absurd with respect to physical qualities, or causes, and their combinations, it must likewise be absurd with respect to moral qualities, or causes, and their combinations. For quality is in no other sense a quality, but as it hath fixed, certain influences in certain cases. The words *natural* and *moral*, can make no difference in that respect. As a natural quality must mean a property of a body, which hath certain effects, so a moral quality must mean some quality of a mind which hath certain effects. If combinations of moral qualities or causes hath not their natural effects, as well as combinations of physical qualities, then there could be no political science, since that only means a collection of just conclusions concerning the natural effects arising from certain moral causes: even as there could be no physical science, did not physical causes or qualities produce certain effects; since that only means a collection of just conclusions concerning the operations of physical qualities in various circumstances or combinations. Better or worse, more or less inconvenient, cannot be acknowledged, or indeed have any meaning with respect to civil constitutions, but upon supposition that different internal principles of government (as they are very properly called by political writers) have naturally different effects. But if they have, and therefore there really be such a science as politicks, it ought certainly to make a principal part in the education of youth, of the more distinguished ranks in life, who are, as it were, born, to be public guardians; that is, they

they ought early to be directed into the proper method of making right judgments about different conſtitutions, and the various effects they are liable to, in conſequence of the natural effects of their internal principles in various circumſtances; and of ſtudying hiſtory in that view: and to prepare them for ſuch ſtudy, they ought early to be made acquainted with the authors who have reaſoned beſt upon theſe ſubjects. And indeed the more I have looked into hiſtory, and into ſuch authors, the more reaſon have I found to conclude, all the effects produced by different internal principles of government or civil polity, to be proofs of the wiſdom of the laws, which conſtitute and govern the moral world: and, at the ſame time, the more reaſon have I found to conclude, that a great deal more is owing to the natural operation of internal principles than is commonly imagined. COR. X.

It is pity, that hiſtorical regiſters of natural phenomena have not been carefully kept from the beginning of the world, in all times and countries. Had that been done, it is reaſonable to think, natural knowledge muſt have been long ago brought to very great perfection; and, by conſequence, man would have been, long before this time, that maſter of the world he was certainly intended to be by ſcience, and can only be in that manner. But tho' that method of enlarging human dominion and happineſs be yet exceedingly neglected, notwithſtanding all the pains Lord *Verulam*, and other great genius's have taken to recommend and chalk it out to us; tho' it be not ſet on foot as it ought, even now when it is univerſally acknowledged by all philoſophers to be the only method, and an infallible one, of getting at the knowledge of nature, of the advantages of which to us no one can doubt: tho' this is really matter of regret, yet it is a great happineſs to mankind, that the hiſtory of moral affairs from the moſt ancient times is ſo exactly tranſmitted to

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COR. X. us as it is: and indeed, in this case, the only thing that seems wanting, is the art of making the proper uses of such experimental registers. It were therefore to be wished, that more persons of abilities for it, would apply themselves to such calculations and deductions, for the benefit of human society, as these moral records afford proper materials for.

As it is natural to think, that very like circumstances of mankind, in the more capital or important respects, must frequently recur, because all men, in all ages, are actuated by the same springs, *i. e.* by the same affections, and have nearly the very same powers, and the very same connexions and dependencies: so, in fact, almost no circumstances now happen to any society, of which ancient history doth not afford some example, so similar in many material points, that by it a very right judgment may be made of their tendency, according to the natural operations of moral causes; and of the proper means to be used or interposed to give them any demanded turn.

This must have been the case ever since history deserved to be recommended, not merely for amusement, but for our instruction in the various tendencies of moral causes, and in the arts of government. 'Tis only on this account, that history merits to be called not barely, "*Testis temporum & nuntia vetustatis*;" but, "*Lux veritatis & magistra vitæ.*"

It could not be of use in that way, were it not for that likeness of times to times, and events to events, arising from the likeness of men to men, or that sameness of human nature in all times and ages of the world, which history puts beyond all doubt. But human affairs appearing by history to be really such, it acquireth thereby a right to be appealed to, to confirm or refute any political reasonings, as we do in philosophy to experiment; and thus to be deemed

deemed the beſt, the moſt uſeful of all ſtudies, and the ſureſt teacher and guide in matters of ſociety and publick concern. No doubt, men acquainted with hiſtory and human nature, might carry on moral inveſtigations about moral qualities, and combinations of moral qualities, and their effects, a much greater length than hath been yet done. And till youth are acquainted with making proper reflexions upon, or uſeful deductions from events, as from moral experiments, they cannot poſſibly ſtudy hiſtory in the only profitable way. COR. XI.

But, however that be, it is obvious, to uſe the words of a very great author often quoted, "That as low as philoſophy is now reduced, if morals be allow'd belonging to her, politicks muſt undeniably be hers. For to underſtand the manners and conſtitutions of men in common, 'tis neceſſary to ſtudy man in particular, and know the creature, as he is in himſelf, before we conſider him in company, as he is intereſted in the ſtate, or join'd to any city or community. In order to reaſon rightly concerning man, in his confederate ſtate and national relation; as he ſtands engaged to this or that ſociety by birth or naturalization; we muſt firſt have conſidered him as a citizen or commoner of the world, and have traced his pedegree a ſtep higher, or have view'd his end and conſtitution in nature itſelf."

Philoſophy does not proceed to its principal part, till the nature of human ſociety, the end of government and laws, and the various tendencies of different moral combinations in ſocial reſpects, or with regard to publick happineſs, are thoroughly weighed and underſtood. But it muſt begin at conſidering man in the abſtract, or his natural ſtate and conſtitution; ſince to deduce any moral duty, or to know the perfection or imperfection of any creature whatever, it is requiſite firſt of all to underſtand what condition and relation it is placed in,

Cor. XI. and what is the proper end and purpoſe of its being.

Corolary XI.

If any one ſhould ask, what is the propereſt way and time of beginning in the inſtruction of youth? The anſwer ſeems obvious from the preceeding account of human nature. It may be delayed too long, but it cannot be attempted too ſoon (*c*). For the ſooner our faculties are invited by proper methods to diſcloſe themſelves, the ſooner they begin to operate, and by proper working, they quickly gain conſiderable ſtrength, and arrive to great maturity: our moral ſenſe, together with our delight in analogy and ſimilitude, ſoon diſcover themſelves, if they are duly tried. And one of the propereſt means of improving both theſe faculties, or rather determinations of our nature, is very early to convey into young minds the more ſimple and obvious moral truths, by appoſite fables and allegories. Here poetry is of admirable uſe; for whatever principles, maxims, or precepts can

(*c*) Quintilian *gives a very important advice to this purpoſe, founded on a very true obſervation.* Igitur nato filio, pater ſpem de illo primum quam optimam capiat, ita diligentior a principiis fiet. Falſa enim eſt querela pauciſſimis hominibus vim percipiendi quæ traduntur eſſe conceſſam; pleroſque vero laborem ac tempora tarditate ingenii perdere. Nam contra, plures reperias, & faciles in excogitando, & ad diſcendum promptos: quippe id eſt homini naturale. Ac ſicut aves ad volandum, equi ad curſum, ad ſævitiam feræ gignuntur: ita nobis propria eſt mentis agitatio atque ſolertia, unde origo animi cœleſtis creditur. Hebetes vero & indociles, non magis ſecundum naturam hominis eduntur quam prodigioſa corpora, & monſtris inſignia. Sed hi pauci admodum fuerunt. Argumentum quod in pueris elucet ſpes plurimorum, quæ cum emoritur ætate manifeſtum eſt, non naturam defeciſſe ſed curam. Præſtat tamen ingenio alius alium concedo: ſed ut plus efficiat aut minus. Nemo tamen reperitur, qui ſit ſtudio nihil conſecutus, &c. *Quin. Inſt.* l. 1. c. 1.

be

be ſo conveyed, both ſtrike the mind more ſtrongly at firſt, and are more eaſily retained by it afterwards. COR. XI.

But, in order to form the attentive habit, and ſtrengthen and whet reaſon and the perceptive faculties; or to beget at the ſame time the love of knowledge, and a juſt notion of acuracy and coherence in reaſoning, geometry hath ever been acknowledged by all philoſophers to be the proper inſtrument, if I may ſo ſpeak. *Quintilian* tells us, in a few words, what opinion the beſt ancients had of it in theſe reſpects. "*Fatentur eſſe utilem teneris ætatibus, agitari namque animos atque acui ingenia & celeritatem percipiendi venire inde concedunt. Sed prodeſſe eam non ut cæteras artes, cum perceptæ ſint, ſed cum diſcantur, exiſtimant.*" (*d*)

But there is another reaſon, tho' that be ſufficient, why it ought to make an early part of education, namely, becauſe it is the key to that true natural philoſophy, which ſhews ſo plainly the wiſdom of GOD in all his adminiſtration; and ſo naturally leads the mind to the ſtudy of order, beauty, wiſdom and goodneſs, which cannot be contemplated without being loved, nor loved without being imitated.

I ſhall only add to this, that by the proper methods of inſtructing youth in any language, their tender minds will be early let into, and repleniſhed with the knowledge of the beautiful and truly wonderful analogies and harmonies, which prevail throughout the whole of nature. For were not only all ſenſible ideas analogous, in many reſpects, one to another, but all moral ideas likewiſe analogous in many reſpects to almoſt all ſenſible ideas, if there could be any ſuch thing as language at all, which I much doubt, yet it is plain, at leaſt, that languages could not abound ſo much as they do in

(*d*) *Inſtit.* l. 1 c. 17.

Cor. XII. metaphorical words. But that being the caſe, early inſtruction in the beauty, propriety, elegance and force of metaphorical words, muſt not only improve the imagination, but it muſt really fill the mind betimes with very uſeful and agreeable knowledge. All this is as true and as manifeſt, as it is that a metaphor muſt be loſt upon one who does not fully and clearly comprehend the analogy ſignified by it, and that makes it a proper or well choſen one.

Corolary XII.

From this ſpecimen of moral philoſophy, and the preceeding corolaries, it is viſible, that the ancients had very good reaſon to ſay, that all the ſciences are one, even as nature is one; and that they ought not to be violently torn aſunder from one another in education; but ought, on the contrary, to be united together in it agreeably to their natural connexion and one common end (*d*).

All

(*e*) *See what is ſaid on this head from* Plato *by* Cicero. Ac mihi quidem veteres illi majus quiddam animo complexi, multo plus etiam vidiſſe videntur, quam quantum noſtrorum ingeniorum acies intueri poteſt, qui omnia hæc, quæ ſupra & ſubter, unum eſſe & una vi, atque una conſenſione naturæ conſtricta eſſe dixerunt. Nullum enim eſt genus rerum, quod aut avulſum a ceteris per ſeipſum conſtare, aut quo cetera, ſi careant, vim ſuam atque æternitatem conſervare poſſent —— Eſt etiam illa Platonis vera & ſibi, Catule, certe non inaudita vox, omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum, & humanarum artium, uno quodam ſocietatis vinculo contineri, ubi enim perſpecta vis eſt rationis ejus, qua cauſæ rerum, atque exitus cognoſcuntur, minus quidam omnium quaſi conſenſus doctrinarum, concentuſque reperitur. De *Orat.* l. 3.

So pro Archia poeta: *Orat.*

——Etenim omnes artes, quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, quoddam commune vinculum & quaſi cognatione quadam inter ſe

All the liberal ſciences into whatever different claſſes they may be diſtributed, do indeed make but one body; and none of them can be fully underſtood ſeparately, or apart from all the reſt; no more than a limb can be, without referring it to the whole body of which it is naturally a member. COR. XII.

This is plain, becauſe in reality, that which is the only object of real knowledge, *viz.* nature, is truly one indiviſible object, all the parts of which are ſtrictly coherent. All that we can ſtudy, or have to ſtudy, is our own conſtitution and ſituation; our own make, and the relation we ſtand in to the ſyſtem of which we are a part, and its author. And all the liberal arts and ſciences are really but ſo many different languages, by which the various connexions which make our ſyſtem may be pointed out, expreſſed, embelliſhed, recommended or enforced on the mind: as other inferior ones are but ſo many arts of imitating certain laws and connexions in nature, for the convenience or ornament of human life and ſociety. But having ſufficiently illuſtrated this point in my *eſſay on ancient painting*, I ſhall not now inſiſt longer upon it.

I ſhall conclude with obſerving, that the moral philoſophy here delineated, will not ſuffer its ſtudents to give themſelves up entirely to contemplation and admiration, but will vigorouſly puſh and

ſe continentur, &c. And nothing can be more juſt than what is ſaid by one of the perſons in the third book, *De finibus*, towards the cloſe, in order to ſhew the mutual connexion and dependence of natural and moral philoſophy. Phyſicæ non ſine cauſa tributus eſt idem honos: propterea quod qui convenienter naturæ victurus ſit, ei & proficiſcendum eſt ab omni mundo & ab ejus procuratore. Nec vero poteſt quiſquam de bonis & malis vere judicare, niſi omni cognita ratione naturæ & vitæ etiam deorum, & utrum conveniat, necne, natura hominis cum univerſa——Atque etiam ad juſtitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias, & reliquas caritates, quid natura valeat, hæc una cognitio poteſt tradere. Nec vero pietas adverſus Deos, nec quanta his gratia debetur, ſine explicatione naturæ intelligi poteſt, &c.

prompt

COR. XII. prompt them to virtuous activity as their main end, in fitting us for which the whole merit of ſcience conſiſts. They will ſoon perceive, as *Cicero* obſerves, 1. That the active mind of man when it is once inured to ſerious meditations and profitable enquiries, can be very buſy about theſe while the body is intent upon, or entirely occupied in walking, riding, or other ſuch exerciſes. 2. And every ſtep one advances in moral reſearches, he muſt have this important truth more and more deeply enforced upon him, that man is made for ſociety and action. (*f*) "*Virtutis laus omnis in actione conſiſtit*". I cannot better explain this doctrine, which is the plain language of our whole frame and contexture, than *Cicero* hath done in his *offices* (*g*). I ſhall therefore give his opinion of it in the words of his *engliſh* tranſlator.

"The principal of all the virtues is that ſort of wiſdom which the *Greeks* call σοφία; (for as to *that* ſort which they call φρόνησις, and we *prudentia*, it is a thing of a perfectly different nature, as being no more than *the ſkill of diſcerning what it is that we ought, or ought not to do:*) But that ſort of wiſdom, which I ſaid was the principal is, *the knowledge of things both divine and human*; and ſo comprehends the ſociety and relation of men with the gods, and with one another. If then this, as moſt certainly it is, be the greateſt virtue; it follows, that the duties which flow from ſociety muſt as certainly be the greateſt: for the deepeſt knowledge and contemplation of nature, is but a very lame and imperfect buſineſs, unleſs it proceed and tend forward to action: now the occaſions wherein it can ſhew itſelf beſt, conſiſt in maintaining the intereſts of men, and of conſequence belong to the ſociety of mankind: from whence it follows, that the maintain-

(*f*) Firſt book of the *offices*, toward the beginning.

(*g*) Firſt book of the *offices* towards the end. Edit. Schrv. No. 43, 44.

ing

ing of this, ſhould in reaſon take place before learning and knowledge. Nor is this any more than what all good men ſhew they judge to be true by their actions and practices: for who is there ſo wholly addicted to contemplation and the ſtudy of nature, as that, if his country ſhould fall into danger, while he was in one of his nobleſt reſearches, he would not immediately throw all aſide, and run to its relief with all poſſible ſpeed; nay, though he thought he might number the ſtars, or take the juſt dimenſions of the whole world? And the ſame would he do in the caſe of any danger to a friend or a parent. From all which things it undeniably appears, that the duties of knowledge and ſearching after truth, are obliged to give way to the duties of juſtice, which conſiſt in upholding ſociety among men; than which there is nothing we ſhould be more concerned for. Nay, thoſe very men, who have ſpent their whole lives in philoſophy and learning, have yet always endeavoured, as much as they could, to be ſerviceable to the intereſt and good of mankind. For many brave men, and very uſeful members of their ſeveral ſtates, have in great part been made ſuch by their inſtitutions. Thus *Epaminondas*, the famous *Theban*, was indebted for his education to *Lyſis*, the *Pythagorean*: *Dion* of *Syracuſe*, for his to *Plato*; and the ſame may be ſaid of a great many others; even I myſelf, whatſoever ſervice I have done the republick, (if at leaſt it may be ſaid that I have done it any ſervice) muſt wholly aſcribe it to that learning and thoſe inſtructions I received from my maſters. Neither is their teaching and inſtructing others determined to the time of their living here; but they continue to do it even after they are dead, by the learned diſcourſes which they leave behind them: for there is no one point they have left unhandled, relating either to the laws, cuſtoms, or diſcipline of the commonwealth: ſo that they ſeem to have ſacrificed their leiſure and

COR. XII.

oppor-

COR. XII. opportunities of ſtudy, to the benefit of thoſe who are engaged in buſineſs: and thus we ſee how thoſe men themſelves, whoſe lives have been ſpent in the purſuit of wiſdom, have nevertheleſs endeavoured by their learning and prudence, to be ſome way profitable to the community of mankind. And for this one reaſon, perſuaſive ſpeaking; if joined with prudence, is a greater accompliſhment than the acuteſt thinking, if deſtitute of eloquence: for thinking is terminated in itſelf alone, but ſpeaking reaches out to the benefit of thoſe with whom we are joined in the ſame ſociety. Now as bees do not therefore unite themſelves together, that ſo they may the better prepare their combs; but therefore prepare their combs, becauſe they do by nature unite themſelves together: ſo men, and much more, being creatures that naturally love ſociety, in conſequence of that, ſeek how they may find methods of living happily in it. From hence it follows, that the knowledge of things, unleſs it is accompanied with that ſort of virtue, which conſiſts in defending and preſerving of men, *i. e.* in the maintenance of human ſociety, is but a barren and fruitleſs accompliſhment; and even greatneſs of ſoul, without a regard to this ſociety and conjunction, is very little better than ſavageneſs and barbarity. Thus we may ſee, that the getting of knowledge is a duty of much leſs concern and moment, than the preſerving this ſociety and union amongſt men. It is a very falſe notion, that hath been advanced by ſome people, that neceſſity alone was the motive to this ſociety, which we have ſo often mentioned; and that men would never have aſſociated together, but that they were not able, in a ſolitary life, to furniſh themſelves with the neceſſaries of nature; and that every great and exalted genius, would providence ſupply him with food and the other conveniences of life, would withdraw from all buſineſs and entercourſe with mankind, and gave himſelf wholly

wholly to ſtudy and contemplation. This is not ſo; for he would avoid ſolitude, endeavour to find a companion in his ſtudies, and always be deſirous of teaching and learning, of hearing and ſpeaking. From all which it is abundantly evident, that the duties belonging to human ſociety, ſhould in reaſon take place before thoſe which relate to unactive knowledge". COR. XII.

All I have been endeavouring to prove, in the text to be true, and in the marginal notes to have been the conſtant opinion of the beſt ancient philoſophers, concerning human nature and the preſent ſtate of virtue, is delightfully expreſſed by *Cicero*, in his firſt book of laws, where it is likewiſe fully explained and demonſtrated. *Animal hoc providum, ſagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis & conſilii quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum eſſe a ſupremo Deo. Quid eſt, non dicam in homine, ſed in omni cœlo, atque terra ratione divinius? Quæ cum adolevit, atque perfecta eſt, rite ſapientia nominatur. Eſt igitur, quoniam nihil eſt ratione melius, eaque & in homine, & in Deo; prima homini cum Deo rationis ſocietas. —— Jam vero virtus eadem in homine ac Deo eſt, neque ullo alio ingenio præterea. Eſt autem virtus nihil aliud, quam in ſe perfecta, & ad ſummum perducta natura. Eſt igitur homini cum Deo ſimilitudo. Quod cum ita ſit, quæ tandem poteſt eſſe propior, certiorve cognatio. —— Nec eſt quiſquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad virtutem pervenire non poſſit.*

ERRATA.

ERRATA.

THE Reader is entreated to excuſe and amend a few errors of the Preſs. *Page* 10. *l. ult.* inſtead of *analogous* read *diſanalogous*. *p.* 18. *l.* 30. for *mankind* read *man*. *p.* 61. the notes are miſplaced, what is firſt ought to be laſt. *p.* 71. *l.* 13. read *material world*. *p.* 82. *l.* 28. inſtead of *ideas* read *habits*. *p.* 91. *l.* 18. inſtead of *exiſtence* read *coexiſtence*. *l.* 32. read *really coexiſtent* inſtead of *real*. *p.* 131. *l.* 6. for *voluptas* read *bonum*. *p.* 135. *l. pen.* read inſtead of *contains*, *contemns*. *p.* 150. *l.* 27. inſtead of *things* read *pleaſures* and *pains*. *p.* 180. *l.* 12. inſtead of *and* read *but*. *p.* 201. *l. pen.* for *and* read *or*. *p.* 213. in the notes, *l.* 1. read inſtead of *obſervantur*, *obverſantur*. *p.* 259. *l.* 35. for *gratifications* read *qualifications*. *p.* 277. *l.* 29. read *of creating*. *p.* 316. laſt *line*, read *that to attain to*, inſtead of *every man's attaining*. *p.* 321. *l.* 16. read *ſo much cultivated as it ought*. *p.* 327. in the notes, ſecond paragraph, *l.* 3. inſtead of *dilatory* read *deſultory*. *p.* 364. *l.* 15. inſtead of *or*, read *us*. *p.* 372. the reference (*g*) is miſplaced, it belongs to the preceeding *page*. *p.* 373 *l.* 24. inſtead of *conſtant* read *inconſtant*. *p.* 380. *l.* 4. inſtead of *any* read *the*. *p.* 410. in the notes read inſtead of *Atheſis*, *Syntheſis*. *p.* 411. *l.* 10, *to our improvements*. *p.* 413. *l.* 10. for *preſent* read *perfect*. 416. *l.* 3. read *eminent* for *excellent*.

THE CONTENTS

Digeſted into a

REGULAR SUMMARY.

PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

THO' natural philoſophy be diſtinguiſhed from moral philoſophy, yet every enquiry into any part of nature is an enquiry into fact: an enquiry concerning the human mind, its powers, and affections, and their operations, is as much an enquiry into fact, as an enquiry concerning the texture of the human body. *Pages* 1, 2

Natural philoſophy is an enquiry into the general laws, according to which all the appearances in the material or ſenſible world are produced: and into the fitneſs or goodneſs of theſe laws. *p.* 2, 3

It proceeds upon theſe few following fundamental principles.

I. That the corporeal world cannot be an orderly, regular ſyſtem, nor by conſequence the object of ſcience and imitation, unleſs it be governed by general laws. *p.* 2, 3, 4

II. Thoſe are juſtly concluded to be general laws in the material world, which are obſerved to prevail and operate uniformly in it; and regularly to produce like appearances. *p.* 4, 5, 6

III. Thoſe general laws of the material world are good general laws, which by their ſteady, uniform operation, produce its good, beauty and perfection in the whole. *p.* 6

Corolary I. No effects of such laws are absolutely evil. *p.* 6, 7

II. Such effects as are reduced to general laws, are accounted for *physically*. *p.* 6

III. They are also accounted for *morally*, if the laws be shewn to be good. *p.* 7

IV. Natural philosophy, when it proceeds so far as to account *morally* for appearances in the material world, coincides with moral philosophy. *p.* 8

When it does not proceed so far, it falls short of its principal use. *p.* 8, 9

Moral philosophy is an enquiry into the texture and oeconomy of the human mind, its powers, and affections, and the laws according to which these operate or are operated upon: and into the fitness, and goodness of these powers, and affections, and their laws. *p.* 9

It must presuppose and proceed upon the same fundamental principles as natural philosophy. *p.* 9

Indeed those principles which have been mentioned as the fundamental principles, or the basis of natural philosophy, are in their nature universal truths or principles. *p.* 10

And therefore of every system, material or moral, it must be true. 1. That unless it be constituted and governed by general laws, it cannot be regular: and consequently it must be absolutely unintelligible. *p.* 10, 11

II. Those must be received as general laws in a moral as well as a material system, which are found by experience to operate uniformly or invariably in it. *p.* 11

III. Those are good general laws in a system, moral as well as material, which are conducive by their general operation to the greater good of that system. *p.* 11

Corolary. I. No effects of such laws are absolutely evil, but good. *p.* 12

II. Those effects are accounted for *physically* which are reduced to general laws. *p.* 12

III. They are accounted for *morally* by shewing the laws to be good. *p.* 12

Hence we see how moral philosophy ought to be carried on, and what is its end and business. *p.* 13

It is a mistake to imagine, that natural philosophy only can be carried on in that manner: or that it is a material system only which can be governed by general laws. Moral powers,

powers, and their exercises, necessarily suppose general laws established with regard to them. *p.* 13, 14
We are as sure as we can be of any thing by experience and consciousness, that we have a certain sphere of power, activity or dominion. *p.* 14, 15
But a sphere of activity cannot take place but where general laws obtain. *p.* 15
Here some few remarks are made upon the disputes about liberty and necessity: the doctrine of necessity was very properly called by the ancients, *the doctrine of inactivity*. *p.* 15, 16, 17
The enquiry in which man is chiefly concerned, is the extent of his power or sphere of dominion: accordingly the design of this treatise is to enquire into the powers and affections belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to them. *p.* 18, 19
This enquiry is carried on in the same way with natural philosophy. *p.* 19
Accordingly as the one, so the other may proceed in the double manner of analysis and synthesis. *p.* 20
Hypotheses are not admitted in either, any further than as questions, into the truth or reality of which it is worth while to enquire. *p.* 20, 21
As natural philosophy proceeds from causes to effects, or from effects to causes, and so is compounded of experiments and reasonings from experience, so moral philosophy in like manner, *&c.* *p.* 21, 22, 23

The following treatise therefore consists of observations or experiments, and reasonings from experiments about the human mind, in order to give a satisfying answer to this question, "Are all the effects and appearances relative to the constitution of the human mind, effects of faculties, powers, dispositions and affections, which with all the laws and connexions belonging to them, tend to produce good, order, beauty and perfection in the whole?"

CHAP. I.

The first general law relative to mankind, is one that extends to, or runs thro' the whole of our constitution and circumstances. It may be called *the law of our*

right method of teaching any language, would at the ſame time teach us this beautiful and exceeding uſeful analogy. *p.* 54, 55

Moreover, it is by our fancy that our paſſionate part is touched: truths cannot find their way to the heart but thro' the imagination. *p.* 56

We are ſo conſtituted for very good and wiſe reaſons. *p.* 56

Imagination is not an ingovernable faculty, as is commonly imagined — but it is much neglected in education. *p.* 56, 57

The other faculty of our minds that remains to be conſidered is invention. *p.* 58

A hiſtory of this faculty, and of the phenomena belonging to it is much wanted—Mean time, it is obvious, that invention is the faculty of finding out truths quickly, by ranging or diſpoſing ideas in proper juxta-poſitions for diſcovering their relations — Every new juxta-poſition of ideas diſcovers ſome unknown truth—New truths cannot be any other way diſcovered—It is therefore by exerciſe that invention is improved. *p.* 59, 60

In the laſt place, it becomes eaſier to make progreſs in knowledge, in proportion as we make advances in it: and by the help of that ſcience, whoſe object is ſcience and evidence, properly called *the art of reaſoning*, much neglected ſince *Plato*'s time, tho' clearly delineated and ſtrongly recommended by the great *Verulam* *p.* 60, 61

General concluſion concerning our furniture for knowledge; it is very large and noble. *p.* 61

CHAP. II.

A ſecond claſs of laws, thoſe relative to our embodied ſtate, and our connexion with a material world by means of our bodies. *p.* 62

Communication with the material world neceſſarily ſuppoſes dependence on its laws—And natural philoſophers have proved theſe laws to be good. *p.* 62, 63

A material world without being perceived could be of no uſe *p.* 63

Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, nature would not be full nor coherent. *p.* 64

And by our commerce with the material world, we receive a great many pleaſures of the ſenſitive kind, which well deſerve their place. *p.* 64

Our

Our ſenſes are admirably adjuſted to one another, and to our whole frame. *p.* 65
But this is not all; our ſenſes are inſtruments or means, by which we are capable of many noble ſciences and arts, —of natural philoſophy. *p.* 65
And of many ingenious imitative arts. *p.* 66
Nor is this all; they are the means, or afford the ſubjects and occaſions of many virtuous exerciſes, —of many ſocial virtues — And which is principal, they afford our reaſon and moral conſcience ſubjects to govern and keep in due order—And thus we have a noble dominion to acquire. *p.* 67, 68
But this ſuppoſes a moral ſenſe in our mind, which ſhall be conſidered in another chapter. *p.* 69
Senſible pains, whence they ariſe—The law with regard to them is ſhewn to be good. *p.* 69, 70
Pains are proper and uſeful monitors. *p.* 71
The only proper ones for us—Nay, we can have no other conſiſtently with the laws relative to knowledge. *p.* 72
But from the neceſſity there is that bodily appetites ſhould be attended with uneaſy ſenſations ariſes the neceſſity of all the other uneaſy ſenſations accompanying our deſires, which are called *paſſions* *p.* 73, 74
The law of matter makes an infant ſtate of body neceſſary —And the law of progreſſive knowledge and power or perfection, makes infant minds neceſſary—And ſuch bodies and minds are proper mates. *p.* 74
There is a great variety among mankind in reſpect of mental powers—And this very conſiderably depends on phyſical cauſes, — as is generally owned—It is well worth while to enquire more fully into this phenomenon than hath been yet done. *p.* 75, 76, 77
Mean time, it is evident, that ſuch a dependence is involved in the very idea of union between mind and body. *p.* 78
And it hath very good effects. *p.* 79
True morality, therefore, muſt conſider man as a compound creature, neither merely ſenſitive nor purely moral,— but, as he really is, *Nexus utriuſque mundi.* *p.* 79, 80
All the obſervations made by naturaliſts upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, and of other animals, might be inſerted here—But the preceeding remarks will prepare every intelligent reader for making a proper uſe of ſuch, as they occur to them in their reading and ſtudies.

The laws relative to our communion with a material world are therefore very fitly chosen. *p.* 81

CHAP. III.

Another class of laws. Those relative to the association of ideas and habits. *p.* 81, 82

Both these effects take their rise from one principle.—And they are inseparable, or must go together; if the one take place, the other must likewise take place. The formation of habits supposes association of ideas; and where association of ideas takes place, habits must be contracted. *p.* 82, 83

But whether these effects are reduced to one principle in our nature or not, they do really take place, *i. e.* ideas are associated, and habits are formed by us. And both proceed from a most useful principle in our nature. *p.* 83

Which is really the law of improvement to perfection: for by means of it only do we, or can we arrive at perfection of any kind. *p.* 84

But, in order to treat more fully of so useful and extensive a law of our nature, an associated idea is defined and exemplified, in order to distinguish it from a complex idea. *p.* 85

From the very definition, it is plain, that almost all our ideas have something in them of the associated kind. *p.* 86

This is the necessary effect of a world, governed by general laws, upon minds which have the associating quality, or are capable of forming habits. *p.* 86, 87

Accordingly, when we come to philosophize, natural philosophy consists, in a great measure, in separating ideas, which the order of nature hath associated in our mind. *p.* 87

And it is one great business, if not the chief in moral philosophy, to break or separate associations. *p.* 88

Many associations are made by ourselves. But many are inevitably formed in consequence of the order of nature, or the methods in which ideas are independently of us conveyed into our mind. *p.* 89

What hath been said is no objection against the law of association. For, in general, it is the law of improvement to perfection. *p.* 90

Several

Several good effects ariſe from it—Without it we could never become acquainted with the courſe of nature; every thing would for ever be new to us. *p.* 91

Unraveling or ſeparating ideas of aſſociations is a very agreeable, rational employment. *p.* 91

It is in conſequence of the law of aſſociation, that we are capable of ſtrengthening or diminiſhing our deſires, or of adding to our pleaſures, and of alleviating our pains. *p.* 92

Becauſe deſires are excited by ideas, and our power over our ideas lies chiefly in aſſociating and ſeparating. *p.* 92, 93

Another circumſtance with reſpect to aſſociation merits attention—Like ideas are very eaſily aſſociated. Wit conſiſts in aſſociating—Judgment in ſeparating—Both ſuppoſe the law of aſſociation to take place — It is therefore in conſequence of the law of aſſociation, in a great meaſure, that there are different genius's among mankind—The ſame law gives riſe to an equal diverſity of moral characters. *p.* 93, 94

But ſo far as temper depends on aſſociation of ideas, it depends on ourſelves. *p.* 95

Wit and its inſtruments, *metaphor and ſimile*, are aſſociations—Philoſophy is ſeparating work—Both may run into extravagances. *p.* 96

Practical philoſophy, or the government of our affections, conſiſts in the aſſiduous examination of our ideas, fancies and opinions—The chief buſineſs of education is to eſtabliſh early the habit of ſelf-examination. *p.* 97

Aſſociations cannot be broken by mere refutation of falſe opinions, but by contrary practice—Were it not ſo, the law of aſſociation would not have its effect. *p.* 98

I proceed next to conſider active habits, properly ſo called, —from our power of contracting habits, proceed memory,—habitual knowledge, taſte of every kind,—and perfection of whatever faculty. *p.* 99

Inſtruction and education preſuppoſe the power of habit —How memory may be improved in conſequence of this law—We are imitative creatures, but it is in conſequence of the law of habits that imitation hath its effect, or example its influence. *p.* 100, 101

Habit renders that agreeable which was at firſt diſagreeable. *p.* 102

It ballances our natural deſire after novelty. *p.* 103

By

By the law of habit, paſſive impreſſions grow weaker in proportion as practical habits are ſtrengthened—inſtances. *p.* 103

It is in conſequence of the law of habits that temper is formed—In conſequence of it, we are able to eſtabliſh in our mind the deliberative habit,—which is ſelf-command, and true moral liberty. *p.* 105

It is therefore this law which renders us capable of liberty, or of being *free agents*. *p.* 106

The laws relating to aſſociation of ideas and habits, are therefore good general laws,—an uſeful corolary. *p.* 107

CHAP. IV.

Another claſs of laws relative to our guiding principle and our moral conduct — Our excellence conſiſts in our having reaſon and a moral ſenſe to guide our conduct. *p.* 107

It is by our reaſon, that we riſe above merely perceptive beings in the ſcale of life—It is all our force, or, at leaſt, our chief one *p.* 108

Reaſon is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as ſuch. *p.* 109, 110

There are two things to be conſidered with reſpect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct—Our ſenſe of right and wrong,—and our ſenſe of happineſs—That theſe two do not diſagree, ſhall be ſhewn afterwards. *p.* 110

But firſt let us conſider our ſenſe of right and wrong—whether we have ſuch a ſenſe or not is a queſtion of fact—But that we have it is plain, for we are not only capable of electing, but of approving—Theſe two are very different operations. *p.* 111

If we have an approving and diſapproving ſenſe, we have a moral ſenſe, or a ſenſe of right and wrong. *p.* 112

What are the qualities which excite approbation or diſapprobation—Actions muſt be done with affection, freedom and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemnation. *p.* 112

Of ſuch actions, veracity, candor, benevolence, *&c.* excite our approbation, and their contraries our diſapprobation. *p.* 113, 114

Several arguments to prove we have a moral ſenſe—from analogy,— for we have a ſenſe of beauty in material forms. *p.* 115, 116, 117
—From languages, for they ſuppoſe it. *p.* 118, 119
—From the polite arts, oratory, poetry, painting, *&c.* for they ſuppoſe it. *p.* 119, 120
Without ſuppoſing it, to account for ſeveral phenomena, we muſt have recourſe to very ſubtle reflexions of which the mind is not capable, and for which it hath not time. *p.* 121, 122
We can no more be bribed to approve an action, than to aſſent to a propoſition. *p.* 123
Further reflexions on a moral ſenſe—It is not worth while to diſpute about a name, if the thing be owned. *p.* 124, 125
And it muſt be owned by all who acknowledge moral differences of actions and characters. *p.* 125
However, it is proper, nay, neceſſary to give this ſenſe or faculty in our nature a diſtinguiſhing name—This is no leſs neceſſary than it is to give diſtinguiſhing names to our other ſenſes and faculties. *p.* 126, 127
That we are determined by pleaſure and pain in all our motions, is true in a certain ſenſe—But this general propoſition is of little uſe in philoſophy, till our pleaſures are diſtinguiſhed and claſſed. *p.* 128
And our moral ſenſe renders us capable of a peculiar ſet of them, the higheſt we are ſuſceptible of, or can conceive. *p.* 129
The cautiouſneſs of the ancient moraliſts in uſing the words *good* and *evil* very commendable. *p.* 130, 131, 132
If we have no moral ſenſe, then we are only capable of computing our external intereſt or advantage. *p.* 133
But if we have a moral ſenſe, we are capable of riſing higher, and taking in what is worthy and laudable in itſelf into the account. *p.* 133, 134
If we would but try ourſelves by proper queſtions, we ſhould ſoon feel, that we have indeed a moral ſenſe—
And it is abſurd to ſuppoſe a moral ſenſe, not to be from nature. Art cannot create. *p.* 134, 135, 136, 137
A moral ſenſe does not ſuppoſe innate ideas—But moral ideas are continually haunting our mind—Nature therefore hath not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice—But our moral ſenſe, like all our other faculties, muſt depend on our care to improve it. *p.* 138, 139, 140

Hitherto

Hitherto then we have found our nature to be admirably well constituted with regard to virtue and vice—But, it remains to be enquired, how interest and virtue agree according to the constitution and laws of our nature. *p.* 141

CHAP. V.

Another class of laws. Those relative to interest, or private and publick good. *p.* 141
First of all, the several enquiries about morals are classed. *p.* 142, 143
Next, it is to be observed, that beauty is inseparably connected with utility throughout all nature—It is so in all the imitative arts—Because it is so in nature the standard of truth. *p.* 144
It is so in our mundan system—and with regard to the bodies of all animals. *p.* 145
It is so, and must be so with respect to the fabric of the human mind, affections, actions, and characters, and their effects. *p.* 146
The proof of this must be fetched from the anatomy or texture of the mind—Lord *Shaftsbury*'s reasoning to prove it, is taken notice of as an example how enquiries into the human mind ought to be carried on. *p.* 147, 148, 149, 150
Another train of reasoning to prove that virtue is private interest—and universally acknowledged to be so. *p.* 151, 152, 153
Some observations on *Cicero*'s way of ascertaining human perfection and duty,—and then of proving that virtue is in all respects our truest interest. *p.* 153, 154, 155, 156, 157
An observation upon other ancient arguments to prove that virtue is private good,—we are not made for sensual pleasures, but for those of the mind, or rational ones. *p.* 158, 159
Man is made for exercise, and to acquire dominion over his mind, and all its appetites—In this our natural greatness of mind consists, and virtue alone can content this natural desire of power, and inclination to extend our capacity. Several observations to illustrate this. *p.* 160, 161, 162

Some

Some other conſiderations taken from ancient authors to prove, that virtue is man's ſupreme, nay, his only happineſs,—and that virtue alone can be the reward of virtue. *p.* 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168

Virtue is therefore private intereſt or good *p.* 170, 171

This chapter concludes with ſome reflexions on the debates among philoſophers about the meaning of obligation. *p.* 171, 172, 173

And then ſums up all in a concluſion from the foregoing conſiderations concerning human nature and its maker, in Lord *Shaftsbury*'s words. *p.* 174

CHAP. VI.

Another claſs of laws. Thoſe relative to ſociety, or the dependence of human perfection and happineſs on ſocial union, and rightly confederated abilities and powers. *p.* 175

A general view of our ſocial make—Man is in as proper a ſenſe made for ſociety as any machine is for its end. *p.* 176, 177

The fundamental error of *Hobbs* conſiſts in his conſidering the deſire of power, which is natural to man, as his only natural appetite or inſtinct. *p.* 177

But our natural deſire of power, as it is conjoined in our frame with other equally natural deſires, is a moſt noble and uſeful inſtinct. *p.* 178, 179, 180, 181

All our affections, not only the publick ones, but even the private, have a reſpect to ſociety, and are formed with a view to it. *p.* 181, 182

Society or variety of ſocial happineſs. *p.* 183, 184

Requires variety of talents and characters. *p.* 184

The exigences of our animal life require great diverſity of powers and talents. *p.* 185

Moral happineſs requires the ſame diverſity—A variety of different tempers and characters is requiſite to various reflexions or modifications of ſocial happineſs; in like manner, as various textures of bodies are neceſſary to the different reflexions, refractions, and tranſmiſſions of light and heat, in which the beauty of the viſible world conſiſts. *p.* 186, 187

All ſocial virtues ſuppoſe mutual dependencies and wants, for they may be all reduced to *giving* and *receiving*. *p.* 187, 188

Natural

CHAP. VIII.

Here is given a table of the chief phenomena, good and bad belonging to the human ſyſtem; or reſulting from its contexture and ſituation. *p.* 215, 216, 217

All theſe phenomena are reducible to the excellent general laws which have been delineated, by which man is fitted and qualified for a very noble end and happineſs. *p.* 217

Wherefore there are no evils, abſolutely conſidered, ariſing from our frame. *p.* 218

If we judge in this caſe as we do in other like ones, we muſt conclude, that all our powers are given us for a very perfect and noble end. *p.* 218

Indeed our moral ſenſe cannot poſſibly be given us for any other reaſon, but to guide us to the right uſe of all our powers. *p.* 218, 219

Our whole frame therefore is good—For all effects reducible to the laws of knowledge, to the laws of our ſocial make, or to any other of the laws of our nature above explained, —muſt be ſufficiently accounted for, if explication of phenomena hath any meaning at all. *p.* 220

For all the preceeding reaſonings about the fitneſs of laws go on in the ſame way that is admitted to be good in every other caſe,—in natural philoſophy—The preceeding account of human nature is therefore ſtrictly philoſophical. *p.* 220, 221

A brief recapitulation to prove this. *p.* 221, 222

General concluſion concerning human nature, that tho' we are not the top of the creation, but are made lower than angels, yet we are crowned with glory and honour, and have a very noble dominion allotted to us, natural and moral. *p.* 223

Man therefore is made for virtue, whether he is made to laſt for a ſhort time or for ever—But before we proceed to enquire concerning his duration, it is proper to oppoſe to the preceeding account of man, ſuch a ſtate of mankind, as it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe muſt have been the product of a malignant Creator, who had no ſenſe of nor regard to virtue, or the proper good and perfection of moral beings. *p.* 224, 225, 226

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Let us now enquire what judgment ought to be formed concerning death—The phenomenon fairly ſtated—Futurity wiſely hid from us *p.* 227, 228

Yet we have reaſon to infer, that death is not a diſſolution of our moral powers—It is not analogous to our make to ſuppoſe that it is *p.* 229

But it is proper to conſider this matter very fully and accurately—Our preſent connexion with a ſenſible or material world, by means of our bodies, is arbitrary, not neceſſary *p.* 230, 231

We may therefore ſurvive ſuch a connexion,—our periſhing totally with our bodies, muſt be the effect of an arbitrary appointment that it ſhall be ſo *p.* 232

But there is no reaſon to apprehend ſuch an annihilating or deſtroying humour in nature—The deſtruction of unthinking matter is not properly deſtruction—Wherefore the deſtruction of a perceiving being cannot be inferred from the deſtruction of matter *p.* 233

But there is no ground to think any particle of matter is ever deſtroyed: what we call ſo, is really but change of form—*a fortiori*, there is no reaſon to think any perceiving being is deſtroyed *p.* 234

All that can be inferred from death is, That a particular order, in which certain ſenſations are now conveyed into our minds, then ceaſes—Whence a deſtruction of all thinking powers cannot be deduced *p.* 234

There is no likeneſs, no parity between death and total deſtruction of our being, whatever view we take of it *p.* 235

The Objections of *Lucretius* and *Pliny* againſt immortality, abſurdly ſuppoſe, that matter can think, or that we are wholly body—The facts only prove a preſent dependence of our body and mind according to certain laws of nature *p.* 237

But further, let us conſider this is a very good firſt ſtate for ſuch a progreſſive being as man—And a firſt ſtate cannot laſt always, but muſt give way to another *p.* 238

It is therefore reaſonable to think, that this ſtate only ceaſes as the firſt ſtate of progreſſive beings ought to do *p.* 239

That our death is attended with pain, only proves, that the laws of union with body continue to operate till the union is quite diſſolved. *p.* 239

There is a plain reaſon why there ſhould be ſuch a being in the ſcale of life—But there is no reaſon to think it proper, that our preſent union with a material world, ſhould always continue, or be the only ſtate in which our moral powers are placed *p.* 240

Nay, it is evident, that union with body and a material world cannot always laſt *p.* 241, 242

Hence, it is reaſonable to conclude, that our moral powers, naturally capable of laſting for ever without wearing out, are only united with bodies for a time, in order to the fulneſs of nature, and becauſe it is a very proper firſt ſtate for our powers to be formed and improved in. *p.* 242

Men muſt live upon earth by ſucceſſive generations—Our earth could not be rendered more capacious without altering our whole mundan ſyſtem—When our mundan ſyſtem is able to hold out no longer, there is reaſon from analogy to think it ſhall be ſucceeded by another proper to ſucceed to it, perhaps riſing out of its ruins *p.* 243

But if ſo, we have yet better reaſon to think this is but our firſt ſtate, which ſhall be ſucceeded by one very proper to follow it *p.* 244

If mankind ceaſe to be at death, there will neceſſarily be a void, a chaſm in nature—But we have reaſon to conclude from experience and analogy, that fulneſs and coherence is the end of nature *p.* 245

This idea of the univerſe is natural to the mind; it greatly delights in it—Wherefore it muſt be true—fulneſs in nature can only mean a progreſs toward fulneſs, without any interruption or breach—which cannot be the caſe if man is not immortal *p.* 246, 247

Hitherto we have only enquired what ought to be inferred from the courſe of nature by analogy——But this courſe proves the Author of nature to be perfectly well diſpoſed. *p.* 247, 248

Let us therefore conſider how the argument will ſtand, when inſtead of nature, or the courſe of things, we ſay, the wiſe and good Author of nature—Then the argument in the weakeſt ſtate muſt ſtand thus; all looks well, upon ſuppoſition that death is only a period to a firſt ſtate,

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The

The treatise ends with a quotation from *Cicero*, to prove that unactive knowledge is of little use in comparison of that which prompts to the virtuous activity for which we are made—And another, that contains the substance of what we have proved concerning man, most elegantly expressed from the same Author.

FINIS.

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